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Chapter 1 
Introduction    
 
 
Dombe, Sussundenga District, 30 July 2002. It is early morning at Chief Chibue’s homestead. The 
area was controlled by Renamo during the war, and is still today known as a stronghold of what is 
now an opposition political party. On this morning in July, numerous people from the 
neighbourhood have arrived and are busy preparing a grand visit from the District. The atmosphere 
is intense. A local state official is nervously running around, shouting instructions to everyone and 
telling them where to place chairs and tables and how to set up a flag-pole. Chief Chibue, a man in 
his fifties, smokes a home-made cigarette while explaining to Chief Kóa what all the tumult is 
about. Kóa has just walked for two days from his homestead and, it turns out, has absolutely no idea 
that he and Chibue will be recognised by the state today. “Chief Gudza should have been here too”, 
Chibue explains to him, “but people say that he is sick because the spirits are angry. He is not the 
real chief. They are fighting over that, but the Government wants us to come forward now.” A 
couple of hours later, the sound of a car breaks the busy atmosphere. A large white Land Rover 
arrives through the tall grass, while children are shouting “the hurumende [state] is coming! The 
hurumende is coming now!” The District Administrator steps out of the car, followed by the District 
Commander of Police and the First Frelimo Secretary. They are surrounded by police officers, 
carrying arms. People are promptly told to form a straight line behind the chiefs in order to shake 
hands with the official guests. Some people look terrified. Others just have a curious expression on 
their faces. No wonder! It is the first time ever that a district administrator has visited the 
chieftaincy. Is this a sign of a new beginning? A local teacher tells me that it is a sign of 
development. An elderly woman says it is a sign that the state is now in the chieftaincy, and a young 
man adds that it is the Frelimo party that has come to align itself with the chiefs. After the new 
national anthem has been sung by schoolchildren and the official guests – no one else knows the 
words – the District Administrator explains what it is all about: “We have come here today to 
celebrate that tradition is a profound element of the community. It is very important to the nation of 
Mozambique. The government sees that. For this reason, we have come here to recognise your 
chief. He will work with the state for the development of the community, for the elimination of 
poverty, for the end of confusion and crime, and for our nation to prosper.” These words ring out as 
a sign of change. They are spoken under the shade of the very same mango tree where Chief 
Chibue’s father was told by Frelimo-state officials in 1976 that chiefs and tradition no longer 
existed in independent Mozambique. In the name of the socialist revolution, the People had to be 
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liberated not only from the oppression of colonialism, but also from the constraints of traditional 
beliefs. During the 1980s Renamo tried to change that by reinstating the Dombe chiefs. On this day 
in July 2002, ten years have passed since the end of a brutal war between Frelimo and Renamo and 
the transition to liberal democracy began. The District Administrator reminds the people how the 
times have changed as he calls forward Chief Chibue and Chief Kóa to stand by his side. He asks 
them to sign a new contract with the state and to receive the outward signs of the state’s recognition 
of their traditional authority. Solemnly the District Administrator hands over a national flag to each 
of the chiefs before carefully fixing a ribbon on their chests consisting of the colours of the flag. 
Two badges are pinned to their shirts, one with their new title, “Community Authority”, the other 
displaying the coat of arms of the Republic of Mozambique. The District Administrator informs the 
audience that these symbols mean that the chiefs represent the community and the nation state. He 
tells everyone to celebrate, to clap hands, dance and sing, “as you do traditionally”. Shortly 
afterwards he stops them and engages in a lengthy explanation of all the administrative duties of the 
chiefs. They have to collect taxes, help the police deal with criminals and solve problems, and 
ensure that the government’s development programmes are implemented. He also informs the 
crowd that they must now learn to respect the government in power, the Frelimo party, and not fall 
prey to the oppositional ideas of the former rebel movement, Renamo. After this the District 
Administrator hands the word over to the First Frelimo Secretary standing next to him. The 
Secretary gives a long speech emphasising how much Frelimo values the beauty of the people and 
their traditions. He assures them that the Frelimo government represents the interest of the nation 
and is bringing peace and development. Finally, the state’s recognition of the chiefs is completed 
with a small national ceremony. To the strains of the national anthem, the national flag is raised on 
a new bamboo pole. This is the first time that the flag of Mozambique has waved over Chief 
Chibue’s homestead. The chieftaincy shows its gratitude by giving presents to the District 
Administrator and offering a feast of food and locally brewed beer to all the official guests.   
 
The passage above sets the public scene for this study: state recognition of traditional 
authority ten years into the post-war democratic transition in Mozambique. It demonstrates 
how the formal recognition of the chief’s authority was mirrored by the chiefs’ recognition 
of the state. The key point is that the authority of each is constituted relationally, and as a 
result reshaped. State recognition of traditional authority shapes chiefs’ practices and 
claims to authority, but by the same token it also shapes the operations and authority of the 
local tiers of the state. The present study is about this productive tension in rural 
Mozambique. It is about fixations, mutual transformations and relational constitutions of 
state and traditional authority.  
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The recognition ceremony in Dombe reflects the attempts of local state officials to fix and 
reorder existing chieftaincies as an element of state re-formation in general, and of 
consolidating the power of the ruling party, Frelimo, in particular. I argue that it represents 
a particular project to reproduce the post-independence party-state under the pretext of 
post-war democratisation. This process is not without its contradictions, however. Outside 
the public space of the recognition ceremony, other processes are at work. Chieftaincy and 
state institutions are both transformed in everyday practice and through mutual interactions. 
Repeated attempts by local state officials to fix a boundary between state and chieftaincy as 
distinct domains of authority are circumvented, and the chiefs’ own tendency to define 
themselves in opposition to the state deflected. In fact, multiple practical fusions challenge 
the distinction between state and chieftaincy. Local police officers begin to take decisions 
on witchcraft accusations using official stamps and procedures, although they claim that 
witchcraft does not fall under their jurisdiction. Chiefs often refer to state law in conflicts 
over traditional authority and in dispute settlement, although they just as often flout the 
state law. These oscillations between distinction and fusion make up a productive tension 
that reconstitutes the particular authority of both state and chiefs. In fact, the very 
distinction is constantly at stake. This challenges the larger project of party-state 
consolidation through a simple incorporation and regulation of chiefs.  
The key issue is that chiefs and local state officials claim and exercise 
authority in competition and negotiation, while also being caught up in a relationship of 
interdependence. Efforts to create distinct domains of authority are undermined by both 
groups’ efforts to entrench authority. This is fuelled, at least partly, by competing claims to 
sovereign authority over various central fields of social life. In this dissertation, I focus on 
the policing of delinquency and the enforcement of justice in Dombe and Matica in 
Sussundenga District. These two fields are also marked out in the law on the state 
recognition of traditional authority, Decree 15 of 2000.    
T
The result of the interaction between state officials and chiefs is high levels of 
uncertainty in the exercise of authority. Authority remains essentially precarious, but the 
scope of action differs between state officials and chiefs. Ultimately the outcome is a local 
state that relies on political exclusion and violence to deal with the uncertainty of Frelimo-
state authority. Chiefs get the short end of the stick: they face the dilemma of sustaining 
their own authority while being at risk of becoming subject to state violence. For people in 
Dombe and Matica, the result is conditional citizenship. Access to services, recognition and 
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influence depend on the ability to negotiate settlements with chiefs and local state officials, 
which is ultimately conditional on allegiance to the Frelimo party, not on their formal rights 
as citizens.   
 
My exploration of the recent state recognition of traditional authority in Mozambique has 
been designed to answer the following question: What are the repercussions of state 
recognition of traditional authority for claims to and practices of authority and 
citizenship in the rural former war zones, taking place within the post-war democratic 
transition of Mozambique? In addressing this question, the dissertation aims to contribute 
to the growing literature on the formal resurgence of traditional authority in the emerging 
democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the 1990s (Ray and van 
Nieuwaal 1996; van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999; Sklar 1999; Skalník 2005; Oomen 2005; 
Englebert 2002; d’Engelbronner-Kolff et.al 1998; Mamdani 1996; Ntsebeza 1999; 
Rathbone 2000). It links this debate to another body of literature that explores post-colonial 
processes of state formation and the constitution of authority and citizenship “from below” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Das and Poole 2004; Lund 2006a; 2006b; Lentz 1998; Nugent 
1994; Kabeer 2005; Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998; Moore 1978; Gupta 1995).  
The core argument of the dissertation is that state recognition of traditional 
authority reshapes not only chiefs’ but also local state practices and claims to authority. 
This questions two key positions in studies of chieftaincy and the state in Africa.1 On the 
one hand, studies of chieftaincy hold that chiefs have been reshaped by decades of 
interaction with the state but remain partly autonomous by straddling two distinct worlds, 
the ‘traditional, local order’, and the ‘modern, state-bureaucratic order’ (Ray and van 
Nieuwaal 1996; von Trotha 1996; van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999; Sklar 1999; Quinlan 
1996). This position challenges the view that chiefs have become fully encapsulated by the 
state bureaucracy (Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; Jordan 1997; Ntsebeza 1999), but shares 
with this view a failure to ask whether state institutions may also be (re)shaped through 
interactions with chiefs. The result is a reification of the state as a fixed, homogeneous 
entity. On the other hand, studies of the state show how state institutions are reshaped by 
social forces, i.e. by ‘African political culture’, but fail to address the possibility of these 
forces also being reshaped by processes of state formation (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Santos 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions include Oomen (2005), Van Binsbergen (1999) and Rathbone (2000).   
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2006). The result is reification of a distinct African political culture, represented, for 
example, by traditional authority.   
The tendencies to rely on a fixed, reified conceptualisation of either the state 
or of traditional authority are problematic in view of the findings of this study. Implicitly or 
explicitly both positions fall back on an analytical model that sees (the modern) state and 
(traditional) society as each others’ opposites. This model makes little sense in 
contemporary Africa (Griffith 1986; Oomen 2005; Geschiere 1999) and conspicuously 
downplays history. It also blinds us from seeing the possible ways in which state officials, 
chiefs and ordinary citizen-subjects, who are part of the same local arenas, mutually 
reshape and reconstitute each other. I suggest that the either/or reification of the state and 
traditional authority can partly be explained by the tendency to take for granted the state 
officials’ and chiefs’ attempts to assert difference, to claim distinct domains of authority as 
an element in legitimisation. While such assertions are certainly important to take account 
of, they should not, as is often the case, be studied in isolation from the everyday practices 
of chiefs and state officials.   
In an attempt to overcome these limitations, this study refuses to 
conceptualise the state and the chieftaincy or rural society analytically as essential and fixed 
entities, and instead approaches such distinctions as the result of past and present political 
processes. It fills a gap in the existing literature by using an approach that combines 
ethnographic studies of both the practices and claims of state officials and chiefs, and how 
the mutual interactions between these and ordinary citizen-subjects influence the 
constitution of authority and citizenship. It links such ethnographically grounded research 
with a study of past configurations of state-chief-society relations in the areas under study 
and of the recent production of legislation in national arenas.  
This entails an analytical framework that links the national and the local by 
focusing on the mutually constitutive relations between state-legal categories and local 
social realities (Merry 1992; Moore 1978). The basic assumption is that although the 
legislation on state recognition of traditional authority, Decree 15/2000, reshapes locally 
lived realities, the legal categories of “traditional authority”, “state” and “rural community” 
are reinterpreted and transformed by state and non-state actors in local arenas. By 
implication I do not limit attention to authority and citizenship as state-legal categories, that 
is, as formal legal status, but also address these as a set of practices and claims (Isin and 
Wood 1999; Lund 2006a). Theoretically this is informed by a processual understanding of 
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social order and of the regulation of social life as never fixed and total. State law and other 
activities producing rules, categories and rituals that seek to create durable social and 
symbolic orders are viewed as being full of ambiguities and as continuously reshaped by 
adjustments in real life situations (Moore 1978). Past, historical configurations of state-
chief-society relations are viewed in this study as significant for understanding the 
intertwined processes of order-making and situational adjustments.  
The analytical framework of this study thus aims to broaden our 
understanding of the dynamic inter-linkages that exist empirically between state-legal 
categorisations and practices of authority and citizenship, while also acknowledging the 
significance of history. In order to include these different dimensions of study – history, 
national policy-making and local practices – the main research question is divided into 
three sub-sets of operational questions. These correspond to the three parts into which the 
dissertation is divided.  
 
How did traditional authority become a subject of state legislation during the post-
war democratic transition, and what historical processes preceded this? How were 
national interests in recognising traditional authority informed by the political context at the 
time, as well as by past configurations of the relationship between state, chiefs and rural 
populations? How were traditional authority and rural society defined in legislation, and 
what underlying assumptions and interests informed these definitions? How was this state-
driven project influenced by past articulations of state institutions and representations of 
chiefs as the constitutive other of the state? (PART I).  
 
How was state recognition of traditional authorities implemented and received in 
Matica and Dombe? How were the key definitions and aims of Decree 15/2000 translated 
into practice by local state officials, and how was this shaped by particular political 
agendas, officials’ ideas about chieftaincy and the state, and the existing forms of 
organisation in the areas under study? What practices, claims and contestations were at 
work in the quest for state recognition by chiefly claimants and other rural actors? What did 
this mean for local power relations and the role and position of citizen-subjects in 
legitimising authority? (PART II). 
 
How was the relationship between the local state authorities and the chiefs organised 
and practised around the shared tasks of policing and justice enforcement laid down 
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in Decree 15/2000? How were the areas of jurisdiction and collaboration of the state police 
and the chiefs organised, who defined the rules, and what issues of power were at stake? 
What everyday patterns of action and interaction resulted from this organisation? What role 
did the practices and perceptions of ordinary citizen-subjects’ play in shaping the 
operations of chiefs and state police officers? Overall, what do these processes tell us about 
the form of state and chiefly authority that was constituted and the kinds of citizenship that 
were enacted? (PART III).  
 
In addressing these questions, the dissertation links the past and the present, the national 
and the local. The dissertation begins with the legacies of the past, focusing on the 
historical configurations of the chieftaincies in Dombe and Matica, and then travels forward 
in time to the national-level policy-making process in the 1990s, showing how this was 
shaped by local, national and even global conditions at the time. The journey then takes us 
to the marginal corners of Dombe and Matica in Sussundenga District, where Decree 
15/2000 was implemented from 2001, and then returns in the last chapter to larger 
questions about authority, citizenship and state formation.   
Before going into the details of the study, the remainder of this introductory chapter 
outlines the general debates in which it is located and the theoretical and methodological 
approaches from which it draws its inspiration. In Section 1, state recognition of traditional 
authority in Mozambique and my approach to it is situated within the broader debate on 
similar processes in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 2 outlines my overall 
framework of analysis and addresses the theoretical discussions of state formation, 
citizenship and authority that I draw on. Section 3 is concerned with the methods and 
focuses adopted in the study. It describes the fieldwork sites, the choice of the fields of 
policing and justice enforcement, and the data-collection techniques I have used. Finally, 
Section 4 provides an outline of the chapters of the thesis.   
 
1. Situating the Study: the Resurgence of Traditional Authority  
 
State recognition of traditional authority in Mozambique was instigated by Decree 15/2000, 
passed by the Council of Ministers in June 2000. In a pervasive break with the past, this 
decree provides the first post-colonial legislation to recognise traditional leaders, who were 
officially banned for 25 years by the Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) 
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Government after independence in 1975. Its implementation has impacted on widely 
different local contexts. Across the country nonetheless, local chiefs have become subject 
to the same catch phrases that can also be heard in other corners of the world: community 
participation, cultural diversity, localisation of development, decentralisation and 
democratisation. In this study it would be insufficient to explore state recognition of 
traditional authority in Mozambique independently of similar processes in the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa and of the global changes and discourses of the post-Cold War period.  
This section first situates the Mozambican case within the widespread 
conjunction between democratisation and the resurgence of traditional authority across 
Africa and reviews what has already been said about this in the existing literature. It then 
positions this study in relation to the existing literature on what state recognition means for 
traditional authorities locally.  
Formal recognition and democratisation 
The formal recognition of traditional authority in Mozambique bears comparison with a 
wave of resurgence of so-called traditional forms of leadership, both formally and 
informally, that has been going on in numerous Sub-Saharan African countries since the 
1990s in particular (Englebert 2002; Oomen 2005; Kyed and Buur 2007). This wave has 
overturned the attempts of most newly independent African states to suppress chieftaincies 
as a pervasive element in the modernization and nation-building projects of the 1960s and 
1970s. In Mozambique, as elsewhere, the post-colonial government presented chiefs as 
colonial bureaucratic inventions who had been used to suppress and exploit the native 
populations. Not all post-colonial governments banned chieftaincy altogether as was the 
case in Mozambique, but the majority tried severely to curtail the administrative and 
judicial roles that chiefs had played in colonial indirect rule (von Trotha 1996: 81; Lugard 
1965; Mamdani 1996).2  These attempts have proved unsuccessful: across the continent, 
traditional leaders have made a come back.   
 The resurgence of traditional leaders has taken place in countries with 
internal conflicts and a weak, or collapsing, state apparatus, but it has also occurred in 
countries with a relatively well-functioning state and where transitions to liberal democracy 
are taking place. In the first case, resurgence has happened largely by default and outside 
                                                 
2 Exceptions include Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, Togo and Botswana, where some level of formal recognition 
continued even after independence. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, chiefs were only banned for a short period of 
time following independence (Kyed and Buur 2007 forthcoming).  
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the formal control of states (such as the Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Angola and 
Mozambique in times of war). Here chiefs have bolstered their authority in local 
governance, in some contexts in competition with or overt resistance to state authorities, 
and in other contexts merely replacing or complementing state institutions where these have 
ceased to function (Englebert 2002, Oomen 2005). In the second case, the resurgence of 
traditional leaders has been recognized in state legislation and bolstered by national 
government interests (such as South Africa, Ghana, Namibia, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Niger and Mozambique after the war). Here chiefs have been 
recognized by states as key counterparts of state institutions in local governance and 
development. Countries such as Ghana, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Uganda have 
also provided traditional leaders with political weight at the national level – in, for example, 
national houses of chiefs and traditional leaders (Englebert 2002). In some countries, state 
recognition of traditional authority has been boosted by the appearance of strong 
organizations and unions of traditional leaders that have been successful in increasing their 
influence in national politics (such as the Buganda of Uganda, the Asante of Ghana, the 
Lozi of Zambia, and the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa) (von Trotha 
1996: 89; Odotei and Awedoba 2006; Englebert 2002; Pitsch 1999; Williams 2000). In 
post-conflict countries, such as Mozambique and Sierra Leone, the recent legislations on 
traditional authority have been passed in the context of the continued informal roles played 
by chiefs in local governance during the war, in some areas through alliances with the 
insurgency parties, Renamo in Mozambique (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique) and 
RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in Sierra Leone (on Sierra Leone, see Fanthorpe 2005).    
 Notwithstanding country-specific differences, one intriguing commonality is that 
the switch to (increased) state recognition of traditional authority has coincided with the 
wave of democratisation that has rolled over Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s. In fact, 
Englebert’s (2002) analysis of numerous country cases suggests that it is predominantly 
those countries that have embarked on comprehensive democratic reform that have been 
most concerned to increase the de jure status of traditional leaders. Mozambique is no 
exception. The law on state recognition of traditional authority, Decree 15/2000, was the 
result of a policy-making process that began with the transition to liberal democracy in 
1991 and was subsumed under heavily donor-funded programs under the title ‘democratic 
decentralisation’. Decree 15/2000 itself also promises, in the name of democratising rural 
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society, to enhance rural community participation in development and administration and to 
ensure that traditional leaders are indeed legitimised by these communities.  
 The timely convergence between liberal-style democratisation and state recognition 
of traditional authority in Mozambique, as in many other Sub-Saharan African countries, 
provides the broader context in which this study is situated. The question is how this 
convergence came about, how this was reflected in legislation, and most importantly what 
this implies ‘on the ground’. In this dissertation, I argue that the liberal democratic 
ingredients of multi-party democracy, decentralisation and civil society resurrection 
provided an important context for the formal recognition of traditional authority, as well as 
a significant vocabulary in which such recognition has been cast and justified. This may 
seem surprising.     
Should we not have expected, as Beall (2005) suggests, that the new 
institutional apparatus and models of state and society that accompany liberal democratic 
transitions would have eradicated traditional authority? To answer this question in the 
affirmative would necessarily require us to follow the view of scholars like Beall (2005) 
and Mamdani (1996), who claim that traditional leadership “operates on principles that are 
antithetical to liberal democratic ideals” (Beall 2005: 3). Being “a hierarchical and 
patriarchal system”, chieftaincy enforces exclusionary rules and has limited scope for 
representation and downward accountability (ibid.). Mamdani (1996) has similarly argued 
that the failure to dismantle partly hereditary, partly appointed chieftaincies is antithetical to 
democratisation because it reproduces the kinds of despotism that characterised colonial-
style indirect rule in the countryside. Despite such views, state recognition of chiefs in 
Mozambique and beyond has been carried out in the very name of democratization and 
popular participation (Englebert 2002). This has been supported by scholars like Skalník 
(1996), who argue that chieftaincies are genuinely democratic and may well act to increase 
democratic processes in Africa by providing checks and balances with regard to elected 
politicians and state bureaucrats. They can perform this role, he suggests, because of “the 
original consensual politics of chieftaincy”, and because, “by sheer fact of their smaller 
size, they are more democratic than states” (ibid.: 5). Ray and van Nieuwaal (1996: 7) also 
present the chieftaincy as “an important vehicle for more or less authentic indigenous 
political expression”, capable of contributing to democratisation by mediating the 
relationship between citizens and the state. Bennett (1998) follows up on this argument by 
suggesting that chiefs have an important role to play in local democratisation because they 
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“provide an adaptable form of local government which is more in touch with community 
sentiments than is the central state” (ibid.: xii). Similar, the key Mozambican academics 
behind the drafting of Decree 15/2000 held that traditional authority represented a genuine 
African form of democracy that deserved to be recognized by the state and that could 
contribute to post-war democratization and nation-building ‘from below’.  
In short, if critics like Mamdani and Beall have cast traditional authority as 
anti-democratic and state recognition of it as a path to continued despotism, proponents of 
traditional authority have found it relatively easy to state the opposite. In the Mozambican 
case, I suggest, democratization provided an important vocabulary for revised definitions of 
traditional authority in national policy circles, even if it is clear that chiefly status based 
partly on hereditary succession is at odds with the normative definition of democracy as 
formal elected representation. This is most eloquently exemplified by the new title of 
‘community authority’ given to state-recognized chiefs, which implies a recognition that 
chiefs have democratic credentials as the legitimate representatives of local communities.  
However, such revised definitions of traditional authority should not make us 
confuse the drive behind state recognition of traditional authority with the achievement of 
democracy per se, as scholars like Skalník (1996) suggest. On the other hand, it is too 
simplistic to view legislation on the state recognition of traditional authority as merely a 
counter-process or oppositional reaction to democratisation, such as proposed by Mamdani 
(1996), or as driven only by the desire of states to recover ‘lost’ legitimacy and control over 
territories and people, as argued by others (see Fanthorpe 2005; Herbst 2000; Baker 2000; 
von Trotha 1996). Rather, I suggest that we take seriously the openings and vocabulary 
provided by democratic transitions in addressing how legislation on traditional authority 
came about. At the same time, we should note that it is not the only game in town, and that 
democratisation is not “a unilinear process, a technical procedure with predetermined 
means and goals” (Englund 2004: 3). Democracy as a political ideal and vocabulary may be 
used for inherently undemocratic purposes, and may co-exist with other agendas and 
practical engagements by, for example, state officials, political parties, chiefs and donors. If 
this is the case for Sub-Saharan Africa more generally (see Englebert 2002), Mozambique 
is the case par excellence which illustrates this, as I will show in Chapters 3 and 4.  
In Mozambique the definition of traditional authority as a democratic force to 
be reckoned with co-existed with other partly contradictory agendas, conditions and views 
of chiefs, which all played a role in laying the ground for state recognition of traditional 
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authority. The Mozambican case suggests that we need to go beyond single explanations 
for the recent wave of formal resurgence of traditional authority, as well as locate it within 
wider global processes of political liberation and the increased celebration of cultural 
diversity, ‘the local’, tradition and community. At the same time, we should also be aware 
of the particular national interests and local conditions that may partly draw on and partly 
be at odds with such processes.3 These links are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 of the 
dissertation, where I explore how ‘traditional authority’ became the subject of legislation.  
Now one thing is the question of how and according to which justifications, 
the governments of transitional democracies like Mozambique embarked on state 
recognition of traditional authority in the twenty-first century. Another is local-level 
appropriations of legislations on the ground and what this means for rural populations, 
chiefs and local state officials. Both these questions are central to this study, and they need 
to be addressed together. Next I address the main positions in the literature on what state 
recognition of traditional authority has implied locally, as well as situating my own study 
within this debate.  
Positions on state recognition of traditional authority 
The studies of chieftaincy in Sub-Saharan Africa can roughly be divided into two opposing 
perspectives on what the different modes of state recognition have meant for the position of 
traditional leaders locally. In view of my empirical findings, both make important 
contributions, but also present limitations. I have therefore found it necessary to employ an 
alternative approach. But before outlining this, let me briefly describe the two positions.    
The first position draws its inspiration from the top-down instrumentalist 
‘invention of tradition’ position initiated by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). It holds that 
state-recognised chieftaincies are colonial bureaucratic inventions that transformed 
traditional leaders into despotic autocrats, charged with a host of non-traditional functions, 
to bolster the state’s legitimacy (Costa 1999; Serra 2000; Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; 
Jordan 1997; Ntsebeza 1999). As a result, it is argued, traditional leaders have become 
distanced from their followers: since colonial indirect rule and codifications of custom, the 
traditional legitimacy of chiefs has been replaced by state-sanctioned authority; and the 
negotiated, pre-colonial practices of chieftaincy have been substituted by largely 
authoritarian rule in service of the state (mainly through coercive sanctions, forced labour 
                                                 
3 For a similar argument, see Oomen (2005) and Englebert (2002). 
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and tax collection) (Mamdani 1996: 54). By implication, this position views state 
recognition of chieftaincy as resulting in a transformation and co-optation of traditional 
leaders by the state, which is propelled by the state’s interest in control, extraction and 
subordination. The emphasis here is on the social construction or invention of tradition and 
custom by state bureaucracies, which draws on some aspects of, but also creatively 
sculptures, the heterogeneous local orders (Mamdani 1996: 49). Tradition and custom are 
harnessed by the state to ensure the subjection of rural populations under an essentially 
“state-enforced customary order” (ibid.: 18). Although this position is based on the colonial 
experience, it has been employed to explain post-colonial state recognitions of chiefs as in 
the influential work of Mamdani (1996). Mamdani’s main argument is that the failure of 
post-colonial states to dismantle traditional authority in the rural areas presents the most 
significant impediment to democratisation in present-day Africa. It reproduces colonial 
despotic rule and continues to position rural people as subjects, rather than as de facto 
citizens, because it prevents the emergence of an active civil society (ibid.: 21).   
This first position, I suggest, presents an important contribution to the study 
of chieftaincy because it compels us to question the ostensible timelessness of traditional 
authority and unpacks the assumed dichotomy between African tradition and European 
modernity, which dominated earlier anthropological studies such as the dual society 
position (Ekeh 1975).4 It also encourages us to question critically the seemingly benign 
recognition of ‘existing’ forms of traditional authority and community presented in state 
legislations of transitional democracies, such as Decree 15/2000, and to study the 
production of legal categorisations as being driven by attempts to reorder and regulate 
social life by state bureaucracies and/or party politicians. The warnings of critics like 
Mamdani (1996) also alerts us to the question of whether the state recognition of traditional 
authority in the name of democratisation and community participation de facto challenges 
unequal power relations and the kind of state authoritarianism that have characterised many 
colonial and post-colonial states. That said, I find that the first position’s view of the effects 
of state recognition for the position of traditional leaders in local contexts is overly 
simplistic, as it grossly exaggerates the power of the state apparatus to transform 
                                                 
4 The dual society position rested on the assumption of a strict boundary between fundamentally distinct and 
autonomous ‘systems’ or ‘logics’ – the traditional and the modern. Although they contested the evolutionary 
modernisation theories that predicted the disappearance of tradition and religion with the advent of modernity, 
by emphasising the possible co-existence of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ within the same societies, they did not 
account for possible overlaps of two domains (for a critique, see van Binsbergen 1999: 99).  
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chieftaincy to ‘its’ own advantage. Both are difficult to reconcile with the dynamics of local 
political configurations in places like Dombe and Matica.5  
Although the implementation of Decree 15/2000 did reshape existing 
chieftaincies, and although local state officials, like their colonial predecessors, did attempt 
to fix and co-opt the chieftaincy to consolidate state as well as Frelimo authority, this was a 
negotiated and contested process. State authorities’ dependence on chiefs to apply and 
legitimate rule limited the full control of the state apparatus, as well as reshaped the 
practices of state officials. Therefore it is important to pay attention to the possible ways in 
which colonial and post-colonial forms of indirect rule are governed by ongoing 
negotiations and compromises between rulers and ruled, as Spear (2003) also shows. The 
bottom line, I suggest, is that this first position fails to address such local-level negotiations 
because of a view of processes of state formation as unilateral and coherent, and state 
officials as automatic transmitters of state law and national political interests. The result is a 
reification of the state.    
The second position, which deals more explicitly with post-colonial 
experiences, criticizes the invention of tradition stance for omitting the creative agency of 
chiefs to resist complete co-optation by the state apparatus. It also argues that chiefs have 
not lost popular legitimacy. Rather, it presents the argument that traditional leaders, despite 
being reshaped by colonial and post-colonial state interventions, have retained legitimacy 
rooted in a culture and tradition that derives from the pre-colonial past and follows a 
different logic than that of the modern state (Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996; von Trotha 1996; 
van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999; Quinlan 1996; Sklar 1999). While drawing on the 
recognition and resources flowing from the state, chiefs’ capacity to sustain authority until 
the present day rests on their dual basis of power: “from tradition chiefs derive their sacred 
and other customary power. From the modern state, chiefs attempt to capture resources in 
the forms of development projects, taxes etc.” (van Nieuwaal 1996: ibid.: 7). As a result, 
present-day chiefs are defined as hybrid authorities who straddle “radically different 
worlds” (i.e. academic titles, bureaucratic positions, national political and economic 
networks, and European dress from ‘the modern world’; dispute settlement, allocation of 
land, elimination of witches and performance of rituals to sustain the local cosmological 
                                                 
5 See Gould (1997) and Spear (2003) for a similar argument in their discussion of the limitations of Mamdani 
(1996) and of the earlier invention of tradition position for addressing chieftaincy in post-colonial Africa.  
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order from ‘the traditional world’) (ibid: 24-5). This leads to a form of neo-traditionalism: 
chiefs are not longer merely ‘traditional’ authorities, but also ‘modern’ ones.  
This position, I suggest, provides a useful contribution to understanding the 
creative agency of chiefs in situations of state recognition. By studying the everyday 
practices of chiefs in different fields, it compels us to question present-day chieftaincy as 
simply the result of purely top-down state interventions, and therefore to scrutinise the 
power of the colonial and post-colonial states to penetrate and transform chieftaincy 
completely. However, in view of my empirical findings, this second position also fails to 
ask whether the everyday operations of state officials may also be reshaped through 
interactions with chiefs, as well as with rural populations.  
This is surprising, because the literature insists that chiefs’ ability to remain 
influential is partly based on the state’s dependency on chiefs to entrench authority (Ray 
and van Nieuwaal 1996: 27; van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999: 4). However, on the ‘state 
side’, the reliance on chiefs is confined to the delegation of administrative tasks to chiefs 
and to symbolic ‘borrowing’ in public gatherings such as the use of chiefly garments, ritual 
forms and celebrations of tradition in a folkloric form. The literature does not focus on the 
possible practical fusions on the ‘state side’. The reason for this, I suggest, is that the basic 
understanding of chiefly authority rests on an presumed opposition between the state and 
rural society, each representing distinct ideological structures: ‘the traditional’ and ‘the 
modern’.6 Hence chiefs are defined as intermediary actors (Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996), 
double gate-keepers or brokers (von Trotha 1996) between the rural population and the 
state or “between the traditional local order and the world of modern economy and politics” 
(van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999: 5). In fact, a core argument is that chiefs have remained 
important in present-day Africa because antagonisms have persisted between the state and 
rural society. This has laid the ground for the “need of both the rural population and the 
government to dispose of a go-between” – the chiefs (Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996: 25).  
How can this view of rural populations as entities isolated from the ‘outside’ 
with norms and beliefs fixed in time and space still continue to resound in present-day 
Africa? Can we assume that every ‘contact’ with the state or with that other world outside 
the local rural sphere goes through the mediating, hybrid chief? Obviously, the answers are 
negative. On the other hand, is it futile to view the state, in the form of its various 
                                                 
6 In this sense, the second position somewhat returns to the dual society position in earlier studies of the 1950s 
and 1960s, which the invention of tradition approach tried to challenge.  
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representatives, programs and laws, as a fixed entity, isolated from rural society? As shown 
by this and other studies, the answer here is also negative (see Bayart 1993; Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Lund 2001).  
In sum, the two positions outlined above leave us with two possible scenarios: 
state recognition of traditional leaders either results in a complete co-optation of chieftaincy 
by the state-enforced order or else gives way to the co-existence (if not the preservation) of 
two distinct orders or ideological structures, ‘the rural-traditional’ and ‘the modern-state’. 
In view of my study, both these scenarios fail to address the mutual 
transformations and relational constitutions of local state institutions and chieftaincy that 
resulted from the state recognition of traditional authority in Matica and Dombe. In 
particular, their shared view of the state leaves little space for addressing a key insight of 
this study: the practices and claims to authority of state officials were also reshaped in the 
process of attempts to fix and regulate chiefs as part of a larger project of consolidating 
Frelimo-state authority. In respect to the second position, the understanding of the ‘go-
between’ position of the chief as based on a fundamental split between the modern state and 
rural-traditional society is also problematic in view of the findings of this study. If I had 
confined the study to the explicit representations of actors, to the public arenas of state-
chief engagements, as well as to the state-legal categories of Decree 15/2000, I might have 
arrived at an understanding of the existence of two distinct ideological structures. However, 
by exploring concrete interactions between state officials, chiefs and rural populations, 
another insight emerged: mutual ideological exchanges and practical fusions between 
different rural actors, including state officials, constantly befuddled the ideal-type 
distinction between the modern state and traditional-rural society. It was not only chiefs, as 
suggested by the second position, who performed boundary-crossing: state officials and 
rural residents also engaged in such processes.7 A significant insight of my study is that 
such boundary-crossing is itself constitutive of the remaking and re-creation of the 
conceptual boundaries between state and chieftaincy. It is the very boundary that is at stake 
in chiefs and state officials’ claims to and practices of authority.    
These key insights of the study have compelled me to suggest a different 
approach. My first suggestion is that a study of state recognition of traditional authority can 
benefit from drawing on the insights of recent studies of state formation, which draws our 
attention to how state institutions and the implementation of state law are reshaped by and 
                                                 
7 For a similar perspective, see Oomen 2005: 28; Spear 2003; Rathbone 2000; Vaughan 2000; Moore 1978. 
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reconstituted through interactions with other forces in society. This also means approaching 
the state as internally heterogeneous rather than as a coherent actor (Bayart 1993; Hansen 
and Stepputat 2001; Santos 2006; Moore 1978; Lund 2006a). To approach the state in this 
way is not, however, to concur with the position of some scholars that state practices and 
representatives become completely ‘captured’ by informal, traditionalist politics, to such an 
extent that the state loses ‘its’ distinctive properties (Chabal and Daloz 1999). This 
encourages a misleading reification of a particular African political culture or logic, 
represented, for example, by traditional authorities. It also fails to capture how state 
officials in Matica and Dombe were indeed engaged in attempts to enforce state law and 
consolidate state authority through the enforcement of rules that relied on distinctions 
between state and traditional authority. Thus to view the state as shaped by social forces is 
not to substitute a view of the state as inherently distinct from chieftaincy with one of 
complete fusion.  
My second suggestion is therefore that we should approach the question of 
what state recognition of traditional authority means for practices and claims to authority 
by exploring the interrelationship between: a) the constant attempts to produce and 
conceptualise the state and chiefs as representing distinct domains of authority; and b) the 
practices of and interactions between chiefs, rural residents and state officials that often 
makes for a merging of categories and a blurring of boundaries. This way of addressing 
how state and chiefly authority is constituted is based on a processual analytical framework 
that addresses the productive tension between schemes of ordering (law, definitions and 
conceptual models) and observable actions (the practices of and interactions between 
chiefs, state officials and rural residents in local arenas).  
This approach allows us to take seriously both the constitutive effects of state-
legal categories or schemes for ordering chieftaincy (the first position), and the creative 
appropriations and enactments of such schemes by locally situated actors, including not 
only chiefs (the second position), but also state officials. It also helps us to grasp the 
apparent contradiction between chiefs and state officials’ attempts to entrench authority 
both through claims to be distinct, and through multiple exchanges and practical fusions. 
Instead of approaching these distinctions as reflective of opposed ideological structures and 
practical fusions as situational boundary-crossing (the second position), I treat them as 
existing in a productive tension. It is a tension because conceptualisations do not 
necessarily mirror actions; it is productive because such a tension potentially creates change 
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at the conceptual as well as practical levels. This means taking seriously the conceptual 
boundaries between state and chieftaincy as constitutive of state and chiefly authority, but 
not to take these for granted as fixed ideological structures in the first place – i.e. of ‘the 
traditional-rural society’ and ‘the modern state’. Rather, it is the very boundaries that are 
constantly at stake in the relational constitution of chiefly as well as local state authority. 
For this reason, I suggest, it is the creation, maintenance and remaking of the boundary 
between state and traditional authority that needs our scholarly attention the most.8 The 
boundaries are not simply an inevitable ‘background’ that may or may not be straddled in 
practice. They are an aspect of ongoing activities, such as in the implementation of state-
legal categorisations, chiefs and state officials’ attempts to assert difference in claims to 
authority, as well as rural residents’ practical engagement with and perceptions of chiefs 
and state institutions.  
Approaching the boundaries between state and chieftaincy as negotiated and 
in a continuous process of remaking does not mean ignoring the significance of unequal 
power relations and historically embedded scripts (ideas, rules and practices). There are 
limits to what is negotiable, and actors are not equally positioned to define the terms. Thus I 
approach the creation and maintenance of boundaries as informed by historically embedded 
scripts and as inherently political processes of order-making in which issues of power are at 
stake. This position informs my choice of theoretical perspective, as well as of how I 
address the three main concepts of this study: authority, state formation and citizenship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 For a similar point, see van Binsbergen’s (1996) study of chief-state relations in post-colonial Zambia.   
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2. Theoretical and Conceptual Issues 
 
Field notes, July 2004. Today at the police station in Dombe three cases concerning witchcraft 
accusations were heard. This seems to be a growing phenomenon, although Samuel (the chief of 
police) still insists that this really is not the case and the state knows nothing of such matters, that 
don’t have material evidence. It is only the chiefs that know. The police take care of crime, which 
the chiefs have no authority to do. The rules are at least very clear. Nonetheless, I begin to see a 
clear pattern in the way the police officers deliberate these cases. As if by routine they write down 
the cases on papers holding the official stamps of the police, that is, after they have listened to all 
the parties and they have discussed possible solutions. Also today there was another situation where 
a family came to the police to accuse a neighbour of witchcraft, and again the officer on duty gave 
them a letter, which said that the accused should appear at the station. The officer also told them 
that this person would be prosecuted if failing to turn up, because, he said “to disobey the orders of 
the police is against the law”. So he was referring to the law – also in such cases, that the police say 
is outside the law. After the hearings today, the officer reminds me that he just helped these people 
to solve their problems. And then he says an interesting thing that I have heard many people in these 
areas say too: “it is important that we help with these cases, because, you know if they are not 
solved serious crimes, even murder….who knows. It happens.” Perhaps this is also why many of the 
chiefs still settle so-called crimes, although the police hit hard on them when they do?   
 
This extract from my field notes captures one of several examples of a key paradox in this 
study: while state officials invested enormous energy in communicating and enforcing rules 
that posited a clear boundary between the jurisdictions of chiefs and state institutions 
respectively (i.e. chiefs take care of the traditional cases outside the law, while the police 
have a monopoly on dealing with criminal cases within the law), both state officials and 
chiefs frequently exercised authority across these boundaries. The intriguing aspect was 
that such blurred boundaries were not just situational deviations from the rule: either they 
introduced new routine practices, as in the police hearing witchcraft cases and chiefs’ 
reference to state law in deliberating non-criminal cases; or else they continued pre-existing 
practices such as chiefs’ settlement of criminal cases. Another intriguing aspect was that, in 
the very same situations that chiefs and state officials engaged in boundary-crossing, they 
also articulated a clear distinction between chiefly and state authority.  
 The question is what theory of social life can help us make sense of this apparently 
paradoxical oscillation between distinction and fusions in representations and observable 
actions? Should it be understood as a discrepancy between ideology and social actions, 
between law/models of society and social reality? In one sense this was the case, because 
the boundary between state and chiefly jurisdictions did not mirror social practice. 
However, it should also be realised that the very boundaries between state and chiefly 
orders were constantly subject not only to negotiation, but also to remaking practices and 
representations, as noted previously. Attempts to fix and order the distinct domains of state 
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and chiefs were ongoing activities, existing in what I earlier referred to as a productive 
tension with activities that challenged such an order.  
 In trying to make sense of this productive tension, I have found it useful to use an 
analytical framework that draws on a process-oriented theory of social life inspired by the 
work of Sally Falk Moore (1978) and underlining more recent studies of state formation, 
citizenship and authority (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Isin and Turner 2002; Lund 2001). 
Central to this framework is a processual understanding of social order as never fully fixed 
and total, but as constantly being made and remade through active processes of the 
regulation of social life. The latter are defined by Moore as processes of regularisation and 
refer to the enactments and representations of rules, categories, symbols and rituals that 
give form, order and predictability to social life and thus fix apparently durable social and 
cultural orders (Moore 1978: 6). State law or programmes are viewed as but one example of 
these processes, co-existing with other forms of order-making by state as well as non-state 
actors.9  
The view of social order as active processes is based on the assumption that 
indeterminacy is an underlying quality of social life and that people are active participants 
in creating continuity as well as change (ibid.: 48). Social and cultural orders, the regulated, 
patterned aspects, are omnipresent in social life, but they “always leave gaps, require 
adjustments and interpretations to be applicable to particular situations” and “are 
themselves full of ambiguities, inconsistencies and often contradictions” (ibid.: 39). Central 
to this understanding is the view that social life consists of a variety of situations, and 
shifting sets of persons, that make the total regulation of all of social life utterly impossible: 
e.g. state-legal categories that seek to fix particular relationships are always a simplification 
of social reality, not a mirror reflection of it.10 This implies openings and rooms for 
manoeuvre in social situations, in which rules and categories are the subject of potential 
negotiations, reinterpretations and remaking. By implication, processes of regularisation 
can be seen as struggles against indeterminacy in two senses: on the one hand, the explicit 
                                                 
9 This point about the co-existence of different modes of rule-generation and order-making within a political 
organization was a major contribution of Moore (1978) to legal anthropology, which had previously 
privileged the existence of a single legal field: Western state law. This contribution has since predominated 
within the more recent literature on legal pluralism, which argues that state law is not the only possible source 
of rule-generation, and that it co-exists with other sources, such as international, folk, customary and religious 
systems of rules and norms (see, for example, Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988; Moore 1978; von Benda-
Beckmann 1997; Galanter 1981; Santos 1987, 1995, 2006; Pospisil 1971; for a critique see Tamanaha 1993, 
2000). Thus the main claim is the existence of a plurality of legal orders outside or in addition to those of the 
state. 
10 See also Scott (1998) on this point.  
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attempts to fix social relationships, as exemplified by state law, are by implication a 
realisation that they are mutable; on the other hand, such attempts are at the same time 
matched by counter-activities – i.e. adjustments to particular situations, reinterpretations 
and manipulations of categories, distinctions and rules (ibid.: 40). The latter Moore (1978: 
50) defines as processes of situational adjustment.  
In this study, the factor of indeterminacy is used to grasp how state-legal 
categories were partly reshaped locally, as well as how the partly reshaped rules to fix 
chieftaincy as distinct from the state were challenged even by state officials themselves in 
adjusting to particular situations and expectations. Analogously, it also informs the way in 
which I approach the lack of fit that frequently obtained between enactments or 
representations of order and many everyday practices – i.e. the stated rules versus actual 
deliberations, as exemplified in the above excerpt from the field. Instead of viewing this 
lack of fit as a discrepancy between fixed, invariant social structures on the one hand and 
deviant, varied behaviour on the other, I approach it as reflecting a productive tension 
between processes of regularisation and situational adjustments. This understanding helps 
capture my earlier point that the boundary between state and chieftaincy as representing 
distinct orders was not a fixed given, or the order pertaining, which was then sometimes 
transgressed in practice: the boundary itself was the subject of active re-enactments and 
verbal representations, that is, of processes of regularisation.   
Following Moore’s view of indeterminacy as a central feature of social life 
positions me as a cautious post-structuralist, because indeterminacy does not rule out order, 
consistencies and repetition as omnipresent features of social life in observable actions and 
expressed ideas (ibid.: 38). The framework proposed does not imply substituting a study of 
order, repetition and continuity with a study of inconsistency, contradictions and change, 
but including both as features of social life.11 This is captured by the view of processes of 
regularisation and processes of situational adjustment as two implicated forms of behaviour 
in social situations (ibid.: 50). The two kinds of behaviour do not rule each other out but 
                                                 
11 This perspective on the omnipresent co-existence of the regular and the indeterminate departs from two 
opposed theoretical models that privilege either structure/continuity or actor/change: on the one hand, the 
structural-functionalists model, which sees structure, congruence and durability as the central feature of social 
life, and views whatever discrepancies there may be between ideology and actions as deviance or momentary 
transitions (i.e. Radcliffe-Brown 1952; Morgan 1963); and on the other hand, the rational, actor-oriented 
perspectives (or methodological individualism), which emphasise individual rational transactions, 
inconsistency and change as the features that make up a society and down-play the limits that the cultural 
patterning of individual perception and social institutions place on actions and choice (i.e. Barth 1966; Bailey 
1969).  
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exist in a productive tension: the very processes of situational adjustment that prevent total 
order also reshape efforts at partial ordering. Analogously, processes of regularisation, such 
as the rules that fix a boundary between chiefs and state police jurisdictions, also set the 
terms for boundary-crossing. Important to this understanding of productive tensions is that 
each of these processes may be concerned with and have the effect of stabilising and 
changing social order: regulation is not always concerned with maintenance of the status 
quo, and adjustments do not necessarily reflect individual change-oriented actions (ibid.: 
52). This point is important for the present study because it sheds light on a) the legal 
recognition of traditional authority, as de facto employed to fix and reshape existing 
chieftaincies, and b) situational manipulations of this fixing as both reactionary and 
productive of new rules.  
Finally, the view of regularity and inconsistency as co-existing in social 
situations is important because it emphasises the limits not only to order, but also to 
negotiations. Situational adjustments, as well as attempts to fix social order, take place 
within a larger political context and are framed by historically embedded ideas, role 
expectations and norms, which place limits on what is negotiable and in what ways 
ordering takes place (ibid.: 40). Because context and history matters, there is variety in the 
form and content of regulation and adjustments in particular settings, as well as in what 
issues are at stake. In this dissertation, I argue that sovereign authority was a key issue for 
chiefs and state officials, and that the situational adjustments and modalities of regulation 
were shaped in particular by two historically embedded scripts: the political script of the 
Frelimo party-state and the local script of evil-doing linking the visible and invisible 
dimensions of (dis)order (see Parts II and III).  
This study makes two additions to the analytical framework of Moore (1978) 
outlined above: a) the central role of power; and b) the constitutive effects of 
representations. First, this study places power at the centre of the analysis of processes of 
situational adjustment and regularisation. Not all people are equally positioned or have the 
skill and ability to engage in negotiations and regulation, and some forms of regulation are 
more powerful and less negotiable than others, in particular those backed up by coercive 
sanctions and violent exclusions. Power is understood here in two senses, which are viewed 
as interrelated: impersonal power (i.e. relations embedded in institutions, laws, conventions 
and practices that are both restrictive and productive of behaviour) (Foucault 1991); and 
power as the act of persons to enforce their will upon others’ behaviour (i.e. the power of 
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some persons over others) (Weber 1947). To include these two dimensions of power 
implies exploring who is able – under what wider conditions and according to what 
positions – to act and speak with authority, and against whom (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). In doing this, I pay attention to hierarchies and aspects of inclusion and exclusion 
from decision-making and negotiations.  
Secondly, although practices and interactions in particular situations 
constitute a central part of this study, these are analysed in relation to representations, 
which I see as permeating the processes of regularisation and situational adjustments.12 
Representations in this study refer to people’s expressed ideas, legitimisations and 
definitions of the order of the world as represented in texts, speech and symbols. In 
particular this study includes three forms of representations: a) text (state-legal categories, 
programmes and plans); b) speech acts (communication of law, claims to authority by 
reference to sources of legitimacy external to actions, and people’s expressed ideas about 
social organisation, relationships and order/disorder, as well as about core concepts such as 
the state, authority, chiefs, citizenship and community); and c) symbolic displays (the 
display of material artefacts, power positions and social organisation in public meetings and 
ceremonies). The assumption is that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between 
representations and observable actions. Thus, the challenge here is not to privilege either 
dimension, but to realise their differences and how they permeate, affect and contradict 
each other. Next I address in more detail how the framework outlined in this section 
informs how I approach my three core concepts.  
Concepts: Authority, State formation and Citizenship 
The processual understanding of social order, the issue of power and the relationship 
between representations and actions are central to the way I approach the three key 
concepts of this study: authority, state formation and citizenship. The point of departure is 
that I approach the concepts in a non-essentialist way. This means that I do not take for  
granted the pure, fixed substance of these concepts, but approach them as socially made and 
remade in representations and actions. To suggest this does not mean that conceptual 
definitions and the substance they refer to are without importance, as noted earlier; but they 
are not necessarily abidingly instantiated in practice or understood the same way by 
different actors.  
                                                 
12 Moore (1978), whose primary focus is on actions, places little emphasis on what representations imply for 
actions (see Chanock 2000: xviii). 
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Against this background, the concepts are approached as having both a 
practical and a representational dimension: they are explored as ideas expressed in verbal, 
legal and symbolic representations and as sets of practices. It is the dynamic interplay 
between these dimensions that are central to this study’s exploration of what state 
recognition of traditional authority implies for claims to and practices of state and chiefly 
authority, as well as citizenship. Cutting across these dimensions is the significance of 
relations in two senses: on the one hand the relationship between the concepts, and on the 
other the relational constitution of each.  
First, state and citizenship are viewed in this study as twin concepts: the very 
processes of state formation, of consolidating sovereign authority, rely on the production of 
a political community of citizens (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Agamben 2000). Authority 
on the other hand is viewed as a concept that cuts across and goes beyond state and 
citizenship. It can exist in claims and practices independently of the state, as it is a more 
universal analytical concept describing a relationship between rulers and ruled (Weber 
1947). However, in this study, where the theme of analysis is the “state recognition of 
traditional authority” and where legal recognition is directly linked to the inclusion of rural 
community members within the nation state, the concept of authority becomes linked to 
citizenship and state formation too. Moreover, as noted above, an intrinsic element in 
processes of state formation is the constitution of sovereignty, that is, the claim to superior 
or final authority within a political organisation. Thus, when I address the concept of 
authority, this is not confined to chiefs, but also to the state and other potential actors’ 
claims to authority. 
Secondly, authority, state and citizenship are each approached as constituted 
relationally not only in the sense of actual interactions, but also of representations. The 
constitution of each is based on the assertion of difference from something ‘other’, i.e. a 
constitutive outside (Mouffe 2006: 15). For example, authority does not exist without a 
differentiated relationship between the ruler and the ruled: state and chiefly forms of 
authority are constituted in relation to each other through assertions of difference and 
mutual recognition, and citizenship is based on some form of we/they relation. These 
assertions of difference are part of what I referred to earlier as processes of regularisation. 
However, in line with the analytical framework used, I do not approach these assertions of 
difference, such as the distinction between state and chieftaincy, as fixed givens, but as the 
result of their continuous making and remaking in social situations.      
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These commonalities linking the three concepts analytically do not rule out 
the differences between them. Next, therefore, I give due attention to the distinctive 
features of each, and how I approach them in this study.      
Authority  
The interest of this study is to explore the constitution of state and chiefly authority as 
practices and claims in relation to, but also going beyond, de jure or state-legal status. This 
means that I want to arrive at an understanding of de facto forms of authority, that is, 
authority as vindicated and confirmed in interactions between chiefs, state officials and 
ordinary citizen-subjects. Inspired by a processual analytical framework, the underlying 
assumption is that limiting attention to legally attributed authority can blind us to how 
authority is not necessarily a fixed given in practice, but needs to be re-enacted and re-
confirmed to endure (Lentz 1998: 47; Lund 2001). Although, as Lund asserts, the legal 
attribution of authority is important, it is not an absolute guarantee for the actual exercise 
and maintenance of de facto authority. Seemingly trivial actions by individuals can 
undermine the legitimacy of de jure authorities by, for example, not respecting them or 
taking their ‘business’ elsewhere (Lund 2001: 863).  
Key to this understanding is that the practical involvement of ordinary people 
with authorities in different social situations impacts on how de facto forms of authority are 
(re)constituted. This means paying attention to the ways in which “authority is being 
constructed in the imagination, expectation, and everyday practices of ordinary people” 
(Lund 2006b: 696). Authority is therefore understood as constituted relationally through a 
process of dual-recognition: “when an institution authorises, sanctions or validates certain 
rights, the respect and observance of these rights by people, powerful in clout or numbers, 
simultaneously constitutes recognition of the authority of the particular institution” (Lund 
2006a: 676).  
This approach to the constitution of de facto authority follows a particular 
definition of authority. In line with Weber (1947), authority is viewed as a hierarchical 
relation of command and obedience, and as “an instance of power which seeks at least a 
minimum of voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way” (Lund 2006a: 
678). Viewing authority as a hierarchical relation means that authority does not reside 
alone in the particular attributes of a person, in legal categories or in claims to authority: 
authority is constituted when “a directive communication is accepted by one to whom it is 
 25
addressed” (Mandeville 1960: 117). Authority therefore “does not exist unless it is 
effectively executed” (ibid.): it depends on the willingness of others to grant recognition 
and legitimacy. This definition means that authority should be confused neither with pure 
coercion, nor with mere persuasion (Mandeville 1960; Arendt 1961).13 Simple persuasion 
is different from authority because it presupposes equality and works through a process of 
argumentation. On the other hand, authority has failed when the demands of obedience rely 
exclusively on violent coercion (Arendt 1961: 92-3). The point is that authority is a 
hierarchical relation that requires a recognised legitimacy of the hierarchy between the 
rulers and the ruled.  
This emphasis on legitimacy is important to this study because it draws 
attention to the mutually constitutive relation between representations and actions. The 
exercise of authority as a concrete interaction is accompanied by some reference external to 
the interaction itself, that is, to some source of legitimacy (e.g. ‘the law’, ‘tradition’, 
‘spirits’, ‘the nation’, ‘leadership skills’) (ibid.: 96). The point is that representations of 
sources of legitimacy, state-legal or otherwise, are significant in the actual exercise of 
authority, but they do not (re)constitute authority on their own. To endure, authority must 
be continuously re-enacted, and claims to legitimacy reasserted.  
In this study, therefore, sources of legitimacy are approached as part of 
processes of legitimisation, which permeate not only the achievement of de jure recognition 
by the state, but also the re-constitution of de facto authority in everyday interactions. 
Following Lentz (1998) on this point, legitimacy is therefore not presumed as something 
defined once and for all, but rather “a conflict-ridden and open process” in which different, 
more or less powerful actors intervene (Lentz 1998: 47). This also implies being open to the 
possible co-existence, overlap and complementarity between different sources of 
legitimacy, as well as the potential for different sources to be invoked in different situations 
(ibid.). In this study, I add to the perspectives presented about that legitimisation of 
authority is influenced not only by relations between rulers and ruled, but also by relations 
between different authorities (i.e. chiefs and state officials). This may be expressed both 
through competition over jurisdictions and mutual recognitions. But, as this dissertation 
shows, the relational constitution of state and chiefly authority is also exemplified by the 
                                                 
13 To assert that authority precludes pure coercion is not to deny that orders may be obeyed due to a fear of 
sanctions or punishments (Caporoso 2000: 9).  
 26
way in which sources of legitimacy are defined, are given substance, by the assertion of 
difference from another type of authority.   
This way of approaching legitimacy departs from two widespread tendencies 
in many Africanist studies: first the studies that have identified patrimonialism, i.e. the 
accumulation and distribution of wealth, as the predominant ‘matrix of legitimacy’ in 
African politics, shared by chiefs and state officials (Schatzberg 1993; Chabal and Deloz 
1999; Thomson 1999; van de Walle 2001); and secondly, the aforementioned position on 
state-chief relations, which views the constitution of authority on the basis of fixed 
Weberian ideal sources of legitimacy, ‘the traditional’ and ‘the modern legal-rational’ (cf. 
Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996).14 I find it too simplistic to identify one singular source of 
legitimacy. Instead, I explore the possible influence of shifting and differently combined 
sources of legitimacy that chiefs as well as state officials may draw on (e.g. tradition, 
custom, magical powers, education and professionalism, state-legal office or position, 
economic wealth, age, gender, generosity and leadership abilities). Moreover, the 
representations of distinctions between chiefs and the state as embedded in different 
sources of legitimacy should not be underestimated, even if exercises of authority may 
often deny such distinctions. They do have constitutive effects for the ways in which 
authority is exercised, just as state-legal categorisations do.  
To emphasise the significance of distinctions is not to concur with the view 
that ‘traditional’ and ‘state-modern’ sources of legitimacy are a priori static or imbued with 
a particular predefined substance. By implication, the ‘traditional’ is not approached as a 
predefined analytical concept by which to measure whether certain practices and 
institutions can be regarded as ‘traditional’ and as, for example, different from other types 
of authority, such as the legal-rational or that of the modern state. Rather, I approach the 
traditional as the result of ongoing processes of attempts to capture the term. Particularly 
valid here is Moore’s (1986) view of ‘the traditional’ as internally contested and its 
manifestation at any given historical moment as the outcome of processes of redefinition 
                                                 
14 Weber (1947) famously defined three distinct ideal types of authority (traditional, charismatic and rational-
legal authority) on the basis of differences in administrative structures and in the belief systems that legitimise 
authority (Blau 1963: 308). In the Weberian typology, chiefs have commonly been equated with traditional 
authority, legitimated by the sanctity of tradition or custom and a cultural belief in the divine right of the ruler 
to rule. The modern state and its bureaucracy has usually been likened to legal-rational authority, legitimated 
by a formalistic belief in the supremacy of the law as an impersonal body of legal rules produced in the 
rational pursuit of collective goals (ibid.: 313). It should be noted that Weber did not suggest that these ideal 
types existed in pure empirical form, but in various admixtures, hence the emphasis on the ‘ideal’. He 
nonetheless saw them as distinctive features of politically and historically specific systems (ibid.: 310). 
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and reproduction. As Handler and Linnekin (1984) point out, this allows us to see present 
articulations of traditional legitimacy less as a question of simple continuity, and more as 
symbolic processes that take past equivalences for granted and produce them anew by 
reinterpreting them according to current requirements. Similarly, the state, as a type of 
authority, needs to be contextualised and scrutinised from an empirical perspective.      
State Formation   
In line with the process-oriented theory, this study views state formation as not simply “a 
top-down, from-the-centre-outward process” that produces predetermined results, but also 
as taking place “from below” (Stepputat 2001: 287). State operations, institutions and ideas 
about the state are viewed as being shaped and reshaped by the everyday practices of and 
negotiations between different actors in local settings. This becomes clear when an 
ethnographically grounded and decentred approach to state-formation is employed, as 
exemplified by a number of recent studies (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Nuijten 1998; 
Nugent 1994; Gupta 1995; Tsing 1993; van Beek 1999; Wilson 2001; Das and Poole 2004).  
 Inspired by these studies, I approach state formation as shaped both by transnational 
features, i.e. particular ‘languages of stateness’, and by social forces in specific contexts. 
This means denaturalising the state as a coherent, homogeneous actor, detached from 
society, while still taking serious the constitutive effects of larger state schemes and 
programmes for the shaping of societies. By implication, I conceptualise state formation in 
terms of both processes of regularisation and situational adjustments at the micro- and 
macro-levels.      
This view of state-formation departs from the state-centered and state-
penetrative approaches which have predominated within political science (Jessop 1990). 
The first position views the state as a key independent factor in social explanation, as 
something that can be readily identified and is largely separated from the dynamics of 
society (ibid.: 278-9, 288). It thus produces a particular reified conceptualization of the 
state. The second position views state formation as an often violent, but relatively 
straightforward penetration of territory by army, bureaucracy, capital, law and governing 
programmes, which reduces people to the objects of a centralized sovereign power 
(Stepputat 2001: 285).  
This study illustrates that the state recognition of traditional authority was in 
many ways appropriated by local state officials as part of what we could call a larger 
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project of state penetration of the rural hinterlands, exemplified by institutional-
administrative presence, schemes of ordering populations, and attempts to consolidate state 
sovereign authority by regulating non-state authorities. However, this was not a 
straightforward process. It was mediated and reshaped by the realities on the ground, by 
interactions with chiefs and rural residents, as well as by the particular historically vested 
perceptions and political agendas of local state officials themselves. These affected how 
local state officials operated, enforced the law and attempted to constitute authority.  
These observations suggest that the state apparatus itself is better viewed as 
the aggregate of partly autonomous and partly heterogeneous institutions and practices, 
rather than as a coherent entity. It also compels us to view state officials as creative 
‘translators’, rather than as automatic transmitters of programmes, laws and schemes of 
ordering drawn up on the tables of ministries in the capital city (Wilson 2001; van Beek 
1999; Stepputat 2001). 15 As Wilson (2001: 316-19) has pointed out, the extension of the 
state – ideas, practices, categories and symbols – across territorial space happens through 
layers of translation by locally positioned actors. It is therefore problematic to approach 
state formation as a totalizing process resulting in a kind of Weberian ‘iron cage’ in which 
people are reduced to mere objects of central power (Stepputat 2001: 285)..Rather, we 
should pay attention to how locally situated state as well as non-state actors contribute to 
the making of the state, and hence how the state becomes locally grounded (Gupta 1995; 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001).  
 That said, as the findings of this study show, we are still confronted with a 
twofold paradox. First, even as local state officials’ operations were reshaped locally, 
officials frequently invoked – in verbal and symbolic representations – the state as a 
homogeneous, abstract entity, elevated above society. These representations informed the 
distinction between state officials and chiefs and were expressed during public meetings 
and state-orchestrated ceremonies, as well as in legitimising more mundane exercises of 
authority. Secondly, in the particularistic, locally reshaped operations of state officials, 
there were also discernable elements of general, transnational scripts of state formation.      
How do we capture these two apparently paradoxical dimensions of state 
formation? In this regard, I find the approach to the state by Abrams (1977) and Hansen and 
Stepputat (2001) useful. They suggest conceptualising the state as de facto the effect of a 
                                                 
15 In addition, it can be problematic to view state schemes of ordering and law as internally coherent, as if 
imbued with one rationality. Policies are not written by one hand or carried out by one actor, but are 
multivocal, internally contested and often internally contradictory (Moore 1978; van Beek 1999: 369). 
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set of dispersed practices and institutions of governing, but equally to take seriously the 
state as an idea, that is, as an ideological construction.16 The state as an idea refers to the 
attempts to legitimise and render natural the state as the centre of sovereign authority and as 
a coherent, transcendental entity, embodying the common will of the nation (Abrams 1977: 
76-7).17 Central to this idea are representations of the state as an entity standing above 
society and separated from it (ibid.). To take seriously this idea of the state, Abrams 
suggests, is important because it forms part of legitimising the everyday governance, 
including the employment of violence, by state agencies. The point is that the constitution 
of state authority requires that state officials not only govern in technical terms, but also 
constantly reproduce an imaginary dimension that separates the actions of the state from 
those of any other agency (Abrams 1988: 77; see also Bourdieu 1999).  
This view of the state compels us to attend to both the practical and symbolic-
representational dimensions of state formation processes, just as I suggested we do with the 
study of the constitution of authority more generally. Following Hansen and Stepputat 
(2001), these two dimensions can be conceptualised in terms of two different ‘languages of 
stateness’: symbolic languages of authority, and practical languages of governance. I 
approach these as general, transnational scripts of state formation, while it is realised that 
they are differently combined, translated and disseminated in different national and local 
contexts (ibid.: 7).  
The first set of languages of practical governance – or statecraft, as Scott 
(1998) terms them – has to do with how the state governs, i.e. with its practical and 
institutional dimensions. They may cover the following: the assertion of territorial 
sovereignty by the monopolisation of violence and permanent and visible military and 
police forces; the gathering and control of knowledge of the population – its size, 
occupations, production and well-being – of the territory; and the generation of resources 
                                                 
16 This perspective combines two apparently divergent approaches to the state. First, there is the Foucauldian 
view of the state, not as the centre of power, but as an effect of a wide range of dispersed techniques of 
governing, ranging from larger schemes of classification and ordering to everyday routine actions and micro-
operations undertaken by state as well as non-state representatives. Foucault denaturalised the state – in his 
famous quote, ‘beheading the King’ – by stressing how power was not centred within one actor – the state – 
but consisted of disbursed practices of governance. However, this perspective undermines the potentially 
constitutive effects of the representations and enactments that invoke the state as the locus of sovereign 
power, and it does not pay much attention to how the state is rendered legitimate. These aspects are the focus 
of a second, more Gramscian inspired perspective on the state, which views it as an ideological construct that 
sustains particular power relations (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 3-5).  
17 Abrams argues that the idea of the state as being above social relations and practice is a misrepresentation 
or a myth, which hides political and economic domination, as well as the fact that the state is, when 
demystified, a set of practices and institutions inhabited by real people – policemen, armies and so forth 
(Abrams 1988: 75).   
 30
and ensuring the reproduction and well-being of the population. In short, these languages 
denote the territorial extension of the state in terms of a dispersed set of institutions, 
personnel and schemes of ordering, classifying and stabilising larger populations by state 
bureaucracies (Scott 1998).18  
The second, symbolic languages of authority have to do with how the state is 
rendered legitimate, that is, with the production of the state as an idea. These may cover the 
following: the institutionalisation of law and legal discourse as the authoritative language of 
the state; the materialisation of the state in series of permanent signs and rituals (stamps, 
uniforms, identity cards, state ceremonies, hierarchies of rank); and the nationalisation of 
territory and the institutions of the state through the inscription of a history and a shared 
community on landscapes and cultural practices (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 7). Central to 
this set of languages is the production of a political community of citizens as members of 
the nation state, above other sources of identification. Another is the significance of 
ceremonial and ritual performances for (re)producing the idea of the state, such as through 
the display of hierarchies of rank, stateliness and pomp at larger state-orchestrated public 
meetings (see also Bourdieu 1999; Geertz 1980; Bell 1992). This aspect draws attention to 
the cultural-symbolic dimensions of state formation, beyond the legal, bureaucratic and 
mundane, technical sides of governance (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 4; see also Steinmetz 
1999). As this dissertation will illustrate, such dimensions were rendered explicit, for 
example, during the state-orchestrated recognition ceremonies of traditional leaders, as well 
as during national days of celebration (see Chapter 6).19  
Studying state formation processes through these two sets of languages of 
stateness helps us grasp the inherent ambiguities of state operations from the vantage point 
of local settings: the representations of the state as distant, impartial and impersonal ideas, 
                                                 
18 The practical languages resemble what Foucault has defined as modern techniques of governing or 
governmentality, which have to do with how the conduct of a population is governed, disciplined and 
managed, often based on scientific knowledge-gathering techniques (for example, within the spheres of 
health, education, welfare, family planning, policing and censuses) (Gupta 2001: 67-8; Hansen and Stepputat 
2001: 4).  They can also be associated with a Weberian emphasis on the legal-rational conduct of state 
bureaucracies.  
19 Mbembe (2001) has suggested that public state rituals can be all the more important to state authority where 
the state apparatus is weak and less capable of securing control and citizens’ rights, as in many post-colonial 
African states. However, this should not, as Abélès (1988) and Bell (1992) suggest, lead us to neglect the 
significance of state rituals as a more general feature of modern nation states around the world, including 
western democracies. In making this point, Abélès (1988: 391-2) criticises political theory for having over-
emphasised the secularisation of modern politics and reduced the links between ritual and politics, and 
between power and the sacred, to a feature of governance in traditional societies. As an alternative, he 
illustrates the continued importance of rituals in legitimising political representatives.  
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as well as the state as a set of profane, localized and personified institutions and practices 
(ibid.: 5; Hansen 2001: 226). They also provide a useful analytical device for attending to 
the intersection of national and local processes. However, to focus on these languages as 
generalisable state scripts that local state officials draw on should not blind us to how these 
may be combined with other, partly contradictory scripts. As this dissertation will show, the 
activities of state officials in Matica and Dombe were permeated in particular by an extra-
local political script, which reproduced Frelimo as the sovereign authority. This co-existed 
with other, more localised scripts of evil-doing and the belief in the spiritual power of 
chiefs as conducive to the administrative and developmental concerns of the state.       
Moreover, we should be open in the analysis to how languages of stateness 
are not necessarily the preserve of official state representatives, but may also be drawn on 
by other actors such as chiefs (Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 9; Lund 2006a). For example, 
even though state officials may lay claim to sovereign authority, we cannot expect the 
performative aspects of sovereign power – such as the use of legitimate violence and final 
decisions over life, death and punishments – to be necessarily the monopoly of state 
authorities (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). As this dissertation will illustrate, a pervasive 
issue at stake in the production of boundaries between state and chiefly authority was 
exactly the precariousness of state sovereignty in various central areas of social life.   
 Finally, the findings of this study suggest it is useful to add to the umbrella of 
‘languages of stateness’ the relational constitution of the state, that is, the consolidation of 
state authority through constituting ‘its’ exterior ‘Other’, its “constitutive outside” (i.e. 
chiefs and other non-state authorities). This aspect is not least relevant to include, I suggest, 
in studies of state recognition of traditional authority. But I will also suggest that it is 
applicable more generally, as exemplified by the constitution of state authority through 
attempts to produce a political community, i.e. citizenship.    
Citizenship 
The aim of this study is to arrive at an understanding of what repercussions state 
recognition of traditional authority has for de facto citizenship, that is, citizenship as a set 
of practices and claims. Inspired by a number of recent studies of citizenship, this means 
going beyond legal categories and formal models of citizenship (such as liberal, republican 
or communitarian models) (Isin and Wood 1999; Isin and Turner 2002; Cruickshank 1999; 
Kabeer 2005; Mouffe 2006; Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998). Citizenship is analysed as 
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more than a legal status in the sense of de jure, contractual relations between state and 
people, and a set of equal rights (civil, political and social) granted to the members of a 
political community. It is also approached as a set of practices in the form of claims, 
recognitions and distributions of rights, as well as modes of producing membership and 
shaping conduct and attitudes. The key here is to explore the mutual constitutive 
relationship between citizenship as a legal category and as a set of practices, much as I have 
suggested doing with the concept of authority.   
The importance of focusing on modern citizenship beyond legal status has 
emerged from a series of studies in the West and recently in Africa, which have illustrated 
the critical aspects of the modern concept of citizenship (Isin and Wood 1999; Isin and 
Turner 2002). From the perspective of practice, modern citizenship has proved to be 
unequally distributed. Legal status does not automatically translate into de facto and equal 
access to rights and substantive membership, even though this may be granted de jure. As 
Isin and Turner (2002: 3) point out, “While cast in the language of inclusion, belonging and 
universalism, modern citizenship has systematically made certain groups strangers and 
outsiders”. Modern citizenship is an exclusionary category, in the generic sense not only of 
having relied on us/they categories of foreigners and nationals, but also of having produced 
de facto internal hierarchical differentiation of de jure included citizens (along the lines of, 
for example, gender, age, race, ethnicity, literacy, political affiliation etc.). This is 
expressed in terms of de facto differentiation of who in practice gains access to rights, 
resources and recognition.20 Similarly a number of Africanist scholars have recently 
pointed out that post-colonial universal and individual-based models of citizenship have 
failed to translate into practice, instead reproducing different layers of citizen–subject 
positions (von Lieres 1999; Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998; Werbner 2002; Wilmsen 
2002; Hitchcock 2002). This has happened both as an effect of state institutions’ incapacity 
to secure resources and rights for all its citizens, and/or as an aspect of the exclusionary 
politics of top-down ‘ethnification’, with national governments supporting some groups to 
the detriment of others (Halisi, Kaise and Ndegwa 1998). These perspectives hence 
underline a distinction between what can be referred to as de jure citizenship (legal status) 
                                                 
20 The critics of the modern concept of citizenship based on an individual and universalist model instead 
propose a concept of citizenship that includes the de jure recognition of group differences (for example, on 
the basis of gender, race, ethnicity and minority groups) and various forms of identification within the concept 
of citizenship (Isin and Wood 1999; see also Mouffe 1996; Young 1989). This is more conducive to genuine 
democratisation, they argue. In this thesis, I shall not go into a discussion of whether or not such a revised 
conceptualisation of citizenship is more conducive to democratisation or not. For a discussion of this in 
relation to Decree 15/2000 in Mozambique, see alternatively Kyed and Buur (2006).  
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and de facto forms of citizenship (actually enacted citizenship). The latter cannot be 
divorced from particular power relations and political practices of inclusion and exclusion 
(Isin and Turner 2002; Cruickshank 1999).  
 With these perspectives in mind, how do we then concretely study de facto 
citizenship? As in the case of the concept of authority, I explore citizenship as the product 
of legal categories, local representations and concrete practices of and interaction between 
subject populations and state representatives.  
First, I explore how citizenship is constituted through the practices that relate 
to how people (here, rural populations) gain access to particular services from the state 
(here, justice and security), i.e. how (and if) they claim these and how local state 
representatives grant them such services (Isin and Turner 2002). However, in doing this, I 
take note of the issues of power and governance that permeate state-citizen interactions, as 
Cruickshank (1999) also suggests. The production of citizenship also covers what 
Cruickshank refers to as practical technologies of citizenship (ibid.: 1-2), that is, discourses, 
programmes and other tactics that centre on shaping and regulating the conduct of citizens 
(for example, ways of acting and organising, obeying rules, hygiene, education, and so 
forth). This may be induced directly by state officials or indirectly through, for example, 
chiefs, as was the case during colonial rule, and as is inscribed in Decree 15/2000 through 
the delegation of civic-educative functions to chiefs.  
Secondly, I analyse citizenship as the production of membership of a political 
community, both as expressed in public representations and as enacted in state-citizen 
encounters. In doing this, I go beyond the formal criteria of nationality as defining 
membership, and instead explore from an empirical perspective what de facto substantive 
content categories of ‘us’ and ‘they’ are invested with: i.e. against what criteria are people 
included and excluded as citizens (such as race, ethnicity, political affiliations, rural/urban 
etc.). This follows the perspectives of Mouffe (2006) and Isin and Turner (2002) that 
‘us’/’they’ categorisations within the nation state are a generic aspect of the production of 
citizenship as a form of collective identity formation. Every identity, Mouffe holds, is 
relational: the creation of a “we” can only exist by demarcation from a “they”, that is, “the 
affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the existence of every identity, i.e. the 
perception of something ‘other’ which constitutes its ‘exterior’” (Mouffe 2006: 15). 
Citizenship is therefore viewed as based on a fundamental division internally in nation 
states in which the definition of ‘us’ relies on a “constitutive outside” (Mouffe 2006: 15) or 
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the “included excluded” (Agamben 2000: 31). This division can be seen as core aspect of 
sovereign power, that is, as the capacity to define and enact who is included and who 
excluded (ibid.). Therefore the substantive content of ‘us’/’they’ categories can tell us 
something about particular power relations and the types of division on which sovereign 
power is reconstituted. As this dissertation shows, the substantive content that ‘us’/’they’ 
categories were invested with by local state officials bore a remarkable party-political 
dimension. This had consequences for who gained access to services and voice, but it was 
also part of constituting a particular form of state authority.   
 To focus on de facto citizenship is not to deny the significance of de jure models of 
citizenship and legal categories per se. Rather, like authority, it is the relationship between 
the two that is interesting (Isin and Wood 1999: 4). Therefore it does matter that there is 
today a constitution which legally grants equal rights to individuals in Mozambique, unlike 
during the period of colonial rule. Also it is not irrelevant that Decree 15/2000, along with 
an individual-based model of citizenship, at the same time recognises rural residents as 
communities or ‘groups’ within the nation state. The question that needs to be scrutinised 
from an empirical perspective is how these legal categories are translated into everyday 
encounters, and what kinds of power relations this (re)produces.  
In doing this, I do not set out to measure whether reality fits with or is a pure mirror 
reflection of the formal model(s) of citizenship as inscribed in the Mozambican constitution 
or as pre-defined by scholars. Rather, this study is open to the possible overlap between 
different practices of and claims to citizenship, which may only be situationally enacted and 
negotiated as the rural population interacts with and is acted on by local state officials. In 
other words, I do not find it useful to limit the study to a view of citizenship as only 
occurring when it is fully in accordance with pre-defined formal models.  
This position contrasts with, for example, that of Mamdani (1996), who 
strictly adheres, it seems, to a Tocquevillian conception of citizenship, which defines 
citizens as individuals who actively participate in politics and are imbued with autonomy 
and power. They are therefore the opposite of subjects who are subjugated to authoritarian 
power and are passive and powerless (Cruickshank 1999: 21-3). Adhering to this strict 
opposition between citizens and subjects, Mamdani (1996) concludes that rural Africans are 
exclusively subjects and not citizens because they are still under the rule of chiefs as groups 
or tribes. Using the either/or categories of citizen and subject blinds us to how there may be 
overlaps and different combinations of citizen-subject positions in contemporary Africa 
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(see also Geschiere and Gugler 1998: 315). It also blinds us to the possible co-existence of 
different practices of citizenship that do not in themselves provide a mirror reflection of 
formal models. They may nonetheless be significant for the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the chiefs, state officials and the rural population.   
 
3. Methods and Fieldwork Sites  
 
The theme of this study and the analytical framework chosen to address it calls for a 
research methodology that combines a range of different forms of data, which can address 
the mutual constitutive relations between local political dynamics and national polities, as 
well as between representations and practices in local settings.  
Although this study is primarily about the repercussions of state recognition of 
traditional authority in two particular localities, Matica and Dombe, it also links these 
localities to the national, and even global, levels. This has necessitated a combination of 
long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the particular localities with a study of the wider 
political and historical contexts in which these are positioned. This is based on the 
assumptions that a focus on the outcome of a state law for practices of and claims to 
authority and citizenship requires that we look beyond locality. It is also based on the 
acknowledgement that, although marginal, rural localities may have spatial boundaries in 
people’s minds and on maps produced by the state, they cannot be regarded in the classical 
anthropological sense as ‘bounded cultural wholes’ or as ‘holistic legal systems’ with a 
shared set of uncontested rules and norms (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 1-5). Ideas, 
aspirations, laws, material resources and so forth from beyond these localities equally shape 
and sustain social life. Thus the task is consistently to have an eye on the dialogue between 
these localities and extra-local polities. In this study, the main extra-local polity is the state, 
which is approached in the various senses of its national and local institutions and 
personnel, its laws, and modalities of regulation. However, I also take into consideration 
how these are influenced by history, as well as by global tendencies and international 
actors, such as the donor community.  
In practical terms, the linkages between the local and the national, the past and the 
present, have been addressed by combining different kinds of data-collection. One part of 
data-collection was focused in the area of national legislation, public discourse and debates, 
as well as wider past and present political developments. This involved secondary historical 
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literature, donor reports, ministerial documents, interviews with key national and 
provincial-level role players (ministry staff, NGOs and donors), and analyses of laws and 
newspaper articles. The bulk of these data are used in Part I of this dissertation, where I 
explicitly address historical reconfigurations of state-chief relations, as well as how the 
coming into being of Decree 15/2000 was shaped by the linkages between local conditions, 
the wider national political context and global trends at the time. However, the linkages 
between present local political dynamics and wider past and present polities also carry over 
into the rest of the dissertation (Part II and III).  
Thus the first set of data has been triangulated with the different kinds of data that I 
collected during fieldwork in Matica and Dombe. These covered: participant observation of 
everyday practices and interactions, as well as public events, meetings and ceremonies 
using situational analysis; qualitative in-depth, semi-structured interviews (167 in total) 
with a wide range of different categories of actors; and case studies of leadership disputes 
between and within chieftaincies in the process of state recognition (6 in total), as well as of 
the settlement of disputes and delinquency (234 in total). A detailed outline of these data-
collection techniques, as well as ethical considerations pertaining to the conduct of 
fieldwork, is given in Appendix I. Here it suffices to emphasise that the triangulation of 
these different kinds of data served the purpose of addressing the interrelationship between 
representations and observable behaviour as these unfolded both in public arenas and in 
more everyday social situations. Thus the fieldwork was designed to explore the interplay 
between the ‘flow of action’ – actual interactions and practices– and the ‘flow of ideas’, 
that is, the conceptualisations and representations of people about practices, positions, 
authority, state, justice, order, rules and so forth (Nuijten 2003: 11-12; Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2001: 45-6). The way in which this was pursued was necessarily informed by the 
particular fieldwork settings, as well as being limited by my specific choice of the fields of 
policing and justice enforcement. The remainder of this section describes the fieldwork 
settings and then addresses the reason for choosing the fields of policing and justice.    
Fieldwork Settings on the Margins of the State  
A total of fourteen months of fieldwork was carried out in Dombe administrative post and 
Matica locality in 2002,21 2004 and 2005.22 These areas form part of Sussundenga District 
                                                 
21 The fieldwork in 2002 was carried out prior to the commencement of my PhD project and formed part of 
my MA Honours programme. It was done in collaboration with Lars Buur (then a post-doctoral researcher at 
the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen).  
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of Manica Province, which lies in the central part of Mozambique and shares a border with 
Zimbabwe in the east.23 This district was one of the areas affected most strongly by the 
civil war, which began here as early as 1978, when Renamo troops began incursions from 
Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). During the 1980s, Frelimo-state control was confined to urban 
and semi-urban areas surrounding the administrative capitals. The rest of the territory 
consisted of zones of combat or were controlled by Renamo. The war had devastating 
effects on the district, including massive destruction of infrastructure and the local 
economy, and it led to the displacement of huge numbers of people, as well as the 
emigration of many of those chiefs who had formed part of the colonial system of indirect 
rule. It also meant that state administrative and police presence was either sparse or fully 
absent in the rural hinterlands after the war and that the legitimacy of the state, and the 
ruling party, Frelimo, was highly contested. This was reflected in continuing pockets of 
resistance to the state in the mid-1990s and in the huge electoral victory of the opposition 
party Renamo in the first 1994 general elections. In the past two elections (1999 and 2004), 
Sussundenga District remained a Renamo stronghold.  
My choice of Sussundenga District was based on these legacies of the war, which 
meet the criteria of what a number of scholars have referred to as ‘the margins of the state’: 
that is, spaces where state control of territory and people is incomplete and contested, 
where people are viewed as insufficiently socialized into the law and order of the state, and 
where practices of regulation and ordering are often taken care of by non-state actors (Das 
and Poole 2004; Worby 1998; Tsing 1993). To situate this study in an area on the margins 
of the state follows the assumption that these provide particularly privileged spaces for 
understanding often taken-for-granted processes of state intervention and the production of 
the state as an idea and a locus of sovereignty. This is because, in these spaces there is a 
continual need for the state’s modes of order and law-making to be re-founded, as it meets 
with the practices and politics of life in the margins (Das and Poole 2004: 8).  
The particular choice of the areas of Dombe and Matica was intended to have a 
comparative advantage because they represent two different scales of the margins of the 
state. This accorded with two main criteria of selection: first, geographical proximity to the 
district capital; and secondly, the scope of the state’s presence and regulation during the 
                                                                                                                                                     
22 Administrative posts are the second lowest level of the Mozambican state administration, and locality the 
lowest. These fall under districts and provinces. Some fieldwork was also carried out in Mouha administrative 
post because this is where the paramount chief of those sub-chiefs residing in Matica lives.  
23 Sussundenga covers an area of 7,060 sq. km and, according to the 1997 census, had a total population of 
92,622. 
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colonial, earlier post-colonial and war-time periods, with the latter corresponding to a 
division between the areas controlled by Frelimo and Renamo. This difference was also 
reflected in the extent to which existing chiefs and sub-chiefs had informally collaborated 
with Renamo militias (Dombe) and Frelimo-state officials (Matica).  
Matica locality lies in the northern part of the district, bordering Mouha 
administrative post in the west and the district capital of Sussundenga in the east. The main 
village of Matica, where the head of the administration is located, lies only 22 kilometres 
from the district capital. According to the 1997 census, it had a total population of 7,841.  
During the civil war, the main village and its surrounding areas were under the control of 
the Frelimo-state administration, which managed to set up the new party-state structures, 
organised around communal villages, co-operatives and a state farm. The latter was 
established on the premises of the former Portuguese Empresa Agrícola de Sussundenga 
(agricultural business), which, since the late colonial period, consisted of private 
Portuguese-owned farms with high rates of agricultural production employing hundreds of 
local workers. In the last period of the civil war, the main village of Matica was turned into 
a concentration of refugees predominantly from Dombe, and it received large amounts of 
foreign aid for the provision of food and basic services. In addition, this period marked 
increased informal collaboration between chiefs and Frelimo-state officials, despite the 
official ban. This war history left its marks on the post-war period. First, it meant that the 
population of Matica at the time of my fieldwork comprised a mixture of the native Chi-
Teve speaking group and those Chi-Ndau speakers from Dombe who had chosen not to 
return after the war.24 Secondly, the re-establishment of a functioning state apparatus in 
areas outside the main village happened quickly and relatively smoothly after the war, 
which could not be divorced from the fact that the two main sub-chiefs of the area 
supported the ruling party and were willing to collaborate with it. Thirdly, by the time the 
Decree was being implemented, Matica too was experiencing various post-war 
government-launched (and donor-financed) development inputs (schools, health posts, 
agricultural associations), as well as settlements on the former privately owned farms by 
better off Mozambicans. Since the mid-1990s, Matica had also experienced a gradual influx 
of private investors and NGOs launching community-based development projects. From 
2001 this also included white Zimbabwean and South African farmers looking for farming 
                                                 
24 According to data collected by Alexander (1994: 19), by 1993 there were a total of 12,615 former Dombe 
residents living in the bairros of Matica. No updated figures became available during fieldwork, but it was 
clear that at least half of these had returned to Dombe.    
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opportunities. Although the majority of Maticans lived off subsistence farming, this also 
meant increased labour opportunities and income from the selling of produce. In short, by 
the time the Decree was being implemented, Matica was not a new territory of state 
intervention, state collaboration with local chiefs and development investments. In all these 
respects Dombe differed from Matica.    
Dombe administrative post lies in the southern part of the district, its main village 
being 80 kilometres from the district capital. It is the largest administrative post in the 
district in both territory and population (totalling 45,234 people in 2001 compared to 
36,324 in 1997). Its main native population consists of the Chi-Ndau-speaking people. 
From the ministerial corridors of Maputo to provincial government officials, Dombe was 
referred to as uma zona de confusão (literally ‘a zone of confusion’) associated with 
insecurity, crime and backwardness. When contemplating doing fieldwork there, I was 
warned by various officials and academics in Maputo that this was too dangerous a place to 
work and that the chiefs would be hostile to any foreign encroachment. This perception of 
Dombe was intimately related to its history as a Renamo-controlled zone. It had been the 
‘provincial’ headquarters of Renamo’s military organisation in Manica Province from the 
beginning of the 1980s. Renamo’s early arrival in the hinterlands of Dombe from 1978 
meant that the area turned into a zone of intensive combat, leading to mass population 
displacements and the disintegration of the chieftaincies. Importantly, it also meant that the 
Frelimo-state presence was confined to the main village of Dombe and its vicinity from an 
early stage. None of the new post-independence development schemes and political 
structures was set up outside this area. In 1991 Renamo also managed to take over the main 
village and to establish its parallel system of governance throughout the territory of Dombe. 
This system also included intensive collaboration with the eight paramount chiefs of 
Dombe, which in the majority of cases included substitutes for those who had acted during 
colonial rule. Renamo control of Dombe village lasted until the end of 1995 (three years 
after the Peace Accord), when the state’s administrative and police presence was re-
established after several failed attempts caused by overt resistance from a number of chiefs, 
Renamo militias and the rural population. For similar reasons of hostility, the re-
establishment of the state was not successfully achieved in the rural hinterlands until the 
period from 1999 to 2001, which in many areas coincided with the first initiatives 
concerning the state recognition of chiefs.  
 40
The history of Renamo control meant that post-war foreign-aid distributions, NGO 
projects, private business investments and infrastructural reconstruction only commenced 
from the late 1990s. Rather, besides subsidence farming, the local economy had been 
sustained by migrant labour to South Africa and Zimbabwe. The latter represented a legacy 
of colonial rule, under which Dombe provided a pool for forced migrant labour, rather than 
an area of Portuguese agricultural investment. In short, by the time of my first fieldwork in 
2002, Dombe was still, relatively speaking, a new territory of state administrative and 
development intervention. In fact, state recognition of the chiefs marked the first visit by a 
post-colonial district administrator to the chieftaincies in the rural hinterlands.   
Choices and limits of the study 
This study is limited by the fact that fieldwork was carried out in two particular localities in 
Sussundenga District, a former war zone and Renamo stronghold. This necessarily 
compromises the breadth of the research and the extent to which it can be generalized. I 
therefore do not claim that my findings constitute a basis for generalisations about the 
repercussions of state recognition of traditional authority in Mozambique as a whole. 
Limiting fieldwork to two localities nonetheless reflected two key assumptions. First, it is 
imperative in winning the confidence of informants necessary to obtain in-depth 
information, even on sensitive issues such as politics, authority, power, conflicts and crime. 
Secondly, it is based on the idea that long-term involvement in particular localities is 
imperative if a researcher wants to obtain a profound understanding of local dynamics and 
the interdependencies between practices, representations and socio-political conditions. 
Another limitation of the study is that, in addressing the third sub-set of 
analytical questions – i.e. how the relationship between state and chiefs was organised and 
practised following the formal recognition of chiefs – I chose to focus particularly on 
policing and justice enforcement. These are only two of the many tasks that chiefs are 
obliged to assist the state with according to Decree 15/2000. This choice involved omitting 
a detailed study of, for example, the tasks of tax collection, land allocation and 
development planning, although by being in these areas for a long time I did, of course, 
follow developments within these fields as well. I made the choice of policing and justice 
enforcement partly because I simply could not achieve the requirements of in-depth, 
qualitative ethnographic research if I covered equally all the prescribed areas of 
collaboration between chiefs and the state. Importantly, I had learned from fieldwork in 
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2002 that state officials gave a high priority to these fields, and that the chiefs themselves 
and many members of the rural population also identified chiefly authority with the ability 
to resolve conflicts and dispense justice. From an analytical point of view, I also expected 
policing and justice enforcement to be privileged fields of action and interaction in which to 
observe the exercise of authority and the enactment of the criteria for proper citizenship and 
community membership. This involved studying court sessions, police hearings, everyday 
policing activities, following a large number of disputes and criminal cases, and talking to 
people about ongoing practices and their notions of justice, order and disorder.  
I assumed that these were privileged fields for two main reasons. First, 
policing and the enforcement of justice cover those social spaces and practices that 
explicitly revolve around the authority to regulate, sanction and enforce rules and norms 
(state-legal and otherwise) of proper conduct and social relationships.25  In short, I assumed 
these to be spaces where de facto forms of authority enforcement and categorisations of 
human beings as members of a social order are explicitly at stake.26 Secondly, these two 
activities provide social spaces in which rural residents directly address state and non-state 
authorities in pursuit of particular services. Their reasons and possibilities for doing so and 
the extent to which they abide by the judgements made can provide insights into the 
legitimacy of different forms of authority.  
These assumptions are based on a particular understanding of policing and 
justice enforcement. In this study, policing is understood as a mode of ordering and 
                                                 
25 In this study, unlike much of the literature on legal pluralism, I do not use the concept of law as a broad 
cover term for all kinds of normative orders, including rules, patterns and processes of social ordering in 
social groups of whatever size (family and to the international level) (see, for example, Griffiths 1986; 
Galanter 1981). Instead I use the concepts of rules and norms, as well as rule- and norm-enforcement, as 
analytical categories covering both domains defined as state and non-state. At a general level, norms are 
defined as standards for right/good and wrong/bad behaviour, whereas rules are understood as prescriptions 
and proscriptions for conduct and action. Yet I distinguish between a) lived rules and norms as pertaining to 
everyday routine and habitual aspects of social life; b) rules and norms as identified and represented (verbally 
or in writing); and c) rules and norms as enforced by institutions within particular social spaces, including 
principles of enforcement and sanctions, which may or may not be backed by force. The concept of law (lei in 
Portuguese) is treated as a sub-category of rules and norms. In line with Tamanaha (2000), it is used in this 
study as what people in the fieldwork setting referred to as law (lei), which was always associated with the 
state. This included a) the rules codified by and embedded in the state legal order; and b) the non-codified 
rules communicated by local state officials as lei and enforced as such. By contrast, people used the concept 
of mutemo (literally ‘to command’ or ‘to order’, but also translated as ‘tradition’) when speaking about the 
rules enforced in the chiefs’ courts.   
26 I realise that these are not the only spaces in which the regulation and ordering of society and individual 
conduct takes place. It is crucial to recognise that there are also more subtle and mundane forms of the 
‘conduct of conduct’ – e.g. as shown by the work of Michel Foucault, such as the disciplinary forms of power 
in schools, prisons, the workplace etc., or as the forms of social ordering that take place in the family and in 
everyday interactions. However, as Oomen points out (2005: 209), courts nonetheless provide symbolically 
and materially distinct social spaces, where power relations are laid bare, and where rules and norms are 
explicated, negotiated and potentially reaffirmed.      
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regulation in accordance with some prior definition of order and disorder, and with the use 
of an array of possible instruments (surveillance, patrols, arrests, searches, inspection, and 
protection). These instruments may or may not be viewed by the subjects of policing as 
being in accordance with their own notions of order and disorder (Hills 2000: 6). Justice 
enforcement is understood as the application of moral standards in accordance with 
different, sometimes contradictory rules and norms of fair and proper treatment and the 
restoration of order (Maiese 2003).  
The emphasis here on the differences and possible contradictions between 
notions of order and disorder, as well as the instruments applied to restore or enforce order, 
is important to this study. It is viewed as permeating the ways in which distinctions 
between state and chiefs are produced in representations and rules, and it is approached as 
influencing the practical engagements of ordinary people with existing authorities and vice 
versa. In paying attention to these aspects, I also soon discovered that, to understand how 
the relationship between chiefs and the state institutions was organised and practised, it was 
necessary to go beyond both Decree 15/2000 and chiefs and state officials. I also had to 
address other post-war legislation on policing and justice enforcement and the wider plural 
landscape of institutions in Matica and Dombe that also played a role in the provision of 
justice, conflict resolution and order-making. Some of these existed inside codified state-
law and others outside it: for example, the semi-official community courts, the secretários 
of villages and suburbs – who used to form part of previous Frelimo-state structures, and 
who were also recognised by the state as community authorities in 2004 – the policing 
assistants and council of elders of chiefs’ courts, and the wadzi-nyanga (traditional healers), 
who played an indispensable role in the many cases of witchcraft and spirit possessions. 
Although the main interest of this study is chiefs and state officials, these other kinds of 
institutions also shaped the way in which the jurisdictions between state and chiefs were 
defined and the authority of each reconstituted.  
 
4. Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This thesis is divided into three parts, addressing respectively: history and policy-making,   
de jure conferring of authority to chiefs; and everyday practices and modes of organisation 
within policing and justice enforcement. Cutting across these is a focus on the relational 
reconstitution of chieftaincy and shifting polities, as this is expressed in both 
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representations and practices. However, it should be clear that the bulk of this dissertation 
is concentrated on the post-war period in Matica and Dombe.      
PART I attends to history and post-war policy-making. It deals with how  
‘traditional authority’ as a local political figure and state-legal category has, over time, been 
reconfigured in relation to shifting polities in general, and as an element of the post-war 
democratic transition in particular. The part is divided into three chapters.  
- Chapter 2 is a historical chapter, which traces the changing configurations 
of the chieftaincies in Dombe and Matica in relation to shifting polity-formations, from the 
pre-colonial conquests to the peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992. It 
shows that the relational reconstitution of local chieftaincies and shifting states or kingdoms 
has deep historical roots. Each polity-formation extensively reconfigured local 
chieftaincies, but each was also reshaped by compromises with the societies over which 
they sought to rule. This happened even when the mambos (local word for chief) were 
formally banned by the post-colonial Frelimo government. That said, the chapter also 
shows that every past mode of governing the rural areas provided no exemplary historical 
reference point for re-inserting ‘traditional authority’ into post-war democratic governance. 
- Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 address how ‘traditional authority’ became an object of 
national policy-making and ultimately of legislation at the very moment of the post-war 
democratic transition. Chapter 3 discusses the nine-year long policy-making process of the 
1990s in which the category of real ‘traditional authority’ became the subject of intensive 
research and politically infused classificatory struggles. It shows that a multifaceted 
interplay between local, national and global conditions and varied actor positions impacted 
on how traditional authority became re-imagined and re-defined to fit with post-war 
democratic legislation. Importantly, struggles over defining real traditional authority 
extended beyond traditional authority itself. It formed part of reconstituting the power 
positions of other actors than chiefs, and these actors’ models of rural society, the state, the 
nation and democratic governance: i.e. state officials, political parties, international donors 
and Mozambican academics. Chapter 4 discusses the end product of the contested policy-
making process, Decree 15/2000 and the categorisations of ‘traditional authority’, ‘rural 
community’ and ‘local state’ that informed it. It shows that Decree 15/2000 was a 
compromise between various, partly contradictory post-war agendas, but that this relied on 
a de-historicised, de-politicised simplification of the reality of chieftaincy and rural 
community that it sought to recognise.  
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This simplification of local reality becomes clear in PART II, where we return to 
Dombe and Matica. This part is divided into two chapters, which focus on how Decree 
15/2000 was translated by local state officials in and around the official steps of 
identifying, legitimising and granting de jure recognition to traditional, community 
authorities. It discusses how the decree was employed to stabilise, fix and regulate existing 
chieftaincies – the chiefs and ‘their’ communities – as an element in re-establishing state 
administrative presence and consolidating Frelimo-state authority.  
- Chapter 5 shows that the relational constitution of state, chiefs and community 
was not a straightforward process. It was shaped by the contested reality of community, 
conflicts between chiefly contestants, and by the intertwining of different scripts deriving 
from colonial and post-colonial state formation and from a culture of power related to 
secrecy and the family. Focusing on the activities of identifying and legitimising traditional 
leaders, Chapter 5 points to the reproduction of local power relations and the practical 
dimensions of state-bureaucratic intervention, which both sacrificed the democratic 
credentials of the Decree allowing ordinary citizens to participate in legitimising authority. 
- Chapter 6 explores the state-orchestrated recognition ceremonies at which chiefs 
signed a state contract and received paraphernalia, and the meanings that different people 
attached to state recognition. The chapter brings us into the symbolic-representational 
dimension of state formation in the form of the medium of political, state rituals. It shows 
that de jure recognition of chiefs and ‘the tradition’ was accompanied by staged 
celebrations and displays of superior state authority. This relational constitution of state and 
traditional authority in a ceremonially staged form also relied on representations of an 
ideal-model relationship between state authority, chiefs and community citizens, in which 
notions of both shared nationhood and hierarchical distinctions were pervasive. Permeating 
these representations was a historically embedded political script of the Frelimo party-state. 
This was also reflected in the meanings that different people attached to state recognition of 
chiefs.  
  PART III takes us to the post-recognition period and addresses how the 
relationship between the state and chiefs was organised and practised within the fields of 
policing and justice enforcement. It looks at the productive tension between regulation, 
boundary-marking and adjustments, boundary-crossing, within public spaces, everyday 
practices and representations. The part consists of four chapters and ends by discussing, at a 
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broader theoretical level, what the productive tension teaches us about de facto authority 
and citizenship in Matica and Dombe.  
- Chapter 7 explores how the local state police tried to organise and regulate the 
local institutional landscape of policing and justice enforcement. It shows that such 
processes of regularisation took the form of a set of locally adjusted, extra-legal rules or 
‘models for practice’ to fix the boundaries between distinct state and non-state jurisdictions. 
The chapter asks what issues of power were at stake in these forms of boundary-marking 
and what repercussions this had for the chiefs. It argues that state recognition of a distinct 
domain of traditional authority also criminalised those self-proclaimed mandates of chiefs 
that competed with the state police’s claim to sovereign authority. Boundary-marking 
served to reconstitute local state sovereignty by incorporating the chiefs, yet setting them 
apart from the state. 
- Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 discuss the every-day patterns of action and interaction 
that I identified within various forms of case settlement, and the meanings people attached 
to these. It shows that different layers of situational adjustment constantly befuddled the 
state police’s classificatory boundaries between distinct domains, and that even police 
officers engaged in this. Also chiefs’ assertions of difference from the state were 
precarious. Contestations and negotiations of boundaries were constantly at stake. Practical 
and ideological fusions co-existed in a productive tension with articulations of distinctions. 
These two chapters ask why this was so and what was at stake. It argues that, for chiefs and 
state officials, authority and power were at stake. This both shaped and was reshaped by 
ordinary people’s strategic manoeuvring and their preferences for justice, their perceptions 
of order and disorder, and their views of the state and the chiefs.  
- Chapter 10 discusses the wider meanings of the patterns of action and interaction 
for conceptualising de facto authority and citizenship, and in doing this reengages with the 
existing Africanist literature on state and chieftaincy. It argues that the productive tension 
between distinctions and practical fusions gave way to negotiable and hybrid forms of both 
state and chiefly authority. This also underscored de facto citizenship as situationally 
enacted, partially inclusive and conditional. The result is high levels of uncertainty in the 
exercise of authority. In the last part of chapter 10 I draw out a case from Dombe to discuss 
the flipside of this uncertainty for the prospects of political pluralism, citizen inclusion and 
democratic engagements. This surfaced during “exceptional situations” in which the 
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sovereign power of the Frelimo-state was directly contested, and negotiations were 
substituted by violent responses and political exclusions.  
  - Chapter 11 concludes the dissertation by summarising the main results of the 
study, and by discussing their theoretical implications.         
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Chapter 2  
From Partial Invention to Feeble Banning 
 
 
This chapter attends to the legacies of the past. It consists of a historical analysis of the 
changing configurations of the chieftaincies in Matica and Dombe in conjunction with past 
modes of governing the rural areas by shifting expansionary polity formations. The periods 
covered range from the pre-colonial kingdoms to the period of war-time governance until 
the peace agreement between Frelimo and Renamo in 1992.27   
The aim of the chapter is twofold. First, it provides the historical background 
for exploring, in the remainder of this Part I, how ‘traditional authority’ became the subject 
of national policy debates and state legislation in the post-war democratic transition. 
Secondly, it is intended to provide a background to how Decree 15/2000 was implemented 
by local state officials and how chiefs and ordinary people reacted to it in the areas under 
study, which are dealt with in Part II and III. The main assumption is that the past is 
significant to the present in two different senses. The past is important as a “political 
symbol” (Keesing 1992: 19) in the sense of explicit references to the past in legitimising 
and de-legitimising practices and claims in the present, such as in chiefs’ claims to 
legitimate authority and in the policy-makers’ definition of the category of ‘traditional 
authority’ in Decree 15/2000. Equally significant is the past as a continuous historical 
process of cumulative activity and the slow alteration of practices and meaning-making. 
This meaning of the past refers to the ‘spill over’ of practices and ideas, irrespective of 
wider polity changes (Geertz 1980: 5). Although in Mozambique such changes have 
officially been cast as radical breaks from earlier polities, past modes of governing the rural 
areas have made an imprint on present-day administrative organisation, habits and styles of 
governing by local state officials and chiefs, as well as on ways of perceiving the state and 
traditional authority by the people in the areas under study (Santos 2006: 48).  
To trace the legacies of the past, this chapter is divided into four sections. 
These deal with four main historical periods of the wider polity formations that I have 
identified as significant in reshaping the chieftaincies in Matica and Dombe: first, the pre-
                                                 
27 The insights presented are based on a combination of secondary historical material and oral narratives 
obtained during fieldwork. For a remarkable and detailed account of Mozambican history, see Newitt (1995); 
Hedges 1993; Hall and Young (1997); Coehlo (1993); Alden (2001); Serra (2000).     
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colonial period (1400-1891), from the conquests of the Manica area by the Shona-Karanga 
mambos (local word for ‘chief’) to the subsequent attempts by the QuiTeve and Ngunis 
kings to centralise power and subordinate the mambos under a wider territorial polity; 
secondly, Portuguese colonial rule (1891-1975), which shifted from private Company rule 
in the Manica-Sofala area and an ad hoc use of chiefs (in Manica from 1896-1947) to direct 
administration by the Portuguese state and formalised indirect rule through chiefs (Manica 
from 1947-1975); thirdly, the first period of post-colonial nation-state formation by Frelimo 
(1975-1987), which replaced the chiefs with new party-state structures, to Frelimo’s war-
time compromises with chiefs in Matica; and finally, the period of Renamo war-time 
governance (1979-1992) of the Dombe area, which led to the re-insertion of the mambos.28  
 In each of these periods, I approach the concept of ‘modes of governing’ as 
encompassing three elements of polity formation: the organisation of territorial control and 
hierarchies of authority (e.g. centralisation or decentralisation of power, the military and the 
state administration); practices of governing (e.g. extraction of resources, labour and 
revenue, and regulation of human behaviour through coercion, rewards, conscription, 
categorisations and/or discipline); and ideological claims to a particular basis of legitimate 
authority (e.g. spirits, tradition, the law, civilisation, the people). The focus on these three 
elements makes it possible to compare the shifting polities, and it corresponds with my 
main approach to processes of constituting authority and consolidating power across 
territorial space as involving both practical and representational-ideological dimensions. 
 
1. The Pre-colonial Reformation of Mambos  
 
Present-day claims to an unchanging pre-colonial past of authentic ‘traditional authority’ 
neglect the fact that African forms of expansionary polity-formation preceded the European 
ones and considerably reshaped local forms of authority. This was also the case in what 
today are the Matica and Dombe areas of Manica Province. In fact, the mambos of these 
areas who were recognised in 2002 shared a common myth of origin in present-day 
Zimbabwe. The forms of socio-political organisation that were established with the 
invasion from Zimbabwe were later reshaped by two successive African polity-formations: 
the QuiTeve and Nguni kingdoms. The latter polities represented the first attempts to 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that there are considerable overlaps between these periods, which are distinguished here 
for analytical purposes: there were no total, abrupt shifts from one polity formation to another.  
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centralise power over a wider territorial space and to introduce a rudimentary repertoire of 
governing practices to extract tribute and labour. In this section, we shall trace these pre-
colonial reformations of the mambos.  
The Shona-Karanga: the origin of the mambo 
The va-Ndau chiefs of Dombe and the va-Teve chiefs of Matica shared a common myth of 
origin related to the Shona-Karanga invasion from Zimbabwe sometime in the 1400s 
(Newitt 1995: 32-41). The story goes that Muriani, a descendant of the M’biri king, who 
had made himself independent of the larger Monomotapa kingdom of Great Zimbabwe, 
arrived with his clan members in search of cattle-grazing opportunities and fertile land.29  
Muriane gradually managed to establish the Shona-Karanga as the ruling clan over the 
native Tsonga populations, which consisted of smaller, dispersed family clusters with no 
centralised authority. Muriani did this, the story goes, by distributing his ‘sons and 
‘daughters’ across the territory of what are today Sussundenga and Gondola Districts (see 
also Newitt 1995: 32-41; Florêncio 2005; Artur 1999).30 By 2002, the common ancestry 
from Muriani was still marked by the Dombe and Matica chiefs’ identification with a 
common totemic clan (dzinza). A chieftaincy near Sussundenga district capital still has the 
name Muriani or Muribane.   
According to Newitt (1995) and Artur (1999: 74-5), the invasion from 
Zimbabwe led to a relatively peaceful merger of the socio-political organisation of the 
Tsonga with the Shona-Karanga. This was probably, Florêncio (2005) and Newitt (1995) 
suggest, because the Shona-Karanga chieftaincies did not attempt to create a singular 
political-territorial structure under the control of a common centre, nor did they develop 
practices of governing that relied on the extraction of tribute and labour on a large scale. 
Rather, the period was characterised by small and autonomous territorial chieftaincies, 
where a mambo (chief) of the ruling family (ucama) of a given territory (nyaka) would 
share decision-making power with a council of elders (matombo) of the most important 
Tsonga families. A nyaka consisted of a number of families with one superior family 
(ucama), characterised by extended agnatic parenthood. The nyaka of a mambo was divided 
                                                 
29 With regard to the distribution of ‘daughters’, I shall return in Chapter 4 to the system of female chiefs that 
formed part of Muribani’s political-territorial organisation (in Portuguese rainhas or queens, and in chi-Ndau 
and chi-teve mambo we mukadzi or female chief) and that still have significance today for claims to legitimate 
authority.  
30 On the Monomotapa kingdom, see Newitt (1995), Florêncio (2005).  
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into sub-chieftaincies led by a mambo moducu (later sabuku), and below these were smaller 
units overseen by sagutas. There was no superior authority over the mambos.  
According to Florencio (2005) and present-day oral accounts the legitimate 
authority of the mambos was primarily attached to their ability to mediate between the 
woku Wadzimu (the world of the ancestral spirits) and the wa Penhe (the world of the 
living) in securing prosperity and protection.31 The superiority of the mambo was attached 
to the notion that the ancestral spirits of the mambo clan were more powerful than the 
spirits (vadzimu) of the native families. According to Flôrencio (2005: 110-115), no mambo 
claimed superior spiritual authority over other mambos, which accords with the lack of any 
wider territorial centralisation of power. The QuiTeve king tried to change this situation 
approximately a century after the Shona-Karanga invasion.  
The QuiTeve Kingdom: towards centralisation 
From the mid-1500s to the 1820s, the QuiTeve kingdom gradually claimed territorial 
control over the wider area between the Revué and Búzi rivers (today the districts of 
Sussundenga, Manica and Mossurize). It differed from the Shona-Karanga chieftaincies by 
developing a centralised power base around the king’s court and his immediate subjects, 
and by attempting to incorporate the smaller territorial chieftaincies of mambos under the 
superior authority of the king (Newitt 1995: 40-5; Florêncio 2005: 80-5). The king’s claim 
to legitimate authority rested on spiritual superiority over the mambos. This was 
exemplified by attempts to monopolise the woku wadzimu through the use of spirit 
mediums concentrated at the central court (zimbabwei) of the king. 
The main organisation of the kingdom rested on direct rule of the subjects in 
the immediate vicinity of the king’s base of central power, and on indirect rule over the 
surrounding territories through the mambos. The dominant practices of governing 
combined the use of coercive power for the yielding of tribute with the delegation of 
ceremonial and tributary functions to the mambos. The latter were given material rewards 
for collecting tribute from amongst their subjects to sustain the king (Newitt 1995: 50).32 
This ‘mode of governing’ largely left intact the socio-political organisation of the territorial 
                                                 
31 This kind of mediation was facilitated by mambos’ common use of the spirit medium chad-Zviquiro, who, 
according to oral accounts, originated from M’biri in Zimbabwe.  
32 In the eighteenth century, the QuiTeve kingdom also made the first contacts with Arab and Portuguese 
traders, from whom the king acquired tribute to bolster his economic power (Florêncio 2005: 80-1). 
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chieftaincies, but it expanded the functions of the mambos and tried to make them pledge 
loyalty to a superior, centralised authority.    
Notwithstanding its influence, the QuiTeve kingdom’s attempt to establish an 
enduring polity was never completed, and its claim to superior spiritual authority over the 
mambos remained contested. The territorial chieftaincies continued to be relatively 
autonomous, their connection to the central power unstable and fluctuating (Newitt 1995: 
45-6; Flôrencio 1995: 80-1). The weakness of the QuiTeve kingdom, Newitt (1995: 46-47) 
suggests, was probably due to the lack of sufficient institutional backing for the control of 
territory, such as a permanent military force. That said, the QuiTeve-kingdom was 
relatively successful in blocking attempts by the Portuguese to establish permanent 
settlements in the interior (as they did, for example, from the 1600s in other areas of 
Mozambique such as present-day Tete, Zambezia, Angoshe and Sofala on the coast).33 In 
fact the end of the QuiTeve kingdom in the 1820s (Florêncio 2005: 80-1) led to the 
surrender of the mambos not to the Portuguese, but to Nguni invaders from the south.  
The Nguni kingdom: towards state-formation  
The expansionary polity-formation of the Nguni kings, finally leading to the Gaza Empire, 
has been referred to by scholars like Newitt (1995) as the first form of state-formation in 
the area under study (1830s–1895).34 In comparison with the QuiTeve kingdom, this was 
marked by the development of a much more pervasive form of centralised power under a 
singular ruler, with a military force capable of controlling resources and incorporating 
conquered people into the fabric of the polity. Like the QuiTeve, the Nguni relied on 
incorporating the smaller territorial chieftaincies under the sovereign authority of the king, 
but in doing so they developed a more extensive system of indirect rule over a much larger 
territorial space. The practices of governing indirectly through the mambos also expanded 
from the mere collection of tribute to the recruitment of slaves and soldiers to the king 
(ibid.: 257-9). As opposed to the QuiTeve, the Nguni kings made no claims to spiritual 
superiority over the mambos. The authority of Nguni kingdom was largely based on 
coercion, material rewards and military protection. According to Newitt (1995), the Nguni 
                                                 
33 The Portuguese did attempt to overthrow the QuiTeve king during their gold expeditions in the 1500s, but 
this failed in the sense of gaining control of the wider territorial-chieftaincies (Newitt 1995: 58).   
34 The Nguni emerged from the Zulus as a result of the disintegration of the Chaka kingdom in present-day 
South Africa. Newitt (1995) relates the Nguni invasions into present-day Mozambique to the Nguni’s 
increased need for cattle to trade with the Portuguese on the coast, as well as to the drought in the 1790s, 
which made it increasingly difficult for Nguni leaders to support their subjects.                                                                                 
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kingdom resembled a kind of tributary-military state (ibid: 261-2). Despite its influence, 
however, it was also fraught by internal struggles over power and by the increased 
competition over territorial control between itself, the Portuguese and the British. These 
factors also meant that the capital of the kingdom shifted location over time.  
In the area under study, the Nguni invasion commenced in 1830s, with a 
military faction led by N’xaba. He managed to destroy the QuiTeve kingdom and for ten 
years consolidated his power over the existing territorial chieftaincies (Newitt 1995: 260-1). 
Like the QuiTeve, N’xaba allowed the pre-existing socio-political organisation of the 
mambos to continue, as long as they paid tribute, recruited soldiers and slaves, and 
recognised Nguni overlordship. N’xaba nonetheless introduced a new hierarchy amongst 
the mambos by crowning Muriani ‘mambo of mambos’.  
In the late 1840s, N’xaba was defeated by his Nguni rival Soshongana (Newitt 
1995: 260-1). Soshangane moved the capital of the kingdom from the central to the 
southern part of present-day Mozambique, establishing what is today is referred to as the 
Gaza state, which in the 1850 and 1860s covered the whole of what is today southern 
Mozambique (with the exception of Inhambane and Maputo ports, which were held by the 
Portuguese), western Zimbabwe and northern Transvaal) (ibid.: 261-2). The movement of 
the capital meant that the area under study became under less direct rule. As in the QuiTeve 
period, the central core of the kingdom (today Gaza Province) was under the direct rule of 
the king. The peripheral zones were governed indirectly through a hierarchy of Nguni 
chiefs, with below them the Shona-Karanga mambos. This system slightly changed again 
when Soshongana was succeeded by his son Umzila, who moved the capital back to the 
central part of present-day Mozambique (today Mussorize district just south of Dombe) 
(Florêncio 2005: 88-9).  
During Umzila’s rule, the Portuguese began to gain control of the northern 
part of Manica and the southern part of Gaza (Newitt 1995: 348-9), which considerably 
weakened the kingdom. Umzila’s successor, Ngungunyane (from 1894), was nonetheless 
able to regain some of the lost territory through a strategy of shifting alliances and 
agreements with the British and the Portuguese, who during this period were themselves 
competing for territorial control and access to resources. In 1889, battles over the Manica 
area between the Portuguese, the British and Ngungunyane led the latter to return to the old 
capital in Gaza. He managed to hold considerable sway over the south until he was defeated 
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by the Portuguese in 1895, four years after the British and the Portuguese signed an 
agreement establishing Mozambique as a Portuguese colony (Newitt 1995: 351-2).  
The Nguni kingdom’s introduction of a hierarchy of chieftaincies, military-
tributary practices of governing, and its movement of subjects considerably altered pre-
existing forms of socio-political organisation and the functions of mambos in the areas 
under study. It also meant that the chieftaincies of the interior of today’s Sussundenga 
District were, despite the contacts between the Nguni and the Portuguese, largely left 
untouched by Portuguese control. Importantly, as we shall see next, the Nguni’s ‘modes of 
governing’ also created the conditions for, and were to a large extent imitated by, early 
Portuguese forms of colonial rule (Newitt 1995: 261). 
 
2. The Colonial Invention of the Régulo 
 
Like the Nguni, to begin with the Portuguese were preoccupied with widening their 
territorial control, subjecting local chiefs to their rule, and developing  practices of 
governing to extract tribute and exploit indigenous labour, e.g. for plantations and the 
mines in South Africa.35 In the areas under study, the fate of the mambos during colonial 
rule (1891-1975) was characterised by a contested and gradual process of increased 
incorporation, regulation and transformation. In fact, it was only from the 1930s that the 
Portuguese developed a formalised and extensive system of indirect rule of the rural 
population through régulos (the new title granted to the mambos by the Portuguese). This 
happened in conjunction with the gradual expansion of a uniform territorial and 
administrative organisation and an intensification of the practices of governing the conduct 
of the rural ‘natives’. The latter was exemplified by a gradual move from Nguni-style forms 
of extracting tribute and labour to modern practices of statecraft (such as codified mappings 
and the classifying of territories and people) and finally modes of governing the conduct of 
populations (such as education, hygiene, development and habitation) (Scott 1998). All 
along, however, the attempts of the Portuguese to achieve superior authority ‘internally’ in 
the colony rested by and large on coercion and rewards, just as had been the case with the 
Nguni. Unlike the Nguni, however, the colony’s basic claim to legitimacy was vested in 
European agreements and ideology.   
                                                 
35 The Portuguese colony was largely financed by migratory labour agreements with the mines in South 
Africa (see First 1983).  
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From the turn of the twentieth century, the ideology underpinning the colonial 
polity was marked by a gradual shift from an assimilationist to a segregationist ideology, 
which was partly tied to the quest for indigenous labour (Newitt 1995: 382-4). This was 
marked by the indigenato system, which introduced a racial-cultural division of the 
population into indígenas (Africans or subjects) and não-indígenas (Europeans or 
citizens).36 Reflecting bifurcated polities in other colonies (see Mamdani 1996), the não-
indígenas were granted full Portuguese citizenship rights, whereas the indígenas were 
defined as subjects under African custom and the specific laws of the colony.37 This system 
laid the first seeds for a combination of direct and indirect rule (Mamdani 1996).38 It was 
initially marked by the new territorial-administrative hierarchy established by law in 1907, 
which divided districts into circunscrições and postos administrativos in the rural indígenas 
areas and into conselhos in the urban não-indígenas areas (Coelho 1993: 100-1). In the 
rural areas, under the 1907 law Portuguese administrators of postos were to exercise 
control, recruit labour and collect hut taxes through indigenous cabos, and below these 
through local chiefs (now granted the new title of régulo).   
In practice, however, this administrative organisation of the colony was not 
implemented straightforwardly across the entire colonial territory from the outset. This was 
not least the case in areas such as the interior of Manica, where the Portuguese had no prior 
permanent settlements. Here in the first forty years of colonial rule administration was 
outsourced to a private company before it came under direct Portuguese control. In the 
following we shall trace the development of colonial rule in the areas under study, focusing 
on how it increasingly reshaped the territorial chieftaincies of the mambos. We begin with 
the period of private company rule, followed by the intermediate and late periods of direct 
Portuguese administration and the increased intensification of indirect rule.    
                                                 
36 In 1917 a third category of Mozambican residence was introduced, the assimilado or assimilated, a category 
of citizen with inferior status. In practice it mainly included those with an Asian or mixed racial background, 
but it could also include native Africans who had obtained an education (O’Laughling 2000: 13).  
37 According to O’Laughling, the indigenato system was intimately related to the ‘labour question’: citizens 
were those who could move freely, contract their labour and acquire property; natives were those who could 
do neither of these, but were instead subject to forced labour (chibalo) (O’Laughling 2000: 12). 
38 As Mamdani notes (1996), many colonies developed a system that combined direct, centralised rule with 
indirect rule. The former was aimed at the exclusion of the ‘natives’ from civil freedoms, underpinned by 
bifurcated systems such as the indigenato. This co-existed with decentralised or ‘indirect rule’, by which the 
colonial administrations heavily relied on indigenous institutions or chiefs for the governance of the ‘natives’ 
(1996: 16-17). According to Mamdani, this system developed out of a common dilemma in the colonies: the 
ability of a tiny foreign minority to rule over a much larger indigenous majority. 
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Company rule: ad hoc use of the mambos 
Mainly due to economic constraints and military weakness (Newitt 1995: 356), only some 
districts came under direct Portuguese administration from 1891 to the 1940s (Gaza, Tete 
and Island of Mozambique, where the Portuguese already had permanent settlements). The 
rest (Niassa, Zambezia, Sofala/Manica) were contracted out to private companies. These 
were entrusted with administrative and military functions, including the right to raise taxes, 
recruit labour and grant mineral and land concessions (ibid.: 368-9). 
Thus the Companhia de Moçambique ruled Manica and Sofala provinces 
between 1896 and 1941. Its mode of governing largely mimicked the Nguni’s. It was 
dominated by the use of coercive military strategies to ‘pacify’ the indígenas in order to 
make a profit from the taxation and recruitment of native labour for various business 
concessions (e.g. plantations, mines, railway construction). Initially the company did not 
rely on chiefs in these matters. Instead it proceeded by destroying the paramount Nguni 
chiefdoms, which were viewed as a threat to the incorporation of the indigenous labour 
force into the colonial economy (Alfane and Nhancala 1995: 53). It reached this goal in 
1902. In line with the 1907 law, however, the company soon embarked on a re-invention of 
the very leadership structures that it had destroyed.39 Realising that it could not secure 
labour through direct taxation and coercion (Serra 2000: 316-7), it increasingly compelled 
the mambos, who had formerly been subordinated to the Nguni chiefs, to assist in collecting 
taxes and recruiting labour. For purposes of defence and labour control, the company also 
recruited indigenous cipais or ma-auxilliares, a local police force, which had also served 
the Nguni chiefs. In this sense, the company mimicked the Nguni system of extraction and 
control. Also, it made no claims to legitimate authority over the areas it ruled, but basically 
relied on coercive measures. The chiefs were poorly compensated and punished with force 
or removed from office if they did not perform (Coelho 1993: 100-10).  
In present-day Dombe and Matica, company rule was nonetheless incomplete 
in the sense of expanding territorial control to the hinterlands (such as Dombe). Modes of 
governing tended to be concentrated in and around the administrative-military posts of the 
company. This meant an ad hoc form of indirect rule, where only some of the territorial 
chieftaincies were loosely incorporated into the polity (Florêncio 2005: 129-30). This 
gradually changed with the end of company rule. 
                                                 
39 The company’s strategy of pacification reflected colonial strategies elsewhere on the continent, where the 
disintegration of larger chiefdoms or African states into smaller, more governable units formed an intrinsic 
part of consolidating colonial power and quelling indigenous resistance (see von Trotha 1996). 
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Standardisation of indirect rule  
The development of a much more elaborate and standardised system of indirect rule 
coincided with the 1933 Constitution, which aimed at the dismantling of Company rule and 
the introduction of a homogeneous, direct form of Portuguese administration. This 
coincidence may seem paradoxical, but as Mamdani points out (1996: 18), indirect and 
direct rule should not be viewed as opposites, but rather as complementary ways of 
governing the ‘natives’. In Mozambique, a more uniform administration gave way to an 
intensification of modern statecraft (including the homogenisation of the mappings of 
subject populations, territories and local chiefs), which at the same time strengthened the 
effectiveness of indirect rule. Conversely a functioning system of indirect rule was 
significant for the consolidation of centralised power.  
The intensification of indirect rule was reflected in the 1933 Lei da Reforma 
Administrativa Ultramarina (the Administrative Overseas Reform Act, known as the 
RAU). The RAU introduced three new elements: classifications of the territorial boundaries 
and hierarchies of the chieftaincies; an extensive list of chiefs’ duties and prohibitions; and 
an emphasis on the popular authority of chiefs as a prerequisite for their position as state 
assistants. These elements underscored both the bureaucratisation of the mambos and a 
recognition of “the local customs and traditions’, which had hitherto not been part of 
colonial indirect role (Ministério das Colónias 1933, Article 94). The succession of chiefs 
was to follow what the RAU defined as ‘tradition’, namely hereditary succession within a 
dominant lineage. Administrators could nonetheless intervene if the proper candidate did 
not suit administrative needs (Article 96). Emphasis in the Law was also placed on the need 
to secure a strict adherence to ‘local customs’ by the natives. Although customary law was 
not codified, as in the British colonies, this latter element exemplified an attempt to fix and 
enclose the indígenas under what Mamdani (1996: 18) refers to as a state-enforced 
customary order, ruled by a unitary tribal authority.  
This process of enclosure was further sustained by fixing the territorial 
boundaries and hierarchies of the régulos. Each posto administrativo was divided into a 
number of regedorias, ruled by régulos. These were sub-divided into grupos de povoações, 
headed by a chefe do grupo de povoação and at a lower level into povoações (populations), 
headed by a chefe da povoação (Ministério das Colónias 1933, Article 91, 94). While these 
foreign classifications corresponded to the three-tier Ndau and Teve systems of mambo, 
mambo muduco and saguta, the act did not allow for the negotiability of boundaries and 
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shifting family alliances and places of residence that had occurred earlier (O’Laughlin 
2000: 20). Residence and leadership were, at least at the level of the law, territorialized in 
an unprecedented way.  
Securing territorialization became concretely bound to a whole range of new 
practices of governing the ‘natives’:  population registration, tax registers, and native passes 
to control movement. While contained within a ‘traditional order’, the native population 
simultaneously became subject to some of the most common practices of modern statecraft 
that centre on making population units legible for state regulation (Scott 1998). Under the 
RAU, these practices, while overseen by the Portuguese administrator (chefe do posto), 
were to be enforced ‘indirectly’ through the régulos and their assistants such as the ma-
auxilliares (a kind of local police force). Along with a formalisation of the tasks conferred 
on the régulos during company rule, namely tax and labour recruitment, the RAU also 
delegated policing and land allocation functions to régulos. These were combined with a 
new set of ‘civilizing’ functions: régulos were to ensure basic hygiene, compel indígenas to 
learn Portuguese and go to school, and denounce the manufacture of alcohol and 
promiscuity (Ministério das Colónias 1933, Article 99).40 In short, the practices of 
governing moved towards more intensive forms of regulating the conduct of the ‘natives’.  
The intensified conferring of tasks on the régulos coincided with both 
increased rewards for them and measures to curtail their sovereign authority. They were 
remunerated with two percent of the hut taxes they collected, and from 1954 received a 
fixed salary and a uniform (Alves 1995: 72). At the same time, the RAU included a list of 
prohibitions delimiting the juridical and economic powers of the mambos (such as 
prohibitions on hearing cases of serious crime, fines on trespassers and the collection of 
revenues for their own ends) (Ministério das Colónias 1933, Article 108). Not unlike the 
Nguni kingdom, the RAU used a system that combined coercion with rewards as a way of 
tying chiefs to the colonial polity. One novelty, however, was that rewards were 
systematised and coercive control codified in a set of judicial punishments (imprisonment 
or public work) (Alves 1995: 75).  
In the areas under study, the RAU, which was implemented from the end of 
the 1940s, led to mixed results. Indeed, as confirmed in oral accounts, the mambos became 
more closely tied to the colonial administration, and their everyday functions changed 
                                                 
40 To prepare the régulos for pursuing these tasks, a decree (36.885) was passed in 1948, which introduced 
‘Schools for the preparation of traditional authorities’. The régulos were to learn Portuguese, the history of 
Portugal, administration and policing, as well as issues about basic hygiene (Alves 1995: 79-83). 
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considerably. The codification of territories and hierarchies, attached to salaries, a uniform 
and specific tasks, at the same time had implications for the socio-political organisation of 
the pre-existing chieftaincies. Although the RAU aimed at drawing on existing territorial 
chieftaincies and rules of succession, there were in practice a range of manipulations. 
Besides numerous incidents in which the colonial administration re-placed non-compliant 
chiefs with more malleable ones (O’Laughlin 2000: 17), there were also cases of 
chieftaincies being split up, reduced or enlarged to fit colonial territorial-administrative 
divisions. In some cases this also meant that pre-existing hierarchies between chiefs and 
sub-chiefs were altered (Florêncio 2005: 126-30). This was, for example, the case with 
régulo Dombe, whom the colonial administration ‘promoted’ as a ‘régulo of régulos’. 
According to oral accounts, régulo Dombe was wrongly placed in that position, “because 
he lived very close to the Portuguese chefe do posto, but he was not part of the real ucama 
(family).”41  
As regards other forms of classification by state bureaucracies (cf. Scott 
1998), although the foreign titles and tasks granted to mambos did have concrete 
consequences, they were not fully observed in practice. On the one hand, the fixing of 
hierarchies and territories in colonial registers concretely influenced claims to succession 
and status related to remuneration (Florêncio 2005 127-35). On the other hand, there was 
also room for manoeuvre and manipulation, as oral accounts point out. Some chiefs 
continued to hear criminal cases to ensure that victims continued to receive restorative 
justice and that perpetrators did not go to prison.42 Chief Chibue also recounted that his 
father seldom reported people who failed to pay taxes to the administration.43 Others 
recalled that chiefs at times circumvented the recruitment of forced labour.44 Along with 
this, the mambos also largely continued their pre-colonial role of maintaining the 
cosmological order by conducting annual ceremonies and consulting with spirit mediums 
and healers. These accounts suggest that, although the RAU did introduce intensified 
regulation and transformation of chieftaincies, colonial indirect rule did not completely 
encapsulate the chiefs. 
Importantly, chiefs’ actions in circumventing colonial regulation were not 
only related to personal gains, but also to questions of popular legitimacy. While the RAU 
                                                 
41 Interview, council of elders of Chief Chibue, July 2004; Interview with Chief Zixixe, August 2002.  
42 Interview, Chief Kóa, 2 October 2002.  
43 Interview, Chief Chibue, 10 September 2002.  
44 Interview, Snr. Elias, Gudza, Dombe, 3 September 2005.  
 62
pretended to guarantee the popular legitimacy of chiefs by supporting ‘local usages and 
customs’, this was attached to the conferring of inherently unpopular tasks on chiefs. In 
particular, taxation and forced labour and cultivation were fierce areas of contention 
between chiefs and their subjects. While colonial rule gave régulos a range of privileges, it 
also challenged their popular legitimacy. This aspect points to an important characteristic, I 
suggest, of colonial rule: the main mode of governing was still based on coercion, not on 
attempts to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the indígenas, i.e. to legitimise colonial rule in the 
eyes of the rural population, such as through mutual relations of exchange. In the last years 
of colonial rule, provisions were made to change this negative relationship of exchange 
between the state and indígenas, but this coincided with the liberation struggle and counter-
insurgency measures.    
From community development to counter-insurgency 
In the 1960s, the coercive character of Portuguese colonial rule came under heavy 
international criticism, leading to the abolition of forced labour and the indigenato system 
in 1961. This coincided with Portuguese concerns to bolster the economic development of 
the rural areas (O’Laughling 2000: 20-1). In many areas of the country this led to the 
introduction of ‘community development’ schemes and a policy of ‘villagisation’ 
(aldeamento), which sought to concentrate the native population in development clusters.45 
Although this policy promised better conditions (e.g. health, education, basic services) for 
the ‘natives’, it also exemplified an intensified technique of governing the conduct and 
social organisation of the rural population: moving people into village ‘concentrations’ 
would make it easier to tax, administer and conscript rural populations (Newitt 1995: 472). 
The scheme was also accompanied by quasi-scientific analyses of local cultural dynamics, 
which were aimed at improving the colonial administrators’ understanding of the mindset 
of the ‘natives’. Despite the abolition of the indigenato, the policy also underscored 
arguments for increasing the power of the régulos, who were now presented as the true 
custodians of rural community culture (O’Laughling 2000: 20-1).  
 That aldeamento was part of a new strategy of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the 
‘natives’, both directly and through the régulos, became particularly clear during the 
nationalist struggle by the Mozambican liberation movement, the Frente da Libertação 
Mozambicana (Frelimo) beginning in mid-1960s. This was reflected in the work of the 
                                                 
45 For a remarkable account of colonial villagisation policies in Mozambique in general and Tete Province in 
particular, see Coelho (1993: 160-322).   
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‘psychological-social service’ workers, who, in the name of ‘community development,’ 
travelled around from village to village gathering intelligence and producing propaganda to 
prevent people from joining Frelimo (Coelho 1993: 151-8). Gradually aldeamento was 
turned into a counter-insurgency device in which villages were used as a way to isolate the 
population from Frelimo propaganda (Newitt 1995: 473). The forced removals of people 
that this led to were highly unpopular.  
Country-wide, the power and influence of the régulos during the liberation 
struggle and aldeamento became highly ambiguous and could not be rigidly defined (Blom 
2002: 145-6). While the Portuguese administration increased chiefs’ salaries to ensure their 
loyalty to the colonial state, it also intensified the surveillance of chiefs out of fear that they 
would align themselves with the nationalist opposition. In practice, some chiefs informed 
the colonial security police about the location of Frelimo guerrillas, while others sided with 
Frelimo and relocated their subjects to Frelimo’s ‘liberated zones’ (West and Kloeck-
Jensen 1999: 472). These opposing practices revealed the ambiguity inherent in the 
relationship between the chiefs and the colonial state.  
In the areas under study, the effects on chiefs of the liberation struggle and 
aldeamento were nonetheless meagre. This was conditioned by the very late arrival of 
Frelimo guerrillas and by the fact that the Portuguese were not successful in establishing 
‘villages’. In Matica at that time, the Portuguese had created the Colonato de Sussundenga, 
which led to the establishment of larger farms for the Portuguese and smaller ones for the 
indigenas (Alexander 1994: 9-11; Artur 1999: 61). In Dombe a similar system was 
established close to the head of administration. Rather than creating the grounds for 
resistance that resulted from aldeamento in other areas, chiefs benefited from these new 
measures in economic terms. In Dombe in particular, present-day chiefs also recalled 
having benefited considerably from organising labour migration to South African mines 
and from the remittances this involved.  
The fact that Frelimo did not manage to establish ‘liberated zones’ as in other 
parts of the country also meant that the relationship of régulos to Frelimo was partial in 
some areas and non-existent in others. Only chiefs in Matica recalled that their fathers were 
contacted by Frelimo in order to obtain counselling, spiritual protection and food.46 Frelimo 
                                                 
46 In the case of Boupua, the sub-chief was imprisoned by the Portuguese for ‘collaboration with Frelimo’. 
Interview, Sub-chief Boupua, 18 September 2002.  
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never reached the more outlying parts of Dombe during the liberation struggle.47 Thus, in 
the period preceding independence in 1975, there was neither a strong affiliation with 
Frelimo, nor any changes emerging from the colonial aldeamento.  
By ways of summarising, colonial modes of governing, both direct and 
indirect, led to significant changes to the va-Ndau and va-Teve chieftaincies, and in 
particular to the roles of the mambo. Colonial rule intensified and significantly broadened 
practices of governing that had their roots in pre-colonial forms of polity-formation. 
However, not only did colonial rule gradually confer new practices of governing on the 
mambos, it also introduced unprecedented administrative codifications and ways of 
regulating people, territories and authorities in political and economic terms. Nonetheless, 
in the last instance, the basic coercive and segregationist character of the colonial state also 
posed a threat to chiefs’ popular legitimacy, as to colonial authority itself. As West and 
Kloeck-Jenson suggest (1999), colonialism placed chiefs in a ‘betwixt and between’ 
position between the conflicting demands of the colonial state and the subject populations. 
Most chiefs tried to balance this relationship by circumventing colonial orders and 
exercising a dual mandate, on the one hand continuing their ceremonial and spiritual 
functions while on the other hand executing largely coercive administrative tasks for their 
colonial masters (Blom 2002: 141). For this reason, the mambos never became solely 
‘administrative chiefs’ (von Trotha 1996) or purely colonial ‘inventions’ (Florêncio 2005: 
159-60). However, as we shall see next, this was largely ignored by Frelimo after 
independence in 1975.  
 
3.  The Post-Colonial Exclusion of Mambos and Tradition  
 
The formal exclusion of régulos from participation in local governance was one of 
Frelimo’s first strategies in radically breaking with colonial rule and building instead a 
homogeneous nation and a party-state along Marxist-Leninist lines (O’Laughling 2000: 
28). The decision to abolish all ‘traditional structures’ had already been made by the 
transitional government in 1974, and it was written into the new constitution after 
independence in 1975 (Hall and Young 1997: 51).48 It formed part of an attempt not only to 
                                                 
47 Interview, Chief Cóa, 24 August 2004. 
48 As early as 1969, Frelimo’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane, who died during the liberation struggle, 
asserted publicly that the authority of traditional leaders no longer derived from ‘the original tribal structure’, 
but rather from ‘appointment by the Portuguese’ (West 2005: 166).  
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do away with the bifurcated colonial system of citizen and subject, but also with those 
‘traditions’ that had divided the Mozambican people and kept them in a backward, 
superstitious form of being - as Samora Machel, the then president of Frelimo, declared on 
his famous rally-tour from Ruvuma to Maputo in 1974 (ibid.: 49). The régulos were 
presented as colonial collaborators, their practices as feudal and backward. Abolishing 
everything ‘traditional’ and belonging to the magico-spiritual world view was seen as a 
means of modernizing society and creating national unity (ibid.: 55-8). Scientific socialism 
and national education were to replace spiritual beliefs. Thus, not only chiefs, but also 
traditional healers, spirit mediums and religious associations were deprived of any role in 
the public domain (O’Laughling 2000: 28).49 Frelimo’s vision of a Mozambican nation 
state was not a return to ‘the old (pre-colonial) world’, but the construction of an entirely 
‘new man’ (homen novo) as the building block of the nation.   
Frelimo’s vision of ‘a new man’ built on the model of the ‘liberated zones’, 
which had been established in some areas of the country during the liberation struggle. 
These were described as areas where the people (o povo) could choose their own leaders, 
where popular power (poder popular) was exercised and where man had been freed from 
colonial exploitation and the bonds of race, tribe, tradition and religious-spiritual beliefs 
(Hall and Young 1997: 47-55). Colonial creations, including the régulos, and non-
collaborators of Frelimo were presented as ‘internal enemies’, who had to be removed or 
re-educated (ibid.: 55).50 This underscored the introduction of intensified practices of 
governing related to the education, disciplining and constant mobilisation of the people. 
These were aimed not only at changing and regulating the conduct of ‘the population’, as 
during colonial rule, but also at radically reshaping the mindset and beliefs of ‘the people’.  
The main ideology underpinning Frelimo’s vision of transformation was a 
combination of Marxism and Leninism.51 Marxism provided a secular vision of renewal in 
                                                 
49 Churches were not forbidden, but all religious activity outside the churches was forcefully prevented 
wherever possible (Hall and Young 1997: 86).  
50 While the Portuguese were removed from the power they had enjoyed, black Mozambicans who were 
considered ‘internal enemies’ were sent to ‘re-education camps’ (Hall and Young: 47-9). As Hall and Young 
argue, the definition of internal enemies was often unclear, ranging from labels such as ‘imperialists’ and 
those representing the ‘world capitalist system’ to people defined as having a decadent and corrupt attitude. 
The re-education camps, formally established in 1974, therefore included not only Frelimo dissidents and 
opposition movements, but also prostitutes, drug addicts and Jehovah’s witnesses (Hall and Young 1997: 46-
8).  
51 This was formally institutionalized in 1977 when Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party (Hall and 
Young 1997: 61). Reflecting the contours of the Cold War, this was also marked by economic agreements and 
support from Soviet-bloc countries and a general distancing from the West (ibid.: 112). Apart from 
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which new institutions would ensure progress, purity and national unity. Leninism provided 
new instruments of social progress in which the state would be the main agent of 
modernisation and the Frelimo party would direct the state and the people (Hall and Young 
1997: 67-71). In line with these ideologies, the basis of the Frelimo leadership’s legitimate 
authority rested on its claim to embody and represent ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’. This 
significantly differed from any previous polity. It underscored a shift from superior 
authority or sovereignty being vested in either the spiritual domain (e.g. the QuiTeve) or in 
the overlord/king (e.g. Nguni and colonial rule) to ‘popular sovereignty’, in which the 
ultimate source of superior authority is vested in the ‘people’ or the ‘national community’ 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 6-9). This was underscored by the concept of poder popular 
(popular power), by which Frelimo promised a radical break with colonial forms of 
subjection and lack of popular influence in decision-making. The Marxist-Leninist tradition 
was also reflected in the economic sphere, where promises of economic progress and social 
benefits for all were to be achieved through the nationalisation of land and businesses, as 
well as the development of state farms, collective peasant farming and cooperatives to 
modernise peasant agriculture.  
The combination of popular power with the central role of the Frelimo party 
in directing the state and the people was significantly reflected in the overall territorial and 
administrative organisation introduced by Frelimo. Although Frelimo largely reproduced 
the colonial territorial and administrative divisions (ibid.: 79), it also created entirely new 
institutions of governance, with elected assemblies from the national to local village levels. 
These underscored the merger of state and party, with considerable power being vested in 
the national Frelimo leadership (ibid.: 69-71). Party assemblies directly elected at district 
and indirectly at provincial levels were subordinated to higher level assemblies and had to 
function as downward channels for central directives (ibid.: 71-2). Moreover, the highest 
ranking administrative official at district and posto levels was also the first Frelimo 
secretary and the president of the assembly at this level. This form of ‘democratic 
centralism’, linking state and party, was combined with new governance institutions at the 
levels below the district, which were to ensure the democratisation and modernisation of 
rural society (O’Laughling 2000: 27). The main framework for this was villagisation, 
involving the removal of dispersed populations into aldeias comunais (communal villages). 
                                                                                                                                                     
Scandinavian aid workers, who had assisted Frelimo during the struggle, aid from Western countries only 
began in 1982 (ibid.: 146-56).    
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These villages were envisaged as collective production units and sites for creating ‘new 
men’ who would govern themselves through the exercise of poder popular (Coehlo 1993: 
338; West 2005: 168). The first move in the direction of poder popular came in the 
transitional period (1974-1977), when the régulos were officially replaced by grupos 
dinamizadores (dynamising groups or GDs), elected by the people.52  These were to 
include women and youth, but not those who had collaborated with the Portuguese, 
including the régulos, who were excluded from standing. The GDs were intended to be 
gradually transformed into party cells, elected committees and people’s assemblies, which 
would represent the interests of each village at higher national levels (O’Laughling 2000: 
28-9). An executive council for each assembly, headed by a secretário, was to be in charge 
of political-organisational, economic, socio-cultural and security matters in the village 
(Coelho 1993: 346-7). In addition, the governance of villages was to be backed by popular 
vigilante groups, and the traditional courts were to be replaced by tribunais populares 
(popular tribunals) of elected lay judges (including women) (O’Laughling 2000: 29).  
With the exception of villagisation as a mode of governing rural society, in 
theory this new organisation of rural governance provided a radical break with colonial 
rule: not only did it dismantle the system of indirect rule through régulos, it also dismantled 
the bifurcated society that had divided society along racial lines into citizens and subjects in 
order to democratise society and place it under a unitary polity covering the entire national 
territory and its people. The new popularly elected institutions provided increased room for 
local participation, albeit within a system of centralised party-state authority.  
 As with earlier polities, however, Frelimo’s ideals of democratisation and its new 
modes of organising rural governance were not straightforwardly translated into practice in 
all areas of the country. This was not least the case in the areas under study, where the new 
policies were met with popular scepticism and where the early entrenchment of the Renamo 
rebel movement from 1979 prevented Frelimo from successfully establishing the new 
structures across the entire territory. In practice, this also meant that the ban on ‘traditional 
structures’ was incomplete. It is to these areas that we shall now turn, beginning with the 
initial period of post-colonial rule, and then the period of war-time governance by the 
Frelimo state.  
                                                 
52 At an early stage the GDs formed part of Frelimo’s popular mechanism to expand its control into those 
areas that had not yet been ‘liberated’ or fallen under Frelimo control by 1974-77, as was the case in 
Sussundenga District (Alexander 1994). Their main task had been to mobilise and ‘dynamise’ the population 
in accordance with Frelimo’s anti-colonial policy. They had also been compelled to exercise vigilance against 
sabotage by ‘internal enemies’, including the régulos (Coelho 1993: 328-9).  
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First Frelimo encounters: removing the régulos, restructuring society   
 
Sub-chief Pampanissa, Dombe, 8 August 2004: When Frelimo came to power, they rejected the 
whole system that had come with the Portuguese. They [Frelimo] called a meeting with us chiefs 
and with the whole population. We were told to come in our uniforms. When we came to the 
meeting, [chief] Chibue and I had to stand in the middle of the crowd and on the right side of the 
Frelimo soldiers. They [Frelimo] told the people that they were now free and that there would be no 
more forced labour…and that they could choose their own leaders…and then…with a gun in our 
faces [chiefs], the Frelimo soldiers asked the population whether they should kill us chiefs. The 
people responded, ‘Yes’, because just before the Portuguese left they had told people to build a 
house for the régulo. But they did not kill us because they had been given orders not to. But they 
said that from today chiefs like me and Chibue were like nothing. We were just normal people like 
any other person…and then they asked the people to choose secretários and dynamising groups, 
who were now to be in charge with the people. They also said that the superstitious ways and the 
wadzi-nyangas [healers] had to stop, because this was contrary to our development.   
 
The above account describes the so-called offensivas (mobilisation campaigns) of 1975-7, 
which marked the initial Frelimo strategy of expanding the new post-colonial party-state 
structures to the rural corners of Matica and Dombe. Although Frelimo guerrillas had been 
in contact with the chiefs and populations of Matica since 1973-4, neither in Matica nor 
Dombe were there any ‘liberated zones’ or already established grupos dynamisadores 
(GDs) on which to build the new popularly elected institutions and promulgate the vision of 
the ‘new man’. As Alexander points out (1994, 1997), the offensivas illustrated an attempt 
to spread party-state structures very rapidly in the hinterlands outside the administrative 
capitals. This was essentially done by destroying pre-existing structures. this was confirmed 
by the memories of informants, who explained that the official transfer of power from the 
régulos to the GDs already occurred at these very first encounters. People had to choose 
their new ‘people’s representatives’ on the spot and at the direct request of the visiting 
Frelimo officials, who were always accompanied by armed soldiers. The only criteria for 
(s)election was that the representatives could not be the régulos or their assistants (such as 
the members of the council of elders or madodas, the police of the régulo or the ma-
auxilliares). By contrast, the offensivas publicly humiliated the régulos and presented them 
as a colonial creation that had made the people suffer. As noted in the quote above, this was 
combined with a general assault on the whole domain of the vadzimu (spirits) and the 
practitioners related to that domain (such as healers and spirit mediums).  
From 1977-8, offensivas became employed as part of attempts to establish 
party cells, headed by secretários, to institute the people’s assemblies at the village level 
and above, as well as to promote collective farming (Alexander 1997: 2-3). This coincided 
with the consolidation of state-administrative structures at the district and posto levels. In 
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both Dombe and Matica, the offensivas of the first period of post-colonial rule (1975-78), 
up until the beginning of the Renamo insurgency (1978-9), were effective in the sense that 
they rapidly introduced new representatives in the former regedorias. Beyond this 
achievement, however, Frelimo also faced a number of obstacles, which ultimately meant 
an incomplete territorial expansion of the new forms of organisation and practices of 
governing. In the first years before the war, this was related both to a lack of resources with 
which to expand social services effectively and secure the functioning of the new 
institutions, and to the mixed reactions that the new policies provoked amongst the 
population.  
Not surprisingly, the régulos and their elderly male assistants reacted with 
discontent to Frelimo’s abolition of everything ‘traditional’.53 For some women and 
younger male members, by contrast, Frelimo opened up new spaces of influence in the 
form of taking up the new positions of GD members and secretários. Again others viewed 
the removal of the régulos as a welcome end to forced labour and the coercive collection of 
taxes, whereas many were discontented with the onslaught on mechanisms for dealing with 
witchcraft and the bans on religious activity, lobolo (marriage payments) and polygamy. 
The collective farming schemes and cooperatives, established close to the Dombe and 
Matica Sedes in 1977, also sparked mixed reactions. While they created new opportunities 
for work, they were also subject to some resistance by people who wished to continue 
forms of production organised around dispersed family units (Alexander 1994: 11-16). 
Besides these mixed reactions to Frelimo policies, the overall modes of governing by the 
Frelimo party-state that came to dominate from 1977 also gradually lead to a reduction in 
the initial enthusiasm for the new institutions of popular power.   
While informants in Dombe and Matica recalled that the GDs and secretários 
were very popular at the beginning, soon they were increasingly being seen as the ‘puppets’ 
of higher level party-state officials. Some informants stated that the secretários became 
increasingly oppressive in their concern for establishing popular alliances with the Frelimo-
state officials who directed orders downwards but provided very few tangible benefits, such 
as development and services, in return. As one woman in Matica recalled:  “Frelimo told us 
that they were telling us the truth of how we should live, and that what they said could not 
                                                 
53 The hostility between Frelimo and the chiefs cannot be fully generalised, even in the initial phase of post-
colonial rule. Some sons and relatives of the former régulos did take up positions in the GDs and later in the 
Frelimo military (e.g. the sons of sub-chiefs Ganda and Boupua, as well as Pampanissa quoted at the 
beginning of this section).  
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be questioned. If you did not abide by their orders, they said, then we would be 
punished”.54 These views reflect a general point made by Alexander (1997) and Hall and 
Young (1997) about an apparent ambiguity in Frelimo’s party-state model: “on the one 
hand, a commitment to popular power, mass participation and popular needs and, on the 
other hand, a puritanical and top-down vision of social progress and the hierarchical and 
centralized means to attain it” (Hall and Young 1997: 74). As Alexander (1994) points out 
for Sussundenga as a whole, at an early stage the ideology of poder popular came to co-
exist with a strict party-state hierarchy that underscored inherently authoritarian styles of 
governing. In practice, these left little room for open criticism and consultation from below 
(Alexander 1994: 45). Her point is that the modes of governing both reproduced parts of the 
military ethos of the liberation struggle and some of the traits of colonial rule, in the sense 
of strict hierarchies, labyrinthine bureaucratic procedures and coercive treatment of those 
who did not obey the dictates of the Frelimo party (Alexander 1997: 2).   
If the overall modes of governing the rural areas and the mixed popular 
reactions to them were similar in Matica and Dombe in the early period of colonial rule, 
then this changed considerably with the inception of Renamo insurgency from 1979. As 
described in the next sub-section, the war years not only militarised Frelimo-state modes of 
governing, they also introduced changed attitudes towards the mambos in Frelimo-
controlled areas.  
War-time Frelimo-state governance: informal re-inclusion of mambos  
The post-independence war spread very early in the area under study, with the first Renamo 
fighters entering from what was then Rhodesia in 1979 into the southern part of Dombe. 
The war meant a gradual loss of territorial control from Frelimo to Renamo, leading in the 
late 1980s to the Frelimo state being confined to urban centres and areas around the 
communal villages created from 1980-1. Not surprisingly this had radical effects on the 
Frelimo state’s modes of governing, including its ability to expand and sustain the new 
institutions and continue to deliver services and development. As Alexander shows (1994, 
1997), the war meant the increased militarisation of party-state officials, but also a reliance 
on local compromises that undercut the official exclusion of régulos and magico-spiritual 
beliefs and practices. This was particularly the case in Matica, where Frelimo managed to 
maintain control. In Dombe, by contrast, the fate of the mambos was influenced by the fact 
                                                 
54 Interview, Madalena, Nhambamba I, Matica, 30 July 2005.  
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that this area increasingly came under Renamo control. Below we shall explore war-time 
Frelimo-state governance, first in Matica, and then in Dombe.  
 
MATICA: war-time compromises with chiefs  
In the Matica area, the Renamo insurgency began around 1981-83 with attacks on party-
state officials, the GDs and the communal villages that were being established in what 
today are the Ganda and Boupua chieftaincies. During the 1980s, the attacks gradually 
meant that the Frelimo state became confined to the district capital and the centre of Matica 
locality, with the communal villages in the surrounding areas being dissolved by massive 
population movements (including chiefs and their assistants). An important consequence of 
Frelimo’s increased loss of territorial control was that party-state officials in Matica and 
Sussundenga Sedes became increasingly concerned with military defence and with the fear 
of losing people, whether literally or in terms of a transfer of their allegiance to Renamo. 
Practices of governing people through mobilisation and discipline became increasingly 
coercive, exemplified by the forced removal of people to communal villages and the 
organisation of local party-state officials into popular militias and self-defence commands 
(Alexander 1997: 4). While the communal villages in and around Matica and Sussundenga 
Sede were officially intended as centres for development, during the war it became a core 
strategy to concentrate refugees and displaced people who could potentially be lost to 
Renamo. This was accompanied by aid distributions, but also restrictions on movement, 
exemplified by the guia da marcha, a letter of permission necessary for travel. Initially the 
communal villages were viewed by the population of Matica with scepticism, but gradually 
they became the only option for some level of security and access to basic services in the 
face of Renamo (Alexander 1994: 11-18). For those ex-régulos (included chiefs and sub-
chiefs) who still resided in and around the villages controlled by Frelimo, war-time 
governance intriguingly lead to a re-bolstering of their role in governance.   
As Alexander points out (1997) – though it is little recognised in other 
academic writing or in Frelimo discourse – the militarization of the party-state coincided 
with negotiable compromises with the ex-régulos in Frelimo-held areas of Sussundenga 
District. The changed attitude towards the chiefs began as early as 1980, when the district 
administrator of Sussundenga initiated regular consultations and alliances with the ex-
régulos, thus going against official Frelimo policy of the day (Alexander 1997: 5). The 
reliance on ex-régulos ranged from placing them and their relatives in Frelimo committees, 
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involving them in the mobilisation of people for communal villages and letting them 
resolve conflicts alongside the secretários. For example, mambo Muriani, referred to as the 
‘father’ of the Shona-Karanga mambos earlier, took an active part in the formation of a 
communal village and was later nominated a secretary of Frelimo. Sub-chief Ganda in 
Matica was granted the authority to hear social and witchcraft cases and to participate in 
land allocations. Party-state officials also increasingly encouraged chiefs to perform rain-
making ceremonies. 
According to Alexander, the reason for informally bringing back the ex-
régulos was predominantly a pragmatic response to party-state officials’ lack of capacity to 
administer these areas or secure party-state legitimacy. But among some party-state 
officials, this was also a matter of belief, as well as of increased disillusion with Frelimo’s 
exclusionary policies. Many party-state officials saw the official ban on lineage leaders, 
religious practices and the denial of witchcraft as absurd (Alexander 1994: 48-9).  
The informal reliance on chiefs in Sussundenga preceded general changes at 
the national level after President Chissano came to power.55 In 1987, he proclaimed official 
tolerance of chiefs and religious movements. This coincided with intensification of the war, 
but also with increased reliance on Western donors and a gradual transition from a socialist 
to a more liberal-democratic vision of modernity (Hall and Young 1997: 201).56  
These changes were hardly felt in the intense war zones of Dombe, and there was no space 
for negotiable compromises with the ex-régulos.  
 
DOMBE:  militarization of governance and confrontational attitude to chiefs 
Beyond the initial mobilisation of GDs and secretaries, the territorial expansion of Frelimo-
state governance in Dombe was very limited.57 Already by 1979-80 its presence (including 
the GDs) was confined to areas in an approximately ten- to fifteen-kilometre radius around 
                                                 
55 Chissano took over from Samoral Machel, who died in a plane crash on South African territory in 1986, 
officially seen as an act of sabotage by the South African apartheid regime (Hall and Young 1997: 163).   
56 From 1984, the Mozambican government made agreements with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as a 
whole range of Western donors. This was partly a response to the economic crisis beginning in 1980 and 
partly due to the war: the Mozambican leadership sought support from the West for aid and in putting 
pressures on Apartheid South Africa, which was known to be financing the Renamo insurgency. In 1987 
Mozambique also adopted an IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme, which followed the mantra 
of political and economic liberalisation (see Hall and Young 1997; Hanlon 1991). 
57 In the mountainous areas of Zomba chieftaincy to the north, as well as in the area of Kóa chieftaincy to the 
west, Frelimo never managed to do more that launch dispersed offensivas with little effect. Nor were 
collective farming and co-operatives ever established in these areas. The memories attached to the early 
period of independence by people in these areas were that the ability to market local produce ended with 
Frelimo and that income from labour migration to South Africa was severely reduced.  
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Dombe sede (the administrative capital of Dombe). The main reason for this was that by 
that time Renamo rebels had moved over the border from Rhodesia, established bases in the 
south-western part of Dombe and begun to make inroads towards Dombe sede, around 
which intense battles were fought (see also next section). During the 1980s Frelimo was 
confined to control of the Dombe sede and the communal villages in its vicinity (present-
day Gudza and Pampanissa chieftaincies). This area became an ‘island’ controlled by a 
government military force, surrounded by Renamo-controlled areas, and supplied by air and 
convoy. The ex-régulos of these areas had fled in fear of Frelimo attacks and taken refuge 
in Renamo areas or in the distant urban-centres. As opposed to Matica, this meant that 
governance in the villages was solely performed by Frelimo secretaries and GDs, who were 
subject to the government military force and its concerns. In other words, no negotiable 
compromises were made with régulos in Dombe.  
 If party-state modes of governing in Matica became increasingly militarised, then 
this was even more the case in Dombe. From the early 1980s, Dombe was essentially a 
battle zone for the control of people (Alexander 1997: 4). This was reflected in the 
complete merger between the creation of ‘community villages’ and military counter-
insurgency strategies. Villagisation was characterised by forced removals using arms, due 
to resistance from the population. This is clearly reflected in the account below, which 
describes the first attempts at villagisation in the vicinity of Dombe sede: 
 
“When we heard the first rumours of attacks by Renamo, Frelimo ordered us to live in villages 
along the river Lucity. But people did not want to leave their homes. So Frelimo threw hand 
grenades into the river to make people understand that they could not refuse to make a village. After 
this a village was established, but some people also moved away to other areas. Here in Chibue 
people just refused. When Renamo came here close by in, I think, 1981 or 1982, Frelimo soldiers 
came here and forced the people by arms to come and live in Dombe sede. We all had to go there. 
During the first night Renamo attacked Frelimo, and there was a huge battle. Three days later many 
of us managed to escape and go back home, but some also stayed.”58   
 
In the late 1980s, Frelimo lost control over the surrounding areas of Dombe sede. In the 
sede, the community village scheme was turned into a ‘centro de recuperação’ (centre for 
recuperation) inhabited by those who had forcefully or voluntarily come to Dombe from 
Renamo-controlled areas. As explained by the then secretary of the centre, the task here 
was to “re-educate and discipline those people coming from the Renamo areas. They were 
                                                 
58 Interview, Resident of Chibue chieftaincy, Dombe, September 2004.  
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punished with death if they tried to escape”.59 Any person fleeing from the rural areas was 
potentially viewed as a Renamo supporter and treated with suspicion and tough 
disciplining. The fact that most of these people were va-Ndau further exacerbated coercive 
treatment, because Renamo had come to be identified with the va-Ndau, due to its 
leadership positions and use of the chi-Ndau language (Schafer 2001). Combined with the 
merger of the new policies with military practices of governing, this hostile and coercive 
treatment of Dombians further underscored a severe crumbling of Frelimo-state legitimacy 
in Dombe in general and in marginal zones in particular.  
In brief, beyond a short-lived period mobilising the new people’s 
representatives and abolishing the régulos, most Dombians experienced no positive benefits 
from independence. In comparison to Matica, Dombe was also characterised by a purely 
confrontational official attitude towards the régulos. As described in the next section, these 
factors considerably influenced Renamo’s ability to establish Dombe successfully as one of 
its ‘liberated zones’, first in the rural hinterlands, and finally in Dombe Sede from 
November 1991, when Frelimo troops were successfully driven out.  
By ways of summarising, this section has shown how Frelimo’s ambitious 
agenda of social transformation, including promises of popular power and improved living 
conditions for the rural population, remained largely an ideal rather than a reality in the 
areas under study. Beyond the first offensivas, the new popularly elected institutions either 
vanished or became increasingly subject to hierarchical subordination to Frelimo-state 
control, which reproduced many of the traits of colonial modes of governing. This was 
exacerbated during the war when modes of governing became increasingly militarized and 
concentrated around urban centres. Combined with Frelimo’s inability to secure economic 
development, these factors challenged the popular legitimacy of the party-state (on the 
country as a whole, see Hall and Young 1997; O’Laughlin 2000). In Matica, intriguingly 
this meant that the official ban on régulos and the onslaught on magico-spiritual practices 
and beliefs was weak and subject to local compromises. As during colonial rule, local state 
officials in Matica were encouraged to rely on chiefs to compensate them for their own 
weaknesses. In Dombe, however, this was not the case. As we shall see in the next section, 
it was Renamo that was credited with ‘bringing back the mambos’ in Dombe.   
 
                                                 
59 Interview, José Razão, Secretario do bairro de Mabaia, Dombe, 23 August 2005.  
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4. Renamo’s Re-insertion of the Mambos  
  
Renamo was first and foremost a military organisation, formed in 1976 in Rhodesia and 
supported by the white regime of Ian Smith.60 It initially emerged out of a mixture of 
discontent with Frelimo’s new policies by Mozambicans in exile and the Rhodesian 
government’s interest in destabilising the newly independent Mozambique. The latter was 
partly due to Frelimo’s support for the Rhodesian black liberation struggle and partly due to 
economic interests (Vines 1991). When Rhodesia gained independence in 1980 as 
Zimbabwe, Renamo began to be supported by the South Africa apartheid regime, for 
similar reasons as the earlier Rhodesian support.61  
The first military operations of Renamo, beginning in 1977, were 
characterised by a combination of the destruction of infrastructure and the targeting of 
party-state officials with the often brutalised recruitment of new rebels from among the 
rural population (Hall and Young 1997: 119). In 1978-79 operations expanded in particular 
into va-Ndau areas, whose people were amongst the first to be recruited and also to fill the 
higher ranks of Renamo (Schafer 2001: 219). Important bases were set up in these areas, 
including the main base in Gorongosa in Sofala and the Sitantonga base in the south-west 
of Dombe. During the 1980s, however, Renamo’s war-time strategies in the rural territories 
became more differentiated. In some areas such as Matica it continued its purely destructive 
activities. In other areas such as Dombe, it attempted gradually to set up alternative 
governing institutions based on the re-insertion of the chieftaincy, alongside its military 
command structure and some service provisions. As noted by Vines (1991), this difference 
could be likened to a distinction between areas that Renamo considered purely ‘areas of 
destruction’ and those that were denominated ‘areas of control’ and later referred to as 
Renamo’s ‘liberated zones’ (such as Dombe and vast areas of Buzi, Mussorize and 
Machaze districts) (cf. Flôrencio 2005: 185). 
                                                 
60 Initially Renamo consisted of former elite black units of the Portuguese colonial forces and others who had 
been classified as ‘internal enemies’ by Frelimo. For a detailed account of the formation of Renamo from a 
number of movements to its development into a military force, see Vines (1991). The radio station Voz da 
Africa Livre, operating from Rhodesia and transmitting in Mozambique, pre-dated the establishment of 
Renamo as a military force. The messages accused Frelimo of having fallen sway to foreign communist 
usurpers and of excluding members of the Mozambican nation (Hall and Young 1997: 116-119).  
61 The support given to Renamo by South Africa reflected a complex set of issues. While South Africa had 
invested a lot in Mozambique in order to ensure access to Maputo’s port and migrant labour, it was also 
discontented with Frelimo’s support for the ANC (Hall and Young 1997: 122-3). The Nkomati Accord in 
1984 between South Africa and the Frelimo government was also intended to have ended support and the 
hosting of organisations sabotaging each other’s country. The agreement only lasted a short while, because 
South Africa continued to support Renamo (ibid.: 146-7). 
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Although the majority of the scholarly literature on the war (and naturally 
Frelimo) presented Renamo as ‘a movement of excessive violence’ which was neither 
ideologically motivated, nor concerned to win civilian support (Nordstrom 1995),62 this 
applied less to the so-called ‘liberated zones’. As Flôrencio (2005) and Schafer (2001) both 
show for va-Ndau areas close to Dombe, although the destructive activities of Renamo 
cannot be denied,63 this did not preclude it winning some popular legitimacy among certain 
sections of the rural population.64  
Moreover, although Renamo was dominated by military concerns, it did to 
some extent try to legitimise its military actions and rural control by appealing to an anti-
Frelimo ideology that incorporated heavy criticism of Frelimo’s anti-tradition, villagisation 
and collective farming policies (Schafer 2001: 221). Renamo claimed to represent both ‘a 
return to tradition’ and ‘rural interests’. This was opposed to Frelimo who was criticised for 
having an urban-dweller’s distain for ‘those living in the bush’ and for being against 
‘traditional’ forms of dispersed habitation (e.g. by introducing communal villages) 
(Alexander 1997: 8). The Renamo leadership translated the emphasis on a return to 
‘tradition’ into a restoration of the chieftaincy and a religious idiom that cast the insurgency 
as a ‘war of the spirits’. Not entirely unlike the QuiTeve king, Renamo attempted to claim 
legitimate authority by capitalising on the spiritual domain that Frelimo had cast aside. This 
had both a rhetorical and practical dimension and was intimately related to military 
concerns. Rhetorically the Renamo leadership claimed attachment to the ancestral spirits 
(wadzimu) of the va-Ndau as a way to control and mobilise the rural population. In practice 
its soldiers made use of spirit mediums and wadzi-nyanga as a way to boost their strength 
in combat.65 Drawing on the magico-religious symbols and practitioners of the va-Ndau 
lent a certain ethnic dimension to Renamo’s claims to legitimacy in areas such as Dombe. 
                                                 
62 Renamo was presented predominantly as a puppet of Rhodesian and South African sabotage. Emphasis was 
placed on its brutal, barbaric and coercive measures of recruitment, banditry and violence against civilians. In 
order to explain why Renamo was able to gain support particularly in the rural areas of central Mozambique, 
the authors have emphasised how Renamo combined the use of fear with physiological subjection. See for 
example Nilsson (1993); Vines (1991); Wilson (1992); Nordstrom (1994).  
63 The war was indeed destructive and violent, leading to over one million deaths, over two hundred thousand 
orphaned children, the displacement of nearly a quarter of the population of fifteen million, and the 
destruction of one third of all schools and hospitals (Nordstrom 1995: 133).   
64 Geffray (1991), who did fieldwork in the Renamo areas of Nampula during the war, makes a similar point.  
65 For example, in the Sitatonga base in Dombe, there were several nyangas who treated illnesses and gave 
soldiers amulets and medicine for protection in combat. Interview, Nyanga, Dombe, 24 August 2005.  
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This was set against the often widespread idea that Frelimo favoured the south and the 
descendants of the Gaza (Nguni) empire, from whom the Frelimo leadership was drawn.66  
As we shall see next, the popular appeal of Renamo’s ‘war of the spirits’ and 
its claim to represent the wadzimu of the va-Ndau among rural Dombians is difficult to 
access fully. More significantly for those who recalled life in the Renamo ‘liberated zone’ 
of Dombe was the re-insertion of the mambos, which provided a means of survival vis-à-vis 
the risk of Frelimo violence. Below I give an account of the modes of governing used by 
Renamo in Dombe, and what this implied for the mambos.  
The re-invention of indirect rule in Dombe 
Sub-chief Mushambonha, Gudza, Dombe, September 2005: Renamo, when they came to this area, 
they called for the return of the régulos, the wadzi-nyanga and the prophets – all those whom 
Frelimo had thrown away. At the beginning of the war my family and I fled to Nhamussisua, where 
Renamo had soldiers and there was almost no war. It was a liberated zone of Renamo, where there 
were teachers, nurses and infrastructure. With Renamo I could solve conflicts and perform 
ceremonies. In 1991 Renamo won the whole of Dombe. They burnt the villages and asked the 
régulos to return to their homes. The people were also happy because they could leave the villages 
and go back to the homesteads that they had been forced to leave. Frelimo had forced them to 
concentrate in places where there was nothing to feed the children. When Renamo came, they said 
that ‘We want to save you and help you be freed from being held in the village.  
 
As in the quote above, some rural Dombians and ex-régulos recall Renamo as a liberating 
force and Frelimo as an aggressor. This was notably the case for those who resided in the 
hinterlands of Dombe sede, as well as those who remained in Dombe after Renamo 
established ‘liberated zones’ and brought back the mambos from around 1982-3. By that 
time, however, a large part of the population had fled to Zimbabwe, taken refuge in the 
Frelimo-held urban centres or been forced into refugee camps. Those who came to inhabit 
Renamo’s ‘liberated zones’ were the people who had only fled temporarily into the 
mountainous areas of the north and south, where there was no combat. These diverse 
patterns of movement also included many of the ex-régulos, their assistants and family 
members, who were often split up. One example was the Chibue chieftaincy: while the 
régulo acting during colonial rule was captured by Frelimo (and never seen again by the 
people), his most important sub-chief joined the Frelimo army, and his half-brother 
remained in the area and later worked under Renamo. In fact, apart from the Kóa and 
                                                 
66 This led some Mozambican observers to discern underlying parallels to the past in the war: the ‘people of 
the Mwenumatapa’ versus the Nguni empire established in Gaza (Hall and Young 1997: 186). 
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Mushamba chieftaincies, there were no other cases in which the ruling ucama was left 
unchanged during the initial phase of the war. 
 The crux of the matter is that, in the initial phase of the Renamo insurgency, which 
was characterised by destruction and often brutal recruitment practices, not all mambos 
wished to or were invited to join Renamo. Rather, many viewed themselves as ‘double 
targets of the war’, potentially subject on the one hand to Frelimo’s exclusionary control, 
and on the other hand to Renamo’s violent abductions. According to informants, this 
changed in around 1983, when Renamo commanders called all the remaining régulos to a 
meeting at the Sitatonga base and announced that the régulos were to reassume all of their 
old functions. Chief Chibue recalled: “The régulos were told to return to resolve conflicts 
and deal with witchcraft and perform ceremonies. We were also told to mobilise the 
population so that they could help feed the soldiers.”67 This first meeting with the ex-
régulos marked a change towards Renamo’s development of a system of rural governance 
that gradually spread all over Dombe territory.   
Renamo’s methods of governing were vested in a dual system of part-politico-
military rule under Renamo commanders and part-civilian rule under the mambos. This 
underscored the existence of two territorial spheres of governing: the Renamo military base, 
and the adjacent areas consisting of the civil population and the mambos. The latter were 
subordinated to the former, but also retained relative autonomy in daily life, such as in the 
administration of land, the resolution of conflicts and the organisation of production. In 
between these two spheres, Renamo also relied on the recruitment of a local police force 
known as the mujhibas. These functioned as mensageiros (messengers) between the 
Renamo soldiers and the mambos, instructing the latter to mobilise the population to 
provide food and shelter for soldiers, as well as to do brief periods of labour on the bases.  
Towards the end of the 1980s, Renamo also developed a system of taxation, 
enforced by the mambos, as well as measures to control movement. The latter was part of a 
military strategy to secure ‘wealth in people’, just as the villages were to Frelimo. Such 
military concerns were bolstered by the gradual development of a certain system of 
rewards: chiefs received donations of cloth, sugar and salt from soldiers, while Renamo 
secured some basic services such as education and health for the local population. People 
formerly educated at the Dombe missionary school were recruited as teachers, and a great 
deal of attention was also paid to bolstering the local churches and religious leaders.  
                                                 
67 Conversation with Chief Chibue, 19 August 2005.  
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Renamo’s de facto modes of governing through the mambos somewhat 
mimicked colonial indirect rule, but as noted by Alexander (1997), it also to a large extent 
resembled Frelimo’s hierarchical ordering of authority and command lines. While 
pretending to be rooted in ‘local traditional’ systems and aiming to ‘liberate’ the people, as 
part of routine administration Renamo soldiers also gave orders to the mambos, who had to 
abide by them and mobilise the population in return (ibid.: 8-10). This contributed to a 
sense of subordination to the military command. In addition, the ‘return to tradition’ was in 
practice a pure resurrection of neither the colonial régulos, nor pre-colonial forms of 
organisation and bases of legitimacy. As already noted, all but two (Kóa and Mushamba) of 
the eight régulos registered by the colonial administration had fled the area before Renamo 
established its own system of indirect rule. As a result, the majority of those who acted as 
mambos under Renamo control were, if at all, members of the ruling ucama, the 
‘substitutes’ of former régulos. Some of these were imposed directly by Renamo soldiers 
(e.g. Gudza), due to the absence of any members of the ‘real family’. Others elevated 
themselves to the position (e.g. Sambanhe). In yet other instances (e.g. Chibue), Renamo 
devolved the power to appoint the mambo to the remaining elders. The majority of these 
substitutes were referred to by informants as ‘relatives of chiefs’, who had not properly 
attained chiefly office through succession. Moreover, due to population movements and 
changing lines of combat, neither civilians nor mambos necessarily resided in their 
‘traditional homesteads’. Many mambos (e.g. Chibue, Mushambonha, Kóa and Gudza) 
presided over territories that had originally been under the rule of another mambo.  
These changing configurations of chieftaincy suggest that Renamo’s re-
insertion of the mambos did not alone grow out of a preoccupation with ‘restoring 
tradition’: it was also a highly pragmatic step. Like Frelimo in the Matica area, Renamo 
was forced to compromise with the societies over which it intended to rule and had little 
choice but to rely on the chieftaincy to keep some ‘wealth in people’ (Alexander 1997: 8). 
This was combined with militarised practices of governing that, as Alexander argues 
(1997), hardly offered an alternative to Frelimo’s failed attempts to secure popular power.  
Nonetheless, Renamo did succeed in maintaining administrative control of the 
vast territory of Dombe even beyond the General Peace Accord (GPA) in 1992 and the 
initial phase of dual administration.68 In fact, Renamo remained de facto in power in 
                                                 
68 The section in the peace accord on local administration during the interim period until the first general 
elections provided for shared administration between Frelimo and Renamo, which followed the war-time 
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Dombe sede until the end of 1995, when the state’s administrative presence was re-
established after failed attempts. These failures were due to the open resistance of 
disgruntled members of the population and by a number of the mambos, who did not want 
the Frelimo state back in the area. Dombians also confirmed their support for Renamo at 
the ballot box in 1994, with approximately 90% voting for it.   
 By way of summarising, this section has shown that, although Renamo was 
predominantly a military organisation concerned to destroy everything built by Frelimo, at 
least in the va-Ndau ‘liberated areas’ such as Dombe it did attempt to institute a kind of 
alternative territorial-administrative polity and to make some claims to legitimate its 
authority. Yet notwithstanding its claim to represent ‘tradition’ and ‘rural interests’, its 
actual practices of governing (control of movement, coercion, taxation, extraction of labour 
and rewards) and its hierarchical organisation of authority reproduced many of the traits of 
colonial indirect rule and the evolving militarisation of the Frelimo state. Hence Renamo 
did not, as was also the case with Frelimo, de facto institute a genuine alternative to the 
lack of open consultation and democratic involvement by the rural population of earlier 
polities.   
The question is to what extent Renamo’s part-restoration of ‘traditional’ 
authority and its emphasis on spiritual practices and beliefs moulded its popular legitimacy, 
underscored by the electoral victory in 1994. The question begs mixed answers. While 
many of the chiefs who had lived in Renamo-liberated areas highlighted the fact that 
Frelimo’s abolition of the régulos had led to the wadzimu revolting – exemplified by 
droughts, a lack of prosperity and above all the war – they did not equally emphasise 
Renamo as embodying the wadzimu. Conversely, the opinions of rural residents suggested 
that popular support for Renamo did not totally reflect traditionalist aspirations for ‘a return 
the past’ or a contempt for ‘modernisation’ (see also Alexander 1994: 49). If articulated at 
all, ‘tradition’ provided an idiom with which to criticise the failures of the Frelimo state to 
ensure development or de facto inclusion of Dombians within the nation state and its 
officials’ gradual resort to oppressive practices of governing (including forced removals 
into villages). As other scholars writing on the va-Ndau areas have also asserted (Schafer 
2001; Florêncio 2005), there seemed to be no straightforward correspondence between 
residing in Renamo’s ‘liberated areas’ and embracing Renamo’s political and ideological 
                                                                                                                                                     
occupation of administrative centres (districts and postos). Renamo was allowed to nominate administrators, 
employ local residents and use chiefs, but it had to adhere to the national laws of public administration. In 
Manica province, Renamo held six administrative posts, including Dombe (Alexander 1997: 11).  
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platform. To the majority of Dombians, this had been a means of survival and an alternative 
to the risk of being subjected to Frelimo’s forced removals and often violent treatment of 
the va-Ndau people.  
Nonetheless, on the national political scene Renamo was able to capitalise on 
its claim to a ‘return to tradition’ and its ‘war of the spirits’ when it was turned into a 
political party after 1992. This attitude also gained weight within the Frelimo leadership, 
who increasingly believed that Renamo’s ‘resurgence’ of tradition had bolstered its ability 
to achieve such a forceful military expansion. As we shall see in the next chapter, this was 
also partly a background for why Frelimo increasingly became intent on the post-war state 
recognition of chiefs. In this sense, Renamo had indirectly won the ‘war of the spirits’, as 
Chief Zixixe noted in August 2002: “The war was bad, but at least it convinced Frelimo 
that it had done wrong in saying that there was no mambo, no God and no spirits”.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Saguta of Chief Dombe, October 2002: The Mambos…the Régulos…they have always been like 
prostitutes of whoever had the force to be in power...whoever is in the big hurumende 
[government]…from the great Ngungunyane, the Caetanao [Portuguese]…to Frelimo who threw the 
régulos out at first and then Renamo who called the mambos back to work.  
 
In 2002, not all mambos of Matica and Dombe entirely agreed with this view of a saguta 
from Dombe. Others highlighted that at least some mambos had retained a level of 
autonomy from the hurumende, the common word used in Chi-Ndau and Chi-Teve to 
describe the shifting wider polities.69 The statement by the saguta does nevertheless capture 
a key lesson from this historical chapter: each of the successive polities, from the QuiTeve, 
Ngunis and Portuguese to Frelimo and Renamo, tried to consolidate superior authority and 
expand territorial control over the rural hinterlands by regulating, domesticating or partially 
extinguishing the smaller territorial chieftaincies of mambos. The core point is that the 
relational constitution of the chieftaincy and external polities has deep historical roots, and 
that this has been permeated by different layers of mutual transformations and continuities.  
As this chapter has illustrated, with the exception of the first period of 
Frelimo rule, past modes of governing the rural areas relied, with varied success and 
                                                 
69 The word hurumende itself derives from the English word ‘government’ and can probably be traced back to 
the period of British-owned Company rule, as well as be explained by the proximity of the English-speaking 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).  
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intensity, on indirect rule through the mambos. Indirect rule was based on some form of 
recognition of the authority and executive powers of the mambos over subject populations, 
and on the notion that these attributes could be converted into consolidating the political, 
military and economic power of a superior authority (king, state, party or military 
command). Recognition at the same time reconfigured the Shona-Karanga chieftaincies, in 
particular with the increased intensity and scale of territorial-administrative control and 
practices of governing populations by shifting polities.  
What this teaches us for the rest of this dissertation is that any present-day 
definition of empirical forms of ‘traditional authority’ and ‘rural community’ as authentic, 
timeless and undisturbed are highly dubious: shifting polity formations and wars 
extensively reconfigured chiefly practices, population units, kinship lineages and claims to 
authority, not only when chiefs were banned, but also when they were recognised. It also 
teaches us that, whatever the claims to historical continuity, chiefs have for a long time 
been drawn into defining and constituting their authority in relation to wider polities, i.e. by 
drawing recognition and resources from them and/or by positioning themselves in 
opposition to external power-holders. This relational constitution of chiefly authority at the 
same time implied reconfigurations. Much the same can be said of shifting polities.  
As this chapter has illustrated, shifting polities were neither fully coherent, 
nor fully comprehensive in their administrative and ideological expansion. Each polity 
formation was reshaped by compromises with the societies over which polities sought to 
rule, their modes of governing reconfigured by the ability of many chiefs to resist full 
subordination. For this reason, colonialism only partially invented and encapsulated 
‘traditional authority’, Frelimo’s banning of chiefs was more feeble than total, and 
Renamo’s re-insertion of the mambos less ‘traditional’ than was claimed. Key to 
understanding this, I suggest, is that the mambo/régulo provided the constitutive ‘Other’ of 
the shifting polities, which mostly took the form of a process of both encompassment and 
hierarchical separation. Even when this took on oppositional form, such as Frelimo’s first 
attempt to build a nation state by eliminating remnants of the past, ‘traditional authority’ 
prevailed as the constitutive ‘Other’ of the state, that is, in negative terms. This point, I 
suggest, is important in considering the legacies of the past for post-war definitions of and 
legislation on traditional authority.  
Having said this, we need also acknowledge the common traits of hierarchical 
organisation, coercion and exclusion that dominated past modes of governing the rural 
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areas of Matica and Dombe. This will be important for understanding, in the coming 
chapters, how Decree 15/2000 was translated into practice by local state officials, and how 
chiefs and members of the rural population perceived the state, citizenship and the 
recognition of traditional authority. Although, as this chapter has shown, some polities 
recognised chiefs on the basis of beliefs in the spiritual power of ruling lineages (the Chi-
Teve king, Renamo, and to some extent war-time Frelimo governance), reliance on chiefs 
was predominantly driven by pragmatic concerns for the often coercive control of people 
and extraction of resources. The important point is that, despite important ideological 
differences, no past polities left the people of Dombe and Matica with experiences of any 
enduring history of state-encouraged open consultation, democratic engagements or 
genuinely inclusive citizenship (Alexander 1997). As such, past modes of governing the 
rural areas provided no exemplary historical reference point for re-inserting ‘traditional 
authority’ into post-war democratic governance. As we shall see next, however, this did not 
prevent numerous people from imagining that this was indeed possible.  
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Chapter 3 
Traditional Authority in the New Democracy 
 
 
President Joachim Alberto Chissano: “We want traditional authority to exist” (quoted in Notícias, 
daily newspaper, 22 June 1995). 
 
Luis Honwana, Minister of Culture: “We didn’t realise how influential the traditional authorities 
were, even without formal power. […] We are obviously going to have to harmonise traditional 
beliefs with our political project. Otherwise, we are going against things that the vast majority of 
our people believe – we will be like foreigners in our own country. I think we are gathering the 
courage to say so aloud. We will have to restore some of the traditional structures that at the 
beginning of our independence we simply smashed, thinking that we were doing a good and 
important thing” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 164).  
 
Minister of State Administration, Dept. of Administrative Development: “An important component 
of the process of national reconstruction within the context of democracy is reconciliation between 
brothers, but also the reconciliation of the Mozambican man with his proper culture. We feel that 
traditional authority represents the local culture of the communities. […] Traditional authority is 
important to the communities. They exist in the whole national territory and therefore constitute a 
fact of national unity. [...] From an administrative point of view, the state should find a way to 
interact with this [traditional] authority, because it represents a position of leadership in the 
communities, and can therefore become the best interlocutor between these communities and the 
state in order to secure local development in the current process of decentralisation” (quoted in 
Notícias, daily newspaper, 27 July 1996).  
 
 
After the General Peace Accord (GPA) was signed in 1992, the vexed question of 
‘traditional authority’ emerged as a matter of topical interest in diverse national circles – 
among academics, the media, politicians, donors and state functionaries.70 By that time, 
Mozambique had embarked on a multiple process of transition (Artur and Weimer 1998: 3) 
characterised by enormous dependency on international donors.71 The transition from war 
to peace took place within the context of far-reaching economic and political liberalization, 
which was already dawning in the second half of the 1980s. These reforms coincided with 
the dominating international donor discourse emerging at the time, in which aid was made 
conditional on having a market economy and liberal democracy. This was already marked 
in the 1990 Constitution, which transformed the one-party state into a multi-party 
democracy and introduced various icons of the Western liberal tradition – the rule of law, 
                                                 
70 On the process of the peace negotiations, see Hall and Young 1997: 205-16; Alden 2001: 13-68; Synge 
1997. 
71 By 1993 foreign aid was accounting for two-thirds of GDP and over half of government expenditure (Hall 
and Young 1997: 231). On donor dependency and the externally driven character of the transition and reform 
processes, see Hanlon 1991; Hall and Young 1997; Plank 1993; Synge 1997. 
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rights, equality, the freedom of the citizen and pluralism of opinion (Hall and Young 1997: 
211). These new principles were accompanied by donor-financed programmes promoting 
‘decentralisation and democratisation’, which aimed to reform the centralised state 
administration and build democracy by creating locally elected governments, revitalizing 
civil society and strengthening local institutions in decision-making. At an early stage, 
‘traditional authority’ was considered one of these local institutions, and was even granted 
its own ‘projects’ (VeneKlasen and West 1996: 1). Throughout the 1990s, the role of 
‘traditional authority’ in such diverse matters as the socio-economic, political, 
administrative and cultural life of Mozambique was a key objective of intensive research 
and heated public debates. However, from the first government-hosted research project on 
this subject, initiated in 1991, nine years were to go by before Decree 15/2000 was passed.  
The aim of this and the next chapter is to explore how ‘traditional authority’ became 
a subject of policy-making and ultimately of legislation at the very moment of the post-war 
democratic transition. To answer this question, in this chapter I first explore the nine-year-
long policy-making process of the 1990s, and ask what actor positions and wider conditions 
influenced the interest in and definitions of ‘traditional authority’. This is followed in 
Chapter 4 by an analysis of the Decree 15/2000 and the definitions of ‘traditional authority’ 
that in the end informed it.  
This chapter’s findings are based on an analysis of the wider political context and of 
the public debate on ‘traditional authority’ as reflected in newspaper articles, published and 
unpublished research results and consultancy reports from the 1990s.72 The main 
assumption is that, to understand how ‘traditional authority’ was envisioned and defined as 
an object of state recognition in the democratic transition, we need to go beyond legislation 
itself and address the political processes preceding it. This involves keeping in mind the 
historical background discussed in Chapter 2, as well as asking what actor interests lay 
behind definitions of ‘traditional authority’, and what wider conditions and agendas of the 
1990s informed these. In doing this, it is important to ask who managed to set the agenda 
and assume the power to define ‘traditional authority’ as a policy field, and against whom. 
                                                 
72 A newspaper database of all articles on the topics of ‘traditional authority’ and decentralization since 1990 
has been made by Carlota Mondlane, a research assistant of Lars Buur (DIIS) and myself, in 2002. I am 
greatly indebted to Rufino Alfane (Ministry of State Administration or MAE) for providing access to 
unpublished material on the topic held by MAE, and Harry West and Bernard Weimer for access to 
consultancy reports. I am aware of the limits of textual analysis alone for exploring a policy-making process, 
as it naturally does not include data on the various micro-practices and negotiations that take place in closed 
meetings and in more informal settings (on this point, see Mosse 2005). Therefore it should be kept in mind 
that the focus of this chapter is on public debates and the opinions expressed in these.  
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To include these questions in the analysis is based on understanding policy- and law-
making as processes of regularisation in which power relations are at stake (Oomen 2005; 
Shore and Wright 1997; Moore 1978).73 Laws and policies are seen as the product of 
contestations over the ‘power to define’ a policy issue, and of attempts to render natural 
particular classifications of social order. These contestations, I suggest, revolve around 
actors’ interests in maintaining or enlarging their influence within a wider arena of power, 
which extends beyond the singular policy issue itself (e.g. traditional authority).   
This chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 1 an overview of the main 
activities of the policy-making process is provided, together with a consideration of how 
‘traditional authority’ as a policy field became framed in relation to the democratic 
transition, and who set the agenda to begin with. Section 2 discusses the public debate on 
traditional authority, and what turned out to be politically infused classificatory struggles 
over definitions of real traditional authority. It identifies six key groups of actors who 
managed to enter the stage of public debate: academics, international donors, state officials, 
Frelimo, Renamo, and chiefs or ex-régulos. The section asks how these actors defined 
‘traditional authority’, what future formal role they envisaged for ‘it’, and what interests lay 
behind their definitions. However, their definitions and interests could not be understood 
independently of wider local, national and international conditions and agendas; these are 
discussed in Section 3. Based on the analysis in Section 2, four main underlying agendas 
and conditions are identified, which extend beyond the historical background discussed in 
Chapter 2: the international reform framework of political liberalisation; global discourses 
on cultural particularism and the rethinking of individual-based citizenship; party-political 
competition in a multi-party democracy; and the dilemmas of post-war state reformation in 
rural areas.  
 
1. The Policy-Making Process: An Overview 
 
In Mozambique, the national policy-making process on traditional authority did not take off 
from ‘below’, but in the ministerial corridors of the capital, Maputo, assisted by 
international donor funding. Although chiefs had made an informal comeback in local 
governance during the war, the policy-making process was not sparked by the result of 
                                                 
73 To argue that policy-making is an inherently political process is not to deny that policies are often 
depoliticised and cast in a technical and neutral scientific language that removes inherently politically 
contested issues from the realm of politics (Shore and Wright 1997; Ferguson 1992). 
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chiefs’ organising themselves to call for legislation that would formally recognise them. 
The actors identifying themselves as chiefs only entered the public stage of policy debates 
in the mid-late 1990s when they were invited to do so.  
Instead the first seeds of a policy-making process began in 1991 as a donor-funded 
research project on ‘traditional authority’, which was hosted within the Ministry of State 
Administration (MAE) in Maputo (Lundin 1995: 15). This project set the first agenda for 
identifying ‘traditional authority’ as a knowledge field and as a common category to be 
inserted into possible future legislation. The decision to launch the project within the MAE 
reflected a more positive attitude towards ‘traditional authority’ among some members of 
the Frelimo leadership, notably the then Minister of MAE, who was a key promoter of the 
value of traditional authority and culture for the new democratic transition (ibid.: 3-5). This 
was supported by a number of Mozambican researchers, as well as by the Ford Foundation, 
which funded the project. Thus the first seeds of possible legislation on traditional authority 
emerged from the interests of other actors, beyond the existing chiefs themselves.  
The aim of the first research project was to provide fieldwork-based evidence of 
whether ‘traditional authority’ actually existed and was legitimate in ‘the communities’ – 
the label used to describe rural populations (ibid.: 8). In contrast to the claims of some that 
‘real’ traditional authority had withered away under colonial rule, the results of the research 
project produced another ‘truth’: “The truth is that local African Authority exists, as present 
and as recognised as important in the communities. […] despite the differences that exist 
from region to region, traditional authority is important in the whole national territory” 
(ibid.: 10, 7, my translation). This ‘truth’ laid the basis for what became a protracted policy-
making process characterised by the co-existence of intensive media debates, more donor-
funded MAE research projects and workshops, the drafting and redrafting of new laws on 
decentralised local government, and ambiguous statements and decisions by the national 
Frelimo leadership on ‘traditional authority’. Key here was the question of where to 
position traditional authorities within the new democratic transition.  
Following the MAE researchers’ declaration that traditional authority did indeed 
exist, the positioning of ‘traditional authority’ as a policy field became directly linked to the 
ongoing donor-driven agenda of democratic decentralisation, which aimed at decentralising 
the state administration and establishing locally elected governments. This was initially 
reflected in the title of the first national seminar on the topic in 1993: ‘Local Government 
Reform and the Role of Traditional Authority in the Decentralisation Process’. At this 
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seminar, the preliminary results of the MAE research were discussed with academics 
(Mozambican and foreign), donors, national, provincial and district state officials, and 
religious movements (Lundin 1998: 33).74 It was established at the seminar that ‘traditional 
authority’ was indeed suited for insertion into a coherent national law on democratic, 
decentralised governance, which at the time was under preparation (Lundin 1995: 151). 
This was based on the argument that kinship-based chieftaincy “demonstrates a 
decentralised model of the exercise of authority” and that the appointment and regulation of 
the power of chiefs represents local “democratic exercises” (Lundin 1995: 25-6).  
The recommendation of the 1993 seminar was realised in the 1994 Legal 
Framework for Local Government Reform (Law 7/94). This law was produced by donors 
and the Frelimo government just before the 1994 multi-party elections. In accordance with 
the donor-agenda of ‘democratic decentralisation’, it provided for the devolution of a 
variety of governmental functions to locally elected governments in urban and rural 
districts (Braathen and Orre 2001: 213).75 These were to ‘listen to the opinions and 
suggestions of traditional authorities recognised as such by the communities’ and to liaise 
with such authorities over local development, conflict and land issues (Artur and Weimer 
1998: 5). Thus Law 7/94 provided the first post-colonial official recognition of traditional 
authority, and framed it directly in relation to local democratisation.  
 However, Law 7/94 did not provide closure to the policy-making process on 
‘traditional authority’. In fact it was never implemented. In 1997 it was amended under 
Law 2/97, which implied a severe reduction in the role of ‘traditional authorities’ and the 
extension of locally elected governments (autarquias locais or municipalities) to 33 urban 
areas only (Bornstein 2000; Soiri 1999). As a result, the rural areas were omitted from local 
government reform. This followed the first general elections in 1994, which were won 
tentatively by Frelimo, but confirmed Renamo’s strong support in many rural areas. This 
led some observers to suggest that the amendment of Law 7/94 was due to Frelimo’s fear 
that autonomous municipalities in the rural areas would constitute a danger to national 
unity and the coordination of state administration, and above all that the party would loose 
                                                 
74 Three ex-régulos also participated, but otherwise the seminar was basically not intended for the wider 
participation of chiefs (Macia 1997: 93).  
75 The seeds of the 1994 municipal law were laid in the World Bank-sponsored Programme for Administrative 
Reform (PROL), adopted by the government in 1991. In line with the 1990 Constitution, this programme 
envisaged a quite extensive devolution of political decision-making to locally elected authorities, as well as 
the devolution of administrative functions and responsibilities from central to provincial and district-level 
state administrations (Braathen and Orre 2001). 
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power to Renamo (Baloi and Macuane 1998; Bratten and Orre 2001).76 This fear was also 
reflected in the indecisiveness of the Frelimo government approving legislation on 
traditional authority. It did not, however, stop at this.  
 In the time-frame between the 1994 elections and the policy closure provided by 
law 2/97, a series of new initiatives on traditional authority ensued: more donor-funded 
MAE research projects, intensive media debates reflecting different opinions, high profile 
meetings with ex-régulos conducted by President Chissano across the country, and 
deliberations back and forth within the Council of Ministers. Indeed, in the 1995-96 period 
a Pandora’s Box was opened on the vexed question of ‘traditional authority’. It was also 
then that those who identified themselves as ‘traditional authorities’ – i.e. chiefs or ex-
régulos – entered the public debate and were invited to participate in numerous stakeholder 
workshops.  
 The opening up of a wider public debate in 1995-6 was facilitated partly by the 
active role of the print media, and partly by the novel principles of consultative, 
participatory policy-making promoted by two new MAE-hosted projects (Fry 1997). One of 
these was the ‘Decentralisation and Traditional Authority’ (D/TA) project, based on 
USAID funding of the African American Institute’s (AAI) Democratic Development 
project. Its overall aim was to “contribute to Mozambique’s efforts to build democracy by 
revitalizing civil society and strengthening local institutions for decision-making” 
(Veneklasen and West 1996: 1). In particular, the D/TA component aimed to “strengthen 
the role of traditional leaders in mediating between citizens and the state” and to lay “the 
foundation for reconciliation between government and traditional authorities and for 
incorporating the latter into administration and governance at the local levels” (ibid.). 
Hence it continued the earlier agenda-setting by linking ‘traditional authority’ to democratic 
decentralisation, but now also adding a more explicit focus on their role in local state 
administration.77 The same was the case with the other MAE-hosted research project on 
                                                 
76 The official reason for the amendment of the 1994 municipal law was ‘gradualism’, meaning that only 
those areas with a certain level of infrastructure and institutional capacity were regarded as ready for the 
devolution of functions. The changes to the 1994 law were criticised by the Renamo leadership, who 
subsequently boycotted the 1998 local government elections, resulting in a Frelimo majority and only 14 
percent electoral participation (Baloi and Macuane 1998).  
77 Apart from research and workshops, the project was also aimed at creating educational material on 
‘traditional authority’ to distribute amongst local state and party officials, who were also to come under a 
training programme so that they could learn about ‘traditional authority’ (Veneklasen and West 1996; Fry 
1997). Hence the aim of the project was indeed to prepare for the de jure interaction between ‘traditional 
authority’ and the state. However, whereas five training material brochures were published in 1996 (more on 
these in Chapter 4), the training programme itself never materialized (Fry 1997: 23).  
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‘Traditional Authority and Local Administration’, which fell under the GTZ-financed 
‘Project on Decentralization and Democratization’ (PDD) (Artur and Weimer 1998: 2). 
Both projects were centred on deepening the research-based knowledge of existing forms of 
‘traditional authority’ in the rural areas and on feeding the results into policy decision-
making.  
 The USAID-funded D/TA project in particular was also credited for provoking a 
lively public debate on traditional authority amongst a range of stakeholders (Fry 1997: 22). 
This was facilitated by the launching of numerous workshops (círculos de trabalho e 
discussão or CTDs) in the rural districts, which saw the participation of chiefs, local state 
officials, religious leaders, political party members, local/international NGO members and 
business leaders.78 Media coverage and evaluation reports on the workshops confirmed that 
participants indeed agreed that traditional authorities were important and legitimate in rural 
communities, and that they were worthy of state recognition. Chiefs themselves also 
pledged to assume a key role in local state administration (VeneKlasen and West 1996; Fry 
1997). This further legitimised the voices of those national academics and politicians who 
were in favour of legislation on traditional authority. Presented as a ‘national consensus’ on 
‘traditional authority, the results of the D/TA workshops also fed directly into the policy 
decision-making process at the national level. 
 In March 1996, a draft law on traditional authority was submitted to the 
Council of Ministers. It covered the state recognition of ‘community chiefs’ – a new term 
introduced indicating that chiefs represented rural communities – as key role-players in the 
local state administration (such as tax, health, censuses, justice enforcement, environment 
and development) (Fry 1997: 17-18). However, the draft also came with a small 
reservation: the D/TA team argued that there could be a danger in “curtailing the flexibility 
of the [chieftaincy] institution by ‘freezing’ it into a bureaucratic mould” (ibid: 17). This 
small reservation had implications. It was appropriated by the Council of Ministers as a 
legitimate excuse for disapproving the draft legislation.79  
                                                 
78 A total of eight workshops were held in Zambézia, Tete, Gaza, Manica, Niassa, Cabo Delgado and 
Inhambane provinces (Fry 1997: 7). On average they saw the participation of 125 people. The CTDs were 
nonetheless criticised for not having ordinary citizens on the board (Veneklasen and West 1996: 7).   
79 Fry (1997: 12) suggests that the decision not to legislate on traditional authority had perhaps already been 
made before the initiation of the D/TA project. He bases this on the fact that the MAE Minister, Aguiar 
Mazula, who was one of Frelimo’s most ardent promoters of ‘traditional culture’, was transferred to the 
Ministry of Defence and later voted off the Political Committee, which he himself believed was due to his 
position on the traditional authority issue.  
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Thus in December 1996, the Prime Minister publicly declared that the draft 
legislation was being rejected because “traditional authority varies according to each 
individual’s own tradition, with different manifestations across the country. How can we 
then make a law that is the same from Rovuma to Maputo? [i.e. in the whole country]”80 In 
the name of respecting the different traditions in the country, the Prime Minister instead 
promised that the Government was going to recognise traditional authorities as “important 
cultural-symbolic figures of African society”, rather than as having a role to play in local 
government administration.81  
While the D/TA team ended up supporting this policy closure as communicated by 
the Prime Minister (Fry 1997: 18-19), many other key stakeholders were dissatisfied with 
the decision not to pass legislation that would clearly define the mandates of traditional 
leaders in local state administration. Dissatisfaction was shared not only by chiefs and 
Renamo, but also by many local-level Frelimo cadres and state officials. Also the members 
of the GTZ-funded research team criticised the Council of Ministers’ decision as yet 
another way of excluding the rural populations “from decision-making and participation in 
programmes” (Artur and Weimer 1998: 19). They saw the decision not to legislate as less a 
genuine ‘respect for tradition’ than a sign of continued scepticism and fear within the 
Frelimo leadership of further empowering those chiefs who supported Renamo (ibid.).  
Dissatisfaction with the policy closure provided by the Prime Minister was reflected 
in the public debates and the practices adopted following the December 1996 declaration. 
The official closure of the policy-making process was not reflected outside the national 
government in Maputo: on the contrary, the public debates over ‘traditional authority’ that 
had been fuelled from 1995 continued. Importantly, the official promises of legislation, the 
media attention and the workshops had also sparked increased practical engagements 
between chiefs, local state officials and political parties. It also raised chiefs’ claims to 
recognition. In some rural areas promises of legislation had also fuelled ongoing conflicts 
over areas of jurisdiction, for example, between the secretaries of GDs and ex-régulos, 
between different claimants to the chieftaincy, and between Frelimo-state officials and 
Renamo (Fry 1997: 9).  
All these issues underpinned, I suggest, both why the policy-making process was so 
protracted, and also why, in 2000, the Council of Ministers ‘changed its mind’ and passed 
                                                 
80 Domingo, 08.12.96.  
81 Ibid.  
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Decree 15/2000. The key to understanding this was the different actor positions on 
traditional authority, reflected in the public debates of the mid-to-late 1990s. As I shall deal 
with next, these were marked by struggles over the ‘power to define’ what is ‘real’ and 
‘unreal’ traditional authority, which were informed by political interests beyond traditional 
authority itself, as well as by wider conditions and agendas.  
 
Figure 3.1.: Overview of the policy-making process.  
Period Activities 
1991-
1994 
Ford Foundation funded research project on ‘Traditional Authority’ hosted by the MAE 
(fieldwork conducted in six provinces in 1992-3).  
1993 Seminar in Maputo on ‘Local Government Reform and the Role of Traditional Authority in 
the Decentralisation Process’ with academics (Mozambican and foreign), donors, provincial 
and district level authorities, and religious movements to discuss the results of the MAE 
team’s study. Intensive media coverage of the topic follows the seminar.  
1994 Traditional leaders inscribed in draft law on municipalities (7/94), based on recommendations 
by MAE team. 
1995 President Chissano conducts high profile meetings with traditional leaders in most of the 
provinces, promising a statement on their future role in local governance in 1996.  
1995 MAE and Ford Foundation-funded research published in two-volume book.  
1995-
1997 
USAID funds the African American Institute’s (AAI) Democratic Development project, 
including a ‘Decentralisation and Traditional Authority’ (D/TA) component’ hosted within 
MAE. New set of studies, training-program, educational material and workshops (CTDs) in 
the provinces.  
1995 Eight CTD workshops, conducted by MAE officials and researchers in each of the provinces 
(apart from Maputo). 
1995-
1997 
GTZ-funded research project on ‘Traditional Authority and Local Administration’, falling 
under the GTZ-financed ‘Project on Decentralization and Democratization (PDD)’, hosted 
within the MAE. Field research carried out in three provinces, resulting in numerous reports 
discussed with national, provincial and district-level state officials and two final academic 
publications in 1996 and 1998.  
1996 In March draft legislation for the Traditional Authorities is submitted to the Council of 
Ministers by the D/TA project staff, including criteria for the nomination of chiefs and a list 
of tasks for them to collaborate in with the local state administration (such as tax, health, 
censuses). In July MAE Minister declares legislation to be on the door-step. In December the 
Prime Minister declares that there will be no legislation integrating traditional authority into 
the local state/government administration.  
1997 Final law on Municipalities (2/97) instituting locally elected governments only in 33 urban 
centres and in none of the rural areas (elections are held in 1998). Substantial reduction of the 
formal role to traditional authorities in local governance and no formalised relationship with 
local tiers of the state administration.  
1998 Stalemate in the national government’s debate on traditional leaders’ role in local governance 
and in terms of legislation.  
1999 Committee on the revision of the 1991 Constitution reaches a consensus on an article that 
recognises traditional leaders’ participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the 
nation (later inscribed in the 2004 Constitution). It does not define traditional leaders as part 
of the state administration. Media debate on traditional leaders, reporting arguments about the 
‘urgent need’ to provide clear legislation from provincial and district-level state officials and 
political parties.    
1999 National elections and prior campaigns in which both parties draw on traditional leaders. 
2000 Decree 15/2000 is passed in June by the Council of Ministers, resembling the draft legislation 
for traditional authorities submitted to the Council of Ministers in March 1996 by D/TA 
project staff. 
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2. Actor Positions and Struggles over Definition  
 
As Fry has pointed out (1997), the final evaluator of the D/TA project, the public debates 
facilitated by the MAE projects did a good deal to convert “even the harshest critics of 
‘tradition’” into acknowledging that ‘traditional authority’ “is a force to be reckoned with” 
(ibid.: 22). However, even if “the question was no longer whether ‘traditional authorities’ 
were important”, then what exactly was to be reckoned with and how remained disputed 
(ibid.). These disputes took place in the mid-to-late 1990s, until the final policy-closure 
provided with Decree 15/2000. The questions that dominated were: Who are the ‘real’ 
traditional leaders? What should their roles be in local government, democratisation and 
development? How should they relate to party politics in the new multi-party system? And 
what are their roles in national reconciliation and nation-building?  
 This section focuses on the positions of the key actors who proved capable of 
entering the public debate on ‘traditional authority’ and to varied degrees influenced the 
policy-making process. In doing this, the section discusses the often conflicting definitions 
of ‘real’ traditional authority presented by these key role-players in public representations 
and what interests these underscored.82 The emphasis on key role-players and their public 
representations is important to note, not only because I do not pretend to cover all 
Mozambican voices on the topic of ‘traditional authority’, but more significantly because 
not all voices were in fact present. Some actors proved more influential than others. Earlier 
this was already hinted at in terms of who set the policy-agenda – i.e. the MAE and the 
donor-funded research projects – and who made the final decisions on successive policy 
closures, namely the Council of Ministers. Added to these were other actor positions that 
proved to be particularly influential. Based on the material I have had access to, six key 
role-players could be identified: Mozambican academics; international donors; state 
officials; Frelimo; Renamo; and chiefs or ex-régulos.83 Conspicuously absent from the 
public debate and research results were ordinary rural people. This may seem a paradox, 
                                                 
82 Because the actor positions described in this section represent public statements, they do not necessarily 
capture the personal or insider opinions of the actors.  
83 By including chiefs as key role-players, I am not pretending that all those who identified themselves as 
chiefs participated equally in the public debate (or at the D/TA workshops. The same can, of course, be said 
of the other key actors.  
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given that the MAE research teams placed much emphasis on the ‘wish’ of rural 
communities to see a formal return of chiefs in local governance.84  
While I can provide no ready-made answer as to why this was the case, this absence 
does hint at the issues of power involved in the policy-making process. The ability to enter 
and influence the public debate on ‘traditional authority’ reflected and nurtured particular 
positions of power in the wider context of the post-war democratic transition. As this 
section will address, the ‘struggles over defining’ and monopolising classifications of what 
‘real’ ‘traditional authority’ is, was intimately related to interests beyond chiefs themselves.  
This was expressed in different perspectives on ‘traditional authority’, which were 
sometimes combined and sometimes opposed: i.e. the ‘culturalist’, ‘administrative’, 
‘developmentalist’, ‘democratic’ and ‘apolitical’ perspectives.85 We shall begin with the 
positions of Mozambican academics, who tended to represent the culturalist perspective.  
Mozambican academics: the culturalist perspective 
 
It would be a gross exaggeration to assert that all Mozambican academics shared a common 
view of ‘traditional authority’ or celebrated the formal recognition of it equally in the mid-
to-late 1990s. As Artur and Weimer note (1998: 8), there certainly were some who 
positioned themselves right at the opposite end, holding on to a kind of ‘invention of 
tradition’ perspective: they cast present forms of chieftaincy as colonial inventions in the 
service of foreign interests (see, for example, Serra 1997). Nonetheless, these were in the 
minority when looking at the academic voices that dominated in the media and that fed into 
the policy-making process.  Rather, the most pervasive academic position in the public 
                                                 
84 I was only able to encounter four newspaper articles in which a number of rural residents gave their 
opinions about ‘traditional authority’: three in which they were in favour of a ‘return’ of the régulos (Notícias 
19.06.97; 14.09.96; Domingo, 09.04.95), and one in which they complained about the violent methods of the 
régulos (Notícias, 23.10.96).  
85 In dividing the positions into these different perspectives I question the tendency in many studies to narrow 
down actor positions of traditional authority in present day Africa to an opposition between ‘modernists’ and 
‘traditionalists’ (see Blom 2002; Oomen 2005; Artur and Weimer 1998; Macia 1997; Mamdani 1996). The 
modernist position, in defence of rights and civil society, has been treated as opposed to ‘traditional authority’ 
because the latter is supposedly anti-democratic and what might be regarded as ‘real’ tradition disappeared 
through colonial inventions. Conversely the traditionalist perspective, in favour of the localisation of African 
politics at the level of the local community, is commonly associated with a celebration of ‘traditional 
authority’, which its protagonists define as a manifestation of African civil society and as inherently 
democratic (see Artur and Weimer 1998: 8; Mamdani 1996: 3). While I do not deny the analytical value of 
this distinction, it fails to grasp how the dominant actor positions in the Mozambican debate crystallised into 
different mixtures of these two perspectives in the mid-to-late 1990s. Although a distinction between 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ was at work, the struggles of definition centred predominantly on different ways 
of reconciling or making the two co-exist according to different interests. 
 
 95
debate was what could be referred to as the ‘culturalist’ perspective, which was in favour of 
the recognition of traditional authority as representative of traditional cultural values and 
beliefs (Artur and Weimer 1998: 8). It was culturalist because, rather than pledging the 
return of the chieftaincy to state administration, it linked ‘traditional’ authority to questions 
of identity, personhood and national reconciliation or unity. The main proposition was that 
‘traditional’ values and culture should be recognised as existing manifestations of African 
civil society and as endemic in reconciling the state and citizens of Mozambique and in 
reasserting nationhood (ibid.: 8-9). This perspective was represented by the MAE research 
team, coordinated by the Brazilian-Swedish scholar, Lundin, and by African scholars like 
Kulipossa (1997), Ngoenha (1994) and the deans of the Catholic University and the 
Eduardo Mondlane University.  
 Underpinning the culturalist perspective was a particular reading of the post-war 
situation and a claim to an authentic pre-colonial culture that could be revived as the 
building-block of ‘real’ Mozambican identity and citizenship. It was argued that not only 
the war, but also the earlier modernist onslaught on traditional values, practices and 
institutions, had meant that rural communities in particular lacked a sense of national 
identity and had become alienated from the state and the urban elite.86 The overarching 
argument was that the occidental, modernist ideas about society and the state that had 
permeated post-colonial ideology had both failed to eliminate fully the traditions of rural 
communities, as well as creating a dual society separating the (urban) modern elite from the 
rural people.87 The failure to reconcile exogenous modernity with endogenous African 
culture, it was argued, had also confused many urban Mozambicans. Fundamental norms 
and moral values had been disrupted, resulting in a loss of personal identity.88  
Against this background, it was argued that post-war nation-building depended not 
only on reconciling the two warring parties, but also on reconciling the two societies in 
Mozambique - the traditional and the modern89 - and on the reconciliation of each 
individual with his/her proper culture.90 As Pengapanga, a Mozambican intellectual, wrote 
                                                 
86 See António Gasper and Martinho Chachiua, two Mozambican researchers involved in the MAE studies 
(Notícias, 02.11.96; 04.11.96). Other academics also presented this view in the media (Notícias, 02.11.96; 
11.11.96; 01.05.97; Domingo, 21.01.96; Demos, 17.01.96).  
87 On this perspective, see Augusto Celistine, a Ministry official, who wrote a historical thesis on the history 
of culture and governance in Niassa (Domingo, , 21.01.96).  
88 See Demos, 17.01.96; Notícias 04.11.96; Demos, 13.12.95.  
89 The deans of Eduardo Mondlane University, and of the Catholic university, in Notícias, 11.11.96. See also 
other academic’s arguing the same point, Notícias, 02.10.96.  
90 Researchers involved in the MAE studies, quoted in Notícias, 27.07.96.  
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in a newspaper article: “it is necessary as a first premise to rediscover the fundamental 
personality, vest it in the past and recreate a spiritual and cultural consciousness. Not until 
then can a project of socio-economic development be launched’.91 Alfane, one of the MAE 
researchers, similarly argued: “first we had to accept that we are black people, we are Bantu 
and we have our traditions that we should accept and use the good values of it”.92  
These views underpinned a view of Mozambican national identity that placed the 
emphasis on a cultural, rather than a purely legal and individual form of citizenship. 
National identity was presented as a question of finding common roots in African values 
and culture that, despite external disruptions, were still to be found in rural communities In 
this the ‘local community’ was presented as a ‘cultural core’ on which to build a shared 
imagined community (Lundin 1995: 31). This clearly embodied a critique of Frelimo’s 
vision of the ‘new man’, though it was not cast in opposition to liberal-democracy. Rather, 
it was held that democratisation implied recognition of the cultures and traditions of the 
country.93  
Underpinning the culturalist perspective was that ‘traditional authority’ could be of 
great value in national identity formation, because they represented authentic pre-colonial 
African ‘traditional values’ and “a symbolic-religious world view, which touches the 
personality of many Mozambicans, urban and rural” (Lundin 1995: 38).94 The version of 
the state recognition of ‘traditional authority’ that emerged from this view was sceptical of 
a reintegration of chieftaincy into the state administration and also as an element of locally 
elected government. The latter, it was argued, would turn traditional leaders into colonial-
style state officials or into modern-style politicians, which would disrupt culture and 
tradition (ibid: 39). Traditional authority should rather be “respected as a symbol of the 
African symbolic-religious world view” and as performers of traditional cultural activities 
(ibid: 41). As we saw in Section 1, this was largely the view that the Prime Minister 
adopted in 1996 when he provided for the first policy-closure.95  
                                                 
91 Demos, 17.01.96.  
92 Interview, A. Rufino, researcher participating in the MAE research on traditional authority, May 2002.  
93 See Domingo, 08.12.96; Demos, , 06.12.96.  
94 See Gaspar and Chachiua in Notícias, , 02.11.96; 04.11.96.   
95 This culturalist perspective was criticized by the Mozambican scholar Macia (1997), not for drawing 
attention to the importance of ‘traditional authority’ in present reforms, but for relying on a reified and 
homogeneous conception of a Mozambican culture vested in an equally reified, timeless and romantic 
understanding of pre-colonial history and culture. Also, he criticised Lundin (1995) for neglecting the 
profound impact of colonialism and pre-colonial forms of expansionary politics on the chieftaincy. Macia 
(1997) viewed the reconstruction of pre-colonial culture as an ideological re-writing of history to fit with the 
aim of recognising ‘traditional authorities’.   
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Donors: the democratisation perspective  
The position of the international donor community on the issue of ‘traditional authority’ is 
difficult to access fully because its members (including those who financed the MAE 
projects) did not directly participate in the public debate.96 Once projects had been framed, 
they largely left the power to define ‘traditional authority’ in Mozambican hands.97 That 
said, donors indeed represented powerful role-players in setting the policy agenda on 
‘traditional authority’, both by financing MAE projects, and by framing the topic as an 
aspect of the process of ‘decentralisation and democratisation’, as noted in Section 1.     
According to West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 460), the MAE studies and the 
observations of scholars like Geffray (1991),98 both of which produced evidence that 
‘traditional authorities’ still existed and were important in rural society, convinced many 
donors and NGOs that ‘traditional authority’ could at least prove temporarily capable of 
filling the gap of a lack of civil society, which was viewed as endemic to the 
democratisation of rural areas.99 Added to this was the underlying assumption that 
‘traditional authority’ could itself somehow be democratized. As West and Kloeck-Jensen 
argue, the donor commitment to the double agenda of ‘democratic decentralisation’ and the 
empowerment of ‘traditional authorities’ was based on the assumption that an extension of 
democracy (i.e. locally elected governments) to the rural areas would not only help 
resurrect civil society, but also repair the divide between the ¨traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
forms of authority: “if people were permitted to elect local authorities, and if ‘traditional 
authorities’ were indeed considered ‘legitimate’ by the local populations, people might then 
elect their chiefs to local office” (ibid.: 461).  
Hence, unlike the culturalist perspective, the donors were less concerned with 
cultural preservation or resurrection than with democratizing existing forms of chieftaincy – 
i.e. by gradually integrating them within a system of elected local government. This was 
partly underscored by Law 7/94, as noted in Section 1. As we shall see later, the 
                                                 
96 When I speak of the international donors in Mozambique, I am referring to international financial 
institutions (IMF/World Bank), international NGOs and bilateral donors. Although there were differences in 
the orientation of these members, they largely agreed on the liberal-democratic transition agenda.  
97 VeneKlasen and West (1996: 13) also point out in their mid-term evaluation of the DTA project that 
USAID was generally reluctant to state its own position on what ‘traditional authority’ is and what role it 
should play. This might have been the case for other donors as well.  
98 Geffray (1991) argued that the domestic cause of the civil war was strongly related to Frelimo’s 
abandonment of the régulos and that Renamo benefited from this in terms of popular support.    
99 The development of a civil society that could effectively and democratically represent community interest 
had been quashed by successive regimes, whose forms of rule had been strong disincentives to the formation 
of organisations independent of the Frelimo party-state (West and Kloeck-Jensen 1999: 461).  
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‘democratization’ perspective of donors was nonetheless contested not only by the chiefs, 
who resisted being the subject of ballot box-style elections, but also by Frelimo, Renamo 
and many state officials. These all shared the view of ‘real’ traditional leaders as apolitical 
players who should be kept out of electoral politics. State officials nonetheless agreed with 
donors that chiefs could be important in rural development and decentralization.    
State officials: culturalist, developmentalist and administrative views 
With a few exceptions, from the mid-1990s higher and lower ranking state officials 
increasingly agreed that “régulos exist. Many of them enjoy huge prestige with the 
population, and they are the ones that guide important aspects of traditional life.”100 They 
also shared the view that chiefs could be important agents in development.101 Apart from 
this, state officials at provincial, district and sub-district levels nonetheless disagreed on the 
role that ‘traditional authority’ should play in local state administration. This was reflected 
in different definitions of ‘real’ versus ‘unreal’ traditional authority, vested in various 
conceptualisations of authentic, past versions of the chieftaincy. Let me begin with the view 
of provincial officials.   
The dominant position of provincial officials resembled the ‘culturalist’ perspective. 
It was that ‘real’ traditional authority belonged to a ‘traditional’ domain of the pre-colonial 
past that was inherently different from the modern state. This underscored the perspective 
that “traditional and institutional [state] authorities are completely different structures”, 
which should be kept separate.102 As the Manica provincial governor noted: “The 
traditional role of chiefs was a question of solving conflicts among families, ceremonies of 
the community and family, dealing with plagues, rain, harvests […] I don’t want chiefs to 
be an extension of the state, of formal power […] I’m very much against any kind of return 
to a colonial rule style adulteration of traditional authority”.103 He also maintained that the 
granting of state uniforms and salaries to chiefs would be an offence against the ancestral 
spirits.104 The provincial definition of ‘real’ traditional authority hence embodied a 
distancing from colonial rule and presented those régulos who had been imposed by the 
                                                 
100 District administrator in Chibuto District, Gaza Province (Domingo 21.05.95). One exception to this view 
was the Governor of Gaza, Eugènio Numaio, who in 1995 strongly argued that ‘traditional power’ had been 
completely corrupted by the colonial regime (see Notícias 18.11.95). 
101 I have chosen to separate the category of state officials from the Frelimo party, although it should be noted 
that many state officials were for historical reasons also members of Frelimo and provincial governors 
appointed by the central government.   
102 Provincial Governor of Manica, Notícias 16.05.95.  
103 Provincial Governor of Manica, quoted in Alexander (1994: 45).  
104 Notícias 16.05.95.  
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colonial administration as ‘unreal’ forms of traditional authority: “the real régulos are not 
appointed, nor conferred with power from the outside. They already exist”.105 This position 
underscored the co-existence of, ‘traditional authority’ and the ‘modern state’, rather than 
one of integration. Traditional leaders should perform religious-spiritual ceremonies, 
resolve minor disputes, and help in the “preservation of culture, tradition and society”, but 
not perform state administrative tasks.106 However, governors also took the view that 
‘traditional’ leaders could be important as development agents, in particular in the 
“mobilisation of the population for the tasks included in the government’s five-year 
development plan”.107  
District-level state officials agreed on this ‘developmentalist’ perspective on 
traditional leaders, but they differed from their provincial superiors in envisaging a central 
role for chiefs in the state administration. As a rule, district administrators’ (DAs’) 
definitions of ‘real’ traditional authority drew not on the culturalist perspective, but on a 
colonial-era version of an administrative form of chieftaincy.108 To them, the ‘unreal’ 
traditional authorities were not the colonial régulos, but those imposed by Renamo or who 
engaged in party politics. DAs viewed the chieftaincy as a revivable set of structures which 
could be put to good use in re-establishing the fragile state administration in rural areas 
(Alexander 1994: 46): “In times past, people only knew the régulo so it’s easy to go back to 
this thing. […] They should work as a link to the administration, they should be responsible 
for the tranquillity of their zone, they should help in reconstruction [and] tax collection 
should be as in the colonial era.”109 The DA of Sussundenga equally held that chiefs could 
be of good use in policing activities and that the state should return salaries to them: “[…] 
because régulos had salaries in the colonial period, it wouldn’t make sense not to pay them 
now.”110 In emphasising the re-integration of chiefs into the state administration, DAs 
tended at the same time to devalue their religious-spiritual roles, emphasised by provincial 
officials as the ‘true’ traditional domain. ‘Spiritual beliefs’ were represented by DAs as 
being detrimental to administration and development (Alexander 1994: 46).  
                                                 
105 Sofala provincial director of government administration, Domingo 21.05.95. For a similar view, see 
Felícios Zacarias, Governor of Manica Province, Notícias 08.02.99 
106 Governor of Manica, Notícias 16.05.95.  
107 Governor of Nampula, Notícias 22.02.97.  
108 There were also critical voices among district administrators (DAs). One was the DA of Homoíne, who in 
1995 told Domingo that a return of the régulos to power would represent a recycling of colonial totalitarian 
governance and be an offence against democratisation, Domingo 09.04.95.  
109 District Administrator of Barúe, Manica Province, quoted in Alexander (1994: 45-6).  
110 Quoted in Alexander (1994: 49).  
 100
This latter view was not shared by sub-district officials, chefes of posts and 
localities. These tended to merge the ‘developmentalist’, ‘administrative’ and ‘culturalist’ 
positions of their superiors. To them there was not an opposition between chiefs’ religious-
spiritual and colonial-style administrative roles (ibid.: 46). Chiefs were viewed as being 
capable of fulfilling a dual mandate: they could both play what were regarded as traditional 
roles (i.e. speaking to the ancestors, asking for rain and good harvests, protecting sacred 
places, solving cases of witchcraft), as well as fulfilling tax collection, census-taking and 
policing roles (ibid.: 47).111 Sub-district officials’ conceptions of ‘real’ versus ‘unreal’ 
traditional authority did not rely on making a distinction between the pre-colonial and 
colonial pasts – indeed, they did not distinguish between the two. Like the DAs, a 
distinction was drawn rather on the basis of party politics: ‘real’ traditional leaders were 
apolitical figures, serving the ‘common good’ and not party political interests (ibid.: 54). 
The de-politicisation of the category of ‘real’ traditional authority was in general 
shared by state officials, irrespective of the roles they envisaged for the chiefs. This could 
be seen as being vested in the interests of securing that administrative concerns were not 
disrupted by party political conflicts, as in fact was the case in many rural areas in the 
1990s (see Section 3). This was not least so in Renamo-controlled areas where chiefs were 
reported by state officials as sabotaging tax collection and government development 
projects.112 Against this background the de-politicisation of ‘traditional authority’ could 
also be viewed as a shared desire to de-link chiefs from Renamo. By lower ranking state 
officials a pledge for legislation that would clarify the apolitical role of the chiefs in the 
state administration could equally be seen in this light and as underscoring the belief that 
such legislation would pave the way to the re-establishment of the state in Renamo held 
areas. This desire to de-link chiefs from Renamo was shared by Frelimo party cadres.   
Frelimo: ‘real’ traditional authority is anti-colonial and apolitical  
The Frelimo government’s agreements to host research projects on ‘traditional authority’ 
within the MAE, both prior to and after the 1994 elections, including its passing of Law 
7/94, clearly indicate that the ruling party’s attitude towards ‘traditional authority’ had 
                                                 
111 On these views, see Domingo 09.04.95; 21.05.95.  
112 For Murrumpula district, Sofala, see Notícias 17.02.96; 21.02.97; for Mossuril District, Nampula, where 
five régulos allegedly sabotaged government development projects, see Notícias 24.08.96; for Homoíne 
District, Inhambane, where chiefs were accused of sabotaging tax collection, see Notícias 10.05.97; 18.07.97; 
for chiefs’ alleged involvement in sabotaging tax collection in Alto-Molócuè, Zambezia, see Notícias 
08.03.99; and for Chibabava District, Sofala, on chiefs’ resistance to state control, see Notícias 30.09.96.  
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become much more positive after the war. In addition, although rarely stated explicitly, 
media coverage during the 1994 election campaign demonstrated that Frelimo officials 
recognised that “figures who claimed authority over kin-based institutions could powerfully 
influence voter behaviour” (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999: 461). The ruling party, it 
seemed, was increasingly convinced of the argument presented by a number of academics 
that its fragile legitimacy in rural areas was due to the history of banning ‘tradition’, and 
that Renamo’s rural support had been achieved by restoring the chiefs (Artur and Weimer 
1998; de Brito 1995; Abrams and Nilsson 1995; Geffray 1991). That said, the decision not 
to legislate, announced by the Prime Minister in 1996, also indicated that there was still 
scepticism within the party regarding the integration of ‘traditional authority’ into the local 
state administration. According to West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999: 468), Frelimo’s fear was 
that legislation could potentially empower figures who tended to reside in the opposition 
camp, and create discontent among those who were Frelimo loyalists in the rural areas.   
In media debates of the mid-to-late 1990s, this fear was reflected not in a negative 
attitude towards ‘traditional authority’ per se, but in the drawing up of distinctions between 
‘real’ and ‘unreal’ chiefs or ex-régulos. Apart from Sergio Vieira, a Frelimo deputy to the 
national assembly, who explicitly claimed that colonialism had completely destroyed pre-
colonial African institutions, most were convinced that ‘real’ traditional authority could be 
identified.113 In line with the views of MAE minister and the General-Secretary of Frelimo 
in 1996, ‘real’ traditional leaders were presented as “those who belong to the real family 
lineages” of a pre-colonial past, and who had not been ‘imposed’ by outsiders.114 This 
followed the argument that colonialism had left behind two types of chief: the ‘false’ 
régulos, who had been created by colonial law, and the ‘real’ traditional leaders of ‘real’ 
family lineages. The difference between them had been demonstrated during the liberation 
struggle, when the ‘real’ traditional leaders had fought on the side of Frelimo and the 
imposed régulos had supported the Portuguese government.115 Hence ‘unreal’ traditional 
leaders were the régulos, who had not only been imposed by the colonial regime, but also 
had not supported independence.   
                                                 
113 On Vieira, see Domingo 27.10.96.  
114 See Savana 28.07.96.  
115 MAE Minister Alfredo Gamito, Savana 28.06.96. To justify Frelimo’s actions after independence, Gamito 
also defended the fact that ‘Frelimo abolished the régulos who cannot be considered ‘genuine’ (genuía) 
traditional authority, but an authority created by colonial law’, and that it did this believing that all those ‘real’ 
chiefs who had supported the liberation struggle had been killed by the Portuguese.  
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Added to this, many Frelimo officials also defined ‘unreal’ traditional leaders as 
those who had been imposed by Renamo during the war and who, in the post-war period, 
enacted the politics of Renamo.116 This was cast in a language that opposed the party 
politics of Renamo to development and the common good. ‘Unreal’ régulos were those 
who engaged in party politics and who sabotaged the government’s plans for development: 
“a real régulo would never create confusion in the population and be against 
development.”117 In statements like this, Frelimo secretaries explicitly blamed Renamo for 
‘politically manipulating’ régulos into sabotaging development.  
Frelimo’s definition of ‘real’ traditional authorities as apolitical actors in the service 
of the common good, I suggest, was intimately linked to the party’s attempt to position 
itself also as the party representing the common good vis-à-vis Renamo. Rather than 
distancing itself from ‘traditional authority’ per se, the apolitical definition of ‘real’ chiefs 
could be seen as a way of converting local forms of power into the power of the party as a 
representative of the whole nation.  
In practice, however, the apolitical definition of ‘real’ chiefs did not always hold 
sway. During the 1999 elections, newspaper articles had local Frelimo secretaries proudly 
reporting that chiefs in Renamo areas had now converted to Frelimo and had helped the 
party secure its victory.118 Frelimo at the same time claimed that Renamo’s use of chiefs in 
voter mobilisation was a “violation of democratic principles”.119 Nonetheless, Renamo 
actually agreed with Frelimo that ‘real’ traditional leaders were outside party politics.  
Renamo: chiefs are representatives of rural Interests  
As opposed to Frelimo sceptics, Renamo members of parliament held on to their electoral 
promises to promote the unconditional re-integration of ‘traditional authority’ into the state 
administration. Officially this was cast not as ‘a return’ to colonial rule, but as a 
prerequisite for the democratic inclusion of the marginalised rural populations in 
development and the nation state.120 In making this claim, Renamo did not draw any 
distinction between ‘real’ traditional authorities and ‘unreal’ régulos, but unconditionally 
                                                 
116 Provincial-level Frelimo secretaries, Notícias 05.07.97; 31.12.97; 28.02.00.  
117 First Frelimo secretary of Sofala, Notícias 05.07.97.  
118 On eleven régulos in Sofala claiming to have converted to Frelimo, see Notícias 02.09.99. For Inhambane, 
on chiefs openly stating that they had assisted Frelimo in campaigning, see Notícias 06.11.99. For Zambézia, 
see Notícias 02.11.99. In Homoíne District, Inhambane Province, a local state functionary also proudly told 
the Notícias that the régulos had agreed to campaign for the Frelimo presidential candidate, Chissano; see 
Notícias 29.10.99.  
119 Notícias 29.10.99.  
120 Notícias 18.07.95; Savana 28.07.95.  
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emphasised the continued, undisturbed historical existence and legitimacy of ‘traditional 
authority’ in rural society. However, Renamo’s definition of ‘traditional authority’ did not 
only represent the ‘culturalist’ and ‘administrative’ perspectives. It combined these with a 
‘democratic’ and ‘developmentalist’ vocabulary that linked ‘traditional authority’ to rural 
community participation in development. Chiefs were cast as representing an authentic 
form of African authority and as genuine representatives of rural community interest:  
 
their [chiefs’] existence is a question of history and culture. […] In the rural areas it is principally 
the régulo and other traditional structures that constitute the true local power. […] This is a power 
that always existed in the African countries. […] They constitute a structure that is inherently 
Mozambican and represents the ideas and interest of the communities they lead. [The régulos] 
constitute the real African authority and represent above all the culture and customs of our 
continent. […] The régulo is the individual who has most prestige and respect in rural areas. He is 
the one that has a dialogue with the people and helps the population solve their problems. It is for 
this reason that they [régulos] can help the government to develop actions for the improvement of 
the living conditions of the population.121
 
Renamo also linked its vision of the chieftaincy to liberal democracy. This was expressed 
by Alexander Faite, a Renamo member of the national assembly, in explaining why régulos 
had supported Renamo: “the big promise that we made [to the régulos] is that we were 
fighting for democracy, social justice and equal rights and these promises were attained.”122 
Renamo thus laid claim not only to the re-insertion of ‘traditional authority’, but also to the 
achievement of liberal democracy on the basis of the interests of the régulos, who, it was 
held, represented the interests of rural communities.   
 This definition of ‘traditional authority’ as the genuine representative of rural 
community interests, defended by Renamo, also involved a definition of chiefs as apolitical 
actors in service of the common good of all Mozambicans.123 In claiming this, the Renamo 
leadership rejected Frelimo’s allegations that Renamo had politically manipulated régulos 
into sabotaging state intervention and government development projects.124 They justified 
this by explaining that disobedient chiefs had just reacted, in defence of their people, to the 
Frelimo government’s incapacity to “create conditions and infrastructure for restoring the 
living conditions of the population that continue to be discriminated against and 
                                                 
121 Raul Domingos, Notícias 18.07.95. Raul Domingos was the head of the Renamo team that negotiated the 
1992 peace agreement. From 1994 to 1999, he was the head of the Renamo parliamentary group. His 
prominence in parliament led to speculation that he might mount a challenge to Dhlakama's leadership if 
Renamo was ever to hold a congress. In 2000 he was suspended from Renamo. Later he formed the Party for 
Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD). 
122 Alexander Faite, Savana 28.07.95.  
123 See Savana 28.07.95.   
124 On this position, see Savana 28.07.95. 
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forgotten”.125 Likewise, the government’s reluctance formally to recognise traditional 
authority was criticised as the government’s reluctance to serve the interests of the rural 
population.126 In this sense, the de-politicisation of ‘traditional authority’ by Renamo can 
be interpreted as forming part of Renamo’s political strategy of claiming to represent and 
defend rural interests and to cast Frelimo as the opposite of this. However, as was the case 
with Frelimo the apolitical definition of chiefs did not always hold sway in practice. Also 
Renamo heavily relied on chiefs during the election campaigns of 1994 and 1999.  
Chiefs: culture, administration, development and community 
The engagement of chiefs in the public debate took the form of claims to recognition raised 
individually or in small groups by chiefs in the media and at the D/TA workshops. It did 
not, as in for example South Africa, take the form of a nationwide association of 
‘traditional leaders’ sitting at the negotiating table with the government to lobby for 
collective claims to recognition and privileges. In Manhiça, Maputo Province, in 1995 one 
attempt had been made to do this by a number of ex-régulos loyal to Frelimo, but the 
intention of extending this to the whole country never materialised (Macia 1997).127
Rather, the D/TA workshops and the media could be credited for inserting the 
demands and wishes of ex-régulos into the policy-making process. They also provided 
chiefs with a pool of information on which to draw in order to strengthen their pledge for 
recognition within the context of the democratic transition. This was the case because the 
D/TA workshops always began with the MAE staff presenting their research findings and 
explaining to the participants the reform agendas of decentralisation, democratisation and 
community participation (VeneKlasen and West 1996: 8; Fry 1997).  
In defining ‘traditional authority’ and making suggestions for legislation, chiefs 
were able to capture the language of these new reform agendas, while at the same pledging 
a return to colonial-style administrative functions and benefits. Chiefs defined themselves 
interchangeably as development agents, custodians of tradition and custom, state-
administrative figures and apolitical representatives of community interests – much in line 
with the views of Renamo and local-level state officials. In agreement with all the other key 
                                                 
125 Raul Domingos, Savana 28.07.95.  
126 Notícias 18.07.95. 
127 As discussed by Oomen (2005: 95-8), CONTRALESA – the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa – was a very powerful nation-wide association of chiefs in South Africa that played a significant role in 
pushing for legislation. The reason for the lack of such a nation-wide association of chiefs in Mozambique 
might have been due to the historical repression of chiefs, the lack of a culture of autonomous association in 
the rural areas, and political divisions among the chiefs themselves.  
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role-players, with the exception of the donor community, there was a broad consensus 
among chiefs that traditional authority should not be part of a representative democratic 
system – i.e. stand as candidates for political office – nor be supporters of any political 
party. This, however, did not mean that chiefs represented themselves as anti-democratic.  
At workshops chiefs argued that they had their own internal mechanisms to ensure 
the legitimate exercise of power, and that these were more effective than electoral politics 
(VeneKlasen and West 1996). In the media, this argument was coupled with the claim that 
chiefs catered for the well-being of the whole populations, rather than servicing particular 
(party) interests. In this chiefs opposed themselves to self-interested party politicians. For 
example, a chief of Niassa defined chiefs as “the basis for the formation of a dignified 
society and its identity”, and politicians as “those who provoke war […] live comfortably 
and only think about assuming the seats of power”.128 Or as another chief put it, “it is our 
obligation to work not with one party, but to mobilise the population for their participation 
in the reconstruction of Mozambique”.129 Chief Matola, based near Maputo, had a similar 
view: “I am neither with Frelimo nor with Renamo. My party is work and development”;130 
“tradition does not have political colours”;131 “régulos think about people, not political 
votes”.132 Invoking the language of liberal democracy, he also claimed that “traditional 
authority is not opposed to democracy, because democracy means the rights and liberties of 
the citizens, which traditional leaders support”.133 A chief of Beira also stated: “I do not 
belong to any party. I only think about the problems of the people. […] If the government 
gives us power, it is not for the sake of power, but for the sake of the people.”134
This self-definition of chiefs as above particularistic interests was coupled with the 
argument that chiefs were important agents in development: “we contribute to the social 
well-being of the population, such as ensuring that pregnant women are brought to the 
hospital […] cleaning of schools and construction of infrastructure”;135 and “We are ready 
to facilitate the program of the government if this means that the benefits do not end with 
                                                 
128 Chief Mataka, Niassa province, quoted in Demos 13.12.95 
129 Chief Mabalane, Gaza Province, quoted in Notícias 22.12.97.  
130 Chief Matola, Demos 30.07.97.  
131 Chief Matola, Demos 26.07.95.  
132 Chief, Matola, Demos 28.05.97. 
133 Chief Matola, Demos 26.07.95.  
134 Chief Luís, Beira, Demos 11.12.96.  
135 Chief Cheringoma, Sofala Province, Notícias 13.06.96.  
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the ministers, governors or the administrators, but with our sons, our wives and ourselves. 
We are making a cry for the development of the country”.136  
While able to draw on the emerging vocabulary of development and community 
representation to strengthen their call for recognition, chiefs’ vision of legislation was 
based on ‘a return’ to colonial-style integration within the local state administration. In fact 
many chiefs made explicit references to the colonial past: they wanted back their 
administrative, judicial and policing functions, as well as the benefits and outwards signs of 
recognition provided by the colonial state, such as a salary, a means of transport, a uniform 
and the right to hoist the flag (Artur and Weimer 1998: 20).137 Noticeably, many chiefs 
presented this model of state recognition as equal to restoring traditional authority itself: “It 
is necessary for the government to give us back all the competences, because only then can 
we function correctly and fortify the traditional power”.138 Or, as another chief claimed: “it 
is necessary for us to have back the uniform in order for us to be recognised by the 
communities as an authority”, adding that “we are the structure of the state”.139 The point is 
that state recognition was not presented as opposed to, but as consistent with chiefs’ role as 
custodians of tradition and providers of peace, social order and prosperity: “the régulos are 
those that know the reality and the tradition of the communities”;140 “we organize our 
rituals to alleviate the sufferings of the communities…for that reason the state should 
recognise us as part of the administration”.141 This view, I suggest, of state recognition as 
equal to bolstering the position of chiefs as ‘traditional’ authorities, reflected the long 
history of the constitution of chiefly authority in relation to shifting wider polities.   
Thus, although chiefs also spoke the language of the ‘culturalist’ perspective, they 
were not satisfied with the recognition of ‘traditional authority’ as a separate symbolic-
cultural domain in Mozambican society. Rather, the place envisioned by chiefs for 
‘traditional authority’ within the new democracy was one in which they became part of the 
state apparatus and as role players in community-based development. Instead they 
distinguished themselves from the system of representative democracy, which they 
associated with self-interested politicians. 
 
                                                 
136 Notícias 09.02.00.  
137 For similar claims made by chiefs, see Notícias 27.06.96; 30.04.96; 05.06.96.  
138 Chief of Gorongosa District, Sofala Province, quoted in Notícias 27.06.96.  
139 Régulo Dondo, Sofala Province, quoted in Demos 13.12.95. 
140 Régulo of Sofala province, quoted in Demos 13.12.95.  
141 Ibid. 
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3. Wider Agendas and Conditions  
 
The different actor positions presented above all contributed in one way or the other to a 
resurgence of ‘traditional authority’ in Mozambique, even if this underscored the call for 
different forms of recognition: for example, chiefs as an integrated element of the state 
apparatus, as part of democratic local governments, as agents of community participation 
and development, and/or as cultural-symbolic figures in nation-building. The core issue at 
stake was that each of the actors had an interest in producing a certain definition of real 
traditional authority, which went beyond ‘traditional authority’ itself: for example, 
academics’ celebration of pre-colonial culture as a way of reasserting a common 
Mozambican identity; international donor’s calls for the localisation of democracy and the 
resurrection of a civil society; local state officials’ pre-occupation with re-establishing the 
state administration; and the main political parties’ competition for rural votes and their 
attempts to assert the position as representatives of the common good.   
In pursuit of official recognition chiefs on the other hand defined, ‘real’ 
traditional authority in such a way as to ‘satisfy’ relatively well the various interests of the 
other actor positions. Overall this suggests that the relational constitutions of traditional 
authority and the position of other influential actors, which had dominated in the past, were 
replayed in post-war public representations. Particular definitions of real traditional 
authority formed part of asserting particular actor positions, and these actors’ models of 
post-war society, state, nation and democratic governance.     
  Having said this, the different actors’ definition of ‘real’ traditional authority and 
the role they envisioned for ‘it’ cannot be understood independently of the particular 
conditions and agendas of the 1990s. The latter, I suggest, provided both a context and 
vocabulary for imagining particular roles and definitions of traditional authority in the 
democratic transition. Based on the analysis of the actor positions in Section two, I have 
identified four significant agendas and conditions, which will be dealt with in this Section. 
The first two are global and international in nature, whereas the second and third have to do 
with the national party-political climate and the local dilemmas of state reformation in the 
rural areas after the war.    
Political liberalisation: decentralisation and democratisation   
Apart from the transition to a multi-party democracy and the holding of ‘free and fair’ 
elections, the international donor community praised the fact that democratisation in 
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Mozambique also included “developing a political culture attuned to pluralism”, “extending 
democracy to local and provincial levels”, “strengthening civil society” and “broad-based 
participation in decision-making” (Alden 2001: 70; Veneklasen and West 1996: 1). 
‘Decentralisation’, including a curtailing of the powers of the centralised state through the 
establishment of locally elected governments and the devolution of functions, powers and 
resources to them, was seen as one of the means to achieve such democratisation (West and 
Kloeck-Jensen 1999: 461; Braathen and Orre 2001). Above I noted how international 
donors in Mozambique financed projects on ‘traditional authority’ as part of this wider 
agenda of ‘democratisation’ and ‘decentralisation’. This link, I suggest, cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the wider reform agenda of political 
liberalisation, which was among the aid conditionalities of the Western bilateral donors and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF/World Bank) from the 1980s, and adopted by the 
Mozambican government in the late 1980s.142 In their turn, these reforms need to be seen 
against the background of the wider global neo-liberal turn that considerably influenced 
international development thinking from the 1980s (McMichael 1996).  
Most pervasively, the neo-liberal ideological turn included a critique of state-driven 
and state-centred development, as well as calls not only for ‘freeing the market’ from state 
regulation, but also for ‘the freedom of the citizen’ within a liberal democratic polity 
(Schuurman 1997: 155). State centralism was criticised for threatening individual freedom 
and inhibiting democracy: the role of the state was not to govern the market and its citizens, 
but to facilitate and create optimal conditions for the self-government of ‘autonomous 
actors’ (McMichael 1996: 134; Leftwich 1996: 13-16). In this respect, as Ferguson notes 
(1998: 6), democratisation came to mean “making more space for (civil) society” and “less 
space for and control by the state”. In international development thinking, the neo-liberal 
ideology influenced policies of ‘rolling back the state’ through decentralisation and 
privatisation, the promotion of NGOs and the strengthening of an autonomous civil society 
(Schuurman 1997: 163-4). This was further supported by the argument that the failure of 
development in Africa was caused by the centralisation of power and by the ‘bad 
governance’ practices of African states, formulated in terms such as corrupt, inefficient, and 
unaccountable government (Oomen 2005: 110).  
                                                 
142 In Mozambique the first seeds of liberalisation reforms had already been sown in the IMF/World Bank-
driven Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) adopted in 1987, followed by the 1990 new democratic 
constitution and the World Bank-sponsored Programme for Administrative Reform (PROL), adopted from 
1991. For a critical analysis of the first structural adjustment programme in Mozambique, known as the PRE, 
see Plank 1993; Marshall 1990, 1992; Hall and Young 1997.   
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The first of such neo-liberal inspired policies were the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) (adopted in Mozambique in 1987), which implied a strong emphasis on 
‘freeing the market’ from state control and of down-scaling the state apparatus in service 
delivery. Around the time of the signing of the Mozambican Peace agreement, the radical 
belief in the free market of the first SAPs had become less pervasive, largely because it had 
already shown itself as not benefiting the poor in African countries.143 This was reflected in 
the poverty-reduction agendas of bilateral donors and UN agencies in the 1990s. In addition 
to the liberal democratic critique of state centralization, these also emphasized the need to 
‘localize development’ by including the participation of the poor and of social forces in 
general in development and decision-making. Instigating the ‘global values’ of liberal 
democracy, good governance and human rights was combined with an advocacy of 
‘popular participation in decision-making’, ‘community-based development’, 
‘accommodation of ethnic, cultural and religious pluralism’, and above all a strong and 
pluralistic civil society capable of putting political pressure on the state (Schuurman 1997: 
163-4).  
This wider turn in development thinking departed from the state-driven 
development of the 1960s and 1970s by recasting the idea that local social forces in the 
Third World necessarily comprise practices and beliefs that inhibit development (Ferguson 
1998: 5-7). Emerging donor discourses on ‘social capital’ and a re-focus on the local 
‘community’ as ways of tapping into the social field exemplified this turn (Delanty 2003). 
Community as a ‘natural’ sphere of social relations of trust, solidarity and shared values 
gained prominence in international development thinking. This might seem to contradict to 
the received wisdom of liberalism as giving primacy to individual rights and liberties, but 
as Englund points out (2004: 7), the accommodation of community can also be viewed as a 
means to bring alienated groups into the mainstream of the (liberal) political community.  
In Mozambique, as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, the ‘localization’ aspect of the 
political liberalization agenda and the emphasis on community underlined the attention 
given by donors to ‘traditional authority’ as a social force to be reckoned with.144 Even if 
the international donors thought that ‘traditional authority’ could be democratised as part of 
decentralisation policies, the emphasis on ‘popular participation’ and ‘community-based 
                                                 
143 In Mozambique as elsewhere, in general SAPs failed to reduce poverty and resulted in increased economic 
inequality because of the removal of social safety nets and the increase in economic competition (McMichael 
1996: 180; for Mozambique, see Plank 1993; Marshall 1992).   
144 The link between liberal reform and the resurgence of traditional authority mirrors developments in other 
African countries (see Englebert 2002; Oomen 2005; Kyed and Buur 2007 forthcoming). 
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development’ provided a vocabulary through which the role of ‘traditional authority’ 
beyond elected local governments could be envisaged. This was reflected in the intensive 
focus of the MAE research projects on defining ‘traditional authority’ as the legitimate 
representatives of rural communities and in both chiefs and Renamo’s emphasis on 
‘traditional authority’ as capable of securing rural participation in development. This 
emphasis gained in strength, in particular after the passing of Law 2/97, which deprived 
rural areas of locally elected governments and thus any formally recognised representative 
bodies. The renaming of ‘traditional leaders’ as ‘community authorities’ in Decree 15/2000, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4, helped fill this gap in ‘representative bodies’ that could cater 
for the ‘localization’ aspect of political liberalization. However, the more intensive focus on 
the local ‘community’ as a cultural core on which to re-create a Mozambican national 
identity was influenced by other global trends of the 1990s.  
Global discourses: cultural particularism and citizenship 
The ‘culturalist’ perspective of Mozambican academics was in no way unique to 
Mozambique in the 1990s. Its emphasis on reconciling endogenous ‘tradition’ with 
exogenous ‘modernity’ and on vesting nationhood in African values and culture, I will 
suggest, mirrored and drew on two interrelated ‘global trends’: the increased articulation of 
cultural particularism as a by-product of globalisation, and a rethinking of the liberal, 
individualist concept of citizenship.  
First, it has been widely acknowledged that globalisation – the increased flow of 
goods, people and information around the world, and the consequent interconnections 
between peoples and polities – has not simply given way to increased cultural 
homogenisation. Globalisation equally sparked processes of localisation, including an 
“affirmation of cultural differences and belonging” (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 424), 
and a general celebration of the local and cultural particularism (Appadurai 1996; Ceuppens 
and Geschiere 2005). This was also felt in southern Africa, most notably in Mozambique’s 
most influential neighbour, South Africa. Here transitions to liberal democracy were, as 
Oomen argues (2005: 107), paralleled by “the deeply felt need, reinforced by global 
culture, to ‘localise democracy’, to brand it a home-grown product instead of a Western 
import, and to link it firmly to African values”. This was captured by the South African 
President’s, Thabo Mbeki’s discourse on the ‘African Renaissance’, which aimed to show 
the rest of the world that African solutions were not backward but could ensure the 
 111
development of genuine and stable democracies (ibid.: 109). It underscored the search for a 
specifically African form of nationhood no longer building exclusively on either the 
Western Enlightenment or socialism, which was often combined with a pervasive ‘finding 
back to our roots’ rhetoric (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). Proponents of the recognition 
of the chieftaincy, including the chiefs themselves, capitalised on this rhetoric by presenting 
‘traditional authority’ as representing the survival of a very pervasive and rooted institution 
representing African values and culture.   
Secondly, the emphasis on cultural particularism and the local community as a 
‘cultural core’ on which to build nationhood mirrored an emergent rethinking of the liberal, 
individual-based concept of citizenship in other corners of the world. Globally this 
rethinking was fuelled from the late 1980s by the rising number of groups claiming 
recognition in the language of cultural rights, and supported by UN declarations on the 
special rights of indigenous people and cultural and ethnic minorities (Isin and Wood 1999: 
1-4). This embodied a critique of the liberal, individualist concept of citizenship, not only 
for having denied cultural differences, but also for having obscured the de facto inequality 
between citizens by postulating a homogeneous public (ibid.: 19-21). The alternative 
proposition was a concept of citizenship that accommodated multiple forms of 
identification, cultural particularism and group-based claims to rights (Isin and Turner 
2002: 2; Sassen 2002: 277-92; Ong 1999; Kymlicka 1995). In the African debate on 
citizenship, the post-colonial employment of individual-based versions of citizenship was 
similarly criticised for denying culture and for contributing to the exclusion of poor and 
marginalised groups, thereby reproducing colonial distinctions between citizens and 
subjects (Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998; von Lieres 1999; Wilmsen 2002). Whereas the 
communitarian perspective, argued that the solution was to locate citizenship at the level of 
African communities, others put forward a concept of citizenship that could negotiate 
individual rights and collective identities, as well as dismantle the dichotomies of 
culture/rights and individual/community (Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa 1998; von Lieres 
1999; Wilmsen 2002; Hitchcock 2002). Nonetheless, both emphasised the inclusion of 
‘culture’ and ‘community’ within the concept of citizenship. As reflected in the culturalist 
academic perspective, this provided a vocabulary with which to promote ‘traditional 
authority’ as representative of local communities and culture.   
In sum, the ‘localization’ aspect of the political liberalisation agenda and the 
discourse on cultural particularism strengthened a place for ‘traditional authority’ in 
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development and nation-building. Likewise the calls for decentralisation of power also 
provided a context for a renewed focus of traditional authority. This however did not erase 
the dilemma facing the quest for re-claiming lost state sovereignty in the rural areas of 
Mozambique. This dilemma, I suggest, underpinned the ‘administrative’ perspective on 
‘traditional authority’, represented by many local state officials.     
The dilemmas of state re-formation in the rural areas 
The expressed need of local state officials to work with chiefs was, as noted earlier, related 
to pragmatic administrative concerns. This, I suggest, could not however be divorced from 
an inherent dilemma of post-war state re-formation: political liberalisation, which was 
aimed at downscaling the state apparatus and decentralising functions to non-state bodies, 
was still premised on the existence and legitimacy of the state as a sovereign authority in 
the first place (i.e. for effectively enforcing legislation). In the rural areas of the country, 
and in particular in Renamo-controlled areas, this was hardly the case when ‘traditional 
authority’ became a topic of policy-making: if not entirely absent, as in for example 
Dombe, then state institutions governed in a very restricted manner in rural areas in the 
mid-1990s.  
The 1994 elections should have paved the way for re-extending a uniform state 
administration and security forces across the entire territory, including a dismantling of 
Renamo-controlled areas, but this was a protracted and conflict-ridden process. Not only 
did the state lack resources, manpower and organisation, it also faced a crisis of legitimacy, 
nurtured by the many years of militarised Frelimo-state governance, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. This was exemplified by the subtle resistance of rural residents and chiefs to 
engage in government-launched development and reconstruction projects, pay taxes or send 
their children to state schools (Alexander 1997: 11-13).145  
In addition, the state faced a situation of ‘decentralisation by default’, in which 
governance was taken care of by non-state actors operating outside the sovereign power of 
the state. In those areas where Renamo had created ‘liberated zones’, such informal 
sovereigns comprised mambos, Renamo officials and the mujhibas, which, as shown in 
Chapter 2, had been shaped in opposition to the Frelimo state. In government-controlled 
areas, on the other hand, state sovereignty was challenged by the presence of development 
                                                 
145 See also Noticias 04.01.96; 17.02.96; 24.08.96; 21.02.97; 22.02.97; 10.05.97; 18.07.97.    
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and emergency relief NGOs, as well as by ad hoc forms of governance performed by GD 
secretaries and ex-régulos (Artur and Weimer 1998: 6-9; Alexander 1997: 11).  
In looking at the attempts to re-establish state administration in rural areas in the 
post-1994 period, it can be seen that district-level state officials regarded ex-régulos as both 
the problem and the solution to the dual crisis of state administrative capacity and 
legitimacy. In government-administered areas, ex-régulos were increasingly used by state 
officials to bolster administrative capacity, but these also sparked local-level conflicts over 
power between the former GDs, the secretários and the ex-régulos.146
In Renamo-controlled areas, chiefs were understood and depicted in the media as a 
main reason why Renamo was able to remain in power and why the state faced difficulties 
in re-penetrating these areas. The case of Dombe was held up by the media as a 
paradigmatic example. In July 1995 the newspapers reported that 44 chiefs and 400 
members of the rural population of Dombe had literally thrown out twelve police officers 
who had tried to re-establish the presence of the state police in the area. Whereas Frelimo 
maintained that the chiefs had been induced by Renamo’s national leadership to sabotage 
the state, newspaper articles had Dombe chiefs stating that it was because the population 
did not want to see armed Frelimo police after the end of the war.147 They also stated, 
however, that they were not against the state police, provided the chiefs were given the 
privileges that they had been promised by the government.148  
These acts of resistance, cast in the name of chiefly demands for state recognition 
and privileges, reflected, albeit less extremely, events in other areas of the country.149 They 
also set the agenda for state solutions to the problem of repenetrating Renamo-controlled 
zones: in Dombe as elsewhere, bicycles and radios were handed over to chiefs by provincial 
governors, accompanied by the delegation of tasks and the promises of state recognition.150 
The results were diverse in the former Renamo areas: while state institutions were re-
established in areas like Dombe (November 1995) and the media reported numerous cases 
of chiefs collaborating with the state administration,151 there were also cases where chiefs 
                                                 
146 On the delegation of taxation powers to chiefs in Manica, Nampula and Inhambane, see Notícias 17.02.96; 
13.06.96; 27.07.96, and Domingo 21.05.95. On the use of chiefs for various forms of population mobilisation 
and in the resolution of land conflicts, see Notícias 23.07.96; 08.02.96; Domingo 21.05.95. See also 
Juergensen 2001.  
147 See Notícias 17.07.95; 19.08.95; Savana 28.07.95. 
148 Interview, Chief Chibue, Dombe, 19.08.05; see also Notícias 18.02.95.   
149 See Notícias 03.11.95; 13.06.96; 27.06.96. 
150 Dombe and Chibabava and Marrumeu in Sofala, Notícias 18.01.96; 30.09.96, 31.01.97. 
151 Dombe, Chiringoma, Gorongosa, Chibabava, Tambara, Notícias 22.08.97; 27.06.96; 30.09.96; 23.07.96.  
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operated in a grey zone, drawing interchangeably on their alliances with the state and 
Renamo.152 In addition to the conflicts over local authority in government-controlled areas 
between GDs, secretários and ex-régulos, this state of affairs supported those actors who 
were in favour of legislation to regulate chief-state relations. From the perspective of local 
state officials, this also underscored the pragmatic need to re-integrate chiefs into the state 
administration and give them the benefits that would prevent resistance such as occurred in 
Dombe in 1995. Overall, this suggests that the background for the ‘administrative’ 
perspective on ‘traditional authority’ emerged in the interface between demands for 
decentralisation and the contested quest to re-claim state sovereignty in rural areas. As the 
Dombe case shows, however, this could not be separated from party political competition 
between the former warring fractions, Frelimo and Renamo, in rural areas.    
Party political power 
As elsewhere in southern Africa, the transition to a multi-party democracy in Mozambique 
created a new environment of competition for power marked by achieving ‘wealth in 
voters’. It also marked an increased interest in ‘traditional authority’ as a route to rural 
votes (Englebert 2002; Oomen 2005). As noted in Section 2 this was also the case in 
Mozambique where both Frelimo and Renamo used chiefs in the election campaigns of 
1994 and 1999 – that is, despite their emphasis on ‘real’ traditional authority as being 
outside party politics.  
For Frelimo the use of chiefs was more progressive in the second elections of 1999, 
which foreshadowed the passing of Decree 15/2000 six months later. This shift cannot be 
understood without recognising that the 1994 election results provided quantitative proof of 
Frelimo’s crumbling legitimacy in rural areas, in particular in those parts of the country 
where Renamo had been in control. The election results had a clear rural-urban dimension, 
corresponding to the geographical divisions of the war: Renamo gained the majority of 
votes in the central provinces (Manica, Sofala, Nampula, Tete and Zambézia) and 41 
percent of the total number of rural votes. Frelimo gained most support in the southern 
(Gaza and Inhambane) and northern (Cabo Delgado and Niassa) provinces, and 40 percent 
of the total rural votes (Juergensen 2000: 15).153
                                                 
152 Notícias 23.09.95.  
153 After the 1994 elections, the 250 seats in Parliament were divided as follows: Frelimo had 129 seats, 
Renamo 112 seats and União Democrática 9 seats (Artur and Weimer 1998: 5).  
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These results emphasised the divisions in the country and set the scene for an 
intensified focus on chiefs as the gate-keepers to the rural population, as well as being an 
aspect of the party-political competition between Frelimo and Renamo. However, they also 
had an impact on why legislation on ‘traditional authority’ was so slow in the making. As 
noted earlier, while Frelimo was cognisant of the potential political value of alliances with 
traditional authorities, it also feared the risk of further empowering figures who had a 
history of residing in the opposition camp. The decision not to legislate in 1996 can be seen 
in light of this risk: as a separate ‘traditional’ and ‘symbolic-religious’ form, traditional 
authority was perhaps less of a risk in directly challenging national and sub-national 
balances of power. But why, then, did the Frelimo government change its mind in 2000 
when its’ Council of Ministers passed Decree 15/2000?  
I suggest that the answer can at least partly be found in the election results of 1999, 
which largely reproduced those of 1994. Although Frelimo and its presidential candidate, 
Chissano, won the election, the results reconfirmed the continuing weakness of Frelimo’s 
hold over the rural areas and the centre of the country. Only a few months after these results 
the Decree 15/2000 was passed, placing traditional leaders as apolitical counterparts of the 
local state administration. This type of legislation linking chiefs to the state should, I 
suggest, also be seen as part of the stakes that the Frelimo government had in reversing the 
dilemmas facing state re-formation in the rural areas. As noted earlier, the re-establishment 
of the state administration could not be understood independently of the party-political 
competition between Renamo and Frelimo over the control of the rural areas. This was 
intimately linked on the one hand to the fact that Renamo had remained with administrative 
control in some of the areas it controlled during the war and on the other hand to the fact 
that Frelimo after the 1994 elections and subsequently had rejected a power sharing 
agreement with Renamo. This meant that only Frelimo members held the positions of 
ministers, governors and district administrators, thereby reproducing the de facto link 
between state and party (Juergensen 2000: 15; West and Kloeck-Jensen 1999: 461). In light 
of this, the disputes over the domain of ‘traditional authority’ between Renamo and Frelimo 
could be seen as a question not merely of ‘voter behaviour’, but also of struggles over the 
state-administrative control of the rural areas. As noted in Section 2, this was exemplified 
by each party’s attempt to depoliticise traditional authority as part of its claim to represent 
the common good, beyond particularistic interests. In the end, I suggest, this further 
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underlined why the Frelimo government became convinced that traditional authority should 
be brought into state legislation, as well as carry the outward signs of the state.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to answer the question of how ‘traditional authority’ became a topic 
of interest and a field of policy-making within the context of the post-war democratic 
transition in Mozambique. It has shown that the resurgence of ‘traditional authority’ did not 
emerge exclusively from any one single factor determined by a single group of actors. Nor 
was it confined to local and national issues alone, but also informed by wider global 
changes. This questions the tendency of a number of scholars to view the resurgence of 
traditional authority within democratic transitions as either exclusively a sign or resolution 
of ‘state failure’ (Herbst 2000; Skalnìk 2004), a result of party-political competition for 
votes, or simply as a result of failed democratisation and counter-reactions to it (Mamdani 
1996).154  
In Mozambique, at least, the democratic transition provided an important 
vocabulary for revised definitions of traditional authority in public representations, as well 
as a new political climate for more open public debate and consultation. Even though the 
policy-making process was not initiated ‘from below’, this climate opened up an intensive 
debate and politically infused ‘classification struggles’ over what real traditional authority 
is and what roles ‘it’ should play in a post-war democratic polity. The result was a 
multifaceted intertwining of partly interlinked and partly contradictory local, national and 
global conditions and agendas, which were reflected in different actor positions on the 
vexed question of ‘traditional authority’: e.g. democracy, decentralisation, multi-party 
politics, state administrative concerns, African values and culture, and community 
participation. These provided both a context and a vocabulary for different ways of re-
defining and re-imagining the role of ‘traditional authority’, for example, as counterparts of 
the state administration, as development agents securing community participation, and as 
cultural-symbolic figures in nation-building.  
Importantly, as was the case in the past, the different actor positions on traditional 
authority reflected interests beyond traditional authority itself. Each of the actor groups’ 
definitions and support of traditional authority as a force to be reckoned with was 
                                                 
154 Exceptions to these singular explanations include Oomen (2005) and Englebert (2002).  
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intimately related to reconstituting the power positions of other actors and/or their 
particular models of post-war society: for example, academics’ celebrations of pre-colonial 
culture as a way to reassert a common Mozambican identity; international donor’s calls for 
the localisation of development; local state officials pre-occupation with re-establishing 
rural state administration; and the chief political parties’ competition over votes and the 
claim to represent the common good. Thus the complex question of ‘traditional authority’ 
could be made to fit very different agendas, at least at the level of public representations. 
I suggest that the possibility of different definitions of traditional authority reflected 
overall a contested history and the heterogeneous reality of the chieftaincy ‘on the ground’. 
However the varied agendas and interests also made it more difficult to arrive at a closure 
to the policy-making process – i.e. to fix a particular definition of ‘traditional authority’ 
within legislation. This difficulty was reflected in the indecisiveness of the Frelimo 
government in passing legislation. As I shall deal with next, the varied agendas and 
interests were also reflected in the final legislation. In essence, Decree 15/2000 became an 
ambiguous compromise between these.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 118
Chapter 4  
Classificatory Closure and Decree 15/2000 
 
 
This chapter addresses the classificatory closure to and end product of the protracted 
policy-making process regarding ‘traditional authority’, discussed in Chapter 3. This 
includes first asking the question of which classifications of ‘traditional authority’ and 
‘rural society’ were ultimately included and excluded from the final legislation, and how 
these were defined in relation to the state and the democratic transition. Secondly, the 
content and underlying assumptions of the final legislation itself, Decree 15/2000, are 
discussed.  
 The aim of the chapter is thus to address how the highly contested concept of 
‘traditional authority’ was caught, fixed and frozen as a common state-legal category to fit a 
nationwide law, and what models of society this supported. Law-making can in this sense 
be understood as processes of regularisation, of order-making, that centre on fixing 
particular relationships and making them appear as reflecting particular social orders 
(Moore 1978; see Chapter 1). This does not mean that we should not pay attention to 
possible contradictions and ambiguities in the law and in state-legal categories. As this 
chapter will address, the final classifications of traditional authority and rural society were 
based on a great deal of historical dissimulation regarding the empirical forms of the 
chieftaincy, and Decree 15/2000 mixed and merged a potpourri of aims and tasks that 
sought to satisfy the widely different agendas of the 1990s. This left unresolved a number 
of potential contradictions, which need to be kept in mind when, in Parts II and III, I turn to 
the implementation of Decree 15/2000 in Matica and Dombe.  
 
1. The Classificatory Closure 
 
When it came to deciding which versions of the much contested concept of ‘traditional 
authority’ was to be caught, fixed and frozen into written legislation, the classifications that 
proved the most powerful were those produced by the MAE-hosted research team first 
funded by the Ford Foundation and later USAID. This research team consisted of a number 
of younger Mozambican researchers and the coordinator, Irêa Baptista Lundin, a Brazilian-
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Swedish Scholar. Although compromises were made with the Frelimo government in the 
final drafting of the Decree 15/2000, the main classifications of ‘traditional authority’ and 
‘rural community’ produced by this team were maintained in the Decree. One possible 
reason for this was that a number of the former members of this team were later employed 
as state functionaries within the MAE to draft Decree 15/2000.155 However, I also suggest, 
that the strong influence of the MAE’s research results owed to the fact that they provided 
classifications of ‘traditional authority’ and ‘rural community’ that both qualified the 
disjointed rural realities for a coherent legislation as well as made these quite successfully 
fit in with the various post-war agendas: democracy, decentralisation, community 
participation, nation-building, and preservation of traditional culture and community.   
 Paradoxically, the MAE research project facilitated the opening of what, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, was a contested debate over the meaning and role of ‘traditional authority’, 
but used this to provide a rigid classificatory closure. The intention of the research was to 
show “the actual reality” without “making value judgements of the traditional institutions 
[and] simply write about what is said, felt and how people live” (Cuehela 1996: 5), but the 
published results conspicuously produced objectified ‘ideal model’ definitions of 
Mozambican ‘traditional authority’ and ‘traditional society’.156 As a result these concepts 
were disembedded from the historical and particular regional contexts in which empirical 
forms of chieftaincy and rural society existed and had developed. This was reflected in a 
two-volume publication on Traditional Authority and Power, describing the topic in the 
past and the present (Lundin and Machava 1995), and in five brochures providing a detailed 
mapping of the roles, structures, rules and values of ‘traditional authority’ and ‘traditional 
society’.157  
                                                 
155 Personal communication from Rufino Alfane and Ambrósio Cuehela, two of the MAE research team 
members who were later employed as technicians within the MAE to draft Decree 15/2000.  
156 The knowledge produced in the publications was claimed to be based on fieldwork-based empirical 
analysis, to which its authors consistently made references. VeneKlasen and West (1996: 10), in their mid-
term evaluation of the project, nonetheless point out that field research prior to publication of the brochures 
was very meagre. The knowledge produced, they held, was mainly based on colonial-era studies written by 
colonial administrations: “as a consequence the brochures present traditional institutions in a way which 
reflects their status prior to 1975 more than their present situation” (ibid.)  
157 The brochures covered the following themes: “I. Traditional Authority” (Cuehela 2006), “II. Social 
Organisation in Traditional Society” (Fernando 1996), “III. Civic Education in Traditional Society” (Alfane 
1996), “IV. Land and Environment” (Macusette 1996), V. Norms, Rules and Traditional Justice: How to 
Prevent and Resolve Conflicts” (Nhancale 1996). They were intended to “educate and create dialogue at the 
local/district level” and above all to teach local state officials and NGOs about what ‘traditional authority’ and 
‘traditional society’ is all about (Fry 1997: 12).  
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Next I address in more detail these publications’ main definitions of ‘traditional 
authority’ and ‘traditional society’, followed by how these were cast in a language that 
made them fit with the post-war democratic transition.  
The basic definitions: ‘traditional authority’ and ‘traditional society’ 
The MAE brochure, with the title “Traditional authority in Mozambique”, begins by 
asserting that “society is dynamic”, “culture is in a continuous process of change” and that 
the concept of ‘traditional authority’ has shifted with the times (for example colonialism, 
the single-party state, the wars, market economy and cultural interchange) (Cuehela 1996: 
5). However, it then goes straight on to assert that “nevertheless traditional authority never 
disappeared, because it still constitutes an everyday reality of the communities of our 
country within the different socio-cultural contexts” (ibid.: 6). It further holds that 
traditional authority is part of the shared national culture of Mozambique: “along with the 
differences that exist from region to region, traditional authority is present and it is 
important in the whole national territory […] the similarities that exist show that all of us 
have a lot in common. This shows the unity of all of us in being Mozambicans” (ibid.: 6-7).  
 Thus if the aim of the MAE research had been to “insert the similarities [of 
traditional authority] in models that can help to understand its extreme value for the 
construction of national unity” (Lundin and Machava 1995: 3), then this was presented as a 
fait accompli in its published results. By implication, the claims that differences existed 
across the country and that “society is dynamic”, were in the last instance undermined by 
the representation of a homogenous and timeless model of ‘real’ traditional authority and 
society. At the same time, it was claimed that this ‘model’ corresponded to the realities 
found in the rural areas. In the publications this was exemplified by the use of the present 
tense to describe the various features of traditional authority and society, as if these 
corresponded to no discernable historical period (West and Kloeck-Jensen 1999: 473). 
(rules of succession, hierarchy, functions, symbolic values, social organisation etc.). 
 Although analyses of the different historical periods were included, such as the 
Nguni period, colonial indirect rule and post-colonial abolition, the publications essentially 
de-historicised traditional authority. Thus it was claimed that “traditional power was 
seriously disturbed at various moments”, but this was followed by the claim that 
“traditional authority exists in the communities and has its origin in the period that 
preceded all these disturbances” (Cuehela 1996: 24). By implication, the internal dynamics 
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of ‘traditional society’ was undermined, and change processes presented as the result of 
relatively unsuccessful ‘external disturbances’ (Lundin 1995: 10-12). This informed a 
particular definition of ‘traditional society’. It was described as consisting of essentially 
harmonious, bounded wholes that were held together by kin ties and a common 
cosmological order, overseen and secured by the institution of traditional authority. In 
explaining those instances in which conflicts and the disintegration of the local 
“communities” had occurred, this was interpreted as being due to the external 
‘disturbances’ of ‘traditional authority’ and as caused by “the treatment that this authority 
[traditional] has received from the established powers in the past years” (ibid.: 14). This 
supported a view of traditional authority as a ‘total social fact’ (Mauss 1990) or as the glue 
holding a given social order together. Lundin (1995) described this order in words redolent 
of British structural-functionalist anthropology:  
 
The real existence of this (traditional) authority in the communities and the perception of the 
legitimacy of its existence, is directly related to its maintenance of social order. […] The truth is 
that the cosmological aspect that rules in the societies, in this case the African local society, is part 
of a socio-cultural totality, which is intrinsically related to the socio-economic and socio-political 
expressions of the communities, such as processes and forms of production, and the structures of 
perception informing the exercise of authority/power. (Lundin 1995: 10) 
   
This basic conceptualisation of ‘traditional authority’ and ‘African local society’ was also 
reflected in the MAE brochures’ more detailed descriptions of the functions of the chiefs 
and the socio-political organisation of rural society. Apart from emphasising differences 
between groups organised according to matrilineal and patrilineal descent, the brochure on 
“The Social Organisation of Traditional Society” described the common existence of 
lineage-based groups comprising a ‘community’, ruled by a “chefe tradicional grande” (a 
superior traditional chief). These communities shared both a common territorial space and a 
common “cultural space” of moral values, religion and customs that “regulate the socio-
political, socio-economic and socio-cultural life of the communities” (Fernando 1996: 9). 
In this sense, the publications produced an unproblematic correspondence between 
‘territory’, ‘community’, ‘culture’ and a ‘traditional chief’.   
The category of ‘traditional authority’ was itself described in the brochure on this 
topic as comprising a ‘traditional chief’, a ‘council of elders’ and ‘diviners and healers’. 
Together these were defined as: “a traditional African socio-political institution, which 
forms part of our culture and tradition” (Cuehela 1996: 10). The ‘traditional chief’ was 
 122
defined as the head of the wider institution of traditional authority within the lineage-based 
territorial space: “in every territory we encounter a real lineage that assumes hegemony, or 
in other words, full power over some things, and enjoys certain special rights in relation to 
others. Its legitimacy is given by all the community [i.e. all the lineage groups] of the 
respective territory” (Cuehela 1996: 19).  
The ‘traditional chief’ was defined as the main figure responsible for maintaining 
“social equilibrium in accordance with tradition and custom” (Ibid.: 31): “the chief is above 
all a councillor who mobilises the elders within his territory to ensure that their children are 
educated about the customs and rules of conduct in order to maintain social order” (Rufino 
1996: 22). The chief, it was held, could do this because “it is the chief that knows of the 
tradition of the lineage” (Ibid.). Further emphasis was placed on the following functions of 
the traditional chief: to secure peace and harmony in the communities, control the territorial 
limits of the lineage, solve conflicts in the community according to custom, ensure that land 
is properly distributed for the use of the whole community, and arrange ceremonies for the 
participation and in the interests of the community (Cuehela 1996: 25). It was further held 
that the ability of the chief to exert such “traditional power” “is based on the chief’s special 
attachment to the ancestors, the most profound basis of the communities” and his 
ceremonial responsibilities for establishing “a permanent relationship between the living 
and the dead” (ibid.: 10-1). In these descriptions emphasis was again placed on the 
commonalities across the country and on the timelessness of tradition: “these functions are 
common in all the communities in the country and for all the traditional chiefs” (Ibid.: 26). 
Similarly, “tradition is in the end not of the past, but what is done today, what our 
grandparents did yesterday, and what our children will do in their lives tomorrow” (MAE 
Brochura II 1996: 38).  
The descriptions of ‘traditional chiefs’ also reflected a romanticised version of 
tradition as by nature non-violent and in service of the common good of the community. 
The references made to slavery, the use of violence, executions, forced tribute and so forth 
were explained as “not part of the tradition” (Cuehela 1996: 32). They were cast as colonial 
inventions employed by those régulos, who had been imposed by the Portuguese and had 
not been legitimized by the community (ibid.). ‘Tradition’ and ‘traditional authority’ were 
also defined as undisputed in local communities. ‘Traditional authority’ was for example 
described as a symbol ingrained in the socio-cultural order, “equally held by all rural 
individuals, independently of their socio-economic position, gender and age” (Lundin 2005: 
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19). ‘Traditional authority’, Lundin held, “is a symbol because it expresses something 
more, something sacred, within the specific common values of a group that share the same 
values. The symbol is a symbol, and therefore is perceived and transmitted to future 
generations in the process of social reproduction” (ibid.: 20). This definition of ‘traditional 
authority’ as a symbol was both used to explain why “traditional authority continued to 
exist after colonialism” and why there were indeed conflicts in some areas of the country: 
“The attempts to suppress the symbol, concretely in this case, the power of traditional 
authority, brought social instability, disorder and conflicts in the communities” (ibid.).  
Based on these definitions the task for post-war rural peace was then to revive, 
where it had been disturbed, ‘traditional authority’, including the internal mechanism for 
solving conflicts. The latter were described in detail in the fifth brochure on “Norms, Rules 
and Traditional Justice”. It outlines, equally in the present tense, a common system of 
‘traditional justice’ comprising the ‘traditional chief’, ‘a council of elders’ and ‘diviners and 
healers’, which resolves everything from murder to minor family disputes in order to 
“maintain the social order” (Nhancale 1996: 15-16). The descriptions of this system of 
‘traditional justice’ again underscored the notion of ‘traditional society’ as integrated, self-
sustainable wholes, which functioned best for the whole community when not subject to 
outside disturbances. Irrespective of this the publications also produced definitions of 
‘traditional authority’ that fit with the national policy-agendas of community participation, 
democracy, decentralisation, and national unity. 
Legitimate community representatives  
The publications defined the authority of ‘traditional chiefs’ as vested in the power of a 
territory’s superior lineage, but at the same time it was held that chiefs were indeed 
apolitical figures serving the common good: “once enthroned he [the chief] does not belong 
to any particular lineage, but is able to represent and defend the interest of the whole 
community of his territory” (MAE Brochura I 1996: 24). ‘Real’ forms of ‘traditional 
authority’ were, besides representing community interests, also defined as community 
legitimised: “traditional authority holds a legitimacy that he is given by the community and 
only by the community” (Cuehela, 1996: 10). This was combined with the assertion that 
‘real’ traditional authority was entirely created from within local communities, and not by 
any external polity: “This institution of the community is a reality that manifests itself 
before the state and its juridical system. They are not created by the law, but are generated 
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by the respective communities” (Lundin and Machava 1995: 151). This underscored a strict 
distinction between state and chiefly authority, which it should be noted, was claimed to be 
perfectly identifiable ‘on the ground’. A distinction was thus drawn between real traditional 
authorities and those régulos who had derived their authority solely from the colonial 
administration. 
To underpin the community legitimised and representative nature of real traditional 
authority, the MAE research team introduced the term ‘community leader’ (ibid.: 37), and 
later the concept of ‘community chief’. The latter was inserted into the first draft law in 
1996 (see chapter 3). The new concept of ‘community chief’ both satisfied the preservation 
of “traditional forms of community organisation based on the cultural roots of the people” 
(Fry 1997: 17) as well as donor calls for community participation. It also did this by 
defining ‘community chiefs’ using the vocabulary of democratisation and decentralisation.  
Democratic and decentralised forms of authority  
In the MAE’s publications “community norms” of choosing a leader were defined as 
inherently democratic, the political organisation of chieftaincy as decentralised. The 
procedures of the succession and enthronement of a ‘traditional leader’ were labelled an 
inherently “local form of democracy” (Lundin 1995: 27):  
 
No chief is a chief if he is not legitimized. The approval [of a chief] functions like a local 
democracy. It is a process of legitimization of a traditional chief, which is related to the good care 
that he can take of his community […] besides being part of the real lineage, the lineage of 
succession, he should have the capacity to solve problems in the community and be a person of 
good heart (Cuehela 1996: 27).  
 
The approval of a traditional chief was further described as “a process of election between 
candidates” in which “the most competent is elected by a body of the eldest of the 
community [council of elders], which comprise what could be called a Colégio Eleitoral 
[electoral college]” (Lundin 1995: 28). Broad-based consensus in the community was also 
emphasised: “in the election there cannot only be a minimum consensus. That is, everyone 
should approve the election” (Cuehela 1996: 27).  
In addition, the exercise of authority was defined as democratic. It was maintained 
that traditional authorities and the Council of Elders form a system of popular checks and 
balances which restrain and monitor power so that it cannot be abused. Emphasis was also 
placed on a mechanism for removing badly performing chiefs (Lundin 1995: 26-7). This, 
Lundin held, was vested in the inherently decentralised character of ‘traditional authority’, 
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in which decision-making powers and administrative functions are distributed between the 
superior chief, a council of elders and the sub-chiefs of particular lineages (ibid.: 26): “all 
power exercised is decentralised in lineages with different types of relation to the dominant 
lineages” (ibid.: 25) and  “within the socio-political structure of traditional authority and its 
territoriality, Mozambican tradition is one of decentralisation” (ibid.: 4). 
Based on these definitions of the MAE research team, the recognition of ‘traditional 
authority’ did not contradict with the development of a system of local democracy and 
decentralised governance demanded by the donor community. However, the MAE research 
team did not envisage this in the form of making ‘traditional authority’ subject to ballot 
box-style elections, nor as an integral part of the state apparatus. Rather it recommended a 
future model of state-chief relations in which ‘traditional forms of community 
organisation’, represented by a ‘traditional authority’, was preserved and co-existed as a 
separate domain from the state apparatus (Macia 1997: 88-9; Fry 1997: 17). This proposal 
rested on a juxtaposition between ‘traditional society’/’traditional authority’ and ‘modern 
society’/’modern state’, not far removed from colonial representations. Nonetheless, the 
view was that this duality of structures could co-exit in a harmonious relation of interaction 
and collaboration within a democratic polity. The community-legitimised and democratic 
nature of traditional authority represented by the MAE researchers made this possible. The 
model proposed was also held out as perfectly consistent with national unity and post-war 
state formation.  
It was held that “[traditional authority] should be valorised at the same time as a 
symbol of Mozambicanness for the enforcement of a unitary state” (Lundin 1995: 30), and 
that “their importance is so huge a value of the culture of all of us that it can consolidate 
national unity” (Cuehela, 1996: 7). Furthermore, the publications emphasised that a 
harmonious relation of interaction between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ domains of 
authority would ‘disturb’ neither of them and even be favourable to the state:  
 
The traditional authority, in front of the formal power, should not be understood in the context of a 
zero-sum game where any reinforcement of local chiefly authority means the weakening of the 
authority of state power in the communities […] a correct coordination or articulation with the 
traditional chiefs will permit the state to enforce its legitimacy and strengthen its prestige in the 
communities (ibid.: 6).   
 
Thus the MAE publications clearly envisaged that state recognition of traditional authority 
would also be capable of reconstituting the state in the post-war rural areas. However it 
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omitted any possible change of the state and the chieftaincy as a result of recognition and 
collaboration. These perspectives of the MAE publications were also reflected in the 1996 
draft law, and later in a MAE-concept paper of March 2000, which laid the basis for Decree 
15/2000. Here, as we shall address next, extensive collaboration between ‘traditional 
authority’ and the state administration was presented as perfectly consistent with a non-
integration of chiefs within the state apparatus, that is, “in order to maintain their cultural 
identity as traditional chiefs” (MAE March 2000: 17).  
 
2. Decree 15/2000: A Compromise   
 
The MAE research projects provided definitions that made ‘traditional’ authority and 
community legible for national legislation. Their definitions also satisfied relatively well 
the various post-war agendas of democratisation, decentralisation national unity, and state 
formation, while also promising to preserve ‘tradition’. At the same time the definition of 
traditional authority as an inherently local form of democracy that deserved recognition as a 
separate domain of Mozambican society, also justified the government’s decision in 1997 
not to extend locally elected governments to the rural areas. The rural communities were 
best left to identify their own representatives from among the ‘traditional authorities’, and 
were believed to be truly capable of doing so in a democratic manner.  
 This basic proposition also underlined Decree 15/2000, passed in June 2000. When 
it was passed it provided the only legislation catering for non-state popular representation 
in the rural areas, co-existing with the locally elected governments in the urban areas.158 
The Decree 15/2000 reproduced the basic definitions of traditional authority and 
community provided by the MAE research team, but it also reflected a compromise 
between different agendas. In particular noticeable were two additions to the MAE research 
teams’ recommendations. First, the Decree extensively conferred upon the state the 
authority to define and regulate traditional authority, although maintaining that ‘traditional 
leaders’ should be legitimised by the community and not be an integrated part of the state. 
Secondly, it did not consider ‘traditional authority’ as the only rural form of authority, but 
also the former Frelimo secrétarios of the dynamising groups and ‘other leaders’ as 
                                                 
158 This changed with the passing of the Law on local state organs in May 2005, which also included 
consultative forums in the rural areas comprising a broad-based representation of community members in 
development planning. However, in Matica and Dombe these were only being implemented at the end of my 
last period of fieldwork in 2005, and therefore had little bearing on my results.   
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community authorities deserving state recognition. The seeds to these two additions were 
laid in the revised draft Constitution of 1999 and in a March 2000 concept paper produced 
within the MAE. The former produced the following article:  
 
The State recognises and values traditional authorities, legitimised by the populations, according to 
customary law […] The State defines the relationships between traditional authority and other 
institutions, and accommodates their participation in the economic, social and cultural life of the 
nation, in accordance with the law (República de Moçambique, 2004: Chapter III, Article 118, my 
emphases).   
 
This constitutional mandate of the state to define “the relationships between traditional 
authority and other institutions” was taken further in the March 2000 concept paper that 
laid the basis for Decree 15/2000. It emphasised “the urgent need of the state to clearly 
define the areas of jurisdiction of the local tiers of the state administration and of all 
community institutions”, including the development of “uniform principles, which leaves 
clear the coordination between community and administrative institutions in political and 
administrative matters” (MAE March 1996: 18, my emphasis). According to the concept 
paper the task was to develop a common state-defined, system of community leadership, 
while also withholding “the non-intervention of the state in traditional and customary 
matters” (ibid.: 19). The emphasis on “all community institutions” also underlined the 
inclusion of the former Frelimo secretários under the new common category of community 
leadership. The official argument was that these indeed existed as community legitimised 
authorities alongside ‘traditional leaders’ in many rural areas of the country. If they were 
excluded from state recognition, it was held, this could bolster conflicts over authority in 
the rural areas (ibid.: 11). However, I will also suggest that this sudden, last-minute 
inclusion of Frelimo secretários reflected a compromise within the Frelimo government, 
underpinned by party political motives. As suggested by Forquilha (2007) it was a way to 
accommodate those voices within the Frelimo party, who feared that recognition of chiefs 
would empower the opposition party, Renamo.159 Thus it was to secure that figures who 
had a history of loyalty to the ruling party would remain with power in the rural areas and 
possibly counterbalance the Renamo loyal chiefs. 
 The different recommendations of the March 2000 concept paper fed directly into 
Decree 15/2000, which introduced the common category of ‘autoridade comunitária’ 
                                                 
159 Forquilha (2007) builds this argument against the background of a newspaper article of 1998, which quotes 
the central committee of Frelimo for stating that if the government should approve recognition of traditional 
leaders, it should also secure a prominent space for the former Frelimo secretaries.  
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(community authority). As we shall address in detail next the Decree represented a clear 
compromise between the different post-war agendas discussed in Chapter 3, including the 
last minute accommodation of Frelimo secretários. At the same time it reproduced, albeit 
ambiguously, the MAE research team’s juxtaposition between ‘traditional authority’ and 
‘the state’.  
State assistants and community representatives   
That Decree 15/2000 tries to cover simultaneous the many post-war agendas is apparent in 
the excess of words of its main objective:  
 
For the process of administrative decentralisation, for the affirmation of the social organisation of 
communities and for the improvement of the conditions of their [communities’] participation in 
public administration for the socio-economic and cultural development of the country, it is 
necessary to establish forms of articulation between the local tiers of the state and the community 
authorities (Decreto 15/2000, Introduction, my emphases); the areas of articulation between the 
local tiers of the state and the community authorities are centred on those activities that are in 
accordance with the consolidation of national unity and on the production of good benefits and 
services that can satisfy basic livelihood needs and local development (ibid. Art 4, my emphases).   
 
In this formulation, the Decree both satisfies the local state officials’ ‘administrative’ 
preoccupations, the donor calls for ‘decentralisation’, ‘community participation’ and 
‘localisation of development’, and the ‘culturalist’ appeal for the recognition of ‘local 
community organisation’ and ‘national unity’. The emphasis on articulação (interaction) 
between the local state institutions and community authorities, rather than integration of the 
latter within the formed, also adheres to the MAE research team’s pledge for the 
preservation of a separate domain of community authority.160 Finally, article 1-2 gives a 
democratic ring to Decree 15/2000 by promising that the state will only recognise those 
leaders who are indeed legitimised and chosen according to the will of local community 
members. Moreover, it in principle allows for any kind of leader to be legitimised as a 
community authority. In the regulamento of the Decree, this latter element covers three 
categories of possible community authorities – traditional chiefs, “secretários of suburbs 
and villages” and “other legitimate leaders” – corresponding to three models of community 
legitimisation.  
                                                 
160 This was confirmed in public statements by MAE staff and President Chissano himself after the passing of 
Decree 15/2000: “community authorities are not state functionaries. We should not confuse it with state 
authority. It is community authority” (Notícias, 11.08.00. For a similar statement by the MAE minister, José 
Chichava, see Notícias, 10.06.00.  
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 ‘Traditional chiefs’ should be legitimised “according to the traditional rules of a 
given community”, secretários through “escolha [choice/selection] by the population”, and 
‘other leaders’ through “approval by the social groups they belong to” (Regulamento do 
Decreto 15/2000, 2000: Art. 1). In this sense the Decree allows the communities to choose 
any leader they consider legitimate, but at the same time satisfies the MAE research’s 
pledge for state recognition of “the traditional rules of the community” as the basis of the 
legitimacy of traditional leaders. In line with the MAE research’s definition of such shared 
traditional rules as inherently democratic, the regulamento of the decree presupposes that 
legitimacy conferred on a ‘community authority’ is indeed broad-based, including the 
whole population within a given territory. This is reflected in its definition of ‘community’ 
as “the totality of the populations and collective persons, which are joined together in a 
fixed territorial-organisational unity” (Regulamento do Decreto 15/2000: Chapter I, Art. 1, 
5). By implication, state recognition of ‘community authorities’ was indeed represented as 
capable of catering for broad-based community representation, that is, in the absence of 
locally elected governments in the rural areas.  
The community representative role is nonetheless combined with the positioning of 
community authorities as assistants of the local state institutions. This is reflected in a very 
extensive list of rights and duties conferred upon ‘community authorities’, which centre 
predominantly on what they can do to assist the state in administrative, developmental and 
security matters. This list resembles the colonial tasks and benefits conferred upon régulos 
(i.e. the 1933 RAU discussed in Chapter 2), but also differs by including novel elements 
corresponding with the varied post-war agendas discussed in Chapter 3. Broadly speaking 
the Decree covers six different areas of interaction between ‘community authorities’ and 
the state.  
 
State administration. The Decree provides for an extension of the state apparatus to levels 
below the ‘locality’ by obligating ‘community authorities’ to enforce the law, ensure social 
harmony, and carry out an extensive list of administrative and security-related tasks: 
taxation, census/registration, justice enforcement, policing, land allocation, community 
labour and food security (Regulamento do Decreto 15/2000: Section II, Art. 5). The list 
clearly resembles the 1933 colonial RAU for indirect rule. This is also true for the rights 
granted to ‘community authorities’ in return for their state administrative duties. They are 
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granted the right to a subsidy based on a percentage of tax collected and a uniform or 
corresponding paraphernalia (ibid.: Section III, Art. 6).161  
 
Civic education. Equally reminiscent of colonial indirect rule, the ‘community authorities’ 
are obliged to ensure the nurturing of proper, well-behaved, law-abiding community 
members. They should communicate state law (Regulamento Art. 5a), prevent of crime and 
maintain peace and social harmony (Art. 5c), as well as perform a number of tasks for 
governing the conduct of the population: personal hygiene, for example by mobilising 
communities to build latrines (Art. 5j), the prevention of premature marriages (Art. 5l), the 
prevention of epidemics and administering vaccinations (Art. 5o), encouraging payment of 
taxes (Art. 5q), and mobilising parents to ensure that children go to school (Art. 5s).  
 
National unity and nationhood. Unlike colonial law, the community authorities are obliged 
to engage actively in nation-building and the ‘fostering of a patriotic spirit’. First, the 
activities pursued by community authorities should be “in accordance with the 
consolidation of national unity” (Decreto 15/2000, Art. 4c). Secondly, they should 
contribute symbolically to nation-building by displaying the national flag at their 
residences, display the emblems of the republic on their clothing, and ensure community 
participation in days of national celebration (Regulamento do Decreto 15/2000, Art. 4c).   
 
Tradition and culture. In line with MAE research team’s pledge for a preservation of the 
traditions and customs, the ‘traditional’ community authorities are obliged to maintain local 
customs, uses and cultural values (ibid.: Art. 5b), and to participate in preserving local 
traditional dances, food, songs, music and ceremonies (Art. 7d-f). 
 
Rural development. In line with the ‘localisation of development’ perspective community 
authorities are obliged to “mobilise and organise the participation of the local communities 
in the understanding and implementation of the economic programs and plans in pursuit of 
local development” (Decreto 15/2000 2000: Art. 2). They are also obliged to engage in 
facilitating labour opportunities, agricultural production and environmental sustainability. 
In line with the MAE research’s definition of ‘traditional leaders’ as promoters of the 
                                                 
161 Neither the Decree nor the regulamento spell out the level of this percentage of the subsidy, nor draw up 
procedures for how it should be enforced.   
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common good of the communities, the recognised community authorities are envisaged as 
representatives of the development needs of rural communities. This is on the one hand to 
be secured by the right of community authorities to be consulted on development matters 
by the state administrative officials. On the other hand they are envisaged as ‘entry points’ 
or ‘mediators’ when rolling out donor aid, state provisions and private businesses in rural 
communities (Regulamento do Decreto 15/2000: Section III, Art. 6a).  
 
Community participation. The Decree promises to ensure local community participation in 
public administration and development. Under the list of rights and duties, it is not spelled 
out how this should concretely be ensured or what form it should take. Only two hints are 
given. First, the community authorities are granted the right to present the problems and 
needs of local communities to the local tiers of the state. Secondly, the involvement of 
members of the community in the various duties conferred on community authorities is to 
take place through the ‘mobilisation’ and ‘education’ of the former by the latter. This 
suggests that responsibility for community participation is being left in the hands of the 
community authority.  
 
This extensive list of rights and duties presents an amorphous and multifaceted cocktail of 
tasks, which tries to straddle diverse aims: community and state interest; the use of 
‘community authorities’ in state intervention; the maintenance of a separate domain of 
community authority from the state; and the preservation of rural community culture and 
traditions. With all these aims, one would therefore expect a clear description of the 
concrete steps to be taken. However, this is not the case.  
In particularly, the decree gives little clues as to how the double-role of community 
authorities as both community representatives distinct from the state and as state assistants 
can be performed and balanced in practice. Closer examination of the legislation reveals 
that the focus is predominantly on what community authorities can do for the state: i.e. to 
execute state administrative tasks and mobilize communities for participation in 
government development programs. Only scant attention is given to how the community 
authorities should perform their representative role and how community participation 
should be ensured. The legislation seems to leave the responsibility for ensuring these aims 
in the hands of the community authorities themselves. This suggests that, once they have 
been legitimised by the community, the community authorities will automatically secure 
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community participation and cater for the needs of community members. At the same time 
the decree presupposes that this will be perfectly consistent with the state assistance role of 
community authorities, and with that fact that it is the state that grants formal recognition 
and the outward signs of the status of community representatives. 
I suggest that the scant attention paid to ensuring ‘community representation’ is a 
result of the decree’s reproduction of the MAE research’s assumption of an unproblematic 
correspondence between a rural community, the traditional leader, and a set of shared 
values and interests existing within a given territorial space. Next I discuss how the 
decree’s reproduction of this basic assumption about ‘rural community’ also underpins a 
perpetuation of the juxtaposition between rural/traditional authority and urban/modern state 
as distinct domains within Mozambican society.  
Assumptions: community, tradition and rural society  
The Decree 15/2000, helped along by the MAE research, indeed managed to capture the 
varied agendas and vocabulary of the post-war democratic transition, but its definitions of 
‘community’ and ‘community authority’ also fixed and justifying a rural-urban 
differentiation. As is the case with most communitarian perspectives (Delanty 2003: 72-
91), the concept of community in the Decree presumes a social ontology of unproblematic 
group ties that emphasise the tenets of shared values and consensus, resulting in an 
uncontested convergence of territory, people, leadership and interests. Communities in this 
view come “to exhibit homogeneity; members behaving similarly and working together 
towards common aims, in one environment” (Barnard and Spenser 1996: 115). The 
assumption that a ‘community authority’ can represent community interests, as well as 
enforce, mobilise and ensure participation, is therefore perfectly valid. However, it also has 
repercussions.  
In the Decree, this applies particularly to traditional leaders in rural areas: while 
secretários should be selected by the population of a suburb or a village, i.e. by what could 
be referred to as semi-urban citizens, traditional leaders residing in the rural areas should be 
legitimized on the basis of the ‘traditional rules of the respective community’. The 
legislation does not spell out what these rules are, but seems to assume, in accordance with 
the MAE research, that such rules exist and are unilaterally agreed upon by the members of 
local communities. The implication is that, by virtue of holding the title of traditional 
leader, the latter unquestionably represents the interests of a given community and derives 
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legitimacy from this very representation. This assumption, I suggest, is on the one hand 
premised on the claim put forward in the MAE research that the meanings and functions of 
‘traditional authority’ are undisputed – i.e. agreed by the ‘community’. On the other hand, it 
is based on the presumed existence of a ‘community’ that can express itself, have interests, 
be represented and legitimise an authority.  
By implication, I suggest, little thought is given in the decree as to how the 
community representative and the consultative role of the ‘community authorities’ should 
be secured. It takes this for granted, and in doing so leaves out any serious considerations of 
the differences (gender, age, family affiliation, class etc.) and potential conflicts within a 
community. Another implication is that it reproduces a colonial-style rural-urban 
differentiation. This was concretely exemplified by (and further legitimised) the fact that 
locally elected governments – i.e. implying each individuals’ right to vote for his/her 
representative – were not extended to the rural areas, but confined to urban zones.162  
The point seems to be that the idea of rural Mozambique as comprising coherent 
groups adhering to the same (traditional) values and interests equally produced the rural 
areas as separate spheres to be governed differently from the urban, not to say modern, 
areas. It underscored, as the MAE research so eloquently claimed, the need for another, 
form of democracy. In one sense this reproduced the colonial-era differentiation between 
modes of governing the rural and urban population, but it also differed from this. The 
recognition of rural communities as groups represented by a traditional, community leader 
coexists with the constitutional recognition of individual citizens as de jure entitled to the 
same rights and with a system of representative democracy. As a matter of even more 
complication, the Decree 15/2000 also promises that state recognition of and conference of 
tasks to traditional authorities would simultaneously strengthen and preserve two 
presumable distinct domains of Mozambican society: traditional authority and the modern-
state. How these seemingly paradoxical relations were played out in practice in Matica and 
Dombe is the subject of discussion in the rest of this dissertation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
162 This perspective was expressed to me by the then minister of MAE in June 2002, “there is no need to make 
municipalities in the rural areas, because decree 15/2000 caters for democratisation of the rural areas in 
accordance with the communities there.”  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed the classificatory closure of the protracted policy-making 
process on ‘traditional authority’. It showed how this closure involved moulding and 
defining a common category of ‘traditional authority’ to fit a national law that corresponded 
with the different agendas of the democratic transition. Decree 15/2000, helped along by 
the MAE research team, was indeed a compromise between the partly contradictory actor 
positions of the policy-making process in the 1990s, which at the last minute also included 
accommodating the Frelimo party secretários, along with the various other interests in 
promoting traditional authorities.  
 This compromise at the same time relied on a simplification of the reality that the 
legislation aimed to recognise. While Decree 15/2000 clearly emerged from a historically 
complex and politically contested field of authority (see Chapters 2-3), it relied on de-
historicised, de-politicised and inherently reified notions of ‘traditional authority’ and 
‘community’ that were represented as existing ‘on the ground’. Legislation depended on 
disembedding ‘traditional authority’ from its historical and political contexts and elevating 
it to a static, indisputable domain of Mozambican ‘tradition’, in order to make ‘it’ fit with 
the ‘modern’ agendas of development, national unity, democratisation, state administration 
and decentralisation. The same can be said of rural populations, relabelled ‘traditional 
society’ and then ‘community’. Despite the historical shifts, wars and mass displacements 
of population, the rural community was presented as existing in a pure, almost undisturbed 
form of being, characterised by an intimate correspondence between a particular territorial 
space, people, leadership, values and interests. This definition gave the impression that all 
the state needed to do in order to implement the Decree was to go out and identify the 
community in order to legitimise the ‘real’ traditional or other community leader.  
 Following the insights of Scott (1998) and Moore (1978), such simplifications of 
social reality and of the disembedding of complex social phenomena from their historical 
and political contexts is not peculiar to the legislation on community authority in 
Mozambique, but an intrinsic aspect of state law and schemes of classification more 
broadly. This is premised on the state bureaucracy’s need for discrete identities that can be 
mapped and rendered legible, in order to regulate populations within a larger territorial 
space (Scott 1998). It is therefore important to pay attention to the ways in which such state 
schemes of classification seek not only to recognise, but also to regulate and reorder 
particular social relationships. Thus, I will suggest approaching the policy closure as an 
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element in processes of regularisation, which does, at least at the level of representations, 
have particular implications.  
 In the case of Decree 15/2000, the classificatory closure, while clearly 
drawing on the new vocabularies of the democratic transition, at the same time reproduced 
two classical dichotomies, reminiscent of colonial era rule: modern-urban individualism 
versus traditional-rural communitarianism, and traditional authority versus the modern 
state. This legitimised the Frelimo government’s decision not to extend locally elected 
governments to the rural areas, which had clear party-political underpinnings. It also carried 
the implication that very little attention was in fact being given to how legislation could 
ensure that ‘community authorities’ were indeed legitimised by the whole community and 
representative of its interests: the classifications produced made this appear as pre-existing 
the implementation of legislation. Finally, the Decree underlined the assumption that 
‘community authorities’ could perfectly well assist and bolster the state apparatus, while 
still being preserved as a distinct domain outside the ‘modern’ state. In this sense, Decree 
15/2000, helped along by the MAE research results, reproduced past representations of 
chiefs as the constitutive ‘Other’ of the state or wider polity, while ignoring the mutual 
transformations of chieftaincy and state institutions that this had led to in the past.  
Now, one thing is how and according to what state-legal classifications and 
justifications traditional authority was inserted into legislation during the democratic 
transition – another is how Decree 15/2000 was appropriated locally and translated into 
practice. In other words, how was the ideal model relationship between community 
authority, local communities and the state put into practice? Did those communities and 
authorities labelled in the Decree actually exist – despite the war, conflicts and population 
movements – and how were they recognised? And what did the dual-role granted to the 
community authorities as both state assistants and as a distinct domain of traditional, 
community authority imply for practices and claims to authority and citizenship? It is with 
these questions in mind that we shall now travel both back and forwards in time to Matica 
and Dombe in Sussundenga District.  
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Recognition of Chiefs and State Formation 
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Chapter 5 
Mutual Constitutions - State, Community and Community 
Authority 
 
 
With the Decree, we are saying that there is nothing new besides that the government has to 
recognise those persons that the communities indicate as their representatives. […] Under no 
circumstances can the government intervene in the process of legitimisation. […] This position of 
the government permits a more efficient decentralisation process and what we in English call 
‘empowerment’, that is, to create opportunities for the communities to take power and participate 
actively in development. We also call this process a process of inclusion. (Minister of State 
Administration, interview, June 2002)   
 
In principle Decree 15/2000 is a formalization of what already exists…only there was no uniformity 
in the relationship between the state and the traditional authorities in the country. (District 
Administrator of Sussundenga, interview, August 2002) 
 
 
The official claim that Decree 15/2000 was simply a piece of legislation recognising, 
empowering and including ‘what already exists’, namely ‘communities’ and ‘traditional 
authorities’, did not mirror social reality. This will become clear in this second part of the 
thesis, where I explore the first phase of implementing Decree 15/2000 in Matica and 
Dombe. This first phase took place from mid-2001 to late 2002 and covered the three 
official steps of identifying, legitimising and granting de jure recognition to community 
authorities. The present chapter deals with the first two steps and Chapter 6 with the third.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore how traditional authority, community and state 
institutions were constituted and enacted in and around the identification and legitimisation 
of community authorities. In doing this, the chapter addresses three interrelated questions: 
How were the aims and key categories of Decree 15/2000 appropriated and translated into 
practice by local state officials? How did claimants to traditional authority and other local 
actors react to the activities of local state officials, and what sources of legitimacy and 
practices of legitimising chiefly authority were at work? And finally, what did the different 
activities mean for local power relations, and the role of ordinary community-citizens in 
legitimising traditional authority?   
In addressing these questions, the chapter attends to the interplay between the 
practices and representations of local state officials, chiefly claimants and other local 
actors. It pays attention to the influence of past and present scripts in the form of ideas and 
practices, and the power relations they support, for the ways in which legislation was put 
 139
into practice and reacted to. Paying attention to these dimensions is based on the 
assumption that state-legal categories are seldom abidingly instantiated, but appropriated 
and adjusted by actors in particular local settings (see Chapter 1).  
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 explores how the first step of 
identification was concretely translated into practice by local state officials. It examines 
how the activities of these officials were adjusted to local social realities, as well as shaped 
by the officials’ particular agendas and historically embedded ideas of chieftaincy and state 
formation. Section 2 addresses the step of legitimisation of community authorities. It 
considers how the Decree’s categories of “community”, “the traditional rules of the 
respective community” and its emphasis on broad-based community participation were 
interpreted, enacted and labelled in the context of deciding leadership positions. Here we 
shall pay attention to who in fact participated in legitimisation, that is, who de facto 
constituted the community, and how this was shaped by existing forms of organisation and 
ideas about power, authority and community. Section 3 takes the insights of the first two 
sections a step further. It provides a more detailed discussion of the contestations, 
negotiations and contradictions that surrounded the settlement of individual leadership 
positions in Dombe and Matica. In doing so, it focuses on the different sources of 
legitimacy that were invoked to justify particular chiefly candidates in pursuit of state 
recognition. These are discussed in relation to the practices of legitimisation that were at 
work – that is, the human agency involved in justifying a given leaders’ legitimacy, and the 
power relations and interests that underlined these (Lentz 1998). It should be kept in mind 
that the analysis of these dimensions will tell us something about the constitution of 
traditional authority in relation to achieving de jure or state-sanctioned authority. It does 
not necessarily reflect the de facto forms of authority that are recognised and constituted in 
everyday practice, which we shall address in Part III. The same can be said of the 
enactment of community as a modality of citizenship, and of the practices and 
representations of local state officials. 
   
1. Identification: Rectifying the State and the ‘Real’ Lineages   
 
In Sussundenga District, implementation of Decree 15/2000 began in May 2001, 
approximately a year after it was approved. Implementation was divided into three official 
steps of state intervention: ‘identification’, ‘legitimisation’ and ‘recognition’ of community 
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authorities. These figured in a guião (guide) produced by the Ministry of State 
Administration (MAE/DAL, December 2000). This three-page guide specified that the 
District Administrator (DA) was responsible for implementing the Decree: he was to 
proceed first by identifying the communities of the respective zones, whose members 
should, secondly, legitimise a community authority at public ‘legitimisation meetings’ in 
the presence of district-level state representatives. Thirdly, the DA should organise public 
recognition ceremonies, at which the legitimised community authority should be registered, 
sign a contract with the state and receive a uniform or equivalent paraphernalia (ibid.). 
 Apart from a brief paragraph laying down that the state could not recognise a leader 
if there was uncertainty about his or her legitimacy, the guide did not specify in any detail 
how the responsible state officials should proceed with the first two steps. The guide 
seemed to reproduce the Decree’s taken-for-granted notion of the pre-existence of 
‘communities’ which could easily be identified by the state and be asked to legitimise a 
leader. In addition, the state officials in Sussundenga District only received a detailed 
briefing on the MAE’s intended meanings of the guide and the Decree itself at a seminar 
held after identification and legitimisation had been carried out.163 In Sussundenga District, 
as elsewhere in the country, these gaps in communication created considerable room for 
creative translations of the aims and key categories of Decree 15/2000 by local state 
officials.164 However, I suggest that such creative translations were also shaped by the 
ambiguous reality of community and traditional leadership that local state officials faced 
and by historically embedded understandings of the state recognition of chiefs.  
 These gave way to quite unintended consequences, as also reflected in the final 
outcome of the first two steps of identification and legitimisation. In August 2001 the 
district administration of Sussundenga forwarded a register to the MAE containing no less 
than 88 “legitimised community authorities”. Replicating the colonial labels, these 
authorities were divided into 13 régulos and 52 sub-chiefs (chefes do grupo and chefes da 
                                                 
163 This seminar took place on 25 October 2001 in the provincial capital of Manica. Similar seminars were 
held at around the same time in the rest of the country. The aim of these seminars was, according to the MAE, 
to “correct the mistakes that have been committed in the interpretation of the Decree … and to prevent more 
mistakes from happening.” The ‘mistakes’ reported for the country as a whole included party political 
manipulation of the leadership by both Frelimo and Renamo; a failure to ensure community legitimisation; 
intense, sometimes violent conflicts between claimants to the leadership; and the registration of (and thus 
promises of recognition to) far more leaders than had been planned (internal communication MAE/DAL, 28 
June 2002).  
164 On the process of implementing these three steps in Machaze District, Manica Province, Bùzi and 
Chibababva Districts, Sofala Province and Govuro District, Inhambane Province, see Dava, Macia and Dove 
2003.  
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povoação) as well as 23 secretários do bairro. The registers also provided the individual 
names and areas of jurisdiction for each of the leaders, also using the colonial label of 
regedoria, not ‘community’. In Dombe this covered the registration of 8 régulos, 14 sub-
chiefs and 2 secretários, and in the much smaller locality of Matica, 1 régulo, 4 sub-chiefs 
and 6 secretários. This excessive number of ‘community authorities’ came as a general 
surprise to the MAE.165 Its officials had not expected the category of community authorities 
to include all secretários as well as all the sub-chiefs, carrying the colonial labels of chefes 
do grupo and chefes da povoação.166 If this was an unexpected side-effect of the 
implementation of the Decree from the perspective of the MAE, it also reflected how local 
state officials understood the Decree and went about putting it into practice. Next we shall 
address the initial step of identification, and how this too was appropriated as a pervasive 
aspect of re-constituting the state in the rural hinterlands in the sense of territorial-
institutional outreach, practices of governing and the creation of alliances.   
Reviving the colonial register   
One notable feature of identification was that local state officials did not, as intended by the 
MAE, begin with the ‘communities’ but with the leaders, the chiefs and secretários. With 
regard to the secretários, local state officials interpreted it as implying the registration of all 
those already existing in the government-controlled areas of Matica and of appointing new 
ones by the officials themselves to fill the positions left vacant during Renamo control of 
the main village of Dombe. For the category of ‘traditional leaders’, they interpreted the 
Decree as a rectification and stabilisation of the régulos verdadeiros (the real chiefs) of the 
linagems reais (the real or ruling lineages) with the colonial names of the regedorias. They 
did not see it as a process whereby a given community was asked to identify whichever 
leader they found legitimate. The decree’s categories of ‘traditional leaders’ and the 
‘traditional rules of the respective community’ were rather represented as a revivable set of 
kinship-based, inherited positions of authority, against which a real heir could be identified. 
This emphasis on the ‘real heir’ was tied to particular understandings of the chieftaincy. 
                                                 
165 Interview, R. Alfane, MAE, April 2004. 
166 This excessive number of community authorities was also reflected in other parts of the country, leading to 
no less than 13,080 registered community authorities. These authority figures were eventually accepted by the 
MAE as the second and third scales of ‘community authority’ and phases of implementing the Decree 
(DAL/MAE, February 2003). In 2002 it was also decided that sub-chiefs should also be recognised and given 
a uniform (Interview, R. Alfane, MAE, 2 April 2004). Despite this being promised to sub-chiefs, it had still 
not happened by October 2005, due to resource constraints (i.e. for the purchase of uniforms). 
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However, it was also shaped by pragmatic concerns and the contested reality of chieftaincy. 
According to the chefe of Dombe post:  
 
We knew that some of the chiefs were not the real chiefs because some abandoned their areas 
during the war. If those who were the real ones from that time [before the war] had died, then it 
should be those with inheritance from the real ones that the state should recognise. Therefore, to 
implement the Decree we had to begin by finding out who is the régulo verdadeiro [real chief].167  
 
The above comment reflects the reality of uncertain leadership and area boundaries that 
prevailed by the time of identification in the rural chieftaincies of Dombe in particular. This 
is not surprising when we consider the reconfigurations of chiefly positions that had taken 
place during the war, including the deaths of previous chiefs and movements out of these 
areas.  
 In Dombe, for example, only Chief Mushamba had survived and remained in his 
area as a chief since colonial rule. In the remaining seven chieftaincies, the former régulos 
had died in exile (Gudza and Zomba), died in their home areas during the war (Chibue, 
Kóa, Dombe and Muoco), or been in exile and only returned some years after the war 
(Sambanhe). In addition, at the time of identification many family members of the former 
chiefs, and hence their potential heirs, had returned only recently. For these reasons, many 
of the chieftaincies were still in the process of resettling leadership positions and areas of 
jurisdiction by the time of the identification process. In some areas, this was also marked by 
intensive disputes over leadership positions. This state of affairs meant that local state 
officials could not just go ‘out there’ and easily identify the ‘real chief’. It also meant that, 
even if the state officials had understood the MAE’s intentions, they could not simply ask 
‘the community’ to identify and legitimise a leader. The Decree’s definition of a 
community did not pre-exist legislation in any purely practical form, i.e. as a neatly mapped 
and organised collective actor (see further, Section 2).  
 Intriguingly, the 1961 colonial register of régulos and sub-chiefs became the 
pragmatic tool that local state officials used to deal with this ‘messy’ reality. At the same 
time, it was represented as indeed containing the names of the real ruling lineages:  
 
When we began to identify the traditional leaders in order to register them, we first had to find the 
colonial registers from 1961 where all the real names are classified. Then we went to make a 
comparison between the colonial registers with the present authorities. That is, we went to 
                                                 
167 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002. 
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investigate until we found those that were the real régulos, chefe do grupo and chefe da 
povoação.168  
  
If the colonial register, or o livro (the book), as it was commonly referred to, was what the 
local state officials had to begin with, then it also turned into a powerful tool for actually 
deciding which chiefly lineages were the legitimate ones. As reflected in the August 2001 
register of ‘community authorities’, the reliance on o livro led to a de facto resurrection of 
the colonial three-tier hierarchy of chiefs and sub-chiefs, who had identical colonial 
classifications of regedorias, types of leaders and lineage names.169 Only the individual 
first names were changed during the implementation of Decree 15/2000. The concrete 
procedures for arriving at this revised register happened in two ways, which reflected the 
different histories of state–chief relations in Matica and Dombe.  
 First, in Matica, where informal collaboration between chiefs and the local state 
administration had been going on for some time, the local state official in charge, the chefe 
of locality, simply certified whether the lineage names of existing chiefs corresponded to o 
livro and then recorded them in a new register. In other words, at this stage there was no 
‘legitimisation meeting’ held with the wider population.170  
Secondly, in Dombe, where state officials were unclear about leadership positions 
outside the administrative capital, identification took the form of so-called brigadas de 
mobilização (mobilisation brigades) consisting of state officials and the First Frelimo 
Secretary. These travelled out into the different areas and called for meetings with the 
famílias reais (the ruling lineages of chiefs), corresponding to the regedoria name 
catalogued in o livro.171 As one chefe of locality explained:  
 
The brigada read out the names of the register, and then we told the family that now it was the 
moment for the state to recognise the real chiefs…we no longer wanted chiefs who were imposed 
by force. The régulo had to be within the real principles of tradition…he had to be within the 
                                                 
168 Interview, DA of Sussundenga, D. Matikiti, 02 August 2002.  
169 This revival of colonial classifications also occurred in other parts of the country (see Dava, Macia and 
Dove 2003: 31-6). The use of the decree to revive the regedorias was received negatively by the MAE, who 
saw it as a “re-creation of the colonial state”, but also noted that, if it was the leaders registered as régulos in 
the colonial register that the communities found legitimate, the state would have to accept this (DAL/MAE 
internal communication, November 2001). Interestingly, when one compares the registers of community 
authorities held at the district and provincial levels, the label régulo is used, but at the level of the MAE this 
has been changed to chefe tradicional (traditional chief). 
170 Interview, Chefe da Localidade, Matica, 30 August 2002.  
171 Interviews with Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002; First Secretary of Frelimo, Dombe, 14 
October 2002; Chefe da Localidade, Bunga, 26 September 2002; Chefe da Agricultura, Dombe, 19 August 
2002; Chefe da Localidade, Matarara, 2 September 2002.  
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lineages in o livro. Some said that those who called themselves régulos had been imposed. In those 
areas we left the families to work out who the real one was according to the names in o livro.172  
 
O livro, in other words, set the framework for and limited the scope of candidates who 
could claim the position of traditional ‘community authority’ where this was not entirely 
clear. Any claimant or his or her supporters had to prove inheritance from the régulo or 
sub-chief catalogued in o livro. In short, o livro became the beholder of the truth of the 
‘real’ tradition against which to verify and create a revised register of individual 
‘community authorities’. Added to this, the state officials authorised the members of those 
‘families’ whose name was in o livro to ‘work out who the real one was’– not, it should be 
noted, the whole population. This reliance on o livro presented a compromised 
interpretation of the Decree’s emphasis on community legitimisation. Importantly, it also 
conveyed authority to the state as the proprietor of the names of the ‘real’ chieftaincies, 
given that the register was in the hands of the state administration. This centrality of the 
state administration in the identification process, however, extended beyond the state-
bureaucratic artefact of o livro. The colonial register, as well as the promises of de jure 
recognition, also proved useful in the pursuit of state-administrative concerns other than the 
identification of the real chiefs.  
Reconstituting the state  
 
When the Decree came, we [state officials] could begin to penetrate the difficult zones that before 
we could not do because some sympathisers of Renamo tried to impede our fixação [permanent 
establishment]. Before that we had had some meetings with the régulos, but not with those in the 
zones held by the opposition. The brigadas were sent to talk with the régulos…telling them that 
they would be recognised…and that there was going to be a governmental authority that would take 
care of the local populations and bring development…after this it was much easier to for us to be in 
the zones.173  
 
As this comment indicates, the identification of ‘community authorities’ in Dombe was 
appropriated by local state officials as part of a larger post-war project of re-establishing the 
territorial-institutional outreach of the state in the hinterlands, where Renamo had been or 
still was influential. Real promises of state recognition to chiefs were used by local state 
                                                 
172 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002 
173 Interview, Chefe of Locality, Bunga, October 2002. It should be noted that the term brigadas de 
mobilização relates to a military concept that derives from the post-colonial socialist period of initial 
mobilisation of GDs in hinterlands where Frelimo was still not present. The historical legacies of such naming 
were also reflected in the fact that the First Frelimo Secretary was part of the brigadas in 2001. 
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officials to create alliances in hitherto contested areas, which could nurture the legitimacy 
of state authorities, as well as lay the basis for pragmatic governance concerns.   
 After the initial brigadas had taken place, this was concretely manifested in the 
opening up of state-administrative offices in four out of five localities (the lowest tier of the 
state administration) of the hinterlands of Dombe (Javela, Muoco, Matarara and Darué).174 
As the Dombe chefe of post noted, “this we could not have done without the régulos, who 
talked to the people after they had been promised recognition.”175 Also the registration of 
the wider three-tier hierarchy of chiefs and sub-chiefs was viewed as part of the wider 
process of consolidating the state-administrative presence: 
 
Why we registered the smaller chiefs? Well this made sense, because…the régulo does not work 
alone, he has his subordinates…the chefes do grupo and the chefes da povoação. This is a way to 
control the persons under him…collect taxes, solve conflicts…because the territory is very 
extensive. Also therefore there are provinces, districts, postos,…for the government to administer 
the national territory better. This is what the Decree 15/2000 is also about.176
 
The resurrection of the colonial regadorias therefore went beyond a particular 
understanding of ‘traditional authority’ as corresponding to the lineages listed in o livro. It 
was also handy in the establishment of a wider system of alliances and of fixing hierarchies 
of authority across space. These were attached to a pragmatic vision of how future state 
functions could be ensured. Similarly, in Matica the registration of secretários and chiefs 
was used to expand further and establish a hierarchically ordered system of leadership to 
the whole territory of the locality, including also the mapping of spatial population units. 
For example, during the identification of ‘community authorities’, 10 new bairros of 
secretários and 8 zonas of sub-chiefs were established by the state administration and were 
registered as falling under the two regedorias listed in o livro, Boupua and Ganda. Much in 
line with the Dombe administration, this territory-based hierarchical system of intermediate 
leaders was, according to the Matica chefe of locality, intended to ensure future downward 
lines of command from the state through the different layers of leadership and upstream 
information about the whole population from the leaders to the state. In short, the Decree 
was appropriated to improve future forms of state intervention.  
                                                 
174 This was true of localities in Sofala Province too, as reported by the DAL/MAE: “the Decree contributes to 
the coming into being of functionaries, such as presidentes das localidades [presidents of localities] of new 
localities.” Internal communication, DAL/MAE, 28 June 2002.  
175 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002.  
176 Interview, Chefe da Localidade, Bunga, 1 October 2002.  
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 In Dombe the establishment of alliances through promises of state recognition of 
chiefs and sub-chiefs was also represented as a means to bolster state legitimacy among the 
people in the rural hinterlands, which were formerly under Renamo control:     
 
 
The armed conflict here destroyed some of the ideas of the people…some believed that another 
government [Renamo] had taken over the nation. The Decree, we said, could make the régulos 
more active in changing this. The chefe da localidade could work with them [régulos] to 
sensibilizar [sensitize/affect/move] the communities for them to recognise the state and for them to 
know that the state lives with them.177  
 
Thus local state officials saw Decree 15/2000 as enabling a double recognition: state 
recognition of ‘community authorities’ was envisaged as enabling community recognition 
of state authority. More broadly the representations and practices of local state officials in 
the identification phase underpinned a process of mutual constitution of state and 
traditional, community authority. On the ‘state side’, this covered attempts both to 
(re)constitute the state as a legitimate authority, and to ensure territorial-institutional 
expansion and the fixing of hierarchies across space, that is, what I referred to as the 
practical languages of stateness in Chapter 1. These attempts were intimately related to the 
resurrection and fixing of existing chieftaincies, though, it should be noted, in the form of a 
bureaucratic re-inscription of the ‘real’ traditional leaders, whose names existed in a 
colonial register. As we shall see in Section 3, this was not a straightforward, uncontested 
process. There was room for manipulation, and contradictions also arose between purely 
state administrative concerns and local state officials’ own beliefs in the spiritual power of 
the ruling lineages. However, before we turn to these issues, I shall first address the next 
step of legitimisation. Here we shift from a focus on the mutual constitution of the state and 
traditional authority to the constitution of ‘community’.  
 
2. Legitimisation: The Constitution of Community 
 
The Decree’s definition of community as “the populations and collective persons joined 
together in a fixed territorial-organisational unity” denotes community as both a spatial 
category – the sum of people within a given territory – and a social category – denoting a 
sense of groupness or shared belonging and of collective agency. With respect to the 
                                                 
177 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002.  
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legitimisation of traditional leaders, the Decree also emphasises a shared set of “traditional 
rules of a given community” and a community’s capacity to legitimise a representative 
according to such shared rules. Finally, the main purpose of the Decree also underscored 
community as a site of state intervention, that is, as a governmental category (Delanty 
2003). The question is how these different layers of community were enacted during the 
implementation of the Decree.  
The insistence of local state officials on a revival of the colonial classifications of 
chiefs de facto excluded the wider rural population from identifying whatever leader they 
found legitimate. In fact, the Decree’s category of ‘community’ was only named and 
enacted through the activities of local state officials at the legitimisation step. However, 
even here community as a social category did not cover the whole population as envisaged 
in the Decree. It was not until after the ‘real’ authorities had been legitimised that the 
‘community’ as a spatial category was identified, mapped and named. Next I address these 
aspects by focusing on the second step of legitimisation and the reasons behind the 
particular ways in which community was constituted.  
Modalities of legitimisation and enactments of community 
In Sussundenga District, legitimisation followed three different modalities, underlining the 
enactment of different conceptualisations of ‘community’. One commonality was that 
nowhere did it involve broad-based participation by the people residing within a given 
territory, as promised by the Decree.  
 First, in Matica, where there had been prior collaboration between chiefs and the 
state administration, legitimisation ended with identification. ‘Community authority’ was 
determined exclusively between already existing chiefs and the chefe of locality, and hence 
without any consultation with the inhabitants of the areas. Public consultation only took 
place at the state-orchestrated recognition ceremonies in 2002.  
 The second and third modalities of legitimisation took place in Dombe, where the 
uncertainty over individual leadership positions made legitimisation more complicated. It 
also involved slightly more people than in Matica. Initially legitimisation happened 
internally in the chieftaincies in the form of often intensively disputed settlements of 
individual leadership positions between candidates and their supporters (see further, 
Section 3). Key here were attempts to prove inheritance from the names catalogued in o 
livro and to provide registers to the state administration of the inhabitants living within each 
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chieftaincy in order to “prove that they had a population.”178 Both of these aspects followed 
the orders of the state brigadas mentioned earlier. Once they had been settled, the name of 
the candidate was forwarded to the chefe of post, who checked that the lineage name of the 
candidate corresponded to o livro and then entered the new individual name in a revised 
register of régulos and their sub-chiefs. This was followed by a third modality of 
legitimisation: state-orchestrated ‘legitimisation meetings’. These took place at the 
homestead of the registered candidate, who had been asked by the chefe of post to invite the 
“whole community to a consultation”.179 At the meetings, the chefe of post asked the 
participants to confirm whether the registered candidate was indeed considered the real one 
and was thus legitimate. If not, the participants were asked to name someone else, but only 
someone whose name corresponded to the regedoria names catalogued in o livro. As such 
the state officials left no space for diverging from o livro, only for contesting the individual 
candidate. This apparent state-controlled aspect of legitimisation was nonetheless justified 
in the name of ‘the tradition’: “The legitimisation meetings were not like an election or 
votes. Because the people know the tradition, there is no need for votes. They just need to 
indicate the real one according to the tradition”.180  This representation of ‘the tradition’ 
may seem paradoxical considering that o livro – a state artefact – had laid out the 
framework for legitimisation in the first place. It nonetheless reflects, I suggest, a fusion of 
“the traditional rules of the respective community” figuring in the Decree with particular 
state-administrative concerns and conceptualisations of community.  
This fusion was reflected in how ‘the community’ was named and enacted during 
the different modalities of legitimisation outlined above. Here a differentiation emerged 
between using the label ‘community’ to designate the wider population (povo or 
populacão) of a given regedoria, and using it to describe a relatively small and exclusive 
group of people who were authorised by the state officials to participate in the internal 
settlement of leadership positions. This latter group of mainly elderly men comprised those 
claiming membership of a given lineage, catalogued in o livro; members of the council of 
elders (madodas), who advise and assist the chief in governing matters; and the chingore 
(nephew) of the chiefly family, who assumes ritual and advisory functions. In short, when it 
came to certifying the régulo verdadiero, ‘the community’ constituted what we might call 
the central organising unit of a chieftaincy. This unit was represented by local state officials 
                                                 
178 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Ibid. 
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and beyond as “those who know the tradition”, due to their particular relationship to the 
ucama we mambo (family of the chief). In the eyes of state officials, this justified the 
exclusive participation of this small group of individuals in settling questions of leadership. 
In fact, the Dombe chefe of post labelled this group the “genuine community” when he 
explained the legitimisation process:  
According to the Decree, the régulos are not imposed by the state, but by the community and 
according to the tradition. So therefore those who impose [the chief] are the genuine families…it is 
the genuine community…it is the principal family and the elders, because they know the origin of 
this traditional power.181  
 
Intriguingly, this ‘genuine community’, attached to ideas about ruling families and 
knowledge of the tradition, did not just reproduce pre-existing relations of power within a 
chieftaincy. The very quest for legitimising community authority in fact led to a process of 
reactivating and reorganising the individual members of the organising unit. The crux of the 
matter is that the constitution and labelling of the ‘genuine community’ did not pre-exist in 
any pure, stable form prior to state intervention. The same can be said of the constitution of 
community as a spatial and governmental category, that is, as the total population within 
the territory of each chief. However, this served other purposes, and was clearly 
distinguished from the ‘genuine community’.  
During the process of legitimisation, chiefly candidates were asked by the state 
administration to provide registers of their inhabitants. The official argument for this was 
that, to be a régulo, one needed to have a população (population), which local state officials 
also labelled a ‘community’. However, it also served concrete state-administrative 
concerns:    
 
In order to facilitate our process of legitimisation, we [state officials] had to produce administrative 
books of censuses…of the populations that had the name of this and that chefe da povoação, chefe 
do grupo and régulo. After they [chiefs and sub-chiefs] had been registered, we asked them to 
register each inhabitant, according to sex and age. Because what justifies a chief is that he has 
population…that he has a community…and these books showed it. They show how many can pay 
taxes….and to plan the building of schools and health posts. This is our system of controlling….and 
for development. And it is also important to the state, because the people….is what makes the state 
exist, because without the povo [people], without persons, there is no state…then the government 
cannot function.182
 
Thus state officials’ emphasis on “having a population or a community” as source of 
chiefly legitimacy implied chiefs proving this statistically, rather than actually being 
(s)elected for office by the sum of the inhabitants of a given territory. By implication, the 
                                                 
181 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 September 2002.  
182 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 August 2002.  
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wider communities, which were ideally to be the point of departure for implementation, 
only became visible to the implementers after their leaders or ‘representatives’ had been 
registered and certified by the organising unit of the regulado. Turning the matter on its 
head, it was the registered leader and his closest assistants, the ‘genuine community’, who 
proved the existence of ‘the community’ at large, not the other way around. At the same 
time, the constitution of ‘the community’ as an element in legitimising traditional authority 
provided the state administration with registers of the population to serve future state 
interventions.  
 The wider implication of these modalities of legitimisation was a de facto scale-
differentiated constitution of community. On the one hand, community as a spatial and 
governmental category designating the total sum of the inhabitants, of tax-payers, voters 
and recipients of health, education, water supply and so forth. In short, they were counted 
and mapped as subjects of state intervention governed by a régulo. On the other hand, 
community was a social category, describing the ‘genuine family’ of the chief who actively 
participated in legitimising a given leader. We could also translate this differentiation into a 
separation between the passive subjects and active members of a spatially defined unit. By 
local state officials, the former was considered statistical proof of a régulo’s authority, 
whereas the latter were regarded as those who, “according to tradition”, had the authority to 
legitimise leadership.  
This scale-differentiated constitution of community was also reproduced at the 
‘legitimisation meetings’ in Dombe. While referred to by local state officials as “a 
participatory consultation with the whole community”, the meetings only saw the 
participation of somewhere between 100 and 300 people.183 When compared with the 
population registers drawn up by the chiefs prior to the meetings, this figure corresponded 
to approximately 5-20 percent of the total population. According to informants, those who 
participated were the organising unit of the chieftaincy, close neighbours of the chief, and 
in some places schoolteachers. The chefe of Dombe post was well aware of this discrepancy 
between the community as the total sum of the population and the relatively small number 
of participants at the meetings. However, he accepted the sum of participants as “a kind of 
representative of the whole community…a sort of representative of the whole population of 
                                                 
183 Minutes from the ‘legitimisation meetings’, held by the Dombe Administrative post.  
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the régulo.”184 This further underscored the scale-differentiated enactment of community 
during the process of legitimisation and showed how this was authorised by state officials. 
The wider implication of these constitutions of community in and around the 
legitimisation of traditional authority was not only that it compromised the democratic 
credentials of the Decree. It also re-constituted particular power relations within the 
chieftaincies, as well as served to re-establish state administrative presence and 
effectiveness. This mutual constitution of chieftaincy and state institutions was carried out 
in the very name of ‘traditional rules of the respective community’. And it was in fact 
widely accepted, or at least, never openly criticised. The question is why this was the case. 
One obvious answer is that local state officials did not encourage the wider population to 
participate in legitimising a representative from the outset. However, I suggest that we also 
need to look beyond this gap in communication by turning to a deeper historically 
embedded culture of power, as well as the concrete reality of social organisation and 
groupness.  
Community as a theoretical group  
I suggest that the lack of broad-based participation in the legitimisation of community 
authorities can partly be explained by the absence in Matica and Dombe of communities as 
de facto existing practical groups (Bourdiue 1991). That is, practical groupness, in the 
sense of members consciously acting and viewing themselves as part of groups defined in 
the decree, did not pre-exist the implementation of the decree (i.e. equating territory, 
population, shared values, agency and representation). Community was rather what 
Bourdieu (1991) refers to as theoretical groups. This concept refers to groups ‘on paper’ or 
abstract groups, classified by experts and policy-makers according to objective criteria of  
individuals’ common position in a social space (e.g. territory, language, ethnicity, religion, 
class), and sometimes with reference to subjective properties (such as feelings of 
belonging). These can exist without group members necessarily acting as or viewing 
themselves as part of these groups (Bourdieu 1991: 226).  
 That community was by and large a ‘theoretical group’ at the time of implementing 
the Decree was exemplified by the seemingly trivial issue of how the term was used (or 
rather not used) by chiefs and rural residents and by the existing practical modalities of 
groupness. First, the concept of community (comunidade in Portuguese) was not part of the 
                                                 
184 Interview, Chefe do Posto, Dombe, 2 August 2002.  
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ordinary vocabulary of chiefs and rural residents prior to the implementation of the Decree. 
It was only put to use by local state officials in the process of implementing the Decree, as 
noted earlier. Instead, people used different terms in both local languages and Portuguese to 
describe respectively spatial-territorial units, social organisation, and family and clan 
relations: for example, the concepts of nyaka or area and regedoria or chieftaincy were 
applied to describe a given territorial space, whereas the concepts of ma-populacão or 
wagari – both denoting population – were used as an abstract category for the sum of 
people living either within a whole state administrative area or within a chieftaincy. 
However, the latter was not used to describe an organised and closely-knit entity of social 
relations with common values and interests. Instead, this was captured by the terms okama 
(family) and dzinza (clan), designating respectively the nuclear family and the wider 
relations of a given clan. Both these, it should be noted, expanded beyond a given territorial 
space. Lastly, okama we mambo (family of the chief), and tchicuata we mambo (the people 
organised around a chief) were used to describe the ruling organisation of a given area. The 
point here is that there was no common umbrella term equating a territory, a population and 
a set of shared values, as in the Decree’s definition of community. This was secondly 
reflected in the practical modalities of groupness.  
 By the time of the implementation of the Decree, the inhabitants of the regedorias 
listed in o livro comprised a mixture of families. Some originated from the chieftaincies, 
but had been absent for long periods of time during the war. Others were entirely new 
settlers from other administrative and chieftaincy areas, which followed diverse movements 
of people after and during the war. Added to this, interviews and the observation of 
practical involvement by individuals at various events (such as public state meetings, 
chiefly court sessions and fertility ceremonies) indicated that many, if not the majority, 
displayed no sense of practical groupness corresponding to a registered territorial space. 
This was reflected in a lack of knowledge of the exact boundaries of the regedoria that a 
person inhabited to a lack of involvement in collective activities that went beyond 
immediate family matters. Despite widespread knowledge that a madzi mambo (paramount 
chief) existed in a larger imagined space then when conflict settlement, witchcraft or land 
distribution were involved, it was a nearby sub-chief (sabuku or saguta) or important 
nearby male elders who were turned to. Moreover, kinship ties extended beyond 
administrative and chieftaincy boundaries in matters regarding the settlement of cases of 
adultery and witchcraft, performing fertility ceremonies, and arranging marriages.   
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In short, notions of belonging to a wider, spatially defined community, in which its 
members act collectively, make use of a common authority and enjoy the benefits of a 
representative promoting their interests, for example, to the state, did not have any concrete 
reality. Rather, different family networks across different spaces and the use of nearby 
authority figures were the norm. This was particularly the case in the hinterlands of Dombe, 
where people lived in scattered family clusters, kilometres away from the homestead of a 
given régulo, and where there had been no or only an extremely short-lived period of state-
sponsored popular consultation and representation, such as the Frelimo GDs.  
Against this background, therefore, it is not surprising that rural residents in 2002 
were unsure how they understood the concept of communidade. Most commonly the 
answers were “I don’t know”, “I have never heard that word before” or “I heard the chefe 
[of post] say it, but I have not been told what it means. Ask the madodas or the hurumende 
(government people).”185 When a more exact answer was given, it was commonly: “I think 
that it might be the régulo and those people working with him” or “maybe it is those people 
of the family of the régulo”.186 What is particularly notable about these latter answers is 
that they corresponded to how ‘community’ was constituted in and around the activities 
related to implementing the Decree, namely those who had managed to organise themselves 
in settling the regulo verdadeiro. This was also reflected in how the madodas and members 
of the chiefly families understood the term. Whereas some referred to the organising unit of 
the regulado, others considered the ‘community’ to consist of those who had participated in 
the state-arranged public meetings (such as the legitimisation and recognition meetings), in 
short, the organising unit of the chieftaincy and the near neighbours and family members of 
a given chief or sub-chief. In this sense, ‘community’ came to mean those who had 
presented themselves before the state at public events and who had displayed some form of 
power through their active engagement in the process of settling questions of leadership.  
 The crux of the matter is that ‘community’ as a label used for a practical group of 
organised, active members came into being, if only momentarily, through state-orchestrated 
public meetings and activities. Community in the perceptions of chiefs and ordinary people 
existed only in relation to the state. At the same time, the meanings of ‘community’ also 
reproduced the local concepts distinguishing the population from the family of the chief 
and his assistants, and thereby also particular power relations. This, as noted earlier, could 
                                                 
185 Interviews with two male residents of Gudza and a female resident of Chibue, August 2002.  
186 Interviews with a male and a female resident of Kóa, October 2002.   
 154
not be divorced from the active role played by the state officials themselves. They did not 
begin by merely recognising ‘what already exists’ or end with this. They were active agents 
in producing the reality of what was to be recognised – the community and its leader. As 
addressed next, this reality, inhibiting broad-based legitimisation, was also underscored by 
a relatively broadly shared ‘culture of power’.  
A Culture of Power: the family and secrecy    
Although some residents of Matica and Dombe expressed discontent about a number of the 
individual candidates who had been legitimised, no one questioned or criticised the ways in 
which they had been chosen. The lack of broad-based community participation was not a 
matter of dispute. Instead, people represented the appointment of chiefs as an “internal 
family matter” to be settled by the chief and his family, and ultimately between this family 
and the hurumende (state/government). The dual-role of the ‘family’ and the hurumende, I 
suggest, was attached to two dimensions of a culture of power that have become merged 
over time: one nurtured by colonial and post-colonial modes of governing, and another 
related to more specific, localised understandings of power as involving secrecy.    
The first dimension has to do with how “the culture of power [in Mozambique] has, 
ironically, remained relatively consistent, while names, and the titles, and the hierarchies 
into which authority is embedded have changed several times over” (West and Kloeck-
Jenson 1999: 479). The culture of power referred to here has to do with the way in which 
the legitimacy and power of intermediate authorities, such as chiefs and secretários, have 
since the colonial era depended on recognition by higher authorities. Their authority, as we 
also noted in Chapter 2, has been constituted in relation to the state, and, thus to a much 
lesser extent, has depended on some form of model tradition of legitimate authority to 
which people can equally refer, enact or make claims in the name of. As a result, when it 
comes to legitimising authority, rural Mozambicans “have in large measure observed the 
‘traditions’ they have been instructed to observe by those more powerful than they rather 
than simply enacting a coherent ‘tradition’” (ibid.). Thus “the traditional rules of the 
respective community”, as inscribed in the Decree, have for a very long time been the 
monopoly of the exclusive few, and often as an aspect of being sanctioned, if not defined, 
by the state. As noted above, this was clearly reflected in the use of a state register as a 
point of departure for legitimising authority, which fused the authority of the ‘genuine 
community’ to settle unclear leadership with the state’s authorisation of this community. I 
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suggest that we also need to relate this dimension of the culture of power to the lack of any 
historical experience of broad-based democratic consultation and participation in the 
hinterlands of a district like Sussundenga.  
These aspects too merged with the second dimension of the culture of power: the 
notion of leadership as an “internal family matter” attached to ideas about family secrecy. 
Concretely, when people spoke about the appointment of chiefs, ‘the family’ included the 
ancestral spirits and the living members of the chiefly lineage. It also included the madodas 
(the council of male elders), who advised the living members of the chiefly lineage. 
However, ‘the family’ also had broader significance as a metaphorical expression of a 
common register of power that naturalises and gives meaning to where and how decisions 
should be taken and what knowledge is best kept secret to prevent conflict and misfortune.  
   Thus people would talk about particular power-holders and their immediate 
subordinates as ‘the family’ (okama), whose internal affairs such as decision-making and 
spiritual consultations were best kept secret from people outside it. To interfere in these 
matters was not only regarded as beyond other people’s scope of influence, but also as a 
risky business. It could result in open conflicts, and worse, in cases of misfortune caused by 
the invisible sources of uroi (witchcraft/sorcery) and vulí (angry spirits).187 These 
meanings, attached to the family, power and secrecy, extended beyond the chieftaincy too. 
The family as a metaphorical expression of power was also employed by people in Matica 
and Dombe when speaking about the national leadership as the ‘family of Frelimo’ and 
when explaining that government decisions were beyond the range of their influence.  
Importantly, this script of the family was also employed by local state officials 
when they authorised ‘the family of the chief’ in settling the leadership, and also when they 
spoke about the government at public meetings. In official speeches, local state officials 
frequently conveyed an image of the Frelimo leadership as a lineage of fathers and sons as 
a way of naturalising power and representing its leadership as beyond dispute. Often this 
was followed by the message that “just as the régulo of a certain family lineage always 
ruled in his area, members of the family of Frelimo have and will always rule in 
Mozambique.” In this sense, the particular script of ‘the family’ underlined a shared culture 
of power, which allowed for no space outside ‘the family’ – of chiefs and of the hurumende 
- for participation in the appointment of leaders or in decision-making more broadly.  
                                                 
187 I return to the wider meanings of uroi and vulí in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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Along with the lack of a widespread sense of practical groupness, this script of ‘the 
family’, I suggest, underlined the popular acceptance of the appointment of chiefs by the 
exclusive few and the active role of the state officials in setting the framework for this. 
More broadly, this informed the reconstitution of particular power relations in the process 
of implementing the Decree. This was exemplified by the enactments of scale-differentiated 
community in the process of legitimisation, which reactivated and conferred authority on 
the chiefly family, i.e. ‘the genuine community who knows the tradition’. At the same time, 
it also conferred authority on the hurumende, whose representatives set limits to who could 
claim to be the ‘genuine community’ and define ‘the tradition’ – i.e. those holding the 
names in o livro. However, as I focus on next, this relational constitution of the traditional 
authority and the hurumende was not without its contradictions and manipulations. This 
will become clear when addressing how those who managed to position themselves as the 
‘genuine family’ responded concretely to the state’s quest for the régulo verdadeiro, and 
what role state officials played in this.  
  
3. Proving the ‘Real’ Traditional Authority 
 
The state officials’ quest for the recognition of the régulo verdadeiro corresponding to the 
lineage names listed in o livro certainly framed the legitimisation process, but it did not 
immediately resolve questions of leadership in all areas. In some areas, the promises of 
state recognition intensified already existing conflicts over the leadership, while in others 
areas new conflicts were sparked off. O livro, although a significant linchpin, could be 
manipulated, and different candidates could be proved to be the real chief or sub-chief. 
Such succession disputes between possible candidates were nothing new but have existed 
for a long time. Although the Ndau and Teve do have a prescriptive rule for proper 
succession (i.e. the eldest son of the first wife of a mambo belonging to the areas’ ruling 
lineage), this rule contains a built-in uncertainty. It allows for alternative candidates within 
a limited pool, which can be adjusted to fit specific circumstances or requirements.188 
Added to this, we have already noted the long history of situational manipulations of 
chiefly positions in relation to colonial as well as pre-colonial interventions (see Chapter 2). 
These aspects were also present during the internal settlements of leadership in 2001-2.  
                                                 
188 This is not peculiar to Mozambique: on South Africa, see Oomen 2005; on the Tswana, see Comaroff 
1975.  
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 This section explores in more detail how the régulo verdadeiro was arrived at where 
this was not entirely clear, and the forms of manipulations, conflicts and creative 
manoeuvre that this sometimes involved, including those of local state officials. In doing 
this, the section focuses on the different sources of legitimacy that were invoked and the 
practices of legitimisation that were at work in attempts to justify particular chiefly 
candidates. First, I give an overview of the different settlements of leadership in Dombe, 
and then a more detailed analysis of one particular case from the Gudza chieftaincy that 
sums up the shifting sources of legitimacy and practices of legitimisation that could be 
involved. Secondly, it considers a case from Matica, which illustrates an attempt to 
manipulate o livro by a local state official due to discrepancies between different sources of 
legitimacy (spiritual/lineage and state administrative) and areas of jurisdiction (chieftaincy 
and state-administrative).      
Dombe: reshuffling leadership and different sources of legitimacy  
In Dombe, no less than five of the eight paramount chieftaincies experienced the 
reshuffling of individual office-holders during the first phase of implementing the Decree. 
Four of these (Zomba, Dombe, Sambanhe and Muoco) were settled before the 
‘legitimisation meetings’, and the fifth (Gudza), analysed in more detail below, was still 
ongoing at the time of the planned ‘recognition ceremony’ in 2002. Apart from the lack of 
any broad-based community participation, two other common aspects characterised these 
cases of re-settling the leadership. First, they were influenced by the state officials’ quest 
for the settlement of leadership positions within a relatively short time-frame. This fuelled 
and reframed already ongoing re-settlements conditioned by the war history of shifting 
leadership configurations. In short, the framework for recognition set by the state coincided 
and merged with internal processes re-stabilising the chieftaincies.  
 Secondly, each office-holder was justified on the basis of the names listed in o livro, 
but these names were also represented as indeed corresponding with “the tradition” 
(mutemo or ma-tradição in the local languages) of each area. Thus all protagonists invoked 
“the tradition” as the most significant source of legitimacy in justifying an individual 
candidate. This was attached to the claim of a pure, indisputable domain of tradition or 
“that which has always been”. However, how “the tradition” was arrived at, and the 
substantial content ‘it’ was invested with, differed from chieftaincy to chieftaincy and was 
sometimes the result of a conflict-ridden process. “The tradition” was both the result of 
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redefinition and reproduction in response to particular requirements of the state, and power 
interests internally in the ‘genuine family’. Practices of legitimisation also varied from 
peaceful changes of leadership to open and violent conflicts between candidates.  
In the case of Zomba, for example, the shift in leadership was characterised by a 
violent conflict between two brothers: José, the youngest, who had recently returned from 
exile during the war, and André, a former Renamo soldier, who had assumed the position 
during the war. By the time of state identification, both brothers were claiming to be the 
‘real’ heir. In an attempt to secure his position, André killed José’s wife. A resolution was 
reached by the madodas in support of José, who expelled André from the area with threats 
to report him to the police. José was recognised in 2002. Although André was the eldest 
son, the madodas supported José because they regarded André as an unsuitable candidate 
for state recognition, given his use of violence and history as a Renamo soldier. Hence the 
prescriptive rules of succession were sacrificed to concerns over future governance related 
to political affiliation and methods of rule. It was nonetheless held out as “the tradition”.  
The case of Chief Dombe followed a similar pattern of conflict between two 
brothers, but it differed in the sense that the final settlement ended in a mysterious death 
surrounded by secrecy. The brother who had ruled during the period of Renamo control 
died during the process of legitimisation in 2001, officially due to suicide, but according to 
various informants due to the invisible sources of vulí sent by someone who had wanted 
him removed. Although no one publicly stated that this ‘someone’ was his brother, 
Augostinho, it was widely believed that the conflict over leadership between them was the 
reason behind the death. Irrespective of this, Augostinho was legitimised by the madodas in 
agreement with the chefe of Dombe post. As opposed to his brother, the madodas held, he 
was a good candidate because he had no prior history of activity on either side in the war.  
In the case of Sambanhe the change of office-holder was peaceful, but also reflected 
concerns for future collaboration with the state: when the ex-régulo returned from exile, his 
brother had assumed the position under Renamo, but voluntarily given it up. By the time of 
identification, the ex-régulo felt he was too old to be a state assistant and instead indicated 
his second eldest son Samuel. Although his eldest son was the rightful heir, the old régulo 
considered Samuel more suitable to be a state assistant because he had received seven years 
of education and served in the military (on the Frelimo side).  
In Mouco, the shift in leadership also began with concerns for future state 
collaboration, but this was in the end overruled by the invocation of kinship and spiritual 
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power as the most significant sources of legitimacy. The chief in power after the war was a 
heavy drinker, who “did nothing for the people”. Officially, however, the madodas deposed 
him on the grounds that he had been “imposed by Renamo” and was not the true heir. 
Instead a 24-year-old man, Róbate, was legitimised. He was, the madodas held, the true 
heir of the last régulo listed in o livro and imbued with the spiritual power of the ruling 
lineage. However, the choice of Róbate represented a sacrifice of performative capabilities. 
He had no experience of governing, nor any formal education.  
 What these cases indicate is how the particular histories of each chieftaincy and 
ideas about state collaboration could lead to different representations of “the tradition” in 
which the lineage name listed in o livro often merged with other sources of legitimacy, i.e. 
spiritual power, performative skills, education and political affiliation or neutrality. As 
opposed to the MAE research and the Decree’s definition of ‘tradition’ as a fixed domain 
separate from the modern state, claimants to ‘traditional authority’ could merge sources of 
legitimacy from both domains. The result was that the settlement of leadership in some 
cases appealed to the requirements of the state administration and in others was at odds 
with them. In the case from Gudza, discussed in more detail below, we shall see how such 
potentially contradictory combinations of sources of legitimacy did not necessarily reflect 
the fixed rules of a given chieftaincy, but could also change within the same chieftaincy 
over a relatively short period of time. Although this case is exceptional because it led to the 
recognition of a female chief, it brings us deeper into the various practices of legitimisation 
that were at work more generally.  
Case 1: Gudza 
The chieftaincy of Gudza is part of Javela locality and is situated ten kilometres from 
Dombe sede. During the war, the area was a fierce combat zone. In the area surrounding the 
homestead of the ex-régulo, Frelimo managed to establish an aldeia from 1983 until 1989, 
when Renamo took control. These shifting configurations in the war implied different 
patterns of population movement in and out of the area, including by the ex-régulo and his 
family, which was split up in different directions. This history was also reflected in the 
leadership disputes that affected implementation of the Decree.189        
 At the ‘legitimisation meeting’ in August 2001, the chief, João Gudza, an elderly 
man who had been acting as chief for some time and been registered by the state earlier the 
                                                 
189 See Buur and Kyed (2006) for an analysis of the dispute that also existed between sub-chiefs in the Gudza 
area.  
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same year, was replaced by a young man called Benjamin Gudza. However, on the day of 
state recognition a year later, Benjamin never turned up to sign the contract with the state. 
The official reason was that he was ill. It later emerged that his illness was due to a conflict 
between him and João. The chefe of Dombe post was aware of this and instructed ‘the 
family’ to resolve the matter quickly so that a new recognition ceremony could be held 
within the time-frame set by the district administrator. Six days later a new ceremony was 
staged, though no new ‘legitimisation meeting’ was held. As a result, it came as a big 
surprise to people outside the family that it was Benjamin’s 27-year-old sister, Concessão, 
who signed the state contract and was inaugurated as rainha (queen) or mambo we mukadzi 
(female chief). João and Benjamin were stripped of their formal power, and Mateus, 
another member of the family, was made the new queen’s assistant.  
 Digging more deeply into the case, it became clear that this settlement of leadership 
was not the result of a powerful young woman who had managed to overthrow the 
contending male members of the family. Rather, the choice of Consessão was a pragmatic 
solution to a long history of shifting leaders, deaths caused by uroi (witchcraft) and 
disputes involving individual power interests and conflicting notions of good leadership. 
However, these were not matters for public discussion outside the chiefly family and the 
council of elders, who, after the recognition ceremony, clung to the official story that 
proved Consessão’s indisputable legitimacy as a resurrection of the tradition. This story 
was meanwhile challenged by two other versions, presented respectively by those who 
supported João and those who supported Benjamin. These three different stories brings to 
light conflicting notions of sources of legitimacy and the strategies involved in arriving at 
an indisputable ‘tradition’.   
 
The official story: the return to the ‘real’ tradition  
The group that had ensured the enthronement of Consessão included four of the madodas 
and the chingore of the family (the closest assistant of a chief in spiritual consultations and 
ceremonies). They claimed that the choice of Consessão was “a return to how things have 
always been”.190 In practice this implied a reconstruction of the official genesis of the 
Gudza chieftaincy, which in fact took place during the six days between the two recognition 
ceremonies, as the chingore confirmed: “No one knew that Consessão would be 
                                                 
190 Interview with Madodas, 4 September 2002.  
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recognized. This we found out through a study we did after we had consulted the ancestral 
spirits.”191  The official story went as follows. 
For as long as the Gudza chieftaincy existed, a queen with supreme spiritual power 
(nhacuaua) had ruled. She was assisted by a man of her lineage (a ‘brother’ or an ‘uncle’) 
to take care of non-spiritual tasks (e.g. collecting tribute, conflict resolution and labour 
recruitment). The first queen was M’mera, who was descended from M’biri, Zimbabwe. 
When the Portuguese came, M’mura made her nephew Offisse an assistant to take care of 
non-spiritual tasks. Offisse was the father of João and Mateus. After the death of Offisse 
and M’mera, Offisse’s eldest son Faife and eldest daughter M’pinde came to power. Faife, 
however, was replaced by Jemusse (the second eldest son of Offisse) because he fell into 
conflict with the colonial administration.192 Jemusse was the father of Benjamin (by his 
second wife) and of Consessão (by his first wife). He reigned during the last years of 
colonial rule, but died in exile during the war between Renamo and Frelimo. No queen 
ruled during this time, the war and Consessão’s infancy being given as the reasons for this. 
Consessão was the true heir, but because she was a child, Jemusse decided before his death 
that Benjamin should assume the position until she was an adult. The latter did so when he 
returned to the Gudza area after the war, but because he was a young man he needed help 
from João, his uncle. This is why João was acting as chief at the time of the ‘legitimisation 
meeting’. The reason why Benjamin fell sick on the day of state recognition was because 
the wadzimu (spirits of the ancestors) had revolted. This was discovered at a spiritual 
consultation at which the spirit of M’mera had informed Benjamin and the chingore that 
“the mambo is Consessão. She has the spiritual power, nhacuaua, and also she is the eldest 
daughter of the old mambos’ first wife.”193 Upholding the indisputability of the line of 
succession and the female spiritual source of legitimacy, this official story presented the 
enthronement of Consessão as a return to “the tradition” (mutemo) and the restoration of 
normality. As the chingore claimed, the return to the tradition meant that the spirits would 
now be satisfied and an end could be put to the ills that had inflicted the area – namely war, 
floods, sickness and a lack of prosperity. However, this revival of “the tradition” was 
challenged by those who supported João as the real heir.  
 
                                                 
191 Interview, Joachim, 5 September 2002. 
192 All these male régulos were listed in the 1961 colonial register, but there was no mention of a queen, nor 
of how the different régulos were related.  
193 Interview, Madoda, Gudza, 4 September 2002. 
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The second story: a queen re-invented and tradition re-negotiated 
The second story was presented by Mateus, João, two madodas and three sub-chiefs. 
Although these actors in the end agreed to the enthronement of Consessão, they began by 
favouring João and later insisted that it was Mateus, not Benjamin, who should be 
Consessão’s assistant. Their story suggested that the enthronement of Consessão was a 
negotiated compromise between different claims and pragmatic concerns for settling 
leadership. Their story went as follows.  
 The disruption of ‘tradition’ began when Faife fled to South Africa, and the colonial 
administration replaced him with Jemusse. Jemusse, the new régulo, was not part of the 
real lineage. He was the son of the youngest brother of Offise’s father, who, when Offisse’s 
father died, married the latter’s wife. Thus Jemusse had the same mother as Offisse, but not 
the same father. According to tradition Jemusse was just a substitute, because the remaining 
biological sons of Offisse, João and Mateus had not been present at the time. When 
Jemusse died, João, the eldest living son of Offisse, should have assumed the position “in 
accordance with the tradition”, but by that time he had fled to Beira due to the war.194 
Mateus, on the other hand, was absent because he had been captured by Renamo and 
become a soldier. Therefore it was decided that Benjamin (then 25 years old) should act as 
substitute. However, when Benjamin returned from exile in 1991 during the period of 
Renamo control, he was not able to assert his position because Manguindi, a nephew of 
Jemusse, had been installed by Renamo and refused to resign. Benjamin was able to do 
nothing because he did not have the spiritual power of a real heir. As a result, Benjamin 
called João to return from Beira and help restore the real leadership. When João came back 
in 1992, he was installed as chief by the madodas because he was the real heir and was 
registered by the state in 2001. There was just one problem: João turned out to be a heavy 
drinker and was greatly disliked as a ruler by the people. For that reason, Benjamin was 
pointed out at the ‘legitimisation meeting’ and sanctioned by the state officials and the 
madodas. But as Benjamin’s illness showed, this change of position had been wrong 
according to “the tradition”. As a result, a compromise was reached between the emphasis 
on “the real lineage” and João’s unpopularity. The madodas re-invented a queen as the real 
heir (albeit not of the real lineage) and ensured that Mateus (of the real lineage) would be 
her assistant instead of Benjamin.  
                                                 
194 Interview, Madodas, 3 September 2002.  
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This second story shows how different claims to the ‘the real tradition’ could be quickly 
changed and negotiated in response to the practical problem of a badly performing leader. 
However, the third version of the story, which supports Benjamin, suggests that there were 
more issues at stake than bad performance and the real line of succession.  
 
 
Figure 5.1.: The Gudza lineage according to the second story.195  
1. M’biri 
2. Offisse’s Father      3. M’mera
   
      4. Offisse   
   
=
Ndiriheyi          11.Mateus           9.João           5./6. M’pinde         5.Faife 6. Jemusse
 = 
7. Manguindi 
==
 
 
     1st Wife 
 
   2nd Wife 
      
11. Consessão     8./10. Benjamin 
       Jemuss’s father   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third story: conflicting sources of legitimacy and power interests    
The third version of the Gudza dispute was held by people who did not have a position in 
the group organised around the chiefly family. It circulated in rumours among some people 
of the chieftaincy and was explicitly articulated to us by a couple of teachers and Gabriel, 
the local Red Cross representative, who was also a native of the area. These protagonists 
supported Benjamin and were fully convinced that the recognition of Consessão was not an 
inevitable outcome of the revival of tradition or a matter of spiritual belief per se: it was 
above all a pragmatic solution to a long-standing conflict of power interests within the 
Gudza family, which too had involved uroi (witchcraft). However, these were not matters 
                                                 
195 The numbers in the figure indicate the chronology of persons who assumed the position of chief.  
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that the Gudza family and the madodas could speak openly about for fear of losing their 
own lives or those of their dear ones. Their story went as follows.  
When Benjamin encountered problems with Manguindi (the nephew ruling during 
Renamo control), he called João for help “because João knows about the botanica” 
(meaning that he knows how to use poisonous plants used in uroi).196 Soon after João’s 
advent, Manguindi died, allegedly due to uroi, and Benjamin was expelled. Troubles arose 
again when Benjamin returned from migrant work in South Africa in 1996. João used 
threats of uroi to keep Benjamin at bay. Even the madodas were afraid to intervene. João 
also played the political card in order to remain in power. During 1995 he was one of the 
prominent figures in expelling the police from Dombe sede. He also participated in the 
settlement of the conflict with the provincial governor, Canana. João used this as a 
negotiating power during state identification in 2001. He went straight to the chefe of 
Dombe post and stated that, if he was not registered, he would make problems for the 
government. While these strategies helped João remain in power, he was very unpopular 
among the population at large. This was also the main reason why Benjamin had been 
pointed out at the legitimisation meeting. People did not want João removed because the 
line of succession was wrong or because of his lack of spiritual power, but because he had 
ruled badly. Besides being a heavy drinker, he was inconsiderate of the needs of the general 
population. For example, he had failed to turn up when food relief was distributed after the 
2000 floods, resulting in the loss of emergency packages for the Gudza population. As a 
leader, he was also seen as highly immoral. He was an ambitious person (um ambitioso) 
who wanted all the power, at any cost, who ruled by fear and engaged in party political 
bargaining. He used his status as an elder and his capacity to engage in uroi for his own 
ends. People widely feared him for these capacities.  
In contrast, Benjamin was chosen because, besides belonging to the Gudza family, 
he had leadership and personal qualities that people viewed as legitimate. He was seen as a 
hard worker and a good leader on moral grounds. He was neither egotistical nor greedy for 
power, but an open-minded, generous person who consulted people and was able to cater 
for the needs of the population. Notably consistent with criteria conducive to collaboration 
with the state, Benjamin was also seen as someone who would be able to speak and 
negotiate with state officials, as well as resolve conflicts. The reason why Benjamin was 
not recognised was because he was afraid of João and because the madodas were not able 
                                                 
196 Interview, Gabriel, September 2002.  
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to deal with João within the time-frame set by the state. João had allegedly killed 
Benjamin’s mother with vulí as an act of revenge after the legitimisation meeting, and on 
the day of the recognition ceremony, Benjamin was suffering from uroi caused by João. 
Therefore Benjamin no longer wanted to be mambo, and the madodas had to find an 
alternative quickly. They chose Consessão, probably because they believed that, as a 
woman, she would be less at risk from the conflicts that had persisted between the men. 
However, this pragmatic stand was kept ‘secret’ by the family and the madodas in order to 
cover up for their inability to keep the popular Benjamin in power.       
This third version of the story suggests that the state-organized legitimisation 
meetings could indeed open up a space for replacing a ‘poor’ (João) with a ‘good’ 
performing leader (Benjamin), although still from within the lineage name registered in o 
livro. The choice of Benjamin indicated how other sources of legitimacy than the real line 
of succession and spiritual power could be emphasised as significant, but also that this 
depended on who was asked and when: for example, sources of legitimacy attached to the 
ability to perform, be popular and have moral attributes such as generosity and 
unselfishness (Benjamin), versus rule by fear, use of uroi and selfishness (João). The third 
version of the story also suggests that the final settlement of leadership was conditioned not 
only by the different audiences that intervened, but also on the tactics of power involved in 
the dispute. One example was João’s use of and threats to use uroi, as well as his ability to 
convince the state to register him by threatening them. Such tactics and the pragmatic 
solutions to them were nonetheless concealed and kept ‘secret’ by those who, in the final 
instance (madodas and the Gudza family), defined “the tradition” and in doing so made 
claims to an uncontested, pure source of legitimacy. This aspect reflects the specific culture 
of power referred to earlier. In this case of the Gudza chieftaincy, however, it not only 
sacrificed the popular legitimacy of a candidate (Benjamin), but also, it turned out, the 
performative qualities conducive to state administrative concerns. Seemingly paradoxically, 
this was too sanctioned by state officials.  
 
Stabilising leadership: secrecy and the sacrifice of performative skills and popularity    
Legitimacy according to authentic spiritual power and line of succession, which justified 
the recognition of Consessão, did not correspond to the other sources of legitimacy that had 
informed the choice of Benjamin. Consessão completely lacked the performative skills and 
knowledge that were required for practical rule. Her lack of aptitude not only applied to the 
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delegated tasks of the Decree, but also to what were defined as traditional functions — 
court sessions (banjas), annual rain-making ceremonies and spiritual consultations. Her 
supreme spiritual status was not recognised in public either, but only by the madodas and 
the state officials. When moving round the area she was treated like any ordinary young 
woman, and not treated with any particular respect like other (male) chiefs. In addition, she 
explicitly stated that she was not interested in doing men’s work or in ‘talk[ing] politics’, as 
she termed those tasks that lay outside domestic work.197 She just wanted to take care of 
her baby boy and cultivate her fields. Her authority, it seemed, was purely de jure and 
ascribed, as she indicated herself: “I am only the queen because the madodas and my uncles 
told me that was what I was supposed to be.”198  
Everything about her case seemed to point to her inauguration having been a 
compromise. This, as we saw, was nonetheless kept secret in public representations. While 
we should not reject the significance of spiritual beliefs, it does seem probable that such 
secrecy also had something to do with the interests of the organising unit of the regulado in 
stabilizing an indisputable order. Not only did their own position depend on such an order, 
it was a necessary prerequisite for state recognition and its possible benefits. These 
immediate goals attached to achieving state recognition cannot, however, be understood 
independently of the culture of power mentioned earlier, in which the secrecy of ‘the 
family’ works to naturalise power. In Gudza’s case, this was exemplified by the official 
story’s emphasis on an indisputable, almost sacred domain of “tradition” which justified the 
enthronement of Consessão, but also the power of the organising unit. This involved 
concealing the human agency that had been invested in and had influenced the settlement of 
the leadership.   
Importantly, local state officials also played a significant role in this concealment and 
naturalisation of order. Not only did they authorize de jure the official story of “the 
tradition” by recognizing Consessão, they also contributed to keeping the secret of the 
family. In the state register of persons legitimized and recognized, Consessão’s name also 
appears on the date of legitimization in 2001, although it had in fact been Benjamin on that 
date. This clearly points to attempts by local state officials to downplay discrepancies that 
had occurred in the process of recognition.199 Like the madodas, it also reflected state-
administrative concerns for stabilising leadership. Although the local state officials 
                                                 
197 Interview, Concessão, August 2002. 
198 Ibid.  
199 Interview, District Administrator, Sussundenga, August 2002. 
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explicitly acknowledged the potentially negative effects of recognizing a less capable leader 
for carrying out administrative tasks, the important thing, they held, was that the conflict 
had ended so that the recognition ceremony could be held within the time-frame set by the 
district administrator and that administrative work could begin.200 This aspect further 
underlines the point that the stabilisation and fixing of chiefly positions and “the tradition” 
was directly attached to the reconstitution of the state administration itself. In the case of 
Gudza, this was further underpinned by a merger of state administrative concerns with the 
local state officials’ own beliefs in the spiritual power of the ruling lineage:   
 
Their norms and beliefs…their tradition is like that when there are problems. They interpret the 
following: when it is not the real one [leader] there are many contradictions with the spirits in the 
area and we [state officials] also acknowledge that as important in pursuing development and 
administration. We have to respect the ancestral spirits so that conflicts do not arise.201  
 
The intriguing aspect is that o livro – a state artefact – was used by state officials as the 
point of departure and ultimately as evidence of such spiritual power, understood to be 
determined by the lineage names catalogued in it. This merger of ideas about spiritual 
power and o livro further underlines the intimate relationship between the state and the 
legitimization of the real traditional leader. However, it also points to the potential 
contradictions that could arise between the state’s certification of “the tradition”, popular 
legitimacy, and chiefly leadership qualities immediately conducive to the performance of 
administrative tasks. These latter aspects are also present in the case from Matica that I 
discuss below. Here, however, contradictions surfaced not due to conflicts over leadership 
internally in the chieftaincies, but because of interventions by state officials.    
Matica: state manipulation and conflicting versions of leadership 
In Matica locality, as noted earlier, the state administration did not face the same conflicts 
over leadership as in Dombe. The process of identification and legitimisation was also less 
complicated due to the longer history of state collaboration with chiefs. Perhaps this also 
underpinned why the wider population and influential elders were never consulted by the 
                                                 
200 Added to these immediate pragmatic concerns, the chefe of Dombe post was also rather thrilled that it was 
a woman who had been recognised. In this he saw an opportunity for Dombe and himself becoming known 
outside the area: “Now Dombe will be famous, maybe come on the radio…now that there is a queen. It shows 
that the senhoras can also come to power…and people will say that the chefe here can secure that the women 
are also given power…this is development.” Indeed, on a countrywide basis the recognition of Consessão was 
an exception to the rule. Out of the 11,933 persons legitimised as community authorities (including sub-chiefs 
and secretarios) there were only 10 rainhas (queens) (internal communication, DAL/MAE, 28 June 2002).  
201 Interview, CDP, Dombe, 2 September 2002.  
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local state official, the chefe of locality: he simply registered the already existing chiefs. 
There was, however, another problem: Matica did not have a paramount chief (a régulo 
maximo in Portuguese or madzi-mambo in the local language). As we shall see in Case 2 
presented below, this particularly became a problem when, in late 2001, the provincial 
government decided that it was only the category of ‘traditional leaders’ of highest rank, 
not the secretários or the sub-chiefs, who would receive official recognition and 
paraphernalia in 2002.202     
Case 2: Ganda, Boupua and Zixixe  
On 9 July 2002, a ‘recognition ceremony’ was staged in Matica for Chief Ganda, who was 
to be the traditional, community authority of the locality. The district administrator (DA) 
arrived with his group of assistants and with the new contract and emblems to be granted to 
Ganda. After the speeches of welcome, the DA called out for the régulo to be recognized. 
Ganda stepped forward. The DA asked: “Are you régulo Ganda?” Before Ganda could 
answer, someone else got his feet. The DA burst out: “Who are you?” to which the person 
answered: “I am régulo Buopua”. After a few moments of silence, the DA looked at the 
audience and asked “Which of them is the régulo?” Ganda looked down and said nothing. 
Buopua looked straight at the DA, and repeated, “I am régulo Buopua”. After a while, 
comments slowly started to flow from the audience, some supporting Buopua, others 
Ganda. The chefe of the locality, who was in charge of the state register of community 
authorities, retreated to his office together with the DA. When they returned, the assistant 
DA began to question Buopua, Ganda and the audience in chi-Teve. A heated discussion 
followed. It emerged that neither Buopua nor Ganda was the régulo verdadeiro, but Zixixe, 
who lived forty kilometres away, in Mouha administrative post. In the end, the DA stated 
loudly: “I have to consult o livro [of chiefs], so we know who the régulo verdadeiro is”. 
                                                 
202 In other parts of the country, secretários were also recognised in 2002 (totalling 614 as against 818 
‘traditional leaders’), but there were none in Manica Province. I was never able to get a straight answer as to 
why this was the case here, but according to the Sussundenga District Administrator and responsible 
personnel within the provincial government, they believed it was because there was only a limited amount of 
state paraphernalia available from the MAE to distribute to the legitimised community authorities (namely 
2,500, which was far outnumbered by the total number of 13,080 leaders: 2,222 covering the régulos, 3,420 
covering the secretários, and the rest sub-chiefs). Thus the Manica government chose to recognise only those 
traditional leaders with the colonial rank of régulo. Interestingly, with the exception of Maputo and Niassa, 
there were more secretaries than traditional leaders recognised in 2002 in those provinces that had a stronger 
history of Frelimo-state governance. The picture was the reverse in areas where Renamo had established 
control and gained most votes (Register of April 2003, DAL/MAE). As Buur and Kyed note (2006), the 
choice of only or predominantly recognising ‘traditional leaders’ in Renamo strongholds could be interpreted 
as a way for the state administration to expand alliances with those leaders who had previously resided in the 
opposition camp.           
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Two weeks later, Zixixe was recognized as the ‘community authority’ under the category of 
régulo maximo (paramount chief) with both Ganda and Buopua at his side. They were now 
formally established as chefes do grupo or sub-chiefs of Zixixe.  
The crux of the matter was that the chefe of locality had somehow managed to have 
Ganda registered as régulo for Matica. When the administrator went to consult o livro in 
order to clarify Ganda’s status, he therefore had to go further than the new revised register 
of community authorities. He consulted the 1961 colonial register, in which Ganda and 
Boupua were catalogued as sub-chiefs of Zixixe, and declared that “by mistake Ganda was 
registered as a régulo. But we have now corrected the mistake by recognising the real 
régulo who is Zixixe”.203 Thus the colonial register became the final arbitrator, here 
enforced by the DA himself. The question is why and how Ganda had appeared as the real 
régulo in the register drawn up by the chefe of the locality, and why Boupua had not been 
considered.  
As opposed to the Gudza case, the (failed) attempts to change leadership had 
nothing to do with either internal disputes over the leadership or conflicting sources of 
legitimacy among members of the chieftaincies. Rather, it was connected with particular 
concerns of the chefe of locality, which made perfect sense from the perspective of the 
state’s administration. However, these concerns were intriguingly undermined when the 
DA intervened in the name of preserving “tradition”, or rather the tradition catalogued in o 
livro. Let us briefly consider these aspects further.  
 
Governmental concerns invoked and recast in the name of ‘tradition’ and o livro 
It turned out that the chefe of locality was very well aware of the superior status of Zixixe.  
However, at the beginning of the identification stage, he had registered both Ganda and 
Boupua as régulos and promised them recognition and state regalia. Thus both Boupua and 
Ganda were surprised when, at a meeting held for régulos at district level at the beginning 
of 2002, Boupua was told to leave because he was not a régulo. Ganda was allowed to stay. 
Boupua complained to the chefe, but the chefe refused to hold a meeting where the matter 
could be discussed in public. It turned out that the chefe had changed the classifications of 
the new register at his own initiative. This happened after he heard from the district 
administration that only ‘traditional leaders’ of the highest rank (régulos maximos) could be 
                                                 
203 Interview, District Administrator, Sussundenga, 2 August 2002.   
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officially recognised in the first round.204 As he later confessed to us, he thought that each 
locality could only have one régulo maximo. Because of this, he went to the district 
administration and ensured that only Ganda was listed as régulo. Why he favoured Ganda 
over Boupua he did not explain, but it could hardly be due to issues related to ability to 
govern or loyalty to the state: Boupua was a well-organised leader and was already very 
actively engaged in collecting taxes for the state administration and mobilising people for 
meetings by 2001. Like Ganda, he also spoke and wrote Portuguese and had a history of 
serving in the military on the Frelimo side. Both were also members of Frelimo. Rather, 
Boupua and Zixixe thought that the chefe had favoured Ganda because he had a private mill 
and some other small businesses close to Ganda’s homestead.  
 These possible personal interests in having Ganda recognised did not, however, rule 
out other state administrative concerns. It was also concerns for the future status of the 
locality that had led the chefe to manipulate the new register, as he later confessed when he 
was asked about the aborted recognition of Ganda: “Now we are going to lose out on 
development…because now there is no community authority when the NGOs come”.205 
His remark reflects a specific understanding of the Decree, to the effect that development 
provisions by state and aid agencies would be channelled through the new governmental 
grid of a régulo (community authority) in charge of a territorially defined unit that ideally 
should fit inside the state’s administrative boundaries. Rightly or wrongly, he assumed that 
his locality would not benefit from the Decree because the régulo maximo belonged to a 
different administrative territory, namely that of Zixixe, who lived in the neighbouring 
administrative post of Mouha. However, this was not the only problem.  
From the perspective of the kin-based hierarchy and spiritual power, the status of 
Zixixe as régulo was undisputed. He had power (uno simba), as people living in Matica and 
Mouha framed it, but in terms of public administrative abilities he was a disaster. Zixixe 
was not interested in any engagement with state administrative tasks because he did not 
trust ‘them’ (the Frelimo Government).206 He was very old and could not read or speak 
Portuguese. He lived 74 kilometres away from the administrative capital of Mouha, to 
which he formally reported. There was no road to his homestead, and when he was told by 
the DA to have one made, he ignored him. As opposed to Ganda and Boupua, he held no 
                                                 
204 As noted earlier, this message from the DA originated in the provincial government’s decision to recognise 
only ‘traditional leaders’.  
205 Interview, Chefe da Localidade, Matica, 30 August 2002. 
206 Interview, Chief Zixixe, September 2002.  
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regular court sessions (banja), did not enforce any tax collection, nor draft manpower for 
the maintenance of schools, and only rarely turned up for public meetings arranged by the 
state administration and the police. In short, as in the case of Gudza, the DA’s authorisation 
of Zixixe as the régulo verdadeiro and the decision not to recognise Ganda or Boupua 
represented a clear sacrifice of administrative concerns to the listings in o livro.    
Seen from the perspective of the chefe of Matica locality, the fact that Zixixe was 
not interested in involvement with the state and belonged to a different administrative area 
of jurisdiction also presented a concrete dilemma: the chefe had to rely on intermediate 
leaders in everyday governance, but was not able to assure them of formal recognition and 
the outward signs and privileges that came with it. However, o livro had spoken, sanctioned 
by the DA, and there was not much the chefe could do about it.  
The consequences of this dilemma for governance concerns became eloquently 
clear in the months following the recognition of Zixixe. While Ganda and Boupua were 
allocated more and more state tasks, they were furious that they received nothing in return 
for their hard work. Boupua stressed that, lacking any outward signs of formal status, he 
had problems in collecting taxes: “Some people just refuse paying taxes, because they say: 
how can we know that you are the régulo? You might be lying.”207 According to Boupua, 
the lack of recognition also fuelled conflicts over the leadership. His uncle Simão – who, 
when Boupua was given the position by his father in 1997, had tried to claim it for himself 
– got back at Boupua after Zixixe was recognised by spreading rumours in the regulado 
that Boupua was too young to rule. This severely impeded Boupua’s ability to govern. To 
Boupua, the main issue at stake was state recognition “or even just a paper that I can show 
from the state that proves that I am the real leader”.208 Boupua saw the state, not Zixixe, as 
the judge that should intervene and resolve the matter. In any case, it was the state that had 
conferred authority on Zixixe, as Boupua reminded me.  
This perception of the state, as imbued with the power to confer authority upon 
chiefs in relation not only to the state administration but also to subject populations, further 
underpins the actual fusions of the ideally separate domains of ‘the tradition’ and ‘the 
modern state’, represented in the Decree. However, as this case from Matica illustrates, this 
did not mean that representations of ‘the real tradition’ were unimportant in settling 
leadership or that this was free of contradicting immediate state-administrative concerns, 
                                                 
207 Interview, André Boupua, 19 May 2004.  
208 Ibid.  
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i.e. a lack of correspondence between leadership skills and spiritual power or o livro and 
between chiefly and state-administrative jurisdictions. The intriguing aspect is that local 
state officials, in this case the DA himself, actively contributed to creating such potential 
contradictions by rigidly interpreting the Decree as a resurgence of “the tradition” inscribed 
in a state register. The same can be said of the Gudza case. Overall this suggests that an 
intertwining of different, partly diverging scripts was at work, ranging from purely state 
administrative concerns to historically embedded ideas about the significance of the 
spiritual power of chiefs for state officials’ ability to govern.  
Concluding the cases: diverging governance concerns   
The material presented clearly indicates that Decree 15/2000 was appropriated by local 
state officials as a mandate to extend the spatial ordering of the nation state by wrapping 
spaces, populations and intermediate leaders within hierarchical administrative divisions. 
Reflecting processes of state formation elsewhere, this was exemplified by the mapping out 
of sub-zones within state localities and administrative posts, and by the registration of the 
population and leaders residing within them. These aspects had clear administrative aims in 
terms of future divisions of labour, lines of command and interventions.  
 On the other hand, the Decree was also taken as a mandate to rectify the real 
traditional authority figures, even when this did not correspond to state administrative 
jurisdictions (Matica) and tasks (Gudza and Matica). Although this mandate was de facto 
limited by o livro, it could not be divorced from the particular ideas of state officials (with 
perhaps the exception of the Matica chefe of locality) of the spiritual power of the ruling 
lineages. According to the district administrator, this was the crux of the matter when he 
decided not to proceed with the recognition of Ganda, just as it had been when the Dombe 
chefe of post authorised the legitimisation of the Gudza Queen. While the DA emphasised 
the potential future problems of the discrepancies between chieftaincy and administrative 
boundaries, he asserted: “This problem of borders is very difficult, but it is the reality. We 
cannot intervene in the traditional hierarchy…go against the régulo máximo [the paramount 
chief]…that would be to go against tradition and the spiritual power. That can create big 
problems for the government.”209 Hence, while downplaying the power of o livro as the 
point of departure for rectifying the ‘traditional’ leadership, the DA emphasised the 
                                                 
209 Interview, District Administrator, Sussundenga, 2 September 2002.  
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significance of the spiritual power of the régulo máximo in preventing conflicts and 
problems in the pursuit of state administrative tasks and development projects.  
 What this points to more broadly is that the domains of the state and traditional 
authority were not understood as strictly isolated entities. One form of authority 
complements the other in respects that go beyond, but can also contradict, the actual ability 
of individual chiefs to perform strictly administrative duties. This was clear in the process 
of identification and legitimisation in which the state officials were constantly present, if 
not directly in the appointment of leaders, then at least in terms of setting the framework for 
and authorising “the tradition” – in short, in re-constituting traditional leadership. Another 
powerful image of this was the ways in which chiefly candidates and their supporters fused 
the state register of régulos with other sources of legitimacy defined as “the tradition”, such 
as kinship and spiritual power, and also with different performative skills that corresponded 
with ideas about the state’s administrative requirements. In short, how the ‘real’ tradition 
justifying a given chief was arrived at defied any generalised Weberian dichotomy between 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ or state-bureaucratic types of authority.  
Having said this, ideal representations of “the tradition” as being beyond either 
internal dispute or state interference were also an important feature of constituting both 
state and chiefly authority. This was underlined by a particular, but relatively broadly 
shared culture of power, which both state officials and the organising unit of the chieftaincy 
tapped into. As exemplified by the Gudza case, public representations of “tradition” as the 
source of legitimacy downplayed and kept secret the human agency and pragmatic 
strategies invested in settling the leadership. The former was rationalised in ascriptive 
terms, vested in the invisible realm of the ancestral spirits, but also attached to the lines of 
succession listed in the state register or o livro. Given that no one in the general population 
had ever actually seen o livro, it, like the ancestral spirits, belonged to an invisible domain 
from which authority could be certified. It was situated beyond popular influence and 
criticism. This conferred authority on the state officials as the proprietors of the (visible) 
register, who in turn conferred authority upon those individuals who were able to claim the 
authority of “knowing the tradition of the ancestral spirits”. The wider implication of this 
dual conferring of authority was that very little space was opened up for the intervention of 
the wider population in legitimising leadership.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the initial process of implementing Decree 15/2000, covering the 
formal steps of identifying and legitimising ‘community authorities’. It showed that the 
Decree led neither to a simple ‘recognition of what already exists’, as claimed in the official 
national discourse, nor to an automatic transmission of new state schemes of classification 
in and on to lived reality. Rather, its implementation was a negotiation between ‘what (in 
fact) already existed’ – disputed leadership positions, unclear, differentiated population 
units and a weak, contested state apparatus – and attempts by local state officials and 
chiefly families to stabilize, fix and re-order ‘real’ traditional authority and community. In 
short, processes of regularisation, of establishing a particular order, were infused with 
situational adjustments to the particular local contexts.  
These adjustments were the case partly because social reality did not fit neatly with 
the Decree’s underlying assumption of an intimate relationship between a traditional leader, 
a community and a territorial space. The ‘unified territory-based communities’, organised 
around a traditional authority figure and sharing a set of ‘traditional rules’, did not pre-exist 
the Decree in any purely practical form. This was some-thing that was attempted in 
response to a legal paper. However, much the same could be said about the state 
administration – the main institution responsible for implementing the decree.  
The key point is that the constitution of community and traditional authority was 
intimately related to a re-constitution of the state itself. The very activities of identifying 
and legitimising community authority were fused with the expansion of the territorial-
institutional presence of the state administration, with practices of statecraft to fix and order 
population units, and with the creation of alliances to bolster state authority. As in the past, 
the re-constitution and expansion of the state administration in Dombe and Matica was 
attempted through the constitution of the state’s other: the community authorities and 
‘their’ communities. By the same token, settlement of chiefly positions and the organising 
unit of the chieftaincy were constituted in relation to state administrative requirements; 
representations of ‘the tradition’ as a pure, undisputable domain were defined in relation to 
a state register.  
This relational constitution was not a straightforward process driven alone by purely 
state administrative scripts – or practical languages of stateness. Rather, it was shaped by 
the merger of partly overlapping, partly diverging scripts in the form of ideas and practices 
 175
deriving from different historical periods. The most powerful image of this was the merger 
of a colonial register with ideas about and claims to ‘real’ traditional authority attached to 
an undisturbed domain of kinship and spiritual power. Another was the influence of a 
relatively broadly shared culture of power related to notions of the family and secrecy, as 
well as state officials’ ideas about the significance of the spiritual power of the ruling 
lineages in bolstering state governance. Even if these scripts could be at odds with 
immediate concerns related to the performance of state-administrative tasks and territorial-
administrative jurisdictions, such discrepancies did not derive from a profound clash 
between ‘the modern state’ and ‘traditional authority’: it was because local state officials 
insisted on a revival of the hierarchies of authority and lineage names catalogued in the 
colonial state’s register, o livro. This not only reproduced colonial classifications, but also 
supported the fixing of a pure, indisputable domain of ‘tradition’, which was understood as 
also conferring authority upon the state. The point is that state and traditional authority did 
not in practice represent isolated and separate domains, and that ideal representations of a 
pure domain of ‘the tradition’ were important in the reconstitution of the authority of each.   
 The flipside of this mutual constitution, and the scripts informing it, was a 
sacrifice of the Decree’s promise of popular, broad-based community participation in the 
legitimisation of leadership. Instead it lead to the reconstitution of particular power 
relations within the chieftaincies. This was exemplified by the constitution of community as 
de facto scale-differentiated: i.e. a distinction was produced between the community as the 
population of passive subjects of chiefs and state intervention, and the community as the 
‘genuine family’ of active members of the chieftaincies imbued with decision-making 
power. This distinction was not exclusively the result of local state interventions, but it was 
certainly bolstered by state officials, who, in the name of ‘the traditional rules’ and o livro, 
authorised and reactivated the power of the exclusive few to decide leadership. What this 
points to more broadly is that the mutual constitution of state, traditional authority and 
community was not simply a benign form of recognition. It also produced elements of 
exclusion and unequal power relations. In the next chapter, where I turn to the recognition 
ceremonies, we shall see how this conditional form of recognition was also merged with a 
particular political script of the Frelimo party-state and by public representations of a strict 
hierarchy between the state and the chieftaincy.  
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Chapter 6 
State Recognition - Staging the Ideal Order 
 
 
This chapter rounds off the analysis of the first phase of implementing Decree 15/2000. It 
explores the state-orchestrated ‘recognition ceremonies’ of the traditional authorities that 
took place in Dombe and Matica in July and August 2002, and then discusses the meanings 
that different local actors attached to state recognition.210 The overriding aim of the chapter 
is to address how the recognition of chiefs was officially staged, and by implication how the 
relationship between state, chiefs and community was conveyed in public representations. 
Thus, whereas the last chapter focused primarily on the dispersed practices and claims that 
were articulated in identifying and legitimising community authorities, this chapter takes us 
to the symbolic-representational dimension of state recognition in the form of the medium 
of public state-orchestrated ceremonies. Concretely this means analysing different forms of 
ceremonial representations (speech acts, display of symbols, bodily performances and 
spatial organisation), and then how the messages these convey are articulated in the 
meanings local actors attached to state recognition of chiefs. In line with my overall 
analytical framework, the main assumption is that public representations comprise a 
significant, albeit not the only register employed in the attempts to constitute authority in 
general, as well as being a dimension of state formation processes in particular.  
  In the MAE guião, the recognition ceremonies rounded off the first phase of 
implementing the Decree through the signing of a contract between the state and the 
community authority and by handing over state paraphernalia to the latter. Closer 
examination, however, revealed that the ceremonies went beyond the material conferring of 
de jure authority on the legitimised chiefs. They also provided a ‘theatrical space’ or ‘ritual 
moment’ in which the ideal relationship between the state, traditional authority and 
community citizens was staged and discursively outlined by state officials. Reminiscent of 
rituals described in the anthropological literature, the ceremonies involved the staging and 
representations of ideal models for society, including of displays of power and hierarchies 
of authority (Geertz 1980; Turner 1969; Gluckman 1963; Bell 1992). In this light, I 
                                                 
210 The analysis in the chapter is based on participant observation of five recognition ceremonies (three in 
Dombe, one in Matica and one in Mouha), using the method of situational analysis (see Appendix I), as well 
as on interviews with different local actors in 2002. 
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suggest, the recognition ceremonies resembled what Bell (1992: 128-9) calls a political 
ritual: “those ceremonial practices that specifically construct, display and promote the 
power of political institutions (such as kings, state, the village elders) [and] define a 
community of ordered and legitimate power relationships”. Political rituals are thus seen as 
significant elements in processes of regularisation in the sense of representations that centre 
on legitimising, fixing and naturalising a particular order. Paying attention to these 
representations can tell us something about the power relations that are attempted produced 
in the state recognition of chiefs and their communities. Given that the recognition 
ceremonies were state-orchestrated, this also draws to our attention the cultural-symbolic 
dimension of state formation processes, i.e. the symbolic languages of authority, referred to 
in Chapter 1.211 Having said this, it should be noted that I do not, as in structural-
functionalist understandings of ritual, approach ceremonial representations as a mirror 
reflection of social reality or as deterministic for everyday practices and meaning-making. 
Rather, in line with the understanding of social order as process, I approach them as indeed 
ideal models for society, and as important registers of authority, which have the potential to 
generate change, but which only partially guide actions in everyday social situations.  
 The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 provides a detailed analysis of 
the recognition ceremonies. Section 2 addresses the meanings that five groups of actors 
attached to state recognition of traditional authority following their participation  in the 
recognition ceremonies (or exclusion form them), namely local state officials, chiefs, 
members of the rural population, Frelimo secretaries and Renamo delegates. It focuses on 
these actor groups’ representations of the wider meanings of state recognition of chiefs, and 
the perceptions of the state, official power and chiefs that these reflected.  
 
1. Recognition Ceremonies: a National Celebration 
 
The first recognition ceremonies of community authorities across the country were held on 
Mozambique’s Day of Independence on 25 June 2002. It was staged as part of the public 
ceremony that state and Frelimo party officials organise every year in the administrative 
                                                 
211 On the analysis of public state rituals and their importance for the production of state authority and state-
citizen relations in Latin America, see Stepputat (2004), Taussig (1992), Knight (1985). On Africa, see 
Mbembe (2001) and Worby (1998).  
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capitals of the country, from Maputo down to the level of posto administrativo.212 This 
symbolised how the de jure conferring of authority on traditional leaders was from the very 
outset linked to a national celebration and drawn into the wider political-historical 
repertoire of Mozambican public state rituals.213 As every year, 25 June 2002 was marked 
by a uniform repertoire of ceremonial representations: the highest ranking state and Frelimo 
officials at each administrative level held speeches, rites celebrating the founding fathers of 
the nation were performed, hierarchies of rank were displayed and parades were performed 
by police officers, together with flag-waving, singing of the national anthem and cultural 
events such as dances and sports competitions. The only difference in 2002 was that, in the 
district capitals, June 25 also included the signing of a contract between the state and 
community authorities and the handing over of national emblems and the flag to the chiefs.  
Independence Day also provided a kind of model for the other recognition 
ceremonies, which were held in the administrative posts and the regulados in July-August 
2002. June 25 differed in its sense of splendour, scale and official representation. It also 
marked out particular hierarchies in terms of state administrative levels and community 
leaders. Recognition only covered an exclusive group of traditional leaders presiding over 
the areas covering the district capitals. In Sussundenga it included the recognition of 
mambo Muribane, who lives close to the district capital and is historically regarded as the 
paramount chief of the Shona-Karanga invaders. After June 25 this hierarchical dimension 
was replicated at posto administrativo level, where the chief living closest to the state 
administration was the first to be recognised. These ceremonies saw the attendance of the 
chiefs residing in the hinterlands, who had been invited to observe how a proper 
recognition ceremony should be performed. As the district administrator of Sussundenga 
remarked, this was important in order to secure uniformity and proper performance during 
the remaining recognition ceremonies, which later took place at the homesteads of chiefs 
outside the administrative capitals.  
It is these last ceremonies that the analysis of this section is based on, including of 
the chiefs Zixixe (July 23), Mushamba and Zomba (July 26), Kóa and Chibue (July 30) and 
                                                 
212 When the community authorities received a full uniform in 2004, this also happened on an important 
national day of celebration, August 7, the day of the Lusaka Accord, marking the moment when Frelimo 
signed an agreement with the Portuguese for the achievement of independence.  
213 During fieldwork in 2002, 2004 and 2005 I followed numerous public ceremonies, including national days 
of celebration and official state visits by the district administrators and provincial governors of Dombe, 
Sussundenga Sede and Matica. Thus comparison with the recognition ceremonies draws on participant 
observation of these events.  
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Gudza (August 6).214 As explored more in detail below, the elements of hierarchy and 
uniformity characterising the sequence of recognition were also apparent within these 
ceremonies. Despite minor variations, the ceremonies were, in a miniature version, 
modelled on the ritual formula of national days of celebration and officials state visits, in 
addition to following the official programme for the ‘Recognition of Community 
Authorities’ produced by the Ministry of State Administration (MAE). The former included 
various ceremonial representations that fell outside the official programme, such as specific 
greetings, slogans, displays of hierarchies of authority, and speeches by state officials 
centred on nurturing notions of shared nationhood. At centre stage was a celebration not 
only of traditional leaders, but also of state authority itself, and, as it turned out, of the 
Frelimo party. Added to this aspect, each of the ceremonies marked the first-time visit of a 
post-colonial DA to the homesteads of the chiefs. Together these elements demonstrated a 
wider point about the recognition ceremonies: they were appropriated by local state 
officials as yet another element in reconstituting state presence in the areas outside the 
administrative capitals, though here they took a ceremonially staged and politicised form. 
During the ceremonies local state officials also took a leading in timing and structuring the 
different steps of the ceremonies. These are decpicted in Figure 6.1:  
 
 
Arrival/ 
Greetings 
1. Reading of 
program by 
DA assist. 
2. National 
anthem 
3. Traditional 
Ritual 
4. Identification 
and formal 
registration 
Dancing and Singing   
5. Reading of 
the Act of 
Recognition 
6. Signing of 
the Act of 
Recognition 
   Dancing and Singing                   
Figure 6.1.: Steps of the Recognition Ceremonies 
                                                 
214 Unfortunately we were not present at the ceremonies that took place in the administrative capitals, as these 
happened before the beginning of fieldwork. Also it should be recalled, as noted in Chapter 5, that there were 
no secretários recognised in Sussundenga until 2004 and before I returned to the field.   
GIFTS to DA            Dancing and Singing 
7. Presentation 
of symbols and 
emblems 
Speech by the 
Frelimo Secretary
Round of 
presentation 
of officials. 
9. National 
Anthem and 
Flagging  
Lunch and 
Traditional 
Beer 
   Viva                                                          Viva                           Viva    Viva                    va 
8. Speech by 
the District 
Administrator 
Departure/ 
Greetings 
Dancing and Singing 
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The steps in Figure 6.1 cover both the formal activities, written in the official MAE 
programme for the ‘recognition ceremonies’ of community authorities (marked by numbers 
1- 9), and those performances that fell outside this programme. These were first, the arrival 
and departure of the visiting state officials involving displays of power and hierarchies 
(marked in orange); secondly, traditional performances (marked in blue, including number 
3), which involved the staged celebration of ‘tradition’ and chiefly authority; thirdly, acts of 
hospitality and reciprocity (marked in green); and finally, the party political elements, 
including a speech by the Frelimo secretary and the ‘Viva’ slogans of the party (marked in 
red). Cutting across these were five types of ceremonial representations that conveyed 
particular meanings to the messages of the different steps: speech acts, displays of material 
symbols, slogans, bodily performances and spatial organisation.    
As shown more in detail below, the steps and ceremonial representations together 
conveyed five partly overlapping messages that, I suggest, reflected different dimensions of 
languages of stateness: 1) an institutional-hierarchical dimension, in the sense of the 
displays of hierarchies of authority, as well as a delineation of the ideal-model relationship 
between the state, community authority and community; 2) a bureaucratic dimension, in the 
sense of the inscription, incorporation and disciplining of ‘tradition’ by the state officials; 
3) a cultural-symbolic dimension, in which nationhood was celebrated and state authority 
was elevated as superior, as distinct from society and as beyond everyday modes of 
governing; 4) a disciplinary dimension, in the form of the verbal outlining of the proper 
conduct of community-citizens; and 5) the party political injections reproducing the link 
between Frelimo, the state and the nation, and underlining particular definitions of proper 
citizenship. In common to these dimensions was a continuous oscillation between 
distinctions and hierarchical separations of the Frelimo-state, chiefs and community 
citizens, and enactments of togetherness and shared nationhood. This, I suggest, was 
intimately related to attempts by local state officials to enact and legitimise the Frelimo-
state as a superior authority, distinct from society, yet claiming to embody the people and 
the nation. Below I begin with the organisation of the ceremonies and the arrival of the 
official visitors, which particularly illustrated the institutional-hierarchical dimension. 
Organisation: the staging of hierarchies and displays of power 
The preparation of the recognition ceremonies in the regulados was closely guided by the 
lowest ranking state official, the chefe of locality. He would typically arrive a day before 
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the ceremony and, in minute detail, instruct the legitimised chief and his close assistants 
how to prepare the ceremony in the proper manner. This included instructions on how to 
make a pole for the flag that the chief would receive and how to organise the ceremonial 
site for the official guest. He ordered the chiefs to provide chairs and a table with a proper 
tablecloth for the state officials – material artefacts that none of the chiefs possessed in the 
right quantity and quality, and therefore had to procure from the school or nearby shops. 
The chefe also instructed the chief’s assistants to prepare good food, doro (locally brewed 
beer for ceremonial purposes), dance groups and traditional rites to entertain the official 
guests. He insisted very forcefully that all these things had to be in place because that was 
the right way to honour the DA and to recognise the chiefs.  
This strict control by a state official was replicated during the early morning hours 
of the day of the ceremony. The atmosphere was intense and filled with high levels of 
activity. While the family members and neighbours of the chief were busy preparing food 
and bringing chairs for the ceremony, the chefe was nervously running around, shouting 
instructions in a very commanding voice, telling people to hurry up and ordering minor 
changes to the ceremonial site. As opposed to the previous day, everyone was dressed in 
their finest clothes. In short, everything signalled a separation from everyday life, but also 
preparation of the ceremony according to the ideal ceremonial model of state officials.   
These aspects were accentuated with the prompt change of scene that followed the 
sound of the district administrator’s vehicle. While young children ran towards the crowd 
shouting “They are coming; the hurumende [state/government] is coming”, the chefe of the 
locality quickly reacted by shouting to people that they should form up in a straight line at 
the entrance to the homestead in order to greet the official guests. The chief was told to 
stand first, followed by the men with the most important positions in the regulado, and after 
them the women. Schoolchildren and youngsters were told to stay at the back of the line. 
The line demonstrated visually how the chefe understood the hierarchies of rank, gender 
and age within the regulado. This display of hierarchy was also replicated by the official 
delegation and combined with a particular script for displaying state authority.    
The Land Rover carrying the official delegation arrived with flashing headlights and 
tooting on the horn. This imitated a miniature version of how the President and other higher 
ranking state representatives arrive when making official state visits. It forms part of the 
display of official power, marked by distinguishing – in sound and appearance – people of 
state rank from ordinary people. Another similarity to other official state visits was that the 
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DA arrived with the First Secretary of Frelimo and the District Commander of Police at his 
side in the car. The joint representation of these three men was a constant aspect of the 
ceremony. They represented what could be called the ‘trinity of official power’ in 
Mozambique: the state, the party in government and the police. This trinity should not, 
however, be understood as representing the constitutional separation of powers into the 
executive, legislative and judiciary. At the ceremonies and other public events, they were 
ritually staged as one joint body, thereby conveying a sense of the continuity of the post-
independence party-state.  
 Along with this trinity of official power came a large group of lower-ranking state 
and Frelimo officials. They arrived with the delegation sitting in the back of the Land 
Rover: line ministry directors, the DA’s assistant, the posto-level Frelimo secretary and 
chief of police, the chefe of post, and two or three police officers with machine guns to 
provide security for the official guests. When the DA stepped out of the car and began to 
shake hands with the members of the regulado, this group of officials formed a line in rank 
order behind the DA. After the DA had shaken hands, the same act was performed first by 
the chefe of post, then the First Frelimo Secretary and the Police Commander, and lastly the 
line ministry officials. The physical enactment of rank on the part of the hurumende was 
mirrored in the ordered line of regulado members receiving handshakes: first the chief, then 
the sub-chiefs and madodas, and finally a slightly separate line of women. The children and 
young people standing behind the lines received no handshakes.  
 This form of display of hierarchies on the state and the community sides was 
also replicated in the spatial organisation of the ceremony, into which people were seated 
immediately after the greetings. As Figure 6.2 below illustrates, the spatial organisation 
also framed a separation between spaces for the state, the community and the community 
authority. The highest ranking DA was seated at the table with the tablecloth, on the most 
comfortable chair, and facing the open circular space around which those belonging to the 
state apparatus and the regulado or ‘community’ were structurally seated. Next to the DA 
were the First Frelimo Secretary and the police commander, expressing the trinity of power. 
At another table, without a tablecloth, sat the DA’s assistant, keeping track of papers. Next 
to him were the chefe of post and the chefe of locality, and then on each side the line-
ministry representatives. After this line of officials came the madodas, sub-chiefs and male 
members of the chief’s family. Young men were placed around the other half of the circle, 
in front of the officials and the women, who were sitting behind the inner circle on mats on 
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the ground. The women only went inside the ceremonial circle when dances were being 
performed. Schoolchildren were located outside the ceremonial circle. At the beginning of 
the ceremony the chiefs were seated amongst the madodas, but after signing the state 
contract, they moved to sit on a chair in the middle of the circle. This conveyed the chiefs’ 
formal position between the state and the community.  
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of line-ministries 
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                       Young men 
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POLICE POLICE 
POLICE 
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Figure 6.2.: Spatial organisation of Recognition Ceremony 
Posto Frelimo 
Secretary, Posto 
police chief   
(on chairs)  
 
Overall the spatial organisation depicted in Figure 6.2. can be seen as a physical display of 
the ideal future relationship between state, community and community authority. While it 
clearly marked off the official guests as separate from the community, it also visibly 
illustrated how the relationship between community and state should be approached in the 
future and how communications and orders were to be effected, namely by the community 
authority sitting in the inner circle. In addition, the spatial organisation also recognized 
local hierarchies as part of the organising unit of the regulado and separated this from those 
who were mere commoners.  
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This institutional-hierarchical dimension was further accentuated by the performances and 
speeches of state officials that followed the seating. As noted in the initial activities, this 
dimension nonetheless oscillated with moments in which the structured seating was 
dissolved by joint celebrations or when state officials verbally conveyed togetherness and 
shared nationhood between state, chief and people. The latter began with a short dance 
performance in which a group of women entered the ceremonial circle, thus disrupting the 
structured seating. This was then disrupted by speeches of welcome that followed the rank 
order of state officials, beginning with lowest ranking chefe of locality and then the chefe of 
post. Both spoke in chi-Ndau or chi-Teve, thus making themselves familiar to the audience. 
As if emphasising a notion of togetherness, they stated that the ceremonies were a joint 
celebration intended to bring together the community and the hurumende (government). 
This was followed by statements like “this ceremony belongs to the community and is for 
the community to enjoy together with the official guests” and rounded off by the shouting a 
series of Viva’s wishing long lives to the comunidade xx, the posto administrativo xx and 
President Chissano respectively. The hierarchical order was then restored again when the 
chefe of post made a round of presentations, outlining the hierarchy and functions of the 
visiting officials.  
 This emphasis on hierarchy was also reproduced by the assistant DA when he 
stepped forward to read the official programme (step 1 in Figure 6.1.). He spoke entirely in 
Portuguese, which very few of those present understood a word of, and also used a highly 
formulaic way of speaking. In a firm voice, he stated that the ceremony had to follow the 
proper steps laid down by the state administration. Replicating the reading of programmes 
on other national days of celebration, in a very monotonous voice he then reminded the 
audience of the territorial-administrative hierarchy of the state (now also including the 
regulado): “Republica de Moçambique, Provincia de Manica, Distrito de Sussundenga, 
Posto administrativo de X, localidade de X e regulado de X”. This was followed by reading 
aloud the nine formal steps of the programme (see Figure 6.2).  
Added to the hierarchical seating of the ceremony, the DA’s assistant’s repetitive, 
highly routinized and formulaic speech act, performed in an idiom (Portuguese) that only 
the official guests and two or three of the members of the regulado understood, gave the 
ceremonies a sense of formality. Given his familiarity with a Shona dialect – which is 
easily understood by the Ndau and Teve – it might have seemed superfluous for the DA 
assistant to speak in Portuguese. However, had he done otherwise, his speech act would 
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have fallen short of imitating the uniform model laid down by the MAE. At the same time, 
it also conveyed a separation between the literate state officials from the mainly illiterate 
members of the regulado. Overall, this conjured up the appropriation of the recognition 
ceremonies as a ‘ritual moment’ at which hierarchies were articulated and enacted by state 
officials. Immediately after the DA’s assistant had spoken, this separation was again 
momentarily disrupted when everyone was asked to join in the singing of the new national 
anthem (step 2 in Figure 6.1.).215 That this shift between messages conveying hierarchical 
separation and togetherness around a shared celebration was also employed to convey a 
particular state-defined ‘tradition’ became apparent in the next set of activities.  
Celebration and bureaucratic inscription of tradition  
Immediately after the singing of the national anthem came the oracão tradicional or 
traditional rite (step 3 in Figure 6.1.). The purpose, the DA told the audience, was to inform 
the ancestral spirits that the chief would be recognised by the state. Indicating that the 
government was not only intent on granting de jure status to chiefs, but also on recognising 
‘tradition’, he added: “This is a way of respecting the tradition that is so important to 
Mozambique. The Government is here to recognise this importance”.  
Despite the DA’s insistence on the rite as a traditional way of doing things in the 
community, it did not entirely mirror how chiefs were usually inaugurated. As the chiefs 
explicitly stated, the rite was performed because they had been instructed to do this by the 
chefe of the locality. The real consultations were performed in the month of September as 
part of the annual fertility ceremony. In short, the rite was purely staged for the state or 
hurumende. This shows how the recognition ceremonies, even when it came to celebrating 
‘the tradition’, were also appropriated as a celebration of the state authority. However, the 
rite also included some familiar elements.  
After the DA’s assistant had stated that it was now time for the traditional rite, six to 
eight people proceeded to the house of the spirits (nhumba we mudzimu), which is used for 
spiritual consultations at the chiefly homestead.216 The people who entered the hut differed 
                                                 
215 The national anthem was a new one that had been agreed at the end of 2001. The old one was changed as 
part of a constitutional promise because its chorus – ‘viva Frelimo, viva Frelimo’ – was biased towards 
Frelimo.  
216 In Sussundenga the house of spirits is indistinguishable from the other huts in appearance, but it is usually 
situated a little apart from them. In the cases of the Ndau chiefs (in Dombe), the female spiritual leader of the 
chief (mambo we Mukadzi) resides in this hut on her own and with her children if she has any. Her husband, if 
she has any, is only allowed to pay visits and, as opposed to the norm in the patrilineal groups of the Ndau, 
she is not allowed to live with her husband. If she does, it will cause problems with the ancestral spirits.  
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from ceremony to ceremony, but were always referred to as those who always participated 
in spiritual consultations. While in all cases the chief, the chingore (‘nephew’ of the chief 
with special ceremonial functions) and two or three of the chiefs’ closest kin entered, the 
female spiritual leader of the chiefly family also participated in the case of the Dombe 
chiefs. Once inside the house of spirits, the remaining male assistants of the chief moved 
forward and sat down on the ground outside the hut, facing the entrance. So far these 
aspects resembled the rite performed at the annual fertility ceremony. This changed when 
the ‘trinity of official power’ and an ordered line of inferior officials suddenly got up and 
moved towards the hut. They sat on the ground with their backs to one side of the hut.  
After people had been seated, there were five to ten minutes of silence during which 
offerings were made to the ancestral spirits inside the hut. Calabashes of doro were then 
passed around outside the hut, first to the official guests, and then to the madodas, who 
each took a sip from the same calabash. While among the Ndau and Teve doro is used in 
offerings to the ancestral spirits, the act of drinking it from the same calabash also 
symbolises a common element of both hospitality and reconciliation such as after the 
resolution of conflicts. Through their participation, the state officials thus drew themselves 
into a particular symbolic act of togetherness. This was noted with amusement by the 
members of the regulados. As many of them reminded us, this was the first time that any 
state official had appeared at a rite performed by the house of spirits. In this sense, the rite 
did have the effect of materially displaying the hurumende’s recognition of ‘the tradition’, 
albeit in a ritualised and state-orchestrated form. The joint celebration during the rite also 
co-existed with a distinction between the visiting state officials and the chieftaincy.   
A difference appeared between those who were respectively inside and outside the 
house of spirits, as well as between those facing the entrance to the house (the madodas) 
and those with their backs to it (state officials and members of Frelimo). The hierarchical 
seating of the ceremonial circle was also reversed. The chief and his closest kin were those 
now filling the most central and superior role, marking their closeness to the ancestral 
spirits. Symbolically this conveyed the spiritual power of chiefs, referred to in Chapter 5, as 
a significant source of chiefly legitimacy, which was recognised by, yet distinguished from, 
the state officials. In the next step of the ceremony (step 4 in Figure 6.1.), referred to as 
‘Identification and Formal Registration’, this distinction between traditional and state 
authority turned into an encompassment of the former by the latter. It marked the 
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bureaucratic inscription and fixing of traditional leadership, as well as the strict control and 
disciplining by state officials of so-called ‘traditional performances’.      
This fourth step again involved a change of scene as the participants resumed their 
previous structured positions in the ceremonial circle. It began with the DA’s assistant 
calling forward the chief, who was asked to demonstrate an ID or birth certificate while 
sitting on a chair in front of the assistant’s table. The assistant DA carefully scrutinised the 
documents and then registered the personal data (name, age, places of birth and residence). 
This was followed by a series of ‘Vivas’, led ahead by the chefe of post (for example, “Viva 
Régulo x, Viva regulado x”), and then by words like: “Now you must celebrate. You must 
dance and sing…. You must perform traditionally”. Some women reacted to the request by 
entering the circle and dancing and singing very briefly before they were firmly told by a 
state official to resume their seats and be quiet. The firm control by state officials as to 
when regulado members should begin and end what the officials themselves called 
‘traditional performances’ conveyed a sense of folklorisation to the kind of ‘tradition’ that 
the state officials recognised. Added to the state-bureaucratic inscription of traditional 
leaders, it gave the sense of a fixing of ‘the tradition’ within a state-defined order. This was 
also the case with the next step, the ‘Reading of the Act of Recognition’ (step 5 in Figure 
6.1.).   
The Act was read by the DA’s assistant, who again began with the monotonous 
repetition of the words “República de Moçambique, Provincia de Manica etc.” In a similar 
formulaic tone of voice, this was followed by: “On day x, month x, in 2002 in the district of 
x, province of x, in the presence of the Senhor District Administrator of District x, with the 
name x, as representative of the State, is to preside over the formal act of State recognition 
of the community leader, with the name of x, with the title of x [traditional leader].” After 
these words, the chief and the DA signed the new contract or acta (step 6 in Figure 6.1.) 
between the ‘community authority’ and ‘the state’. When the DA, signed the official guests 
automatically stood up, while a chefe of post told the rest to do so in order to show respect 
for the superior authority. After this the audience was again told to ‘celebrate traditionally’ 
and again stopped promptly when the DA got up and for the first time during the ceremony 
stepped forward into the circle. He placed himself next to the chief. It was now time for the 
‘Presentation and Exhibition of the Symbols and Emblems of the Republic’ (step 7 in 
Figure 6.1.).  
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If the signing of the new contract provided for a re-inscription of traditional leadership in 
the state’s bureaucratic records, the seventh step could be seen as the outward inscription of 
the nation state on the body of the traditional leader (now the community authority) and his 
regulado (now the community). The latter was carried out in a very serious manner by the 
DA himself. He carefully tied a sash (faixa) with the five colours of the national flag around 
the body of the chief. He then pinned a rectangular badge (emblema) on the right side of the 
chief’s chest reading “Autoridade Comunitária”, under which a round badge (crachá) with 
the state’s coat of arms was placed. He then gave the name of each item and with a raised 
finger told the chief to be careful to keep them intact. Lastly the national flag was given to 
the ‘community authority’. Almost like a priest baptising a believer, the DA spoke loud and 
clear to the audience: “In this way the state recognises that xx is the Community 
Authority.” He repeated this sentence three or four times, and then added: “This flag 
signifies that xx is the leader of xx”. Then he shook hands with the chief to seal the 
contract. This was followed by handshakes by the First Frelimo Secretary and the police 
commander as if conveying the merger of the trinity of power with the state-chief contract.  
Then the structured scene and serious atmosphere were dissolved again. The chief 
was told to move around in the circle and show off his new paraphernalia, and the crowd 
was again told to “celebrate traditionally”. The ceremonial circle became packed with 
people dancing, singing and ululating. As opposed to previous ‘traditional performances’, 
on this occasion the state and Frelimo officials joined in, dancing around with the people, 
laughing, smiling and singing. Hence another moment of togetherness dissolved the 
hierarchical distinctions, this time, however, signalling a joint celebration in which state 
and community, men and women, young and old participated on an equal footing. Again, 
this was brought to an end when the DA firmly told people to be calm and resume their 
seats. It was now time for his words, and what I have referred to as the cultural-symbolic 
dimension of the ceremonies.   
Celebrating and elevating state authority: people, nation and law 
The DA’s speech took between one and two hours to deliver and was translated for the 
audience by one of the lower ranking state officials. Apart from explaining to the audience 
what the state’s recognition of the chief implied and how the paraphernalia should be used, 
the DA took the opportunity to inculcate ideas about proper citizenship and to celebrate 
nationhood and the superior authority of the state. These were particularly apparent in the 
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first part of the DA’s speech and in the flagging rite towards the end of the ceremony. After 
shouting out a series of ‘Viva’s’ (República de Moçambique, Presidente da República, 
Distrito de Sussundenga), the DA began by stating:  
 
This recognition of the chief by the state is a national movement which has taken place in all parts 
of the country. It began on our Day of Independence, which gave national sovereignty to all the 
people of Mozambique and ended the brutal period of colonial subordination. This happened 
because the fathers of our nation fought for all of us and gave us peace and liberty. 
 
He thus drew the recognition of the community authority into a wider celebration of 
national unity and of the founding fathers of the nation, the Frelimo leadership. This was 
coupled with repeated words that conveyed and legitimised the state as encompassing the 
Nation, the Common Good, the People, the Law and Tradition. Thus after the first words he 
explained that the government had never abandoned “our traditions”, but merely tried to 
find ways of changing the colonial system in which régulos had been used “to oppress and 
maltreat the people of Mozambique.” While denying the post-colonial ban on traditional 
authority, the DA used negative descriptions of colonial rule to paint a positive picture of 
the present state apparatus: “Now the chiefs will work alongside the state, which ensures 
the development of the country and the equal rights of its citizens. The chief, together with 
the government, will continue the fight against the absolute poverty of the communities of 
Mozambique.”217 This was usually followed by references to the Law, the Nation and 
Tradition, in which the latter was represented as encompassed by the former: “The chief 
represents tradition, which is very important to the Mozambican nation. From today he will 
work with the state within the law of the country, which guarantees the well-being of the 
people and that there is unity, democracy and development.”  
These links between the recognition of traditional leaders, the Law and the Nation 
was also repeated when the DA subsequently spoke about the paraphernalia that the chiefs 
had received. In what can best be described as an attempt to nurture notions of nationhood 
and respect for state authority, the DA explained in minute detail how the community 
authority should wear the paraphernalia on national days of celebration and on official state 
visits and that the latter should ensure that the whole community joined in celebrating these 
days. Knowing that most regulado members in Dombe in particular usually did not 
                                                 
217 This emphasis on the ‘fight against poverty’ drew on the widespread official discourse of the Frelimo 
government where a luta contra a probeza absoluta (the fight against absolute poverty) has become a key 
slogan of the party, which can in addition be likened to the high profile donor emphasis on ‘poverty reduction 
or eradication’. On the other hand, it is at times coupled with the translational socialist slogan a luta continua 
– adding ‘against poverty’.  
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participate on such days, the DA explained in detail the meaning of Independence Day, the 
Day of the Lusaka Accord, the Day of the Armed (liberation) Struggle, and the Day of the 
Rome Peace Accord. This was combined with a more elaborate praise of the founding 
fathers of the nation, i.e. the former presidents of Frelimo, who were named by the DA one 
by one: Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joachim Alberto Chissano. Like the 
physical display of state authority in the form of the trinity of power, the DA’s speech 
accorded a particular position to the Frelimo leadership as encompassing the state and the 
nation, beyond particular political interests. This also became apparent when the DA turned 
to speak about “(dis)respect for authority”. Here he drew an analogy between chiefly 
authority and the Frelimo leadership. The former was represented as the father of the 
community and the latter as the father of the whole nation:    
 
I have heard of disobedience here…you have to learn to respect the authorities like you respect your 
father. The chief is like your father…he is the father of the community, that has existed always and 
will always exist from generation to generation…the chief is the representative of the state, of our 
nation before the community. The chief has to respect the law of the state…and the heroes that 
brought our nation to independence. They are the fathers of all the people [o povo], whom you have 
to respect like you respect your own father.  
 
The DA used the image of the father as a metaphorical expression for the relationships 
between chief and community and community and state. By emphasising ‘what has always 
been and will always be’ as expressive of the perpetuity of authority within given families, 
the DA also tapped into the specific ‘culture of power’ discussed in Chapter 5. Here it was 
especially employed to naturalise a particular order of authority relations, in which the 
Frelimo leadership was represented as embodying the nation. In the subsequent talk about 
the national flag, this representation was also conferred on the chief: the flag, the DA 
asserted, “symbolises that the chief now represents the nation in the local community.” 
However, he also made it clear, in a firm voice, that if the chiefs did not use and respect the 
flag in a particular way, and by implication what it represented (i.e. the Frelimo-state), he 
would cease to be a ‘community authority’:  
This flag symbolises our nation and our sovereignty. It must be respected with good care. It should 
be raised everyday at 6 o’clock in the morning and be taken down at exactly 6’oclock when the sun 
sets, as we do everywhere in Mozambique where there is a flag. You must also learn to raise it in 
the right way and to fold it properly. The commander of police will show you how to do this 
today…. You must see that the flag is very valuable and important. The chief must take good care 
of it and keep it in a safe place during the night so that nothing bad can happen to it…it must be 
kept clean…. If something bad happens to the flag…if it is lost or torn…then you must know that 
the chief can go to prison and be punished…and the emblems will be taken away from him.   
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This message, conveying the flag as a kind of sublime referent above human action, tapped 
into the wider cultural-symbolic dimension of conveying authority to the (Frelimo) state at 
the ceremonies. The DA also tried to insinuate that the de jure authority of chiefs as 
representing the nation in the communities implied the ability of chiefs to submit to and 
perform particular state-defined practices – in this case around a national symbol. If these 
things did not happen, the chief would lose de jure status. The wider symbolic meaning of 
the flag also indicated that the chief was now a new member of the hurumende (the trinity 
of power). This was ritually staged at the end of the ceremony, when everyone gathered 
around the new flagpole (step 9 in Figure 6.1.) and the newly inaugurated community 
authority was placed next to the ‘trinity of power’.  
 At this moment a small national celebration was performed. It began with 
the police commander demonstrating to the chiefs how to hoist the flag in the proper way, 
including the specific military steps and salutes to be used when approaching the flagpole. 
People were also told by the lower ranking state officials to stand up straight and be quiet 
with their hands folded behind them in order to “respect the flag”. Then the national anthem 
was performed again. This small rite replayed a moment of togetherness between the 
official guests and the community. At the same time it displayed hierarchies of rank and 
included a strict disciplining of the conduct of the participants in the presence of the 
national symbol. In this sense, this small rite conjured up a core message underlying the 
first part of the DA’s speech: the recognition of traditional authority was also appropriated 
to ensure recognition of state authority by nurturing shared nationhood and by disciplining 
the chiefs and their communities. Next this disciplinary dimension of community citizens is 
addressed more in detail, as expressed in the second part of the DA’s speech.  
Discipline and loyalty: outlining the ideal citizen community  
The DA’s talk about the flag and “respect for authority” was usually rounded off with a 
warning to the audience in words such as: “If you do not respect the authorities and the law, 
the chief will expel you from the community to a place where there is no law.” Where this 
place is he never explained, but the people in Matica and Dombe considered expelling a 
person from the regulado a very severe form of punishment.  
 In the DA’s speech, this potential exclusion from the community formed part of 
outlining the proper conduct and morally appropriate attitude of citizens as members of the 
national community and of the regulado. This usually began with the themes of 
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development, hard work and the need to pay taxes. In a disciplinary, didactic tone, he 
explained to the audience: “your area is full of riches…but look here there is poverty”, “you 
must work hard and not sit on your behind and wait for someone to come and help you”, 
and “you should pay taxes for the development of the country”. To these words, he added 
that people should send their children to school, not let their daughters marry too early, and 
teach their young people to be respectful of the elders and the authorities. Usually looking 
at the young men, the DA linked the lack of development to crime, uncivilised behaviour 
and the consumption of soruma (a form of marihuana) and alcohol:  
 
“I know that here there is a lot of soruma…there is a lot of crime because of soruma…people who 
smoke soruma are lazy…they are malandros [bad persons]. They are thieves and do not respect 
anything or anyone. Soruma helps a person be like an animal…. Together with the chief, we will 
ensure that people who have soruma go to prison. […] And I tell you, you should only drink at the 
weekends…. If you come drunk to a public meeting, your chief must send you away.”  
  
Noticeably, the DA’s somewhat scolding words were always mixed with references to the 
last war, which he represented as the reason for uncivilised behaviour. For example: 
“Soruma is the food of the war, of the people who make confusion and destabilise the 
country…now we have peace and development…we want to have no bandidos”, followed 
by sentences like “The chief has the power to fight against these bad things because now he 
works with the police…he works with the state.” Although Renamo was never named 
explicitly, there was no doubt that it was the point of reference whenever the words ‘war’, 
‘confusion’, ‘bandidos’ and ‘destabilisation’ were used. If anyone doubted that this was the 
case, then it was made explicit when the DA ended with a series of slogans following the 
talk about drugs and alcohol: Viva ‘discipline’, ‘authority’, ‘education’ and ‘the 
government’ – Abaixa (down with) ‘indiscipline’, ‘confusion’, ‘bandidos’ and ‘those who 
began the war’. The key point here is that the DA’s disciplinary, moralizing representations 
of the proper conduct of citizens was not only focused on the need to obey the law, but was 
fused with a political dimension. Morally good and civilised citizens, worthy of inclusion in 
the local and national community, were defined in opposition to an uncivilised ‘other’, 
namely the opposition party and former rebel movement, Renamo. This oppositional 
rhetoric, defining Renamo (supporters) as the constitutive ‘outside’ of the good citizen, 
fused with attempts to legitimise and nurture obedience and loyalty to the Frelimo-state. 
Thus the previous celebration of the Frelimo leadership as embodying the nation was here 
taken further in a politicised definition of citizenship.   
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The DA also tried to convey obedience and loyalty to the Frelimo-state by sometimes 
drawing in the audience and explicitly asking them to affirm answers (yes/no) to specific 
questions. For example: “Are you not in favour of the development that the government is 
bringing?”; “Do you still want war and confusion?” or “Do you want me to say that xx area 
is inhabited by war bandidos?” If people answered, which they did not always, they would 
affirm what the DA wanted to hear. Otherwise the DA provided the answer himself. The 
DA also concretely demonstrated what he meant by proper, civilised citizens by ridiculing 
or firmly putting in their place disobedient individuals at the ceremonies, such as people 
who looked as if they had been drinking or who made critical comments. For example, at 
the ceremony of Chief Chibue, there was a drunk old man who several times made 
comments in chi-Ndau about the DA. At one point he even stated that “This thing they are 
doing [recognition] is all the politics of Frelimo”. He was immediately put in his place by 
the chefe of locality and had the DA’s finger pointed at him when he spoke about alcohol 
and the war: “Those people like this old papa, who come drunk to meetings, should be 
thrown out by the chief. This represents a lack of development and respect for the 
authorities”. He then looked at the old man, stating with a smile: “Look at him; he is a 
maluco [crazy person]…he must be one of the bandidos of the war”. After this the DA 
laughed, followed uneasily by the audience (many of whom in fact supported the 
‘bandidos’ of the war, i.e. the opposition party).   
This and similar examples provided the DA with vivid illustrations of ‘the 
disobedient individuals of the regulado’, who would be disciplined or even excluded if they 
failed to abide by the rules and proper conduct laid down by the state. Significantly, the 
consistent use of war rhetoric in such representations also conveyed a distinction between 
‘good’ citizens and loyalty to Frelimo, and those who supported the Renamo party. These 
distinctions, underpinning a clear reproduction of the party-state, were further accentuated 
in the DA’s closing words, and then in the speech by the First Frelimo Secretary.  
The party-political dimension: Frelimo as State and Nation 
At the ceremonies, the DA explicitly described himself as the representative of the state and 
also explained to the audience that “The community authority represents the state and is not 
working for any particular party”. In this sense, he tapped into the relatively new 
constitutional separation of powers between the ruling party and state. However, as we have 
already noted, there were several ceremonial representations that constantly dissolved this 
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separation: for example, the continuous shouting of ‘Viva’ slogans for the Frelimo party, 
the joint representation of the trinity of power, the celebration of the Frelimo leadership as 
the founding fathers of the nation, and the link drawn between proper citizens and Frelimo 
loyalty. If these representations implicitly conveyed an impression that the recognition 
ceremonies were also about bolstering support for the Frelimo party, then this was made 
more explicit in the last part of the DA’s speech. It was also marked by the fact that the 
First Frelimo Secretary held a speech before the flagging ritual and thus within the time-
space of the official steps of the ceremony, and that no other political party was officially 
represented.  
In his closing words, the DA turned to the theme of ‘Peace and Democracy’, and in 
doing this credited Frelimo for achieving these goals. Referring to the 1992 peace 
agreement, he began by asking the crowd: ‘Who brought peace to Mozambique?’ A 
moment of silence followed, after which we could hear one or two of the local state 
officials whispering ‘President Chissano’, while looking a bit anxious as if fearing that 
someone would say ‘Dhlakama’ (the leader of Renamo). To their relief, one or two 
members of the regulado repeated the name ‘Chissano’. The DA responded by saying, 
“Yes, that’s right…one person liked conflict and wanted to resolve it with force, but there 
was also a person who used calmness to end the conflict and create democracy. This person 
was Camarada Chissano of Frelimo.” He also told the crowd that “Democracy means 
respecting the winner” and “not disobeying and opposing the winner…because then you 
can go to prison”. In underlining that there was no room for criticising the ‘winner’ (i.e. 
Frelimo), the DA again warned that this would be treated like disrespecting the chief: “If 
anyone does not obey or creates opposition to the chief and the government, he will be 
thrown out of this zone”. Following a series of ‘Vivas’ again praising the President 
Chissano, the speech-making passed to the First Frelimo Secretary.  
The secretary stepped forward in the ceremonial circle while dancing and singing 
lines like: “We came to see the beauty of x. We came to see the povo of x and this is good.” 
This was followed by a line of ‘Vivas’ for Frelimo, Chissano, Guebueza (Frelimo’s new 
presidential candidate) and Chief x. Unlike the DA, the secretary spoke in the local dialect, 
thus making himself familiar to the audience directly. His speech did not centre explicitly 
on electoral politics. Instead he tapped into a historically embedded political script of the 
Frelimo party-state that conveyed the Frelimo party as the natural embodiment of the nation 
and the state, as if standing above democratic and electoral scrutiny. In doing this, he first 
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articulated the kinship-based analogy between the chiefs and official power that the DA had 
also used. However, this time explicit references were made to Frelimo and its new 
presidential candidate, Guebuza:  
 
President Chissano is now tired and wants to rest. He is an old man and has worked for 
Mozambique for many, many years. He wants to hand over the position to his son, whose name is 
Armando Emilio Guebuza. He is the son born in the files of Frelimo. He, together with Samora 
Machel and Chissano, formed Frelimo as the only unity that could give Mozambique independence. 
It was also he who went to Rome to give us peace. He is one of those who fight every day for the 
development of our country…like the traditional power, this power [of Frelimo] is from generation 
to generation. Therefore Chissano will hand over the position to Guebueza as a new President of the 
Republic because he is of the same family, of one party, that has been in government for a very long 
time.  
 
In a clear re-articulation of the ‘culture of power’ discussed in Chapter 5, the Secretary 
drew on the semantic universe of the ‘family’, in which there is no space ‘outside’ the 
family in the succession to the leadership. This he linked to a particular moral message in 
which disrespect for and the disintegration of the ‘family’ was opposed to morally good 
behaviour and national unity. Renamo was referred to as the immoral Other, “which expels 
its family members…it threw out Raul Domingos (former member of Renamo), and a lot of 
others. If a man always expels his women, his sons, is this a man of dignity and trust? 
Logically he is not. He is a bad person who will lie and tell you that you will receive a lot 
of benefits, but there is nothing to give…. He does not respect the women, but rapes them 
or throws them out.” The rest of the secretary’s speech replicated the oppositions between 
‘Frelimo’ and ‘Renamo’. Inter alia Renamo was associated with negative words such as 
‘people who rape women’, ‘confusion’, ‘illiteracy’, ‘people who disrespect the family’, 
‘liars’, ‘mafiosos’ and ‘thieves’; and Frelimo with positive words such as ‘democracy’, 
‘peace’, ‘development’, ‘education’, ‘rights of women’, and ‘respect for the family’.  
Immediately after the secretary had finished speaking, the crowd was guided 
towards the flagpole for the performance of the miniature national celebration (step 9 of 
Figure 6.1). This was followed by gifts from the community to the DA and a lunch for the 
visiting officials. During the lunch, the recognised chiefs were asked to sit at a separate 
table next to the Frelimo Secretary and the DA, thus re-marking their new membership of 
the hurumende.   
In sum, as a participant observer, the party-political dimension, running implicitly 
and explicitly like a red thread through the acts, speeches and displays of official power, 
gave the impression that the recognition of the chiefs was also appropriated as part of 
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Frelimo’s own agenda of political mobilisation. The question that is still unclear is whether 
this agenda was part of a cleverly crafted national party-political strategy or more reflective 
of the routine repetition of a common post-colonial script for how to perform public state 
rituals and represent official power. The striking similarity between the recognition 
ceremonies and other state-orchestrated public events suggests that the party-political 
dimensions should at least be seen as conveying a wider reproduction of the historical link 
between the state and the Frelimo party. This had implications for the messages conveyed 
by state officials at the recognition ceremonies. It gave a particular political substance to the 
ideal relationship between state, community-citizens and traditional authority, as outlined 
and staged by the state officials.  
As this section has shown, the recognition of traditional authority was matched by 
the constitution of state authority itself, i.e. through the displays of hierarchies and 
representations denoting a disciplining and bureaucratic inscription of traditional authority 
and community citizens within a state-defined order. During the ceremonies, this relational 
constitution was conveyed by representing chiefs and their communities as the constitutive 
‘Other’ of the state, that is, as recognised and included, yet hierarchically separated from 
state authority. This was marked by a continuous oscillation between hierarchical 
distinctions and togetherness around shared nationhood, celebrations of ‘the tradition’ and 
articulations of a shared ‘culture of power’. However, the party political dimension also 
signalled that inclusion within the nation state was ultimately conditioned upon a 
recognition of Frelimo as the superior authority, embodying the state and the nation. This 
also informed representations of Renamo as the constitutive ‘outside’, the entirely 
excluded, of the national community in general, and of the new contract between traditional 
authority, community and the (Frelimo) state in particular.  
The question remaining to be asked is how the different representations at the 
ceremonies were understood by the people who participated in them (and some who did 
not, like Renamo delegates), and how this was reflected in the meanings they attached to 
state recognition of the chiefs. This question is addressed next. 
 
2. The Meanings of Recognition   
 
This section discusses the views of state recognition that were presented to me by five 
groups of actors in Matica and Dombe: sub-district level state officials, chiefs, members of 
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the rural population, and local Frelimo and Renamo representatives.218 As we shall see, the 
representations underlying a continued merger of state and Frelimo during the recognition 
ceremonies fused with deeper historically vested conceptualisations of official power in 
general and chief–state relations in particular. Below I begin with the perspectives of local 
state officials.  
State officials: chiefs are the government 
Sub-district level state officials agreed that state recognition meant that chiefs (still referred 
to as régulos) were now an integral part of the administrative hierarchy. They saw them as 
representing the lowest tier of the state apparatus. This stemmed from the tasks they had to 
perform (tax-collection, policing, censuses and so forth). It was also symbolised by the flag 
that the chiefs had received: “In Mozambique the flag is only placed in front of our state 
institutions…the people, because of this flag that the régulos have been given, are now 
beginning to understand that, when they see the régulo, they are standing before a 
government authority.”219  
 Notably, when sub-district level state officials described the incorporation of chiefs 
within the administrative hierarchy, they tended to merge the performance of state tasks 
with assisting the (Frelimo) government in power: “The régulo now has the very important 
task of promoting the government’s programmes. The régulos are a form of door from the 
national and local government to the population […] now they represent the government in 
each population…they exercise the governance of the Mozambican state.”220 Hence 
officials tapped into and confirmed in interviews the merger of state and party, as staged 
and outlined at the recognition ceremonies.  
Nonetheless, when officials were asked directly whether, as “government 
representatives”, the régulos also had to be members of the Frelimo party, the answer was 
ambiguous. All firmly held that the régulos were not allowed to engage in voter campaigns 
for any political party, but in doing this they often drew a distinction between the public 
and private persons of the régulo. Apparently reflecting a mixture of the languages of one-
                                                 
218 The views of the rural population presented in this section do not necessarily reflect the whole population, 
as they are based exclusively on interviews with people who participated in the recognition ceremonies.   
219 Interview, Chefe of Matica Locality, 26 September 2002. Unlike, for example, my own country, Denmark, 
where private individuals habitually hoist the national flag, the national flag in Mozambique is only placed in 
front of state institutions such as police stations, ministries, administrations and schools – and only since 2002 
also at the homesteads of community authorities. During colonial rule it was only a few régulos who were 
granted a flag by the administration, namely those considered the most superior.  
220 Interview, Chefe of Javela Locality, 1 October 2002.   
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party rule and of the liberal democratic right to freedom of political association, this 
distinction was expressed in phrases such as:  
 
The régulo is an arm of the government, but in private he can also belong to the 
opposition…because as a person, as any other citizen…he has the right to be a member of any 
political party. But in public he is assuming a function of the government…he is not allowed to 
boycott the programme of the government and to promote the politics of another government in 
opposition [i.e. Renamo].221  
 
Comments like these indicate that state recognition of chiefs implied restrictions on the 
public performances of chiefs, while also reproducing the merger between the government 
in power and the state administration. Restrictions also applied to what the officials referred 
to as the ‘traditional’ roles of the chiefs such as the performance of ceremonies and the 
resolution of disputes and witchcraft. Local officials represented such roles as what 
distinguished chiefs from ordinary state functionaries and, as noted in Chapter 5, as also 
conducive to state governance. However, these ‘traditional’ roles of chiefs, officials held, 
needed to be regulated, and chiefs educated, in order to ensure that they did not “contradict 
the law and the development programmes of the government”.222   
More broadly, this reproduced the bureaucratic inscription and disciplining of 
traditional authority conveyed at the recognition ceremonies. It underpinned an 
understanding of state recognition as an incorporation of chiefs, based nonetheless on 
distinctions between state officials and chiefs, i.e. conveying a hierarchically ordered 
boundary regulated by the state administration. This perception of state recognition clearly 
contradicted the official MAE discourse promising that the domain of ‘traditional authority’ 
would not be disturbed by state recognition. Local officials did not unconditionally endorse 
any kinds of ‘traditional’ leadership practices. They also envisioned changes, or at the very 
least state the regulation of chiefly practices. This came as no surprise to the chiefs.         
Chiefs: obeying the government and giving it power    
All the chiefs shared the views of local state officials that the purpose of state recognition 
was to incorporate them within the state apparatus, or rather within what they referred to as 
the hurumende. This concept of the hurumende was used in chi-Ndau and chi-Teve as a 
common label to describe both the state institutions and the party in government, which are 
not differentiated in the local dialects. It was also used to describe the colonial 
                                                 
221 Interview, Chefe of Dombe post, 2 September 2002. 
222 Interview, Chefe of Javela locality, 1 October 2002.   
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administration, and therefore can be seen as reflecting deeper historical roots in the 
conceptualisation of official power. In this sense, it was perhaps not surprising that chiefs 
made direct comparison with colonial rule when explaining the present hurumende’s 
concern with recognition. As one chief noted: “This recognition is to make the régulos the 
arm of the hurumende…it means that the régulos are to be the executors of the law and 
have to obey the hurumende. It is basically the same as during colonial times. The régulos 
are the parrots of the hurumende …they depend on the wishes of the hurumende.”223  
 At the same time, the majority of the chiefs also added that recognition meant that 
“ma-hurumende is now realising the importance of the tradition for securing rain, peace and 
the well-being of the communities.”224 This double-meaning of recognition – chiefs’ 
incorporation within the hurumende and the hurumende’s acceptance of ‘tradition’ – was 
explained as a two-way conferring of power on both the chiefs and the hurumende. For 
example, in explaining the meaning of the national flag at his homestead, Chief Kóa 
asserted: “This flag shows that the régulo has power…that he is different from any ordinary 
person…and the flag also symbolises the hurumende because it is the flag of Frelimo. This 
means that the régulos have to comply with the hurumende…and that the régulos have 
given powers to the hurumende”. This perception of state recognition replicated the mutual 
constitution of state and traditional authority present throughout the recognition ceremonies 
and the activities that preceded them. It also reproduced the merger of the state with the 
Frelimo party: Frelimo was the hurumende, and the flag was its property.   
While some stressed that ma-administrador (the DA) was the main person in charge 
of recognising the chiefs, this was typically followed by phrases such as “Who recognises 
the régulos is the hurumende of Frelimo” or “Who recognised the régulos is Frelimo, 
which is in power.”225 These perspectives underscored the legacies of the post-colonial 
single-party state, but also deeper historically embedded understandings of unitary official 
power (i.e. hurumende). The latter came to light particularly when chiefs expressed their 
vision of how the incorporation of chiefs within the hurumende would be enforced in the 
future. Here they drew on legacies of colonial rule.  
Incorporation was associated with subordination attached to a set of punishments, 
which allowed no disobedience of the orders of the hurumende. This was captured in 
statements such as: “If we do not follow the orders of the hurumende we can go to 
                                                 
223 Inteviews with Chief Kóa and Chief Chibue, August 2002.  
224 Interview, Chief Zixixe, September 2002.  
225 Interviews with Chief Zixixe (September 2002) and Chief Kóa (October 2002).   
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prison…just like our fathers could” or “If the régulos do not abide by the laws of the 
hurumende…iiiihh that is very dangerous…we will be punished maningi [a lot]…just like 
the administrator said when he was talking about the flag [at the recognition ceremony]”.226 
In such comments, a number of chiefs also drew a link with the coercive powers of the 
colonial administrators and past experiences with the Frelimo government: “The caetano 
[colonisers] gave the régulos power but could also remove it…just like Frelimo removed 
the power of the régulos before and now they are giving it back.”227 These comments 
pointed to a particular understanding of state recognition: the two-way conferring of power 
was viewed as inherently hierarchical and ultimately relying on the wit and will of official 
power-holders. However, while all the chiefs shared the notion that the official purpose of 
state recognition was to subordinate the chiefs to the orders of the hurumende, they differed 
as to whether they saw themselves as completely fulfilling that position.  
In general, a distinction could be drawn between those chiefs and sub-chiefs who 
had a long history of Frelimo loyalty (Sambanhe, Boupua, Ganda and Pampanissa) and 
those who had collaborated with Renamo in Dombe (Chibue, Kóa, Mushamba, Gudza, and 
Mushambonha). The former unconditionally presented themselves as an integral element of 
the hurumende, though they also distinguished themselves from state functionaries and 
Frelimo cadres by stating that they represented the ‘traditional’ dimension of the unity. The 
latter group of chiefs drew a similar distinction, but emphasised more autonomy from the 
hurumende. This was expressed in words such as: “The régulos will obey the orders of the 
hurumende…collect taxes and the like…but we are mambos, not the hurumende…we 
represent the tradition and we can assist any person in the regulado…women, men, young, 
old and those of Frelimo and also Renamo.”228 Some were also more explicit about what 
they saw as party political motives behind recognition:  
 
All that recognition is to win the people to their side of the hurumende. We know that this is what it 
is about. But we have to be quiet because we know that it is them who are in the government. If I 
speak today, I will go to prison or be killed tomorrow.229 [Or] Frelimo wants to work with the 
régulos because Renamo said the régulos were important. Frelimo wanted the régulos as a form of 
propaganda to win the elections…the régulos will work for the hurumende, but we will not be part 
of this politics.230  
 
                                                 
226 Interviews with sub-chief Boupua (September 2002), and Chief Chibue (August 2002).  
227 Interview, Chief Kóa (October 2002).  
228 Interview, Chief Kóa, Dombe, October 2002 
229 Interview, Sub-chief in Dombe, 5 October 2002.  
230 Interview, Chief in Dombe, 8 September 2002.  
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Comments like these were never expressed in front of state officials or in public more 
generally. This could clearly not be divorced from the dominant view of chiefs, even 
Frelimo loyal ones, that state recognition was too attached to submission to the hurumende, 
which was backed by sanctions – a view that the messages conveyed at the recognition 
ceremonies also confirmed.   
The rural population: the hurumende is back in the regulados  
Those members of the rural population who had participated in the recognition ceremonies 
shared the double meaning of recognition expressed by chiefs: the hurumende’s recognition 
of tradition, and the incorporation of the chiefs within the hurumende. In highlighting this 
double meaning, the majority referred in particular to the paraphernalia that the chiefs had 
received: “The flag shows that the chief is the superior mambo in the regulado…and it 
shows that the chief represents the hurumende in the regulado”.231  
 The rural population had only previously seen the national flag in front of 
government buildings when visiting administrative capitals. It is therefore not surprising 
that they equated the flag at the homestead of the chief with hurumende representation. 
Recognition and the paraphernalia as such were also associated with Frelimo, captured in 
statements such as: “Recognition of the chiefs and the things that he was given means that 
Frelimo now likes the régulos, which it did not before.”232 However, in such statements, 
only a few people, namely local Renamo delegates, referred explicitly to recognition as part 
of an overt strategy of Frelimo to mobilise votes. The majority made no distinction between 
Frelimo as a political party and the wider re-presence of official power and state institutions 
in the regulados. This was captured under the common term hurumende.   
 The merger of state, Frelimo and government was also reflected in how the people 
in the hinterlands of Dombe envisioned what the recognition of the chiefs would mean for 
their lives in the future. While most were uncertain as to what it would imply in concrete 
terms, they shared the view that recognition signalled that the hurumende was now going to 
be present in those areas where hitherto it had been absent due to Renamo control. The first 
visit of the DA to the homestead of the chief was consistently referred to as symbolising 
this change. By some this was associated with a wider re-inclusion of the hinterlands within 
the nation state, as indicated by a woman from Gudza:     
 
                                                 
231 Interview, female resident of Gudza, 26 September 2002. 
232 Interview, male resident of Gudza, 25 September 2002.  
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I don’t know really what it [recognition] meant. What I know is that to us it was important that the 
administrator was here for the first time, because we had hoped that one day we would see an 
official of the hurumende of high rank such as the administrator…. With his arrival we re-
discovered that we are Mozambicans…with the visit the name of Gudza is going to be known far 
away, across these borders, because he [the DA] will tell his father about Gudza.233
 
Similar views were expressed in the area of Chief Kóa, which hitherto had experienced no 
enduring presence of state institutions due to the early commencement of the war there. 
Here references were particularly made to a new road that had been constructed for the 
DA’s visit. According to one resident of Kóa, this signalled that: “The recognition of the 
régulo…well…before there was no road to Kóa and now there is one…and the 
administrator for the first time came to Kóa, which has been sort of isolated. You know, the 
people had never seen a superior come here in a car…and they have never seen the flag 
here. It meant that the people feel important…that they are not forgotten…and that the 
hurumende recognised the existence of the regulado.”234
 However, these apparently positive views of state recognition as symbolising a 
wider recognition and inclusion of the people in the hinterlands did not amount to an 
understanding of the new state-chief contract as a democratic model of community 
participation. This is perhaps not surprising when one recalls that the DA said nothing 
about this official goal of Decree 15/2000 at the recognition ceremonies. Hopes were 
certainly raised that the new contract would bring development benefits to the regulados, 
but the dominant view was that chiefs would return to performing the administrative tasks 
of the hurumende, just like during colonial rule. Two exceptions were the (by that time the 
only) NGO workers in the Gudza and Zixixe areas. While equally emphasising that the 
chiefs were now ‘representatives of the government’, they also spoke the language of 
community participation: “The recognition of chiefs means that the communities are 
represented before the government…it means that the chief can now bring the problems and 
preoccupations of the community to the representatives of the government”.235 These raised 
hopes for the future were meanwhile opposed by the critical voices of Renamo.  
Renamo: it’s all Frelimo politics!   
Unsurprisingly members of Renamo in Dombe in particular and at the district level in 
general were furious that their party had not been officially invited to participate in the 
                                                 
233 Interview, female resident of Gudza, 27 September 2002.  
234 Interview, male resident of Kóa, 2 October 2002.  
235 Interview, AFRICARE representative, Zixixe, 29 August 2002.  
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recognition ceremonies. While still agreeing that state recognition of traditional leaders was 
right, they heavily criticised the way in which recognition and legitimisation had taken 
place. They represented the process as a strategic move by the Frelimo party to gain votes 
and to monopolise the state and chieftaincy institutions – elements, as we have seen, that 
were not far from some of the messages conveyed at the recognition ceremonies.  
 Renamo criticism was cast in an idiom of democratic inclusion and the 
constitutional separation of powers. Its local delegates represented the implementation of 
the Decree as undemocratic and exclusionary. They also accused local state officials of 
falling prey to Frelimo party politics and of failing to recognise the chiefs as state 
representatives rather than puppets of the old party-state. While blaming local state 
officials, the Renamo delegate in Dombe nonetheless presented this party-political 
hijacking as a larger national project:  
 
The Council of Ministers of Frelimo decided on the Decree without including the other parties in 
parliament…and then what we saw here in Dombe was that the chefes [local state officials] went 
together with the Frelimo secretaries to identify and recognise the régulos…without inviting the 
other political parties. This is against democracy. It is a strategy to exclude everyone outside the 
Frelimo party.236  
 
Also the paraphernalia given to the chiefs was represented as an aspect of the wider 
national project of reproducing the Frelimo party-state:   
 
This whole recognition is for Frelimo to win the chiefs…it is all wrong…the régulos have not been 
given a uniform and a salary…just this emblem that does not say that he is a régulo but that he is a 
‘member’ [of the Frelimo party – referring to the badge reading autoridade comunitaria]…and this 
flag they have been given…it is of Frelimo, it symbolises discrimination and does not represent all 
Mozambicans. Its meaning is that the régulos work for Frelimo and not the public.237  
 
This comment reflected Renamo’s wider condemnation of the national symbols being 
biased towards Frelimo, which was present in the national media and parliamentary debates 
during the time of recognition and beyond.238 That this bias indeed presented a problem for 
Renamo’s position in the rural areas was also hinted at in the meanings that the rural 
population and the chiefs attached to the flag and to the recognition of chiefs more broadly.  
                                                 
236 Interview, Renamo Delegate, Dombe sede, 3 September 2002.  
237 Interview, Renamo delegate, Gudza, August 2002.  
238 Debates over the change of the national flag were still going on in the media in 2005. Renamo argued that 
the yellow star and the Kalashnikov (AK 47), which feature as symbols in the flag together with a hoe and a 
book, symbolise Frelimo and the one-party, Marxist, revolutionary state. Frelimo, on the other hand, replied 
that the AK 47 symbolised the defence of the country and the star solidarity with other African countries. 
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Renamo’s criticism of Frelimo’s monopolisation of state and chieftaincy institutions was 
matched in practice by oppositional reactions. During the time of the implementation of the 
Decree, Renamo delegates did a good deal, behind the backs of state officials, to keep the 
Dombe chiefs and the population on their side. For example, one delegate told us that they 
had encouraged people to boycott the recognition ceremonies, and informed the chiefs that: 
“This recognition is a way for Frelimo to try and win over the population. But it is all lies, 
because it is Renamo who ensured the importance of the traditional leaders in the country. 
And the chief and the people know this.”239 The delegates also asserted that the chiefs 
would continue to support Renamo in mobilizing votes and assured us that “the régulos did 
not take the flag with their hearts, but only because they were afraid to be imprisoned by 
the Frelimo police”240 – a factor that many chiefs also confirmed. This apparently 
contradictory emphasis on the need to separate powers and the political instrumentalisation 
of chiefs was something that Renamo delegates shared with Frelimo secretaries.  
Frelimo: the ruling party created this traditional authority 
The meanings attached to state recognition of chiefs by Frelimo secretaries merged the 
political languages of the past and the present, creating a fuzzy boundary between the 
politically intentional and deeply embedded understandings of the unity of state, party and 
government. While explicitly claiming that “the régulos have the freedom to be members of 
any political party because we now have a democracy”, and that “recognition means that 
the régulos are the basis of the state administration, and not of any party”, this merged with 
continuous references to the recognised chiefs as part and parcel of the Frelimo 
government. 
For example, when answering why he, and not a representative of Renamo, had 
given a speech at the recognition ceremony, the First Frelimo Secretary asserted: 
“Logically, I was there because who recognised the régulos was the government, which is 
Frelimo. The creation of this community authority at the lowest level was the idea of the 
government. We did not elect the régulos to be part of the party, but only recognised in 
public the representatives of the communities.”241 When asked explicitly, lower ranking 
Frelimo secretaries also said that recognition was not about using chiefs in party political 
                                                 
239 Interview, Renamo delegate, Javela, Kóa Chieftaincy, 24 September 2002.  
240 Interview, Renamo delegate, Dombe sede, 3 September 2002.  
241 Interview, First Secretary of Frelimo, Sussundenga, 14 October 2002.  
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campaigning. Yet when they explained in more detail what the contract between the state 
and community authorities implied, they merged the words of party, state and government:  
 
Recognition means that the régulo represents the state…he is the base of the administration…the 
flag shows this. It shows that the régulo now really works for the state…that he has to do everything 
in order to comply with the objectives of the government (governo)…because the flag is a national 
symbol, and in this case it serves to identify anything that is an element of the government…you 
know it is the flag of Frelimo. This is because Frelimo is the party in government. Frelimo has its 
programme, and the state for its part has to take this programme and comply with it...so these 
ceremonies [of recognizing chiefs] they were programmed by Frelimo, and then the state was the 
executor.242
 
This comment replicates a core message of the ceremonies namely, the representation of 
Frelimo as the ultimate authority embodying the state and by implication the recognised 
chiefs. If this representation supported the position of the Frelimo party, it could not be 
separated from historically embedded perceptions of the unity of official power, which 
were shared by many members of the rural population and chiefs. As we saw, this was 
captured under the common label hurumende, which derives from early colonial rule. 
 The important point here is that little was done at the recognition ceremonies to 
change embedded perceptions of official power. Indeed, the speeches and the ritually 
staged displays of power tapped into such perceptions and left little space for understanding 
state recognition as separate from Frelimo. As this section has illustrated, people only 
differed in the extent to which they viewed this merger as a natural given or as part of 
Frelimo’s overt political strategy to win votes and use chiefs to exclude the opposition 
politically. Irrespective of this difference, all five groups of actors, including also Renamo, 
envisaged the recognition of traditional authority as indeed an incorporation of chiefs 
within the state apparatus and as an element in bolstering state authority. They only differed 
as to whether they criticised the lack of separation of state authority from the Frelimo party 
or not. This common view of recognition as incorporation differed significantly from the 
official representations of national and provincial level officials. These maintained the 
MAE’s official position that the Decree would only institute an interaction between chiefs 
and the state institutions, while preserving traditional forms of leadership and community 
as distinct domains. Even if chiefs and local state officials maintained a distinction between 
the hurumende and the régulos in public representations, they shared the view that 
recognition, whether the chiefs liked it or not, was meant to obey the orders of those with 
                                                 
242 Interview, First Secretary of Frelimo, Dombe, 20 August 2002.  
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official power. To chiefs this too related to experiences of colonial rule and the sanctions 
attached to state recognition-cum-submission of traditional authority.    
 
Conclusion  
 
The analysis of the recognition ceremonies in this chapter has further underlined that 
implementation of Decree 15/2000 went beyond simply recognising traditional, community 
authority and the communities they ideally represented. It was equally appropriated by state 
officials as a pervasive process of re-constituting state authority in the rural hinterlands, 
and, as it turned out, of a continued Frelimo state. If the steps of identifying and 
legitimising community authorities, discussed in Chapter 5, underlined the territorial-
institutional extension of the state administration, state-bureaucratic modes of regulating 
the population and attempts to constitute state authority through alliances, then the 
ceremonies compounded these elements in a symbolic-representational form. The 
ceremonies ritually staged the relational constitution of state and traditional authority, 
conveying a double meaning to recognition. At centre stage was the celebration and 
recognition not only of traditional, but also of state authority. However, this chapter has 
also underlined that this relational constitution was conceived as inherently unequal. In 
representations it was underpinned by hierarchy and political exclusion.  
The recognition ceremonies were appropriated by state and Frelimo officials as sites 
at which to stage and outline the ideal-model relationship between state, community-
citizens and traditional authority, which ultimately centred on constituting and naturalising 
a particular state-defined order. This included representations of particular hierarchies of 
authority and of proper community citizens, i.e. of the national, political community. 
Recognition and inclusion were conditioned on incorporation, disciplining and inscription 
within a state-defined order, which at the same time conveyed distinctions between the 
state, chiefs and ordinary community citizens.  
These representations lent themselves to comparison with the cultural and symbolic-
representational dimensions of state formation in the form of political state rituals, analysed 
by scholars elsewhere (Bell 1992; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). This dimension centres on 
producing the idea of the state as a superior, sovereign authority and as a transcendental 
entity that is distinct from society, yet embodies the national community (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001). State authority in this sense is constituted in relation to a constitutive 
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other, i.e. society, and in this case also traditional authority. At a broader analytical level 
this suggests that, in understanding how state authority is constituted, we need to go beyond 
the Weberian the legal-rational character of state practices and the Foucauldian notion of 
the state as the effect dispersed practices of governing. The constitution of state authority 
implies that state representatives not only govern in technical terms, but also engage in 
attempts to produce an imaginary dimension that separates the state from its ‘other’, i.e. 
society (Abrams 1977: 77). Political state rituals, I suggest, can in this sense be seen as one 
dimension of processes of regularisation, and as a significant register of authority. 
Having said this, it is important to realise the significance of particular historically 
embedded ways of representing and perceiving the state and official power more generally. 
As this chapter has shown, the perceptions of the unity of official power, i.e. hurumende, 
associated with orders, obedience and coercive sanctions, invested the representations of 
the state and its ‘other’ with a particular substance. It also informed the meanings people 
attached to state recognition of chiefs. The flipside was not only a clear reproduction of the 
party-state, privileging Frelimo as embodying state and nation, but also political exclusion. 
Representations of the new contract between the state, traditional authority and community 
citizens relied on Renamo, as the constitutive ‘outside’, the entirely excluded. State 
recognition and inclusion as a result came at a price. Not only did chiefs have to ‘obey the 
orders of the hurumende’. Citizenship was also conditioned on people’s submission to a 
particular version of the proper community citizens, based not on equal rights, but on 
loyalty to the Frelimo party. At least this was implied in the representations of the local 
state officials at the recognition ceremonies. The question that remains to be addressed is 
how the ideal-typical relationship between the (Frelimo) state, community citizens and 
traditional authority was played out in everyday interactions and in the performance of the 
shared tasks laid down in Decree 15/2000. This is the theme of the next part of the 
dissertation.   
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Above: Greetings after arrival. The DA shakes hands with the Queen of Gudza, following him the chefe of Dombe post, the Frelimo Secretary 
and the Police commander. On the left side of the Queen, the chefe of locality. On her right side, Mateus, Struba and two madodas.  
Below: Welcome by chefe of Dombe Post (standing up). On the left side the ‘trinity of power’ – police commander, Frelimo Secretary and the 
DA. On the right side (table without table cloth) the chefe of locality and the DA assistant.  
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  Above: Oracão Tradicional (traditional rite) by the house of the ancestral spirits. In front, the madodas and at the side of the hut, the official 
guests. Walking, sub-chief  Struba who is active in the organization of the event. 
Below: Identification and formal registration of the Gudza Queen sitting by the table of the DA assistant, who is writing down her personal 
data. Next to her, standing up is Struba. From the left: police commander, Frelimo Secretary, DA, chefe of dombe post, chefe of locality 
(standing up).  
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Above: Signing of the Act of Recognition by the DA, while people are standing up.  
Below: Presentation of Symbols and emblems. The DA is placing the ribbon on the body of the Gudza queen. Standing up from the left: chefe 
of Dombe posto, DA assistant and sub-chief Struba.  
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 Above: Speech of the District Administrator. Next to the DA, the chefe of locality who translates the speech to chi-Ndau. In the circle, between 
the state officials and the regulado residents sits chief Kóa and Chief Chibue wearing their new regalia.  
Below: The chief of Dombe police explains to a traditional police person from Gudza chieftaincy how to treat the flag and perform the flag rite. 
Next to the chief of police, the District commander of Police.  
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 Above: Flagging ceremony. From the left, Police Commander, DA, First Frelimo Secretary, traditional police, the Gudza Queen, the chefe of 
Dombe Post and a group of women. 
Below: Gifts from the community. From the left, First Frelimo Secretary, DA, chefe of Dombe post and DA assistant.   
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Above: Lunch. Left row, director of education (district level), chefe of Dombe post, and DA. End of table (back), assistant DA. Right row, me, 
First Frelimo Secretary, and Police commander. End of table (front), the Gudza queen facing her back.   
Below: Departure of the DA’s Land Rower.   
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Policing and Justice Enforcement 
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Chapter 7 
Law, Institutions and Models for Practice  
 
 
So far this dissertation has addressed history, national legislation and the granting of de jure 
recognition to traditional leaders and ‘their’ communities by local state officials. We have 
seen how state recognition was also appropriated locally to reconstitute state-administrative 
presence and authority in the rural hinterlands. Decree 15/2000 did not simply imply a 
benign recognition and inclusion of ‘what already existed’, as conveyed in official national 
representations. At least in the public representations of local state officials, recognition and 
inclusion was conditioned upon incorporation within a state-defined order, which also 
conveyed hierarchical distinctions between state and traditional authority.  
The question that remains to be explored in this third part of the dissertation is 
how the relationship between state institutions and the recognised authorities was actually 
organised and practised in relation to the shared tasks laid down in the Decree. To address 
this question implies entering into the spaces of everyday practices, modes of organisation 
and interactions between state officials, chiefs and the rural population. In short, it means 
going beyond codified law and the immediate acts of granting and claiming de jure 
authority by state officials and chiefs respectively. Going beyond these dimensions is based 
on the assumption that authority and citizenship exist beyond de jure status and as 
conveyed in ideal, public representations. They are also reconstituted through everyday 
practice, interactions and de facto modes of organising practice and relationships, which do 
not necessarily mirror the law or ideal representations (see also Chapter 1). Here the 
particular focus of analysis is on policing and justice enforcement as two of the shared tasks 
laid down in Decree 15/2000.243  
The analysis in this chapter begins by addressing how the relationship 
between state institutions and recognised authorities was organised within the fields of 
policing and justice enforcement. This is followed in Chapters 8 and 9 by an exploration of 
the everyday practices of policing and justice enforcement pursued by the state and non-
state institutions, including how these interacted and how members of the rural population 
                                                 
243 See Section 3 of Chapter 1 on the reason for choosing these fields and how I approach policing and justice 
enforcement as comprising social spaces and practices that explicitly revolve around the authority to regulate, 
sanction and enforce rules and norms of proper conduct.  
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made use of them and why. Chapter 10 rounds off this third part by discussing the 
implications of the everyday practices and modes of organisation for conceptualising de 
facto authority and citizenship.  
The main focus of this chapter is to explore the rules and regulations that were 
de facto developed and communicated to organise the relationship between the state-
recognised authorities and the official state institutions within policing and justice 
enforcement. This means paying attention to how the areas of jurisdiction, mandates and 
collaboration of the different authorities were defined and enforced locally. In doing this, it 
is also important to ask who defined the rules, against whom and what issues were at stake. 
As this chapter shows, it was primarily the local tiers of the state police at posto level who 
appropriated the authority to organise and regulate the fields not only of policing, but also 
justice enforcement. The overall aim of addressing how this was done is to arrive at an 
understanding of what it implied for the position and authority of chiefs in relation to 
official state authorities. In short, what system of co-existing authorities was developed, 
and what interests and positionings of local state and traditional authority did this support?   
The question of how the relationship was organised cannot, however, be 
addressed without taking into consideration the plurality and legal grey zones of past and 
present national legislation on policing and justice enforcement, which co-existed with 
Decree 15/2000. Moreover, it was also conditioned by the plural landscape of local 
institutions that, in one way or another, engaged in the provision of justice, conflict 
resolution and order-making in Matica and Dombe. In other words, community authorities 
and official state institutions were but two important authorities in the fields. Whereas some 
of the local institutions and their practices were recognised in different types of post-war 
legislation, others were entirely outside the law. Against this background, the chapter 
begins in Section 1 with an overview of codified law within the policing and justice sectors. 
This is followed in Section 2 by a mapping of the local institutional landscape in Matica 
and Dombe. Here I address the self-proclaimed rules, principles and compositions of the 
different institutions that existed both inside and outside the codified law, and which laid 
claims to partly overlapping areas of jurisdiction: chiefs and sub-chiefs, secretários, 
community courts, wadzi-nyanga or traditional healers, the state police and the official 
district court.  
Sections 1 and 2 form a background to Section 3. This last section outlines the 
particular, locally adjusted rules that were communicated by the local state police to 
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organise the plural landscape of local institutions, existing both inside and outside codified 
law. This took the form of a secondary body of uncodified law – of locally applicable rules, 
prohibitions and obligations – that both expanded and filled out the grey zones of codified 
law. The force behind these nonetheless lay in the fact that they were enforced by the state 
police as lei do estado (state law). In the chapter, I refer to this secondary body of law as 
‘models for practice’. This is to indicate that we are dealing with prescriptive rules for 
actions and interactions, rather than descriptions of observable practices. The crux of the 
matter is that these models did not simply recognise ‘what already existed’, but centred on 
re-organising, re-defining and drawing a boundary between the jurisdictions of state and 
non-state authorities. The ‘models for practice’ in this sense reflected both processes of 
regularisation and situational adjustments of codified law to the particular local contexts. 
The questions that will be addressed are what issues were at stake for the local state police 
in communicating these models in general, and what this implied for the position and 
authority of chiefs in particular.   
 
1. Codified Law: Justice and Policing Reforms 
 
The regulation of Decree 15/2000 states that community authorities should assist the state 
police in locating troublemakers and collaborate with the other local community courts in 
resolving conflicts of a civic nature. How these tasks should concretely be put into practice 
and shared between the state police, the community authorities and the community courts 
remain unanswered. Added to this legal grey-zone, Decree 15/2000 co-existed with a range 
of other post-war legislation that aimed to create and regulate state and non-state 
institutions in policing and justice enforcement. At the level of codified law, these were de-
linked and fell under different ministries.  
 This state of affairs emerged from the wider post-war reform process of the justice 
and security sectors, which since the beginning of the 1990s had centred on adjusting these 
sectors to the perimeters of the 1990 democratic constitution: i.e. the separation of powers, 
individual rights, and the definition of the state as based on ‘the rule of law’. As in other 
transitional societies at the time this reform process was characterised by a gradual, but 
ambiguous, shift from exclusively focusing on ‘getting right’ the official state institutions 
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in the 1990s towards a focus also on informal justice and community policing in the new 
millennium. 244
 In Mozambique, as elsewhere, the initial reform of the 1990s largely consisted of 
Western legal transplants, supported by heavy donor-funding and -coordination: i.e. the 
principles of jurisprudence, human rights, the rule of law, and formalistic-bureaucratic style 
operations.  This was combined with the creation of and donor support for a new set of 
NGOs, which adhered to liberal-democratic models of ‘civil society’ and which could serve 
as check and balance mechanisms for securing ‘the rule of law’ and ‘human rights’ (de 
Tollenaere 2006: 13-15). Moreover, laws sustaining the use of authoritarian measures were 
abolished. This for example included the 1983 law of flogging (lei de chicotada), which 
had allowed courts to inflict corporal punishment. In the 1990s the predominant focus on 
reforming official state institutions and creating new human rights NGOs took place to the 
detriment of popular non-state and informal policing and justice institutions. This gradually 
changed towards the new millennium: justice enforcement moved towards legal pluralism, 
policing towards outsourcing. This gave way to a growing number of partly state-
recognised and state-created local institutions.245 Below I first address in more detail these 
developments within the justice sector.  
Justice sector reforms: towards legal pluralism  
The tendency of the 1990s to exclusively focus on reforming official state institutions was 
exemplified by a removal of the sub-district level popular courts (tribunais populares) from 
the formal justice system. These had functioned exclusively with non-professional judges 
and decided cases according to common sense and local usage. As a result the four-tiered 
                                                 
244 This shift reflects a mixture of wider developments within international assistance to look beyond formal 
institutions with the increased realisation that Mozambican state institutions lacked the resources and capacity 
to provide justice and security on their own. On the former, see Lindholt and Schaumburg-Müller 2005. This 
process is also paralleled in other corners of the world, including the West, where informal justice has 
experienced a revival during the past decade. This follows a period of pessimism towards so-called informal 
justice, which otherwise saw a period of formally recognised expansion in Britain and the US in the 1970s 
(Mathews 1988).  
245 Since 2003 there have also been novel policies regarding local governance and administration, such as the 
2003 Law of Local State Organs (referred to as the LOLE law), which ensures increased deconcentration of 
government functions and development planning. While the LOLE law still ensures that state officials are 
centrally appointed and not locally elected, it does include the principle of active citizens’ participation in the 
solution of community problems. Since mid-2005 these principles have, after being donor-tested in a few 
provinces, given way to new community-based institutions across the country, the so-called Instituições de 
Participação e Consulta Comunitaria (IPCCs). The IPCCs should comprise a mixture of local state officials, 
community authorities and (s)elected community members. They should function as consultative forums to 
enable the inclusion of rural voices and needs in the drafting and approval of district development plans. 
Hence the IPCCs provide an additional kind of ‘representative organ’ to the community authorities, though 
now including a broader representation of community members (see Orre 2006; Buur 2006).  
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system of tribunais populares was replaced by a three-tiered judicial court system 
consisting of the supreme court, provincial courts and district courts (Trindade and Santos 
2003: 536-9). The previous sub-district courts were re-labelled ‘community courts’ 
(tribunais comunais) by law in 1992, but were entirely separated from the official system. 
They were given the status of informal bodies of local conflict resolution. The official 
reason for this separation was the primacy of ‘the rule of law’ and professionalisation of the 
judiciary. Because the community courts decide cases not according to the law but “usages 
and customs” (ibid.: Art. 2-3) and because they only have locally elected judges, they could 
not be part of the judicial system (Santos 2006: 56). The lack of formally established links 
to the official courts for example means that there are no established procedures for appeal. 
Moreover, although the community courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, there 
are no resources allocated to them or any legislation regulating their operations (such as 
monitoring the elections of judges, sanctions imposed, forms of resolution and so forth) 
(ibid.). 
The position of the community courts reflected the general undermining of 
non-state forms of justice enforcement in the 1990s. This came under heavy criticism 
around the turn of the new millennium, which was in particular supported by a 
comprehensive donor-funded study of the ‘administration of justice in Mozambique’ 
(Trindade and Santos 2003).246 A main argument of the study was that the system of formal 
courts was inadequate for ensuring that the majority (in particularly rural) citizens gained 
access to justice. It also held that the types of justice enforced by the formal courts, in 
accordance with the Penal Code, did not satisfy the needs of the rural population, who 
preferred resolution based on reconciliation and mediation (ibid.: 539-40). The study 
recommended that the judicial system be altered in order to ensure a legal and functional 
interaction between the formal courts and community justice. The latter also included 
traditional authorities. This supported a de jure system of legal pluralism, i.e. a system were 
different legal orders were recognised by the state, including technical-professional and 
informal, common sense forms of justice (ibid.: 581-2).  
This recommendation of the study supported the article in Decree 15/2000 
that recognises the roles of traditional leaders and secretários in conflict resolution. It also 
made donors and the government more positive towards recognising the non-state provision 
                                                 
246 This study took place between 1996 and 2002 and covered both a historical and contemporary study of the 
formal justice system and informal forms of conflict resolution, including of traditional leaders. It was funded 
by DANIDA and the Portuguese Institute for Cooperation.  
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of justice in light of the inadequacy of the official system to provide justice to (in particular 
rural) citizens. This was reflected in Article 4 of the 2004 revised constitution, labelled 
‘legal pluralism’: “The state recognises the various normative systems and the resolution of 
conflicts that co-exist in Mozambican society, as long as they do not contradict the 
fundamental values and principles of the constitution” (República de Moçambique 2004: 
Art. 4). 
This constitutional recognition of legal pluralism has not, however, been 
paralleled by laws that legally regulate and link the official and various non-state courts and 
conflict resolution mechanisms. The draft law to ensure this had still not been passed at the 
time of writing (2007). Moreover, although Decree 15/2000 obliges traditional leaders and 
secretários to solve conflicts in cooperation with the community courts, their courts are not 
recognised by law. As opposed to the community courts, they are also fully detached from 
the Ministry of Justice and instead regulated under the Ministry of State Administration. 
Added to this the role of traditional healers (wadzi-nyanga in chi-Ndau and chi-Teve) in 
local level conflict resolution, for example, as a kind of institution of appeal particularly in 
witchcraft cases, has not been official recognised (Meneses 2004). In 1989 the ban on 
traditional healing was lifted and in 1998 associations of traditional healers, such as 
AMETRAMO (Associação Moçambicano de Medicina Tradicional), were officially 
recognised. This legal recognition was further endorsed in a 2004 resolution approved by 
the Council of Ministers. The aim was to integrate traditional medicine into the national 
health system and incorporate traditional healers under the Ministry of Health (República 
de Moçambique, Resolução, n. 11/2004). However, due to the fact that official law does not 
recognise the existence of witchcraft, recognition of healers has solely occurred in the 
biomedical sense of traditional medicine for the cure of illnesses, not as an aspect of 
conflict resolution (West 2005: 210; Meneses 2004: 21-3). Notably, they also fall under an 
entirely different ministry than the community courts and community authorities.247     
Police sector reforms: towards outsourcing 
In accordance with the 1990 constitution, reform of the national police force was aimed at 
democratising and demilitarising police operations, as well as (re)expanding its presence in 
the rural hinterlands. This aim faced an enormous challenge. Not only were the police force 
understaffed and under-resourced, it had simply ceased to operate in many parts of the 
                                                 
247 For a comprehensive analysis of the recognition of traditional healers, AMETRAMO and how these were 
officially de-linked from witchcraft and sorcery, see West (2005) and Meneses (2004).  
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country, especially in those areas controlled by Renamo. Where it had still existed during 
the war, its operations had taken on a paramilitary character, exemplified by the 
standardised use of violence and torture. It worked in collaboration with the Frelimo army, 
and by and large adhered to an enemy-versus-friend ethos, which legitimised acts of 
brutality against enemies of the state (Baker 2002: 108). Moreover, the police force was 
notoriously partisan, in the sense of serving the interests of Frelimo, an aspect that was not 
nurtured by the civil war alone, but also by Law 54 of 1975, regulating the police. This 
meant that its legitimacy in Renamo-dominated areas was highly contested after the war.  
Post-war reform sought to change all these legacies of the past and turn the 
police into a force that would adhere to human rights and follow the principle of serving the 
public rather than the powerholders (Baker 2002; Seleti 2000). These principles were 
enshrined in Law 19 of 1992, which created the Polícia de República de Moçambique 
(PRM). One major legal change was from a predominant emphasis on the defence of the 
state and national unity – including the repression of tribalism and regionalism – to the 
protection of individual rights and liberties (República de Moçambique, 1992b; Governo de 
Transição de Moçambique, Decree-Law 54/1975). In line with these changes, the 
constitution also demanded an impartial police force to underpin the depoliticisation of 
police operations (República de Moçambique, 2004: Art. 254). It also prohibited any form 
of torture and inhuman treatment by the police, stricter regulations for detention and 
imprisonment, the principle of habeas corpus and legal prosecution of police officers 
offending the law (ibid.: Art. 64-7).  
As with the justice sector, reform of the police initially took the form of 
ensuring that the provision of security was solely taken care of by professionally trained 
law-enforcers. By implication the popular vigilance groups and militias that had been 
created during the socialist regime were official abolished. These had comprised ordinary 
citizens, who, in tandem with the police and Frelimo’s party-state structures, had operated 
as law-enforcers and defenders of state security.248 As opposed to the popular courts, no 
substitutes were initially created in their place. This changed as the new millennium 
dawned and the reform of the PRM had produced meagre results in the sense of 
effectiveness, adherence to human rights and popular legitimacy. Moreover, self-policing or 
                                                 
248 Interview, General Macamo, MINT, 12 October 2005.  
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informal vigilantism had not decreased, but rather increased outside the domain of (formal) 
state control (Baker 2002: 110-18).249  
The official response to the failures of reform was a return, under new 
headings, to citizen participation in providing security and to outsourcing of policing tasks 
to community authorities as exemplified by Decree 15/2000. In the 2003-2012 Strategic 
Plan for the police, these initiatives were taken further, and labelled Police-Community 
Links (República de Mocambique (MINT) 2003: 42). Along with Decree 15/2000, these 
links were established through the introduction of ‘community policing forums’, which 
began in 2002 with urban-based donor-funded pilot projects. In 2005 the forums were 
incorporated into a national strategy (not a law) for the whole country, including the rural 
districts. Echoing the recent wave of community police programmes in the West and other 
developing countries (Brogdon 2004), the aim of the community police forums was to 
secure community participation in debating how to prevent and solve crime, as well as to 
create relations of trust between the police and the citizens. Hence, in line with the justice 
sector, one of the main features of the police reform was a gradual move to non-state, 
community-(s)elected, forms of policing and crime-prevention. However, by the time of 
fieldwork there were still no codified laws in this sector regulating these non-state bodies 
and their relationship to the state institutions.  
In sum, despite the gradual move towards a renewed focus on and recognition 
of non-state bodies within the justice and policing sectors, legislation left legal grey-zones. 
Having been elaborated by different ministries, the recognised non-state institutions are not 
only de-linked at the level of the law, but also characterised by unclear mandates. In 
addition, legislation does not cover all non-state institutions that play a role in conflict 
resolution in many rural areas (for example, the courts of the chiefs and the wadzi-nyanga). 
How this legal grey zone was dealt with in Matica and Dombe is discussed in Section 3. 
First, however, it is necessary to map out the existing institutional landscape of the areas of 
study.     
 
 
 
                                                 
249 The media also reported the continued politicisation of policing, exemplified by several incidences in 
1999-2000 in which the PRM employed excessively violent and extralegal measures against Renamo 
demonstrators (Baker 2002: 113-115). 
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2. The Plural Institutional Landscape  
 
As I followed the developments in Sussundenga District from 2002 to 2005, the new legal 
framework outlined in Section 1 translated into the gradual enlargement of a pluralism of 
partly state-created and partly state-recognised institutions. The recognition of the chiefs in 
2002 was followed by the recognition of secretarios dos bairros in 2004, a gradual increase 
in the membership of AMETRAMO, a strengthening of already existing community courts 
and the creation of new ones, and finally, in 2005, the formal launch of community 
policing. These developments happened in direct conjunction with the expansion of state 
police posts and operations in the rural hinterlands.250 The enlarged recognition of non-state 
institutions thus continued the process of extending the territorial outreach and functioning 
of official state institutions that had begun with the identification and legitimisation of 
community authorities, explored in Part II.251 This relational constitution however took 
place in a local context where legally recognised institutions, inside the law, co-existed 
with self-proclaimed elements of local institutions that were not covered by, but were 
outside state law.  
 
Figure 7.1. Institutions in Sussundenga District252
Inside the Law 
Ministry of Justice  Ministry of Int. Affairs  
 
Ministry of State Adm. 
 
Ministry of Health   
District court Locality, Posto, District, 
Police (PRM/PIC) 
Locality, Posto, District, 
administrations. 
Locality, Posto, District, health institutions. 
Community courts 
(1992) 
Community Police forums 
(2005).  
Community Authorities 
(chiefs/2002) 
(secretaries/2004) 
AMETRAMO (1998) with the function of 
healing/curing recognized. 
Outside the Law 
Chiefs/sub-chiefs’ and 
secretários’ courts 
(council of elders) 
Police assistants (ma-
auxilliares) of  chiefs/sub-
chiefs 
 Sub-chiefs and 
secretários (only state-
registered)  
 
Wadzi-Nyanga solving witchcraft and 
revealing perpetrators of theft, homicide etc.   
                                                 
250 Alongside these developments, the areas saw the arrival of the first NGOs in 2003-4 that were not 
exclusively focused on food relief and infrastructure. Their aim was to create community associations for 
income generation, the initial entry point for mobilisation being the community authorities. Also in 2004 
extension officers of tobacco companies were moving into the chieftaincies, beginning by asking the chiefs to 
mobilise possible participants for their micro-credit schemes.    
251 In Dombe the re-expansion of state police operations was paralleled by a process in which Renamo 
representation was increasingly removed from the public sphere. When I returned to Dombe Sede in 2004, the 
Renamo flag had been removed from its original place at the centre of the village, where it had fluttered but a 
few metres from the Frelimo office and the police station. The official reason was that Renamo had failed to 
pay rent for the house, which, the chefe of post held, was state property. Similarly in the localities, the official 
representations of the Renamo party had been ‘pushed’ back to places that were not visible from the main 
road. I return to these points in Chapter 10.  
252 The year depicted in parenthesis indicate the time when the institutions were recognised and/or established 
by the state in the district.  
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Figure 7.1. illustrates the separation of different state and non-state institutions under the 
different ministries, but also the that only some of the functions and role players of the 
different non-state institutions are recognised by state law. I use the concepts inside and 
outside the law to describe this latter difference. It should also be noted that a difference 
existed between those institutions inside the law, which represent actors who existed prior 
to post-colonial state legislation (wadzi-nyanga and chiefs), and those which are entirely 
created by law (community courts, community policing, and secretários), either as a result 
of new post-war legislation (community policing) or as a matter of historical legacy from 
the post-independence socialist period (secretários and community courts as a substitute for 
the former tribunais popularesi). In short, the latter have a history of being part of the 
former Frelimo-state structures.  
These differences are important when we consider the actor compositions and 
the self-proclaimed mandates and principles of the different local institutions, which is the 
main focus of analysis in this section. The local institutions that had been created by post-
colonial law did not as a rule overlap with the principles and mandates of the official state 
institutions, and most of their actors had a history in the former party-state structures. These 
two aspects could not be generalised for chiefs, sub-chiefs and wadzi-nyanga, whose self-
proclaimed mandates and principles both overlapped considerably with the official state 
and the other non-state institutions. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2. below, which 
summarises the principles of the different types of courts according to the representations of 
the actors making up these institutions, inside as well as outside the law. These principles 
range from the types of rules, punishments, costs for accused or offenders and modes of 
resolution (representation, participation in determining verdicts and documentation) that 
were employed, to what types of transgressions or cases each institution claimed to settle. 
By looking at these aspects differences as well as various overlaps between the institutions 
appear. These are important when considering the ‘models for practice’ communicated by 
the PRM, as discussed in Section 3.253 In particular, it is important to note the overlaps 
between chiefs and the official state institutions: the enforcement of non-negotiable or fixed 
rules, which leaves no space for contenders to negotiate a verdict; chiefs’ claim to settle 
transgressions that were also covered by the Penal code; and the chiefs’ application of 
punishments that challenge the state’s self-proclaimed monopoly on the use of force and 
                                                 
253 The overlaps and differences of principles are also significant as a background to understanding the 
everyday practices of case settlement discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, because the different principles had a 
bearing on where rural residents decided to take their cases.   
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expulsion (i.e. prison in case of the state). Apart from these three overlaps, the modes of 
resolution related to participation, documentation and costs differed from the official state 
institutions, and instead overlapped with the community courts and the secretários. The 
point is that there co-existed a plurality of potentially competing institutions, giving way to 
different, but partly overlapping ‘rooms of justice’ (Galanter 1981).  
 
Figure 7.2. Rooms of justice254  
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Next I outline in more detail the principles of each of the institutions and how the local tiers 
of the PRM were positioned within the landscape of the courts. I begin with the official 
state institutions.  
Official state institutions: the district courts and the PRM 
In Sussundenga District there was one court, the tribunal judicial, which formed part of the 
official legal system. It was situated in the district capital and had been established in 1986 
                                                 
254 It is important to note that the principles outlined in figure 7.2. are based on how the different actors of 
each of the institutions described their principles. They reflect the representational models of the actors, and 
therefore not necessarily the actual practices of the institutions, as will also be seen in Chapters 8 and 9.  
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as a popular court. In 2004-5 it still had the same judge as in 1986, as well as three elected 
judges (including two women) who had been elected by the assembleia popular (popular 
assembly) during one-party rule. Another five lay judges were in addition chosen by the 
District Administration in 2004. Two commonalities of the court personnel were that none 
of them had any professional judiciary education and that they were all members of the 
ruling party. Hence, despite the separation of the judiciary from the executive, there was 
still a link between the court and the ruling party in the sense of the composition of the 
court’s personnel.  
 The vast majority of the cases solved in the district court were criminal offences, 
involving prosecution according to the Penal Code, and covering penalties such as 
imprisonment (up to two years) and fines to the state.255 According to the judge, civic cases 
were rarely treated by the court, but when they were, they included only cases of divorce.  
The actual trial of cases within the district court was characterised by systematic 
references to the law, typewritten documentation of all the words spoken and the formality 
of the proceedings. The latter ranged from the strict rules pertaining to seating, movements 
and uniform speech acts to the formal dress of the court personnel. Moreover, verdicts were 
issued solely by references to the Penal Code and left no room for the active participation 
of the parties involved or the audience in discussing the verdict. Cases were judged using 
an individual-based model, rather than cases being treated as conflicts between collective 
parties.256 The latter principles, as we shall see, differed a great deal from those applicable 
in the community and chiefs’ courts. Added to these differences, the judge of the district 
court made it very clear that there were no formally established links with the community 
and chiefs’ courts because the latter did not enforce the law or settle criminal offences: for 
example, there were no formalised or routine procedures for transferring cases from the 
latter to the former or vice versa.257 By contrast, the judge stressed that whatever 
collaboration existed between the state and these non-state institutions in justice 
enforcement occurred indirectly through the sub-district levels of the PRM. By implication 
the district court collaborated only directly, as is formally established, with the state police 
– the PRM and the PIC (the criminal investigation unit of the police) – as well as with the 
                                                 
255 In cases in which the penalty is higher than two years of imprisonment such as rape, homicide and larger 
thefts, the cases should be sent to the provincial court.   
256 In Sussundenga no cases were encountered of legal representation of the victim or the accused, which can 
be linked to the costs related to using attorneys, but also to the very recent history of legal representation as in 
the country as such.  
257 Interview, Judge of the tribunal judicial, Sussundenga, 20 May 2004. 
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state attorney (the procurador). The procedure was that criminal cases were channelled 
through the posto or district level PRM. The latter was supposed to receive the victim(s) 
and on the basis of their statements make out a report, which was then analysed by the PIC 
and examined by the state attorney. If the state attorney decided that the case is a crime, the 
PIC forwarded the case to the tribunal judicial.  
Hence, from the perspective of the district court judge, the formal justice 
system was entirely separate from its informal variants. The PRM had quite another view of 
this when it came to policing and investigation activities. This could not be divorced from 
its recent presence in the rural hinterlands and its general lack of capacity and resources.     
 The PRM and the PIC were strongly represented in the district capital, and to a 
much lesser extent in administrative posts and localities, where police posts were only re-
established in the mid-1990s and 2000 respectively. Whereas in Dombe there was in 2004 
one PRM officer per 6,450 persons, in Matica there was one officer for 7,800 people.  At 
the level of administrative post, the police could investigate crimes because they were 
equipped with a PIC officer and a small cell for keeping suspects (officially up to 48 
hours). At locality level there was only one PRM officer, which could only do patrols and 
arrest suspects or offenders who had to be forwarded to the posto or district level. The lack 
of motorised transport meant that this work was done on foot or with the help of willing 
drivers passing by (distances were up to 40 km in Dombe and 25 km in Matica). A similar 
situation held for the police in Dombe whenever it needed to forward suspects to the district 
court (a distance of 80 km).  
According to the PRM officers themselves, the lack of transport and 
insufficient staff meant that the police could not control and investigate crime in the rural 
hinterlands on their own. Unlike the official court, sub-district level police officers 
explicitly claimed that they needed to directly collaborate with non-state actors. In Dombe 
this was coupled with the argument that the PRM faced problems of legitimacy and trust 
amongst the people living in the rural hinterlands, which often inhibited them from 
operating effectively. This aspect of legitimacy was intimately related to the many years of 
war and Renamo control of these areas, marked in the mid-1990s by pockets of resistance 
to the PRM (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
The sub-district levels of the PRM had dealt with this situation prior to the 
recognition of the community authorities by gradually relying more and more on local 
institutions and actors outside the law. For example, in the areas surrounding police posts it 
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had relied on a number of chiefs and sub-chiefs and their police assistants to locate 
criminals and suspects. In Matica this also included secretários. In Dombe, the police had 
also relied on a group of informal police messengers, referred to as Pessoas da Confiança 
(people whom the police feel they can trust), who were local residents that had previously 
formed part of Frelimo structures. These were used in the secret collection of information 
about criminals and potential troublemakers. After the recognition of the community 
authorities, the use of non-state actors was gradually expanded to the rural hinterlands. 
Besides chiefs and sub-chiefs, it included the formation in 2003 of a group of young men 
who were recruited by the police to help perform arrests and patrols. This group was 
referred to as policiamento comunitário (community policing), but only from 2005 did they 
become part of the official policy of community policing. Hence community policing was 
introduced informally before it became formalised.258 When the latter happened, the 
formation of groups of young men was expanded to the rural hinterlands. Each chief and 
sub-chief was asked to select eight individuals they considered trustworthy in performing 
policing tasks. Their task was to do shifts at the locality and posto police posts and, when 
not on shift, to work for the respective chief/sub-chief.  
This new set-up signalled the first concrete attempt to link the already existing 
police assistants attached to each chief, yet outside the law, with the official policy of 
community policing and Decree 15/2000.259 Before addressing how this system was 
organised by the PRM in relation to justice enforcement, it is, however, necessary to 
consider first the composition and principles of the non-state institutions. I begin with those 
created by the state. 
State created institutions: community courts and secretários 
By 2004-5, the community courts were not equally distributed across the territorial-
administrative divisions of the district. The five existing courts were situated in 
Sussundenga sede (head of district), Rotanda administrative post, Matica locality, Dombe 
sede and Matarara locality of Dombe. During 2004-5, two additional courts were 
established in the locality capitals of Javela and Muoco in Dombe. Whereas the courts in 
Sussundenga sede and Matica were a direct continuation of the former tribunais populares 
of the Frelimo party-state structures, the rest of the courts were created since 1999. The 
                                                 
258 According to the Dombe chief of police, he used the concept of policiamento comunitário because he had 
learnt about it at a donor-financed seminar in Chimoio when, until late 2002, he was working at district level.   
259 I discuss the Dombe PRM’s formation and use of community policing in more detail in Kyed 2007b.  
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reason for this late establishment was that the war had either meant that the former courts 
had been destroyed by the Renamo occupation, as in Dombe sede, or that the war had not 
permitted their expansion. The same could be said of the two secretários in Dombe sede, 
who were only instituted in 2001 as an element of implementing the Decree. For this reason 
the community courts (four in total) and the courts of secretários (two in total) were still in 
the process of establishing their operations during fieldwork. In Matica by contrast the 
history of government control meant that there were ten well-established courts of 
secretários as well as a community court which had operated since 1986 when it was 
established as a tribunal popular during villagisation.  
Irrespective of these differences, the community courts and the courts of secretários 
shared three common characteristics in both Dombe and Matica: first, they were, as 
opposed to the chiefs and sub-chiefs, only situated inside or very close to the semi-urban 
areas of the posto or locality administrative capitals; secondly, they were regarded by their 
members, local state officials and the population in general as integral components of the 
hurumende (state/government/Frelimo); and thirdly, they were composed entirely of people 
who had a history of activity in the old party -state structures or in the military (on the 
Frelimo side).   
 In Matica the community court this link to the hurumende was reflected by the fact 
that it’s sessions took place within the same building as the chefe of locality and the PRM. 
Its members comprised one presiding judge, who was the same person as the one elected by 
the Frelimo party in 1986, one police assistant and one secretary (escrivão). The latter was 
one of the secretários who were recognised in 2004. He had previously been a Frelimo 
secretary in Dombe before fleeing to Matica due to the Renamo occupation in 1991. 
In Dombe, the newly established community courts were situated next to the 
PRM and the state administrative offices. Its members had been (s)elected by the local state 
administration. This had in essence implied a re-activation of former members of the 
grupos dynamizadores (GDs) or others who had been active within the Frelimo structures 
before the Renamo occupation. For example the presiding judge in Dombe sede and two of 
the assistant judges were former GD members. The community court police officer had 
formerly been part of a popular vigilante group in Matica when he was a refugee there. The 
two secretários, Snr. José and Snr. Francisco, who were recognized in Dombe sede in 
2004, also had a long history within the party-state structures. During the 1980s, Snr. 
Francisco had been the commander of the military police in Dombe. Snr. José had been 
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first a secretário da celula, then the secretário of the centro de recuperacão for refugees 
and captives from Renamo zones (see Chapter 2), and lastly a secretário do bairro during 
his exile in Sussundenga sede.  
These mergers of the membership of the community and secretários’ courts 
with local state (s)election and party histories were also reflected in how members of the 
court viewed their positions in the wider system of justice enforcement. The secretários 
considered both the First Frelimo Secretary and the head of the administration to be their 
superiors. The community courts, on the other hand, presented themselves as institutionally 
linked, not to the official district court, but to the head of the local tiers of the state 
administration and the PRM. Their judges reported to the administration and the PRM, and 
received orientations from them. The respective state official (locality or posto) was also 
the person considered as having (and who in practice took) the authority to hire and fire 
community court personnel. In short, the members of these courts considered themselves a 
subordinate element of the hurumende. This was confirmed by local state officials. For 
example in Dombe they presented the reconstitution of the community and the secretários’ 
courts as an integral part of re-establishing and strengthening state institutions, and as 
noted, implicitly the Frelimo party.    
 The fact that these non-official courts were created by and aligned with the 
hurumende at sub-district levels may also explain why their self-proclaimed mandates and 
principles did not compete or overlap with the official state institutions. They did not claim 
to solve cases that are covered by the Penal Code, i.e. crimes settled by the official court in 
collaboration with the PRM/PIC. Also, they did not claim to impose punishments and use 
procedures that are considered the monopoly of state institutions, such as expulsion (prison) 
and the use of force in situations of resistance to arrest. Rather, the self-proclaimed 
principles and mandates of the community and secretários courts tended to overlap 
considerably with those of the chiefs, as well as with each other. Witchcraft (uroi) cases 
aside, they claimed to resolve all kinds of cases that had to do with disputes between and 
within families (for example, adultery, debt, marriage payment, divorce and land disputes). 
Possible verdicts covered fines to the judge, material compensation to victims and public 
work in the administrative capital. As opposed to the district court, they both charged 
parties in a case for hearings. However, the secretários tended to be slightly cheaper than 
the community courts, which related to the notion that the community courts were a more 
superior institution. Another difference from the official courts was that they resolved cases 
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on the basis of a collective rather than an individual model. This meant that the hearing of a 
case required the offended and accused to be represented by a testemunha (testimony) – 
usually by a senior member of the family. This testimony – or baba as it was called in chi-
Ndau and chi-Teve (literally ‘father’) – was regarded as someone who would take 
responsibility for the individuals’ statements as well as his/her verdict (such as pay the 
amount of compensation to the victim).  
Although the judge or the secretário always made the final judgement in 
cooperation with the assistant judges or council of elders, the courts allowed some room for 
the two (collective) parties to debate the verdict against the facts presented. This aspect of 
participation was partly made possible because judgements were not made on the basis of 
codified law, but by oral reference to rules and norms, which were negotiable. Another 
reason was that resolution followed the principle of reconciliation, which supports the aim 
of achieving some level of consensus between the parties. The community and secretários’ 
courts were also characterised by less formality and documentation than the official court. 
Although the judges of community courts did document the names of parties and the 
verdicts in a book kept by the judge, this did not include every word spoken. The level of 
written documentation in the secretários’ courts tended to be slightly lower, depending on 
the individual secretário.  
All of these principles described above resembled many of those of the chiefs’ 
banjas (courts). This also included the secretários’ use of a council of elders, which like the 
chiefs, they labelled madodas. By implication, there was a co-existence of a quite large 
number of potentially competing non-state institutions within the same territorial spaces, 
also claimed by chiefs or sub-chiefs. For example, in the small area of Dombe sede, which 
falls within Chief Dombe’s area of the jurisdiction, state recognition of secretários and the 
re-establishment of the community court resulted in the existence of no less than six courts 
by 2004 (1 banja of the chief, 2 banjas of sub-chiefs, 1 community court and 2 courts of 
secretarios). The same figure applied to the locality capital of Matica (1 community court, 
1 banja of a sub-chief and 4 of secretários). Each of these held court sessions 1-2 days a 
week. In the rural hinterlands, however, chiefs, sub-chiefs and wadzi-nyanga were alone, 
and also covered other principles that the state-created courts, just described.   
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The courts of chiefs and sub-chiefs 
As opposed to the community courts and secretários, the banjas (courts) of chiefs and sub-
chiefs were more evenly dispersed across the territory. With the exception of Chief Dombe, 
they were located in the rural hinterlands and at the homesteads of the chief or sub-chief. In 
2004-5 there were 48 banjas in Dombe (8 of chiefs, 16 of chefe do grupo/sabuku and 24 of 
chefe da povoação/saguta). In Matica there were 6 banjas (2 of chefe do grupo/sabuku and 
4 of chefe da povoação/saguta).  
 Apart from the chief or sub-chief, the composition of the banjas included the 
council of elders (madodas), ranging from four to ten members, one to three ma-auxilliares 
(police assistants of chiefs), and in some cases a secretary (always a literate person). All the 
members of the banjas were exclusively men, aside from the Queen Gudza, but she never 
acted as a judge, just listened. As a general rule the madodas took a leading role in hearing 
the parties to a case and in proposing resolutions. The chief played the role of authorising 
the final judgement, but as a rule was rather inactive during the hearings. This differed from 
the community court judge. It indicated, according to the chiefs, a higher decree of power-
sharing with the madodas, who were held to possess knowledge of the rules and norms of 
the chieftaincy and of representing the different family lineages inhabiting it. Thus the role 
of the madodas, it was held, was to ensure a fair treatment of all the families within the 
nyaka, and not privileging the chief and his immediate piers.    
The function of the ma-auxilliares was to await instructions if a person or 
persons in a case were to be notified or arrested (with the use of rope) in order to appear in 
the banja. For this task, the ma-auxilliares were paid Mzm 10,000 to 50,000 (or an 
equivalent in kind) by those notified or arrested. In a witchcraft case, they could also be 
sent with the parties to a nyanga if the accused did not plead guilty. In these situations the 
police assistant was a baba (testimony) to the verdict made by the nyanga (i.e. whether the 
accused was guilty of witchcraft or not). For this task, the police assistants were also paid 
by the two parties, the amount depending on the distance from the nyanga to the banja 
(MZM 10,000-50,000). The police assistants were aged between twenty and forty and had 
been chosen by the chief or sub-chief in collaboration with the madodas. As a rule they had 
to be trustworthy and physically strong natives of the area, preferably a son or close relative 
of a madoda and with prospects of becoming a madoda in the future. However, around one 
third of the ma-auxilliares in fact descended from other areas as a result of war-related 
migration. In Dombe this applied in particular to police assistants chosen against their 
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history as Renamo combatants or mujhibas. This aspect marked a key difference from the 
Frelimo-related histories of the members of community and secretários’ courts.     
The role of the secretary, where these in fact existed, was to write down the 
main particulars of each case and the names of the parties. This level of written 
documentation, resembling the community courts, was applied by the banjas of the chiefs 
and sub-chiefs, who had some level of education (sub-chiefs Boupua, Ganda, Struba and 
Pampanissa and Chief Sambanhe). In the remaining banjas, the level of documentation was 
confined to letters notifying other banjas to accept a case.  
The main principles of resolution in the banjas had much in common with the 
community and secretários courts, such as the collective-based representation, the 
application of non-codified rules, and room for the parties to participate in the negotiation 
of verdicts that related to compensation payments and reconciliation. Payment for a 
resolution was also required from both parties, ranging from Mzm 25,000 to 75,000, with 
the banjas of sub-chiefs being slightly cheaper than those of the chiefs. This marked out the 
hierarchy between chiefs and sub-chiefs, and also reflected the fact that the banjas of the 
chiefs were seen as appeal institutions in cases when sub-chiefs failed to arrive at a 
settlement.260  
Significantly, the banjas of the chiefs and sub-chiefs adhered to three main 
principles that differed from the community and secretários’ courts. First, they claimed to 
be capable of settling all types of conflict and transgression. This included criminal 
offences according to the Penal Code (for example, theft, physical assault, arson), all those 
cases covered by the other non-state courts (for example, adultery, marriage payments), and 
uroi (witchcraft). In addition, they covered transgressions of particular rules referred to as 
mutemo yo passe chigare (the rules or traditions of the ancestral spirits). These extended 
beyond those transgressions dealt with by the other non-state institutions, but overlapped 
with some of those considered criminal offences in the penal code (for example, homicide). 
Hence as a matter of principle the banjas potentially competed not merely with the other 
non-state courts, but also with the official justice system in prosecuting criminal offences 
and with the PRM in arresting and policing criminal offenders. This aspect of competition 
with the official state institutions also related to the second distinguishing feature of the 
                                                 
260 In all banjas the payments received for resolving cases was shared between the chiefs (fifty per cent) and 
the madodas (and secretário, if any).  
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banjas: the use of punishments that went beyond public work and material compensation to 
victims.  
Punishments applied in the banjas could also include expulsion from the 
chieftaincy, fines to the chief and, in the case of Dombe, corporal punishment. The 
application of physical force and expulsion was regarded as the monopoly of the paramount 
chiefs, which marked out their superior or sovereign authority vis-à-vis inferior sub-chiefs. 
Force could be used to discipline people misbehaving in the banja, when the victim 
explicitly asked for such a verdict, or when the accused resisted arrest. Expulsion was the 
harshest form of punishment a banja could issue and was as a matter of principle very 
rarely enforced: it could be imposed only in situations where a person threatened the 
authority of a chief or repeatedly transgressed the mutemo yo passe chigare and failed to 
repair the wrong he or she had done. This aspect of transgressing the mutemo yo passe 
chigare brings me to the third significant difference between the banjas and the community 
and secretários’ courts.  
Like the Penal Code in the official district court, the mutemo yo passe chigare 
represented a set of non-negotiable rules, attached to a set of non-negotiable verdicts. It 
included transgressions such as violating sacred places, having intercourse in the bush, 
insulting the chief, the spilling of blood on the land (i.e. physical aggressions), and the 
taking of life either physically or invisibly by means of uroi and vulí (evil spirits). These 
transgressions were described as the most severe forms of delinquency because they 
violated the very nyaka itself (the land of the ancestral spirits). During the settlement of 
such transgressions there was no room for the offender or victims to participate in 
negotiating a verdict, as was otherwise the norm in relation to other cases (such as theft, 
adultery, land disputes and marriage payments). It was in relation to these transgressions 
that a fixed fine to the chiefs was imposed (Mzm 20,000-200,000). According to the chiefs 
this symbolised an act of apology to the ancestral spirits. If such fines were not paid, it 
could cause the spirits to act malevolently, resulting in misfortune for the whole 
chieftaincy. In the case of taking life (physically or invisibly), the offender was also 
required to pay a non-negotiable sum (in 2004-5 1.5 million meticais) to the family of the 
victim, which was referred to as soro u mundo (price for life). This symbolised a pardon to 
 236
the spirit of the diseased. If not paid it could cause future misfortune for the family of the 
offender.261  
These non-negotiable rules and chiefs’ impositions of force and expulsions 
represented significant areas of overlap with the official state institutions. Although the 
rules were uncodified, being defined differently than and outside state law, they underlined 
practices that competed with the state’s sovereign claim to have a monopoly of force and on 
decisions regarding life, death and exclusion of members from the community. This 
provided a significant difference from the community and secretários’ courts. Added to this 
difference was the banjas’ significant role in settling cases of uroi and in being able to deal 
with the link between the visible and invisible dimensions of delinquency that most people 
in Matica and Dombe subscribed to. This brings me to the role of the wadzi-nyanga.  
Wadzi-nyanga and AMETRAMO  
In Matica and Dombe the wadzi-nyanga comprised an indispensable institution in 
facilitating the resolution of uroi cases, which amounted to over half of the cases settled by 
the banjas.262 According to informants these cases received by chiefs or sub-chiefs covered 
only a minority of the manifestations of uroi, with the majority being treated alone by the 
wadzi-nyanga. Hence the wadzi-nyanga could be considered a partly autonomous 
institution vis-à-vis the chiefs, and indeed a very powerful and numerous one: for example, 
in Dombe there were no less than 122 wadzi-nyanga registered as members of 
AMETRAMO, and according to its president there were about as many who were not 
members. The powerful role of the wadzi-nyanga had to do with the scope and character of 
uroi itself.  
Uroi (literally ‘to do evil’) belongs to the domain of the invisible, yet is 
always linked to visible manifestations. In principle all manifestations of illness, death, 
misfortune and madness can be explained as uroi.263 However, whereas the original 
perpetrator of these manifestations, the muroi (equivalent to the word ‘witch’ or ‘sorcerer’ 
in English), can be traced back to a person who is known to the victim, the link between the 
                                                 
261 I return to such cases in Chapter 8, as well as how they relate to people’s general notion of a link between 
visible and invisible dimensions of delinquency and misfortune.   
262 This high amount of uroi cases is based on conversations I had with chiefs and rural residents. It is also 
confirmed by the cases I came across during fieldwork. These indicated that 60-70% of the cases settled by 
the banjas were defined as uroi (on this, see further, Chapter 8) 
263 This aspect of uroi has led scholars to regard witchcraft as a way of explaining the inexplicable. As such, it 
can be considered an attempt to answer the question of ‘why’ the visible manifestations of illness and 
misfortune afflict one person and not another (Evans-Prichard 1937; Moore and Sanders 2001).  
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muroi and the sources of uroi is always invisible to the naked eye of an ordinary person.264 
The motives behind uroi may nonetheless vary from being the result of an umroi who “just 
makes bad without reason” to uroi as the result of a disagreement or envy between two 
parties, within a family or between families (for example, over land, debt, theft and 
adultery). To inflict the manifestations of uroi on another person the immediate perpetrator 
need not be an umroi, but he or she would need the ‘help’ of someone who is. This could 
take the form of the person explicitly consulting (and paying) an umroi or merely uttering 
an intention to use uroi, which could then be appropriated by an umroi without the person 
concerned knowing it. In this sense, to resolve cases of uroi could both be an aspect of 
merely dealing with an umroi, but also an aspect of restoring social relationships between 
parties who for various reasons resorted, consciously or unconsciously, to the assistance of 
a muroi in dealing with a specific problem. These different aspects of uroi means that 
inflictions cannot be resolved by way of (material) evidence and a witness-based model of 
resolution such as in the official courts, nor can it be resolved by way of argumentation as 
in the banjas of chiefs. It requires the assistance of wadzi-nyanga, who in the areas of 
fieldwork had a monopoly over the means to reveal the invisible sources of uroi through 
divination (cuxo cuxo). They could also cure the harm inflicted on persons through 
exorcism or by returning the sources of uroi to the perpetrator.265  
However, the role of wadzi-nyanga extended beyond curing illnesses 
allegedly caused by uroi. Many also claimed to be capable of facilitating the resolution of 
the visible transgressions dealt with by the non-state courts (such as adultery) and covered 
by the Penal Code, such as theft, arson and homicide.266 They could do this by revealing 
the unknown perpetrators through divination and by ‘returning’ misfortune to them so that 
they would repair what they had done wrong. For example, in cases of theft or debt the 
nyanga could make the perpetrator fall sick so that he would return the stolen items or pay 
the debt when he realized, after consulting a nyanga, that his sickness was due to the 
misfortune he had caused the victim. Thus by invisible means, the wadzi-nyanga could help 
                                                 
264 Sources of uroi could be invisible vulí (a bad spirit that can be ‘sent’ by a person to possess another), or 
visible amulets and bio-medicine that were accompanied by a spell, which activates the material items that are 
placed in or close to the intended victim. 
265 Cuxo cuxo is the word used in Chi-Ndau and Chi-Teve for divination. In all the cases I observed, it 
involved the throwing of smaller animal bones. By reading the positioning of the different types of bone, the 
nyanga could answer the problems afflicting those who had consulted him, as well as reveal its original 
source.  
266 Added to the functions related to conflict resolution directly, some wadzi-nyanga were also known to be 
able, using spells and medicine, to ensure different fortunes, such as material wealth, power and access to 
jobs. Others also claimed to be able to protect people from misfortune, theft and assaults – in short, security.  
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settle visible transgressions and ensure material reparation. Such forms of resolution were 
referred to as justiça (‘justice’ in Portuguese) or mapipi (’uroi with a reason’ or a justifiable 
form of counter-witchcraft). I return to these aspects in more detail in Chapter 8. Here it 
suffice to note that the clever nyanga could play a role in the resolution of a wide spectrum 
of cases that were not limited to the invisible realm of uroi, not recognised by law. Their 
specific power lay in the fact that they were capable of linking the visible and invisible 
dimensions of transgressions and conflicts that formed part of the world view of most 
people in Dombe and Matica. For this reason, the wadzi-nyanga were also a significant 
institution of appeal for the banjas.  
It should be noted that chiefs only received uroi cases when victims chose to 
publicly accuse the perpetrator revealed by a nyanga and when they wanted compensation. 
In principle the latter could only be enforced by a banja. As a rule, this covered the cases in 
which uroi resulted in a death or when a nyanga held that the perpetrator needed to pay a 
fine to the victim in order for the latter to be cured. During the resolution at a banja the 
wadzi-nyanga were resorted to when the accused did not plead guilty. Given the invisible 
dimension of uroi, divination by a nyanga was used as a kind of evidence to support a 
resolution. The wadzi-nyanga were in this sense indispensable actors, both in the process 
before the case arrived to the banja (i.e. in identifying a case as uroi and in revealing its 
source), and in the resolution process itself (i.e. in providing evidence of uroi). Overall this 
also meant that the knowledge of uroi claimed by the wadzi-nyanga was an intrinsic part of 
keeping uroi alive: only the wadzi-nyanga could prove that an illness or death was caused 
by uroi.267  
This power of wadzi-nyanga also comprised a very significant economy of its 
own. All consultations with wadzi-nyanga were chargeable, ranging from MZM 40,000 to 
3 million per party consulted. Given the high amount of uroi cases, it is therefore not 
surprising that the wadzi-nyanga were amongst the wealthiest people I met in Dombe and 
Matica. The most outstanding was the Dombe president of AMETRAMO, whose material 
wealth extended even beyond that of the richest businessman in Dombe.268 In Dombe the 
economy and power of wadzi-nyanga also comprised a significant aspect of competition 
                                                 
267 This knowledge of the wadzi-nyanga led some of my informants to call them mambo we muroi (‘the chief 
of sorcerers’). The label was used to describe how a nyanga shared the same body of knowledge as the muroi, 
this enabling him to identify and treat uroi. Hence the borderline between umroi and nyanga was precarious.  
268 The president of AMETRAMO was famous beyond Dombe, regularly going to South Africa, where he 
treated high-ranking ANC members, including two governors. He also received visitors from South Africa, 
Malawi, Maputo and Zimbabwe, who paid him dearly for the results he provided: security, wealth, fertility 
and power.    
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within the domain of conflict resolution. For example, during 2004-5 the growing members 
of AMETRAMO were beginning to challenge chiefs’ role in settling the payment of fines 
in uroi cases. Its president argued that it was AMETRAMO, not the chiefs, who had the 
legal mandate to settle uroi cases publicly. Paradoxically, taking into account the fact that 
uroi is outside the law, he justified this by referring to the state law recognising traditional 
healers.269 As a result, the chiefs faced not only potential competition from the official state 
and state-created courts, but also from their historically related and indispensable 
‘counterparts’, the wadzi-nyanga, who were now also partly inside the law.  
In conclusion, this section has pointed to the co-existence of a multiplicity of 
institutions inside and outside the law, which, according to different but partly overlapping 
mandates and principles, engaged in resolving conflicts, dealing with trespassers, enforcing 
justice and thus also in (re)producing different rules and norms. Most profoundly, the 
banjas of the chiefs laid claims to rules and principles that underlined practices of 
authority, which challenged the official state institutions’ claim to a monopoly on the use of 
force and the making of decisions on life, death and expulsion. This did not concern the 
state-created courts, which only potentially competed with the banjas. How the local tiers 
of the PRM dealt with these overlaps and areas of competition is dealt with next. 
  
3. Models for Practice: State Incorporation and Separation 
 
The grey zones of codified law and the pluralism of local institutions, outlined in the 
previous two sections, did not prevent local state officials from trying to organise the wider 
landscape of institutions. On the contrary, the local tiers of the PRM invested enormous 
energy in publicly communicating and enforcing a secondary body of law that both filled 
out the grey zones of codified law and expanded codified law by recognising also some of 
                                                 
269 Another growing type of institution competing over the domain covered by the wadzi-nyanga was the 
churches, which had grown tremendously since the war. While the majority – with the exception of one 
church known as Zione – officially disregarded the existence of uroi, in the practices of regulating behaviour 
and of dealing with evil forces, there were numerous overlaps with the wadzi-nyanga. This was exemplified 
by the growing number of prophets, who, like the wadzi-nyanga, consulted people in cases of illness, 
misfortune or possession by demons, using divination and healing. The prophets of Johane Marange and 
Sabhata were also known for exorcism. The level of de facto competition between prophets and wadzi-nyanga 
was complex, and unfortunately the time frame of the fieldwork did not permit me to go more deeply into this 
question. However, I did come across cases of uroi in a banja where the victim had visited both a prophet and 
wadzi-nyanga before ending in court. An important difference between prophets and wadzi-nyanga was that 
the former did not compete with the official justice system because they were not capable of engaging with 
the identification and treatment of criminal acts such as theft, arson and homicide.  
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those institutions and practices that existed outside the law. This consisted of a set of 
uncodified rules, prohibitions and obligations that centred on establishing a system linking 
the different justice enforcement and policing actors to each other and to the PRM. In the 
introduction to this chapter, I referred to this secondary body of law as ‘models for practice’ 
to indicate that it implied not a simple recognition of the self-proclaimed mandates of the 
non-state institutions described in Section 2, but also an attempt by the PRM to regulate, 
reorganise and redefine them.  
Resembling the public representations of state officials at the recognition 
ceremonies, the ‘models for practice’ were overall characterised by both an incorporation 
of non-state authorities under the local state’s command hierarchy and a hierarchical 
separation of these authorities from an exclusive domain of state authority. This kind of 
boundary-marking between different domains of authority was captured by three sets of 
rules, which are dealt with separately below: First, a set of rules that underlined juridical-
institutional boundaries, defined on the basis of the types of transgressions that each 
institution was permitted to settle in accordance with the PRM’s own classification of three 
categories of cases (criminal, social, traditional); secondly, a set of procedures for how the 
different categories of cases should be passed between the hierarchy of institutions, and 
what punishments they were allowed to issue, and: thirdly, a set of prohibitions, obligations 
and sanctions for how chiefs/sub-chiefs should assist the PRM in policing activities. The 
force behind these three sets of rules was that, although never written down nor mirroring 
codified law, they were publicly communicated by the local tiers of the PRM as lei do 
estado (state law). Like state law they were also attached to the threat of sanctions 
enforceable by the state. This status of the models for practice as the law was made possible 
by the oral character of the communication of law in the areas of fieldwork. This for 
example took place at public meetings in the chieftaincies and at closer meetings between 
the PRM and the non-state authorities in the administrative capitals. The immediate 
implication of this oral aspect was that it left local state officials with a monopoly on 
making and remaking the ‘law’, that is beyond codified or official law.   
The question is why the PRM invested so much energy in organising the 
institutional landscape of policing and justice enforcement, including outside the law, and 
what stakes lay behind the communication of the un-codified rules. Another is what the 
PRM’s ‘models for practice’ implied for the position and authority of chiefs. These 
questions are central to this section. Overall, I suggest, the ‘models for practice’ can be seen 
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as a de facto, but localised, state recognition of ‘legal pluralism’ – i.e. the existence of a 
plurality of legal or normative orders and spaces of justice enforcement within the same 
political organisation (see von Benda-Beckmann 1997; Griffiths 1986). However, the issue 
at stake for the local tiers of the PRM went beyond this. The boundaries drawn between 
distinct domains of authority, I suggest, centred specifically on attempts to claim and 
constitute state sovereignty within a context of competing forms of “local sovereign power” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 30). This was exemplified by rules that criminalised those 
claims and practices of chiefly authority, outlined in Section 2, which challenged the state 
police’ claim to a monopoly on the use of force and on making final decisions on the ‘land’, 
the ‘citizen body’ and ‘public authority’.  
Sovereign power, it should be noted, is conceptualised here not exclusively as 
formal state sovereignty vested in the constitution and in international recognition of the 
self-determination of nation states. It is also approached as particular claims and practices 
that may be a dimension of different forms of authority, including also non-state ones 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Schmitt 1985; Agamben 1998, 2000). This encompasses the 
claim to superior authority within a given political organisation (whether a nation state or a 
chieftaincy), that is, to make final decisions on central areas of social life. By implication it 
also covers the capacity to define and enforce the normal situation of a particular order, i.e. 
the rules applicable, and the exception here to, i.e. to suspend the rules when the order is 
threatened. Based on this definition, I suggest, the local police’s appropriation of the 
authority to make and remake the ‘law’, implied that the ‘models for practice’ not only 
underlined the constitution of state sovereignty in the abstract. More specifically it 
positioned the local tiers of the PRM as a kind of local sovereign power in relation to their 
non-state counterparts. Below we begin with how this was marked by the first set of un-
codified rules of the PRM: the making of a juridical-institutional boundary.   
Juridical-institutional incorporation and separation 
The widespread idea among the people in Matica and Dombe, that state recognition 
indicated the chiefs becoming the extended arm of the hurumende and being subjected to its 
orders had become a reality by 2004. At least this was observable in the public encounters 
between the local state officials and the chiefs, as well as evident in the rules communicated 
by the state officials. For example at public meetings in the chieftaincies local state officials 
communicated the law and programmes of the government and made clear that chiefs were 
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responsible for adhering to these and ensuring that they materialised. The closed monthly 
meetings held in the locality and posto capitals between state officials and community 
authorities also indicated the de facto incorporation of the chiefs within the command 
hierarchy of the state administration. Here the chiefs delivered taxes, received orders to 
perform particular tasks and were required to record all problems in their areas, according 
to what the local state officials defined as of state interest (for example, troublemakers, 
non-tax-payers, food insecurity and a infrastructural problems). Information from below 
was recorded by the local state official and forwarded to the district administration. 
Information from above was disseminated downwards by the non-state authorities. In short, 
as secretários had been for some time, the chiefs were drawn into the state’s hierarchical 
system of top-down command lines and of upward recording of occurrences in areas that 
were beyond the immediate purview of the local state officials.  
A similar kind of state incorporation characterised the PRM’s organisation of 
the fields of policing and justice enforcement. It also went beyond this. Incorporation 
within the state police hierarchy was accompanied by rules prescribing a separation of 
chiefs from the particular domain of state police authority. This separation was marked by 
the first set of rules that prescribed juridical-institutional boundaries between the 
jurisdictions of the state and the different non-state authorities engaged in settling cases and 
dealing with trespassers. These boundaries were defined according to the PRM’s 
classification of three categories of cases: criminal, social and traditional transgressions. 
Only the official state institutions were permitted to settle the criminal cases. The banjas of 
the chiefs had the exclusive authority to settle the traditional cases, and the social cases 
were to be settled by chiefs, community courts or the secretários. Failing to abide by these 
separate categories, the chiefs and others were told by the PRM, would be treated as 
criminal offences – i.e. as law-breaking. This aspect reflected how the PRM communicated 
the ‘models for practice’ as having the status of official state law, albeit this was not 
exclusively the case. They also extended beyond codified state law.  
 According to the chief of police in Dombe, the aim of fixing separate 
categories of cases was to ensure that “all questions of crime are the monopoly of the 
police….and that all cases and conflicts that are not crime, such as the social and traditional 
cases, should be taken care of by the régulos, the secretários and the community courts”.270 
This comment indicates how the ‘models for practice’ were communicated to reconstitute 
                                                 
270 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 31 August 2004.  
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not only the state institutions’ sovereign authority to settle crime, but also to ensure that 
only those authorities that were recognised by the local police handled conflicts and 
misconduct. At public police meetings this was accompanied by a general prohibition on 
any kind of self-redress and order-enforcement outside the system recognised and defined 
by the local police. This was captured in repeated statements by PRM officers, such as: 
“according to the law you [the general population] are prohibited from settling cases on 
your own. It is your obligation to take your problems and cases…also those minor disputes, 
to your chiefs, the secretário or the community court.” This prohibition on self-redress can 
be seen as a kind of de facto recognition and bolstering of the authority of the non-state 
institutions by the PRM. Taking a closer look at how the PRM defined criminal, traditional 
and social cases, however, reveals that this kind of recognition was accompanied by a re-
definition of ‘the traditional’, the mutemo yo passe chigare, and by implication a 
criminalisation of certain practices of chiefly authority.         
The PRM’s definition of criminal cases, claimed to be the monopoly of state 
institutions to decide, covered those acts that violated state property, including the land, and 
that inflicted violence on human bodies.271 In short, this meant acts that were physically 
destructive, covering inter alia homicide, fights in which blood is spilt, rape, stabbings, 
larger thefts involving the use of weapons and violence, the use and production of drugs 
and arson. All these acts were defined by the PRM officers as crimes contra o estado 
(crimes against the state) and thus as punishable by the state, and the state alone. These 
categories of transgressions corresponded to the Penal Code, the so-called public crimes, 
but to these the local tiers of the PRM added a special category of desobediência às 
autoridades (disobedience of the authorities), covering also the non-state authorities.272 
Legally this category only covers slander against and disobedience of state authorities. In 
Matica and Dombe, however, the local tiers of the PRM claimed the authority to prosecute 
offenders of this category of “crime against the state” when it regarded disobedience of 
chiefs and the other non-state authorities.273 This exemplified one aspect of the PRM’s 
                                                 
271 In Mozambique all land is still state property, albeit it can be leased out to private owners for a 99 year 
period.  
272 In judicial language crimes públicos or public crimes means that prosecution is independent of the victim 
and where it is the state that lays the charges. These crimes also cover the highest penalties. They are different 
from crimes particulares (particular crimes) – such as minor slander and minor thefts – which, for prosecution 
by the formal court, depend on the victim taking the case to court him- or herself (personal communication, 
lawyer in Chimoio, August 2005).  
273 In Dombe, for example, the chiefs were told that, if a person notified by the chief failed to show up at a 
banja or for a hearing at the PRM post, then the chief had the right to accuse this person of disobedience of 
the authorities, an accusation that s/he had to forward to the PRM in Dombe sede.  
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expansion of official criminal law into a secondary body of rules, that is, here by publicly 
taking on the “tariff of guaranteeing the authority of the régulo.”274 This local state 
protection of chiefly authority can be viewed as a benign aspect of the PRM’s recognition 
of the chiefs as part of the state apparatus. From the perspective of chiefs it nonetheless 
reflected an attempt by the state police to monopolise decisions regarding matters of 
authority. The same can be said of the PRM’s monopolisation on settling the other criminal 
acts outlined above, and of strictly prohibiting the chiefs from doing so.  
The definitions of criminal cases overlapped considerably with those elements 
of the mutemo yo passe chigare, which underpinned the chiefs’ authority to make decisions 
on the taking of life, insulting of chiefly authority, the spilling of blood and in general the 
violation of the nyaka as a whole. An important consequence of the claim to a state 
monopoly on settling “crimes against the state”, was that the PRM re-defined what counted 
as “traditional” cases: the category covered, according to the PRM, those kinds of conduct 
that chiefs considered to be against “the tradition” (mutemo), but excluded those acts 
defined as a “crime against the state”. If this can be seen as a general affirmation of 
codified state-law, then the PRM also defined uroi as part of the category of traditional 
cases. Hence, while the PRM criminalised the authority of the chiefs to enforce significant 
elements of mutemo yo passe chigare, it de facto recognised uroi. In doing so, the PRM 
also recognised the role of the wadzi-nyanga as an institution of appeal in the settlement of 
uroi cases by the banjas. This recognition of uroi, the banjas and the wadzi-nyanga 
reflected a key characteristic of the PRM’s extra-legal rules:  they recognised institutions 
and practices outside the codified law, but at the same time prohibiting chiefs from entering 
the domain of what the PRM defined as inside the law. Broadly speaking the PRM’s rules 
thus marked a boundary between the domains of traditional and (local) state authority. This 
was accompanied by a rule that prohibited the other non-state institutions from settling 
what the PRM defined as traditional cases.  
According to the PRM, traditional cases were the monopoly of the banjas of 
the chiefs. Community and secretários’ courts were only permitted to solve the so-called 
social cases. They were thus both distinguished from the official state institutions and the 
chiefs. Social cases were defined by the PRM as conflicts and minor transgressions not 
covered by the category of “crimes against the state”, and which could, but need not, end up 
in the official district court: adultery, beatings without bleeding, minor threats and slander, 
                                                 
274 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 26 September 2005.  
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divorce or marriage payments, debt, and land disputes between neighbours. This definition 
corresponded with the self-proclaimed mandates of the community and secretários’ courts. 
As such the PRM did not as a matter of principle criminalise any of the practices of these 
state-created institutions. By allowing chiefs and sub-chiefs to settle social cases too, the 
PRM nonetheless reproduced potential areas of competition between the three non-state 
institutions. This was addressed by the second set of rules communicated by the PRM.    
Procedures: hierarchies, transfers and permissible punishments  
The second set of rules of the PRM’s models for practice comprised procedures for how the 
different courts should transfer the three categories of cases within the system of local 
institutions. They also covered procedures for settling cases such as permissible 
punishments, written documentation and costs. As depicted in Figure 7.3, the local tiers of 
the PRM communicated a hierarchical system that linked the different courts at sub-district 
level to each other and to the local tiers of the PRM. The arrows reflect the rules for the 
transfer of the three different categories of cases, as defined by the PRM. As shown, he 
PRM recognised the three-tier chiefly hierarchy (mambo/régulo, sabuko/chefe do grupo 
and saguto/chefe da povoação) in respect of traditional cases, as well as the chiefs’ 
exclusive link to the wadzi-nyanga. On the other hand, the banjas of the chiefs and 
secretários were made inferior to the community courts when it came to the settling of 
social cases. This meant that community courts were given the authority to make final 
decisions on social cases and that they were considered higher institutions of appeal. 
Figure 7.3: Institutional hierarchy and transfers of cases.  
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Figure 7.3. also reflects how the ‘models for practice’ supported a relatively closed system 
of justice enforcement and crime-control at the sub-district level. All criminal cases should 
be sent directly to the closest PRM office at locality or posto level, since these had the sole 
authority to decide whether these should be forwarded to the official district court. Chiefs 
were thus prohibited from forwarding criminal offences directly to the district level police 
or to the district court. Similarly, the PRM’s rules also reproduced an institutional 
separation between the community courts and the district court by discouraging community 
courts and their clients from directly forwarding social cases to the district. This closed 
system had the implication of positioned the local tiers of the PRM as the only institutional 
link with the district. Given that this was prescribed by the local police’s own extra-legal 
rules it also positioned the local police as the regulator of and superior authority over the 
non-state institutions.  
The self-positioning of the local tiers of the PRM as regulator of the sub-
district level system of justice enforcement was also underlined by a set of rules for 
regulating the prices of the non-state courts and how cases should be transferred and 
documented. The latter included a standardisation of the use of written documentation. The 
non-state authorities were required to document each case and to write notifications 
(notificações) systematically when transferring a case to another court or to the PRM, 
including the names of the accused and victims, the verdict issued and a general description 
of the case. This system of documentation was intended to ensure that each authority in the 
chain of transfers had knowledge of the initial resolution, the location of a case and the 
histories of offenders to which they could return for additional information. For the PRM it 
also provided a system of gathering information that could be put to use in tracking down 
troublemakers and investigating crimes. It also provided the PRM with a means to control 
whether the non-state institutions were adhering to the PRM’s rules, such as the types of 
cases they were permitted to settle and the verdicts they were allowed to issue. In short, the 
rules were intended to enable the local police to further regulate its non-state counterparts.   
Finally, the PRM communicated a set of rules for permissible punishments. 
The recognised authorities were allowed to enforce public work and monetary 
compensation, but they were strictly prohibited from using any kind of corporal 
punishment, physical discipline or expulsion. This had particular consequences for the 
chiefs, whose self-proclaimed mandates covered these latter kinds of punishments. Police 
officers were aware of this and therefore at public meetings particularly stressed: “the 
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régulo can no longer use force of any kind…this is against the law…it is a crime…and your 
régulo will be disciplined by the police if he does this.”275 The application of force by 
chiefs, as noted in Section 2, was a significant marker of a chiefs’ superior authority, as 
well as a means to regulate the behaviour of those who insulted that authority. Thus the 
prohibition can be seen as another element of criminalising those aspects of chiefly 
authority enforcement that had to do with any form of physical or bodily violations and 
disobedience of authority – i.e. final decisions on the ‘citizen-body’ and ‘authority’. These 
were claimed the monopoly of the (local) state-police. Similar, restrictions were placed on 
chiefs’ authority to expel people from the chieftaincy, but this was more precarious. The 
PRM fully prohibited chiefs from expelling people who had committed “crimes against the 
state” (including disobedience of chiefs), but allowed them to ban people who had 
repeatedly been charged with what the PRM defined as ‘traditional cases’ (such as uroi). 
This latter mandate was not recognised by law, and as such provided another example of 
how the extra-legal rules of the PRM recognised practices outside the law. To ban people 
by chiefs, nonetheless required prior authorisation from a chief of police. By implication, 
the restrictions placed on chiefs’ capacity to exclude people from the chieftaincy equally 
granted the local tiers of the PRM the final authority to regulate decisions on who were 
worthy and unworthy members of the chieftaincies. Because this was partially outside the 
official law, it marked how the models for practice centred on the self-positioning of the 
local police as a kind of local sovereign power. It imbued the local police not only with the 
monopoly on making decisions on bodily violations, and on regulating non-state authority, 
but also on including and excluding people from the local community. This underpinned a 
partial and restricted recognition of chiefly authority, which as addressed next was highly 
precarious for chiefs.  
The regulation of chiefs in policing and crime control 
In accordance with Article 5 in the regulation of Decree 15/2000, chiefs were obliged by 
the local tiers of the police to inspect and locate criminals or suspects and to forward this 
information to the PRM. However, the third set of rules communicated by the PRM went 
way beyond this article, de facto positioning chiefs and sub-chiefs as the extended arm of 
the PRM itself in the rural hinterlands. In contrast to Decree 15/2000, the PRM also obliged 
chiefs to arrest law-breakers and suspects and bring them to the police station. Refraining 
                                                 
275 Extract from speech by the Dombe chief of police at a police meeting in the chieftaincy of Chibue, 18 
August 2004.  
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from collaborating with the police in these ways would be regarded as a crime, the chiefs 
were told. The same applied to concealing information about criminals. Chiefs were also 
allowed to tie up criminals or suspects if they resisted arrest, but to use force that resulted in 
physical injuries would be regarded a crime. Only the PRM officers, chiefs were told, were 
allowed to use force. In these activities, the PRM recognized the role of the police 
assistants of chiefs (ma-auxilliares) in detaining and handing over violators, but when they 
dealt with criminals they were prohibited from receiving the usual payment from 
trespassers.  
The point is that chiefs were, as a matter of obligation, drawn into the PRM’s 
domain of crime control and law-enforcement. This included also the outsourcing of 
practices and the recognition of chiefly police assistants that lay outside the codified law. 
At the same time chiefs were set apart from the state police, as marked, for example, by the 
PRM’s claim to a monopoly of force. Outsourcing was accompanied by criminalisation. 
Chiefs were considered law-breakers if they did not assist the police and also if they 
challenged the particular mandates of the (local) state police. This was backed by the threat 
of a set of local state-enforced sanctions that were equally outside the law: i.e. neither 
Decree 15/2000 nor any other law included a list of sanctions for disobedient community 
authorities.276 The implication of this for chiefs’ position vis-à-vis the state police was 
precarious. The PRM’s rules placed chiefs in an anomalous position as state agents, but not 
really as the state. They were strictly obliged to act as if they were the state police in spaces 
outside the physical presence and purview of the PRM, yet to do so without enjoying 
adequately sanctioned sovereign authority. This reflected how the PRM’s reliance on chiefs 
to perform policing tasks was predicated upon a strict regulation of the conduct of the 
chiefs themselves. As also explained by a chief of police, this was enabled by state 
recognition, i.e. by incorporating the chiefs under the superior authority of the state and the 
‘law’:  
 
The régulos are very…very important for the police because they know the people out there in the 
areas where there are no police. They know the criminals, so they can help us and bring them 
[criminals] to us…. But if we [the police] hear that the régulos educate people with the hands…or 
they punish someone with force…or if they hide criminals from the police…then this is a crime. 
And then we will call in the chief and bring him into line…talk with him and tell him that this is 
illegal…. […] Before it was not really like this, but now, with the recognition of régulos and in 
particular with the existence of Decree 15/2000…now we can procure the régulos and discuss with 
                                                 
276 This lack of sanctions in Decree 15/2000 differs from colonial legislation on régulos (the RAU discussed 
in Chapter 2).  
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them what are the reasons for this bad behaviour…because no citizen is above the law. Also today 
the régulo is not above the law, so if he commits a crime he has to respond to what he has 
committed…. Because if the régulos deal with crime on their own, it means that the police are not 
in control of crime.277      
 
The point is that recognition of the indispensable role of chiefs in improving state-police 
operations could not be divorced from a concern with reconstituting the sovereign authority 
of the PRM to control crime and violence. If this was reflected in the rules and 
representations of police officers, then it was also physically demonstrated in the 
punishment of those chiefs who were caught flouting the PRM’s rules. Like these rules, 
punishments also took place outside the law – i.e. none of them involved legal prosecution.  
While the chiefs’ failure to abide by the rules of the PRM by no means always 
came to the knowledge of police officers, they were, when discovered, dealt with in a 
particularly brutal manner.278 During fieldwork in 2004-05, I encountered four such 
incidents and was told about six more. In one incident a sub-chief had solved a case of 
fighting between two men that had resulted in severe physical injuries. When the PRM 
learnt about this from the person who lost the case, the sub-chief was arrested, 
chambokeado (beaten with a rubber stick) and put in the cell for two days. This happened 
three months after the sub-chief had been called to the police post accused of “hiding 
producers of Suruma [an illegal drug]” from the police. After this warning, as the chief of 
police said, it was “necessary to educate him a little bit”.279  In the second incident, a chief 
had ordered local residents to catch and beat up a young man who had burnt down three 
huts in the neighbourhood. The chief referred to this as “a normal practice”, but when a 
police officer heard about it, the chief was taken to the police at posto level, beaten, and 
then fined for having failed to inform the police about the crime. In the third incident, 
another sub-chief was punished by the locality police on the grounds that he had failed to 
prevent a muroi (witch) killing, which had supposedly been committed by two people from 
his area. When the brother of the murdered muroi informed the police at locality level about 
it, the sub-chief was arrested together with two suspects because, as the officer declared to 
me, “the régulo is responsible for reporting crime to us”. According to the sub-chief, all 
three were beaten at the police stations they passed through on their way to the provincial 
                                                 
277 Interview, Chief of Police, 31 August 2004.  
278 In Chapter 9 I return to how and why chiefs flouted the rules of the PRM, such as settling criminal cases.  
279 Interview, Chief of Police, 18 August 2004. When the word educar (to educate or discipline) was used by 
the police or about the police, it was commonly understood as the use of physical force in the form of 
chambocos (beatings with a rubber stick).  
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capital, where they were kept in prison for a year. The case never went to court. The fourth 
incident happened in 2005. A chief had settled a case of arson in which the offended party 
agreed to material compensation. When the PRM officer of the locality heard about this 
through local rumours, he notified the chief as well as the two young male offenders. 
During the two weeks that I spent in this area, the chief was seen in public struggling 
alongside the two young offenders to build a new office for the locality police. In contrast 
to the two offenders, however, the chief was not beaten in public. The police officer gave 
the following reason for treating the chief in this way:  
 
Why I keep the chief here for a few days? Well it is not really a punishment…that is for the tribunal 
[district court]…. It is like a way of education and demonstrating that he has committed an act of 
indiscipline…you know, the régulos need to understand that arson is a crime and that crimes must 
go immediately to the police…they have to know what is crime and what is not crime…. This is the 
law, and it is my job to enforce the law…it is not because we have to punish the régulos…but 
discipline them as an example for the others to see what can happen if they do things illegally…if 
they step out of line.280  
 
As the police officer noted, the disciplining of chiefs in public spaces visibly demonstrated 
to the other chiefs and the population at large the severe consequences of violating the 
PRM’s rules. More broadly, the incidents of punishing chiefs by force and with temporary 
deportation also visualised the attempts to reconstitute the superior authority of the state 
police vis-à-vis the chiefs and what this superiority implied. As this section has illustrated, 
superiority was defined by the official state institutions’ monopoly of making decisions on 
“crimes against the state”, the use of force and the regulation of authority – in short, what 
can be conceptualised as sovereign authority within key areas of regulating a social order. 
The punishment of chiefs, I suggest, can be read as a particular way of concretely 
performing the sovereign authority of the state police. It physically marked the 
hierarchically ordered boundary between the distinct domains of state and chiefly authority, 
which the rules of the state police attempted to fix and congeal. As such the punishments 
conjure up the key issue at stake for the local state police in organising the wider 
institutional landscape of policing and justice enforcement: the reconstitution of state-police 
sovereignty through first the recognition and incorporation of chiefs, followed by their 
separation from the particular domain of state authority.   
  The question is what immediate implications this boundary-marking had for the 
position and authority of chiefs and the local state institutions. I suggest that, in the 
                                                 
280 Interview, locality chief of police, 29 September 2005.  
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performance of sovereign authority on the very bodies of those authorities that the police 
relied on the most to control crime, the police officers positioned chiefs as what could be 
conceptualised as domesticated sovereigns. Chiefs were relied on to exercise functions that 
could bolster the sovereign authority of the police, yet through these very functions they 
were always potentially at risk of being subject to the performance of sovereign authority. 
Importantly, this precarious positioning of chiefs by the local police emerged from a 
particular tension: chiefs’ self-proclaimed mandates represented a domain of authority that 
challenged the proclaimed sovereignty of the state to make final decisions on physical 
violations of the ‘land’, the ‘citizen body’ and ‘authority’. It was for this very reason that 
the PRM was so dependent on chiefs in re-constituting state sovereignty in the rural 
hinterlands. As in the past, chiefs were the significant, constitutive ‘Other’ of local state 
authority. However, as this section has demonstrated, state sovereignty took on a particular 
localised form, which had the immediate implication of positioning the local tiers of the 
PRM as a kind of local sovereign power. Local police officers constantly claimed authority 
by referring to official state law, but de facto operated outside it. 
The point is that the attempts to constitute state sovereignty were most 
pervasively pursued, and in fact seemed to depend on, a set of uncodified, extra-legal rules 
that were in reality outside the law. This included not only local state recognition of 
resolution mechanisms that were outside the law (for example, uroi, the banjas, the wadzi-
nyanga), but also extra-legal rules and practices both to protect the authority of the chiefs 
and to punish them. These rules of the PRM can be seen as an aspect of filling the grey 
zones left open for interpretation in codified law, but this does not capture the whole 
picture. The local police’s enforcement of its rules also involved a de facto suspension of 
codified law in particular situations. For example, in punishing chiefs the police suspended 
the law by using corporal punishment and by issuing sentences without due process through 
the official justice system.  
It may seem contradictory that the local police flouted the law in the very name of 
enforcing it. The point is that, by producing a secondary body of law, the local tiers of the 
PRM positioned themselves as endowed with the authority both to make and suspend the 
law. This aspect, I suggest, is exactly what signalled the self-positioning of the local tiers of 
the state, not only as representatives of the state at large, but as the sovereign in the rural 
hinterlands. To conclude, this necessarily follows my conceptualisation of sovereignty as 
certain practices and claims that exist beyond the official sovereign authority inscribed in 
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the Constitution and in international recognition of independent states. Following Hansen 
and Stepputat’s (2005) interpretation of Schmitt (1985), sovereignty can be seen as 
originating in the exception, that is, in the capacity not only to define the ‘normal’ order 
and the law regulating it, but also to define the exception and suspend the law or the norm. 
The exception is characterised by the sovereign applying exceptional means on the bodies 
of those individuals who threaten the order or normal situation as defined by the sovereign. 
The substances of such exceptional means may vary from physical violence to exclusion, 
but are characterised by excess. This latter aspect was expressed in the PRM’s enforcement 
of the third set of rules mentioned above, and particularly in the brutal punishment of 
disobedient chiefs that these allowed for. 
The self-positioning of the local tiers of the state police as the sovereign in 
local areas should, I suggest, be understood in light of the historical conditions of the 
former war zones of Sussundenga District, that is, as margins of the state, characterised by 
competing forms of sovereign power captured in particular by the figure of the chief. As 
noted by Das and Poole (2004) for the margins of the state elsewhere in the world, such 
conditions mean that the operations of official state representatives are premised on their 
ability continuously to re-found and re-perform state sovereignty by acting above and 
outside the law. Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 29) add to this point the particular visible and 
violent character of the performance of sovereign authority in the margins. With these 
general observations in mind, I suggest, the PRM’s models for practice can be understood 
as more than localised inventions. They also reflect the tensions and violence underpinning 
the quest to constitute state authority, which seem to more generally characterise state-
formation processes in contested terrains.       
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter set out to answer the question of how the relationship between chiefs and local 
state institutions was de facto organised around the shared tasks of policing and justice 
enforcement laid down in Decree 15/2000. It showed how the local tiers of the PRM 
appropriated the authority to define the rules for regulating the plural institutional landscape 
that existed both inside and outside codified law, and asked what immediate implications 
these rules had for the position and authority of chiefs and local state institutions.    
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The chapter has taken us a step further in understanding the state recognition of traditional 
authority as de facto a mutual, relational constitution of local state and chiefly authority. It 
took this point further by highlighting the precarious consequences of this mutual 
constitution for the position of chiefs and their capacity to entrench authority. Not only did 
state recognition imply that chiefs now had to follow the orders of the hurumende as a 
subordinate element of the state apparatus. Recognition and incorporation were 
accompanied by the criminalisation of important claims and practices of chiefly authority. 
This denoted that constituting (local) state authority in relation to the chiefs was predicated 
on transforming chiefly authority and on re-defining ‘the tradition’ (mutemo yo passe 
chigare). At least this was expressed in the extra-legal rules communicated and physically 
performed by the local tiers of the PRM, namely what I referred to as ‘models for practice’. 
Central to the models for practice was boundary-marking, namely fixing 
distinct legal orders and domains of authority: i.e. the state (law/crime), the chiefs 
(tradition/traditional and social cases), and the community courts and secretários 
(community rules and social cases). If this reflected the local PRM’s pragmatic concerns to 
fill out the legal grey zones of codified law and de facto to recognise the plurality of local 
institutions, it also reflected attempts to claim the superior validity of the law and state 
institutions. Scholars like von Benda-Beckmann (1997) and Griffiths (1986) have 
conceptualised this form of state recognition of informal justice institutions as “weak legal 
pluralism”, that is, when other legal orders are recognised through their subjection to state 
law. They contrast this with ‘strong legal pluralism’ or the undisturbed existence of various 
de facto legal systems. While these conceptualisations are useful, they do not capture how 
the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ recognised non-state domains of justice enforcement, not 
by placing them under state law, but by separating them from the very domain of the law. 
This aspect underlined the self-positioning of the local police as a local sovereign authority, 
itself operating partly outside the law. The key to understanding this was that the state 
police operated, and attempted to constitute authority, in contexts in which the use of force 
and the claim to make final decisions on ‘the land’, the ‘citizen body’ and ‘authority’ were 
not de facto a monopoly of the state. It was equally claimed by chiefs. This underscored a 
particular tension: the police depended on the authority of chiefs to reconstitute their own 
authority, but to do this required the congealing of distinct domains of authority. The result 
was a precarious positioning of chiefs as domesticated sovereigns.  
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The question that remains to be addressed is the extent to which the local tiers of the PRM 
were actually successful in enforcing the models for practice in everyday practice and 
interactions between chiefs, police officers and members of the rural population. Already 
this chapter has addressed how chiefs did not always obey the rules of the local police. The 
question is why this was the case even in light of the severe consequences that flouting the 
PRM’s rules could involve. As will be seen next, the domestication of chiefly authority was 
precarious, but so too were the boundaries marking the sovereign authority of the local 
police. The result was a mutual transformation of both local state and chiefly authority.  
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 Above: Police officers on official visit in a chieftaincy together with the District commander. 
The aim is to inform the chiefs and the population about the division of labour and collaboration 
between the PRM, chiefs and the population in dealing with crime. 
Below: the PRM delegation greets the paramount chief Sambanhe and his sub-chiefs before the 
beginning of the public meeting. 
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Above: welcome and greetings at the beginning of the meeting. On the left: police chief of 
Dombe, First Frelimo Secretary of Dombe, Chefe of Locality, District commander of police, 
chief Sambanhe and the Community court judge. On the right: residents of the chieftaincy. 
Below: speech by the District Commander of Police where he informs what according to the law 
is illegal, how the PRM and the chiefs should collaborate and what the chief is and is not allowed 
doing.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above/below: prisoner from district level jail is demonstrated as an example of what can happen 
when a person trespasses the law.  
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Chapter 8 
The Intricacy of Boundary-marking   
  
In Matica and Dombe, the classificatory boundaries of the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ 
discussed in Chapter 7 were continuously breached in everyday practice by rural residents, 
non-state authorities and even by local police officers themselves. Along with increased 
collaboration with the police, chiefs continued to solve what the PRM defined as crimes, 
and rural residents regularly took their cases to the ‘wrong’ institutions. Spending days at 
the local police stations was puzzling because it became clear that the PRM were hearing an 
ever-increasing number of uroi (witchcraft) accusations and cases classified as social. This 
happened as police officers continued to communicate publicly the separate domains of 
each type of authority and to discipline chiefs for flouting the prescribed boundaries. 
Conversations with chiefs and rural residents also revealed widespread knowledge of the 
PRM’s ‘models for practice’.   
In short, there was a constant oscillation, if not an outright tension, between 
representations and enactments of the boundaries between the state and the non-state 
domains of authority on the one hand and multiple ways of breaching these boundaries in 
practice on the other. In line with insights drawn from Moore (1978; see also Chapter 1), I 
conceptualise this oscillation in terms of the two countervailing processes of regularisation 
and situational adjustments, that is, acts of ordering social reality into neat categories and 
acts of manipulation, manoeuvring, and exploitations of the indeterminacies that exist in 
concrete situations.  
The question is how the simultaneous assertion and breaching of the classificatory 
boundaries produced by the local tiers of the PRM took place, why they did so, and what 
this implied for the evolving relationship between the state officials, chiefs and rural 
residents in particular, and emerging practices and claims of authority and citizenship in 
general. This chapter and Chapter 9 engage with these three interrelated questions by 
exploring everyday practices and interactions, as well as the meanings people attached to 
these. In doing this, I move from a specific focus on the ordering- and rule-making 
practices of local state officials, explored in Chapter 7, to the everyday spaces of policing 
and justice enforcement in and around concrete cases of disputes and transgressions. I 
nonetheless leave a deeper interrogation of the third question for Chapter 10.  
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The analysis of this chapter takes its point of departure in the 243 cases that I came across 
by talking to people, taking part in hearings at the banjas of chiefs, community courts and 
police stations, and being part of everyday life in the chieftaincies and administrative 
capitals.281 These cases are used to explore the question of how, in everyday practice, the 
various types of cases, placed into distinct categories by the PRM, were actually dealt with 
by the different authorities outlined in Chapter 7. They also help to explore how different 
authorities actually interacted with one another. Importantly, they also illuminate how and 
when members of the rural population brought their cases or problems to the different 
authorities. In analysing the total number of cases, I have been able to discern particular 
significant patterns of observable actions and interactions that emerged in the wake of the 
PRM’s communication of the ‘models for practice’. These patterns are outlined in Section 1 
of this chapter. This is followed in Sections 2 and 3 by a more in-depth analysis of two of 
the significant patterns that emerged. A third pattern is explored in Chapter 9.  
The in-depth analysis of the patterns of action and interaction is conducted here by 
combining the insights from observable practices, through the illustration of a selected 
number of cases, with the meanings different people attached to ongoing practices. The 
latter serves to address why people did what they did and what underlying perceptions of 
justice, order-making, transgressions and the different authorities informed practices and 
interactions. This aspect is based on conversations and discussions with the different state 
and non-state authorities, as well as with sixty rural residents.282 Against this background, 
this and the next chapter explore the interaction between the flow of action, i.e. concrete 
cases of disputes and transgressions, and the flow of ideas, i.e. the representations that 
                                                 
281 Of the 243 cases I collected, 163 were narrated to me by rural residents, PRM officers, chiefs, community 
court judges and secretários, while the other 80 I followed during fieldwork. This involved my following the 
whole or part of the process, including observation of court hearings and interviews with those on opposite 
sides in a case.   
282 Of the 60 interviews with rural residents, 39 were conducted in Dombe (11 in Dombe sede, 28 in Javela 
locality covering 3 regulados) and 21 in Matica (9 in the bairros of Nhambamba and 12 in the two 
regulados). I conducted these interviews after the cases had been subjected to an initial analysis, which gave 
me some tentative ideas about what informed practice and the patterns of action and interaction that could be 
identified. The interviews were used to solve some of the puzzles that emerged and to assess the significance 
of the findings from the cases. All the interviews were semi-structured and of 40–120 minutes duration. They 
were structured around thirty common questions, asked during the interviews. These covered interviewees’ 
perceptions of the mandates of the different institutions (the types of cases they solve, punishments, 
hierarchical position vis-à-vis other institutions), a range of possible scenarios of preferences for resolution 
(e.g. ‘if you discovered that you have been robbed, what is the first thing you would do?), ideas about the 
reasons for crime, uroi and conflicts, and preferred forms of justice or punishment in different types of case. 
Finally, I asked people to describe a case (if any) that they had been involved in and discussed with them the 
course it took. The selection of interviewees was done on the basis of gender, age and residence in terms of 
relative proximity to a chief and/or an administrative capital.    
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people make about practices and rules/norms of case settlement. Including these two 
dimensions is based on the assumption of a mutually constitutive relationship between 
observable actions and representations, and the view that processes of regularisation and 
situational adjustments are conditioned both by ongoing practices and the ideas that inform 
these (see Chapter 1). As this and the next chapter show, historically embedded scripts in 
the form of ideas and practices of the dispensation of justice and restoration of order set 
limits to and reshaped the enforcement of authority by chiefs and state police officers. It 
also set limits to the police’s ability to enforce the classificatory boundaries of the ‘models 
for practice’ in a straightforward manner. The point is that the practical involvement of 
ordinary people with the different authorities and the ideas that informed these are crucial 
for grasping how de facto authority was (re)constituted, that is, beyond the rules 
communicated by the PRM. Having said this, the classificatory boundaries produced by the 
local tiers of the PRM did have a number of implications for evolving patterns of action, 
not only of chiefs, but also of ordinary people. It is the precarious interaction between the 
implications of boundary-marking and different layers of situational adjustments that form 
the bulk of this and the next chapter.     
    
1. Patterns of Action and Interaction: An Overview 
 
This section gives an overview of the total number of cases I followed.283  It analyses the 
cases quantitatively on the basis of the type(s) of authority who solved them and which 
categories of transgressions they related to. The aim is to identify the most pervasive 
patterns of action and interaction that can be drawn from the cases and relate these to the 
classificatory boundaries of the PRM’s ‘models for practice’.  
Figure 8.1 shows the total number of cases according to how they were classified by 
the parties and/or institution(s) involved in hearing and settling them. I have added in italics 
how the cases were categorised (‘traditional’, ‘crime’ and ‘social’) according to the PRM’s 
‘models for practice’. Added to this is a fourth category (‘political’), which falls outside the 
official classifications drawn up by the PRM. This category was partly dealt with in 
                                                 
283 In this chapter I shall use the word ‘case’, not as an analytical concept as applied in case studies, but as 
equivalent to the word caso in Portuguese, which the chiefs, rural residents and the PRM in Sussundenga 
generally used to describe a dispute or conflict between two parties, whether this involved a criminal offence, 
a social dispute or transgression, uroi, or a combination of these. In chi-Ndau and chi-Teve the equivalent 
word for caso is ndava, which was directly translated to me as ‘problem’ or ‘case’. This word was most 
commonly used in the banjas and community courts, but often interchangeably with caso.   
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Chapter 7, and I will return to it in Chapter 10. For now we shall concentrate on the other 
official categories.   
 
Figure 8.1: Classifications and number of cases collected  
 
Classification Number of 
‘Traditional’  (total: 96)  
Violation of ‘Mutemo yo passe chigare’/ ‘Ma-tradição’ 10 
Witchcraft  (20 of which involved other types of cases) 82 
Crocodile breeding and killings by crocs (all Dombe) 4 
‘Crimes’ (total: 134)  
Homicides 17 
Knife stabbings (not resulting in death) 5 
Murder threats  7 
Rapes 6 
Domestic violence (not resulting in death) 7 
Arms  4 
Thefts 48 
Arson 11 
Beating or violent fighting 24 
Incest 1 
Drugs 4 
‘Social’ (total: 70)  
Marriage disputes 6 
Marriage payment (lobolo) 9 
Adultery 29 
Divorce 6 
Debt 5 
Land disputes  15 
‘Political’ (total: 26)   
Chiefs disciplined/punished by the PRM 11 
Political – arrest/detention of Renamo supporters by the PRM 3 
Leadership disputes (Chiefs/Secretários) 12 
TOTAL (326 out of 243, meaning that 83 cases involved another 
type of case/offence and/or were re-classified as a different type).  
326 
 
In reading figure 8.1., it should be kept in mind that the cases were not systematically 
selected according to type of case (e.g. against the basis of a conscious choice to select x 
number of criminal cases, x number of social cases and so forth within a given time-space 
frame) or type of authority solving x number of cases. Rather, they were collected on the 
basis of my presence, at a given time, at the banjas of chiefs, police stations, and other 
rooms of justice, as well as on the basis of the cases that people chose to tell me about.284 
Against this background, Figure 8.1 only provides a tentative idea of what types of cases 
were the most frequent.285 Triangulated with conversations and interviews, the figures do, 
however, reflect what was highlighted as the most frequently occurring disputes and 
transgressions. Most notable was the prevalence of uroi, theft, adultery and fights. 
                                                 
284 Some of the cases I was able to follow from beginning to end, hence following the flow of action from one 
point to another. In other cases, due to the time-space limits of fieldwork, I was only able to follow part of the 
case. When possible I would follow up on a case through conversations with the people involved and/or who 
had heard of the case.  
285 Given that many cases were not documented systematically by chiefs, secretaries and community courts, 
and that the PRM only had archives for cases that resulted in a criminal trial at district level, it was impossible 
for me to obtain any estimate of the exact number and types of cases over a given period of time.  
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Of greater interest to the analysis is the question of how transgressions and disputes were 
classified and who actually resolved which types of cases. Taking a closer look at the total 
number of cases, three different patterns of action and interaction stand out as particularly 
significant. Importantly, a core commonality is that these challenge the PRM’s models for 
practice. The first two patterns challenge the ability to fit cases strictly into the PRM’s 
official categories of distinct types of transgressions (social, traditional and criminal), 
ideally to be settled by different authorities. The third pattern contradicts the strict 
boundaries between distinct domains of authority in case settlements, i.e. the different 
authorities were frequently addressed with and resolved the ‘wrong’ cases when compared 
with the models for practice. I look at these patterns separately below.    
Patterns one and two: classification of cases and transgressions 
Figure 8.1 illustrates that the total number of 243 cases involved 326 transgressions, 
leading to a surplus of no less than 83 transgressions. This surplus reflected the first two 
patterns of action. First, over the course of time many cases (68 in total) covered two or 
more of the official categories of transgression (criminal, social and traditional). For 
example, a criminal offence either emanated from or resulted in a social dispute or in uroi. 
The second pattern, explaining the surplus of transgressions, reflects how one single 
transgression was either given a double classification or re-classified as another type of 
transgression during the process of its resolution (15 in total). For example, criminal 
offences were in many instances simultaneously defined by the parties involved as a 
‘traditional’ case of uroi (witchcraft/sorcery) or vulí (evil/bad spirit possession). Added to 
this, social or traditional cases were at times re-classified during the process of resolution as 
a criminal offence and vice versa.  
Common to these two patterns of action was the fact that they blurred the 
boundaries between the PRM’s official categories of cases, illustrating how, in practice it 
was difficult to determine neatly which type of authority should settle a case between two 
parties. For this reason, these patterns also underlined how the resolution of a particular 
case very often involved more than one type of authority. In fact, as shown in Figure 8.2, 
over half of all cases that reached an authority were at some point in the process heard or 
resolved by more than one type of authority (police, community court, chief, official court, 
secretário and nyanga).  
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Figure 8.2: Number of institutions involved in the resolution of a single case.  
 
No. of Institutions 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cases (243) 11 105 
 
95 
 
22 
 
8 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Distribution   (48: chiefs) 
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The involvement of more than one type of authority was either the result of people’s use of 
a second, third and so forth authority as an institution of appeal, or because a case moved 
between different categories of transgression.286 This challenged the PRM’s rule that cases 
should be resolved neatly within and by separate domains of authority. Figure 8.2 also 
shows how chiefs were involved in the resolution of the majority of cases and were the type 
of authority which alone solved most cases.287 Closely following were the PRM at locality 
and posto levels, the wadzi-nyanga and the community courts. The official district court 
and the secretários, by contrast, were engaged in the resolution of very few cases and 
resolved none on their own. These figures do not, however, tell us what types of cases the 
various authorities were involved in resolving and which categories of transgression tended 
to be solved by more than one authority. Exploring these questions illuminates the third 
pattern.  
Pattern three: transgressing jurisdictions and domains of authority 
According to the PRM’s ‘models for practice’, social cases were the only ones that could be 
resolved by more than one type of institution (i.e. chiefs, community courts and 
secretários). However, as shown in Figure 8.3, a mere 36% of the cases classified as social 
were solved by more than one authority, whereas no less than 68% of the cases that the 
PRM classified as crimes also passed through the courts of non-state authorities. Moreover, 
                                                 
286 We may also note in the figure that there were some cases (11 out of 243) that never actually reached any 
judicial authority, but were either resolved within the family, between families or individuals, or never 
resolved.  
287 This result, it must be noted, may be affected by the fact that the cases I collected were predominantly 
from areas outside the district capital, and it may also be due to the fact that the chiefs represented the largest 
group of all types of authorities. However, as I show in Chapter 9, this also reflected a widespread notion 
among rural residents that they had to bring their cases to the chief first, before any other authority.  
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contrary to the PRM’s rule that only chiefs, with the assistance of wadzi-nyanga, should 
solve traditional cases, 73% of these also reached the police, the community courts and/or 
the secretários.  
In other words, the PRM’s rule that the different categories of transgressions should 
be confined to separate domains of authority was less the rule than the exception. Each 
authority frequently engaged in solving the ‘wrong’ transgressions. As Figure 8.3 shows, 
this was particularly the case for chiefs and the PRM itself. 
 
Figure 8.3. Percentage of total number of types of cases solved by different institutions 
 Social Cases Criminal cases Traditional cases 
Chiefs 41% (alone 21%) 74% (alone 21%) 49% (alone 6%)  
Police 24% (alone 11%) 59% (alone 7.5%) 26% (alone 0%)288
Community Courts 21%  (alone 6%) 19% (alone 3.5%) 32% (alone 2%)289
Secretários 18% (alone 0%) 9%   (alone 0%) 10% (alone 0%)290
Wadzi-Nyanga 6% (alone 0%) 9% (alone 0%) 75% (alone 61%)291
Official Court 2.8%  (alone 0%) 13.5 %  (alone 0%) 1%   (alone 0%) 
 
 
Chiefs were still engaged in resolving a very high number of criminal cases (74% of the 
total number), and even concluded some on their own (21% of the total number). This co-
existed with the general notion among chiefs, the PRM and rural residents that chiefs now 
increasingly passed on criminal cases directly to the PRM in accordance with what they had 
been ordered to do by the hurumende. Hence chiefs appeared both to adhere to and to 
breach the boundaries captured by the ‘models for practice’. This reflected both continuities 
and changes in chiefly practices of case settlement when compared with the self-proclaimed 
mandates of chiefs outlined in Chapter 7. If this is to be expected, it came as a surprise to 
me to find that the PRM at locality and posto levels engaged just as much in blurring the 
boundaries of their own ‘models for practice’. They did so by receiving and hearing an 
increasing number of so-called traditional and social cases during the period 2004-2005. As 
Figure 8.3 indicates, the PRM in fact formed part of resolving a quarter of the total number 
of both traditional and social cases, including 11% of the total number of social cases 
                                                 
288 All the cases classified as ‘traditional’ solved by the PRM were categorized as uroi.  
289 All but one of these cases, classified as ‘traditional’ and solved by the Community Courts, were 
categorized as uroi. The one case that was not uroi was what was referred to as a pringaniso, in which a wife 
sleeps with another man in her husbands’ house, which can lead the husband to vomit blood and die from it if 
the case is not solved.   
290 All but two of these cases, classified as ‘traditional’ and solved by the secretários, were categorized as 
uroi. The two cases that were not uroi were pringaniso (see note 9).  
291 All of these cases, classified as ‘traditional’ and solved by wadzi-nyanga, were categorized as uroi.   
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without the involvement of other institutions. In short, the PRM itself heard the ‘wrong’ 
cases, thus breaching its own rules. Added to this, the local tiers of the PRM also engaged 
in the resolution of criminal offences without the involvement of the official courts at 
district or provincial levels.  
As Figure 8.3 shows, a very low proportion of the total number of criminal cases 
(13.5 %) that are legally supposed to end in the official justice system of courts actually did 
so. This did not mean that all the criminal cases were left unresolved: 66 of the 134 such 
cases did lead to the perpetrator being convicted. Only 27% of these were concluded in the 
official court. The rest were by the banjas of the chiefs (21%), in the community courts 
(3.5%) or by the local tiers of the PRM (48.5%, two thirds of which had previously passed 
through the courts of non-state authorities). These figures emphasise that the official courts 
did not have a monopoly over concluding criminal cases. They also point to the de facto 
development of a relatively closed system of dispensing justice at sub-district levels, that is, 
as detached from the formal justice system. As also noted in Chapter 7, the PRM’s models 
for practice supported this detachment. In practice this was further underpinned by the fact 
that the local tiers of the PRM convicted many criminal offenders at the local police posts, 
and thus outside the formal justice system. This was particularly the case for Dombe, 
amounting to 80% of the criminal cases concluded.  
It should nonetheless be noted that the criminal cases concluded by the local tiers of 
the PRM excluded homicide. These were always passed on to the PIC, which, if there was 
sufficient ‘evidence’, sent them to the district capital. The same held for chiefs. Whereas 
two cases of homicide were concluded by chiefs, they tended to pass such cases directly on 
to the PRM.292 Besides this, the types of crime heard by the chiefs were similar to those 
heard by the PRM, i.e. theft, arson, violent beatings, rape and domestic violence. In terms 
of the criminal transgressions that were concluded outside the official justice system, there 
were therefore still significant areas of overlap between the chiefs and the local tiers of 
PRM, that is, despite the efforts by the PRM to change this. Intriguingly, this continued 
overlap increasingly co-existed with a new layer of blurred boundaries between chief and 
state police jurisdictions, namely in respect to the so-called social and traditional cases.  
 In sum the three patterns of action and interaction identified illustrate that the 
classificatory boundaries captured by the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ were more often 
                                                 
292 The two cases of homicide that were concluded by the chiefs do not include the 27 cases of death caused 
by the invisible means of uroi heard by them. Hence, when I speak of homicide here, it is in the sense defined 
by the Penal Code, namely where there is direct physical evidence available.  
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than not blurred in practice. This applied to both the strict separation of different categories 
of cases (‘traditional’, ‘social’, ‘criminal’), and the boundaries between distinct domains of 
authority in the settlement of cases. The patterns indicated that ‘processes of 
regularization’, or the attempts to fix and order social reality by the PRM, discussed in 
Chapter 7, were not straightforwardly achieved. Rather, case settlement was very often 
unconfined to separate domains of authority enforcement following the ‘traditional’, 
‘social’ and ‘criminal’ categories, or the state and non-state distinction. This underpinned 
both continuities and changes in settling cases, and the co-existence of both increased 
collaboration and competition between the state police and the chiefs. Noteworthy, chiefs’ 
continued resolution of crimes challenged the PRM’s capacity to domesticate ‘traditional 
authority’ fully. At the same time the PRM began to challenge the autonomous domain of 
chiefly jurisdiction by engaging in the resolution of ‘traditional’ cases.    
The question remaining to be addressed is why the most significant patterns of 
action and interaction consistently blurred the classificatory boundaries of the PRM, how 
this concretely was played out and what implications it had for different actors. Was it for 
example because chiefs and people in general did not know of or resisted the law 
communicated by the PRM, as was often argued by higher ranking state officials, or 
because local police officers did not have the power to enforce their rules? How can this 
explain why the PRM officers themselves flouted their own rules and chiefs and rural 
residents indeed did, at times, adhere to the models for practice? To address these 
questions, it is necessary to go beyond analysing the sum of cases quantitatively, based on 
the questions of what types of transgressions were solved by what types of authorities. It is 
also important to address how the different authorities de facto resolved cases and 
interacted with each other, as well as how cases were actually classified or re-classified. 
Moreover, to grasp the reasons behind the three patterns of action, it is necessary to explore 
the preferences and strategies of the offenders and victims who addressed the different 
authorities, and what ideas underlined their preferences.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore these questions in relation to the first and 
second patterns. I do so by illustrating a number of cases, which are discussed in relations 
to the meanings people attached to ongoing practices. As addressed, the patterns of action 
did not reflect a lack of knowledge of the PRM’s rules. Rather, they reflected 
inconsistencies between the PRM’s rigid separations of different types of cases and how 
cases in reality developed and were perceived. Moreover, it was influenced by people’s 
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capacity to manoeuvre strategically between the different authorities. The inconsistencies 
and strategies were informed by particular notions of justice, ideas about the visible and 
invisible sources of conflicts and misconduct, and by the enforcing power of the various 
authorities. 
 
2. Pattern One: Multiple Transgressions and Authorities 
 
This section explores those cases that, over time, involved different categories of 
transgressions (social, criminal, traditional) and how this laid the ground for the 
involvement of different types of authorities in the resolution process. Examples abounded 
of criminal transgressions (32 in total), usually in the form of self-redress, resulting from or 
leading to what the PRM categorised as social and traditional transgressions. By far the 
most common of these were adultery and uroi. Furthermore, many social conflicts merged 
with uroi accusations or with both manifestations of uroi and criminal transgressions (25 in 
total). According to the PRM’s ‘models for practice’, these cases should ideally be split into 
two or even three categories of transgression, with each being resolved within distinct 
domains of authority, and according to different principles of sanctions. Hence these cases 
pointed not only to the intricacy of boundary-marking with regard to the different 
categories. They also challenged the ability of any one authority, such as a chief, to settle a 
case by reconciling the parties or issuing a verdict relating to a perpetrator. By illustrating 
two cases and drawing on conversations with people, this section draws attention to how 
and why this was so and to the possible consequences of the ‘splitting up of cases’ for the 
authorities, victims and perpetrators involved in them. Below we begin with those 
situations in which social cases merged with criminal transgressions.  
The merger of social and criminal transgressions  
Of the types of social cases that merged with criminal transgressions, adultery by wives 
was by far the most common. According to the rules of the banjas and the community 
courts, such cases should be resolved by reconciling the contending parties through 
compensation payments to the victim. However, no less than 18 out of the 25 cases of 
adultery resulted in a criminal act of self-redress committed by the wronged husbands. 
Redress took the form of 4 incidents of arson, 2 stabbings, 2 incidents of beating where 
blood was spilled, 4 incidents of domestic violence, 1 murder threat and 5 incidents of 
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homicide (3 of the wife and 2 of the perpetrator). In a quarter of these, self-redress was the 
first action taken by the victim. In all other cases where redress was prominent, it happened 
because formerly agreed monetary compensation did not materialize after one or more 
banja and/or community court hearings. Another reason was simply that the victim did not 
believe he would achieve justice in a court. In short, it happened because the authority to 
whom the victim of the adultery applied did not have or was believed not to have the ability 
to enforce a penalty.  
The case material below presents an example in which the authority approached 
could not enforce a penalty. The point of using this case as an illustration is that it brings to 
light how the outcome of cases involving different types of transgressions often depended 
on the ability of the contenders in a case to exploit different types of authorities 
strategically.  
 
Case 1. Crossing multiple boundaries  
In April, 2004 we paid a visit to the elderly Chief Zixixe, the superior of sub-chiefs Boupua and 
Ganda of Matica locality (see Chapter 5). He lives in Mouha administrative post, a different 
administrative area from Matica, falling administratively under Sussundenga sede. On the second 
day of our visit Zixixe receives two younger men from the village of Mussessa, who have come to 
present an ndava (problem). They are accompanied by two of the madodas who work with Zixixe, 
and to whom the alleged victim, Jeu, has brought the case. After greeting Zixixe with the three 
rounds of hand-clapping that is appropriate when meeting a chief, Jeu begins to explain that the 
other man, Antonio, has slept with his wife. Jeu is accusing him of adultery and wants him to pay 
compensation. When Antonio is asked by one of the madodas to give his version of the story, he 
rejects the accusation.  
After a short break for the madodas and Zixixe to discuss the dispute, Jeu is told that the 
case cannot be solved without the testimony of his wife, Maria, and her baba (her father) or an 
equivalent testimony from her family. This is necessary, one of the madodas adds, “Because if not, 
this case can become very dangerous”. Jeu responds that he cannot bring his wife. A week ago she 
ran away to her parents’ house in Nhambamba, the locality capital of Matica (and the chieftaincy of 
sub-chief Ganda), because Jeu beat her up for sleeping with other men. Jeu is first told off by a 
madoda for taking matters into his own hands by beating his wife instead of bringing the case to the 
chief, but nonetheless agrees to continue with the case. Zixixe asks one of the madodas (who 
literate) to write a letter to sub-chief Ganda, calling Maria and her baba to appear before Zixixe a 
week later. The letter is given to Snr. Coffee, a member of Zixixi´s chiefly police, who is made 
responsible for taking the letter to Ganda. However, before this happens, and on the fourth day of 
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our visit, a letter from the community court of Matica arrives with a member of sub-chief Ganda’s 
police.  
The letter summons Jeu to appear before the community court on the 5th of August. He is 
accused of beating his wife. Zixixe sends the letter to Jeu with Snr. Coffee with the words that Jeu 
has to do what the letter says and that Zixixe can do nothing because now the case ‘está mais 
enfrente’ (an expression used when people refer to cases that have moved upwards in the system). 
Wanting to follow the flow of action, we arrive in Matica a day before the community court 
hearing. We ask about the case, and soon learn that it is an old acquaintance of mine, Fillippe, the 
father of Maria, who has brought the case before the community court. Fillippe is a well-known and 
influential person in Nhambamba, a former soldier in the army of the Frelimo government and a 
day-to-day assistant of the chefe of Matica locality. He frequently assists the community court with 
his writing skills and often participates in hearings. Against this background, it is therefore not 
surprising that he has chosen to bring the case to the community court and not to Sub-chief Ganda 
or Chief Zixixe. Fillippe explains to us that, when they received the letter from Zixixe, he became 
very furious because he believed his daughter to be innocent and Jeu to be the real problem in the 
marriage. He wants Jeu to pay a fine at the community court for having beaten Maria, as well as the 
remainder of the lobolo (marriage payment). So far Jeu has only paid 2 million out of the 3.6 
million meticais that he had agree to pay in lobolo. Fillippe reminds us that, according to the rules 
of the community court (and the banjas of the chiefs), a husband is not allowed to beat his wife 
until the whole lobolo has been paid. Hence the case that Fillippe wants resolved at the community 
court is not one of ‘domestic violence’ as such (i.e. a crime according to the penal code), but of a 
failure to make lobolo payments (i.e. a case that the PRM would classify as ‘social’).   
On the day of the community court hearing, Jeu fails to turn up. The community court judge 
reacts by asking his secretary to write a new notification to Zixixe, calling Jeu to a hearing two 
weeks later. When we return to Matica for the next hearing, Fillippe tells us that the case had turned 
very serious and even ended up in the hands of the police. In turns out that, on the 7th of May, Jeu 
had gone to Fillippe’s home, where he destroyed household belongings, stole some clothing and 
beat up Helena, Fillippe’s second wife. Helena was so severely beaten that blood was running from 
her head and Fillippe had to take her to the hospital in Sussundenga sede. Knowing that ‘the spilling 
of blood’ is a crime, Fillippe took the case straight to the PRM officer in Matica, who reacted by 
sending a letter through Sub-chief Ganda, ordering Jeu to appear at the police post in Matica. But 
again Jeu did not turn up. As a result the PRM officer in Matica forwarded the case to the PRM in 
Sussundenga. Another notification, this time with the official stamp of the commander of police, 
was sent to Jeu through Chief Zixixe.  
This time Jeu turned up. For the first three days he was put in the primeiro andar, the first 
floor, and the name of the cell in Sussudenga police station where suspects are detained while 
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awaiting a possible criminal trial. On the third day, Fillippe and Helena were called for a hearing at 
the police station. They were asked by the interrogating officer if they wanted the case to go to the 
district court (i.e. a criminal trial to be opened). But Fillippe declined because as he later told me, 
this would mean that “Jeu would go to prison for a long time and then he will not pay me the lobolo 
and fines for the beatings”. Fillippe was able to convince the officer that he needed payment for the 
expenses they had incurred at the hospital and a fine for the beating of Helena. After Jeu had 
promised the PRM officer that he would pay Fillippe, he was released. Before Jeu left the police 
station, he tried to convince the police to call in Antonio, who, he claimed, was the original cause of 
the problem. But the police officer replied that this was a totally different case to be solved by the 
régulo. According to Zixixe, this never happened. Instead Jeu was called to another community 
court hearing in Matica. This was about the payment of lobolo to Fillipe. But again he never turned 
up. In 2005 Jeu had still not paid the rest of the lobolo. Fillippe told us that he had given up 
claiming his money.  
 
The material presented above illustrates how a particular case could move between 
different categories of transgressions, across administrative boundaries, as well as between 
different types of authority. Here a social transgression becomes a criminal offence because 
Jeu, the original ‘victim’, turns to self-redress when he realises that the case he has brought 
to the chief in his own area has been overruled by his father-in-law’s ability to re-classify 
the case as involving lobolo payments and to bring it before another authority, i.e. the 
community court. This is an authority he is well positioned to exploit and is familiar with.  
In short, self-redress happens because Fillippe tries to exploit the plural landscape 
of non-state authorities in his favour, and within this landscape to re-classify the case to his 
advantage. As a result, the case moves out of the domain of chiefly authority. The problem 
for Fillippe is that the resolution of the case still depends on the chiefly network of 
communication and the power of the chief to make the accused appear at the community 
court. This fails, and Jeu instead turns to self-redress. As a result, the case moves from 
having two different forms of classification that can both be resolved by the chiefs and the 
community court, to becoming a criminal transgression that should, according to the PRM’s 
rules, be sent to the police station. When Fillippe adheres to this rule and the police become 
involved, he is fortunate that Jeu finally turns up. At the same time he risks not achieving 
the kind of justice that he was striving for in the first place: monetary compensation for the 
beatings and lobolo payments. He is nonetheless fortunate that the PRM officer allows a 
criminal case to be resolved without it going to the district court. In short, the PRM officer 
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adjusts to the victim’s own notion of justice. Jeu, on the other hand, is not so fortunate 
when he tries to make the PRM officer call in Antonio in relation to the act of adultery. In 
fact, as a result of the case being split  up and handled by three different authorities, the 
original case of adultery is never solved and the original accused, Antonio, goes free. The 
same applies to the case of lobolo payments, which Fillippe never receives.   
A core point is that adherence to the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ still left 
considerable room for manoeuvre. It also left a high level of indeterminacy with regard to 
the actual outcome of a case. This also related to other cases that were split up into different 
types of transgression. In general, the way the cases were settled depended on the ability of 
the contending parties to use to their advantage the plural landscape of authorities. It also 
depended on the enforcing power of the authorities in question and these authorities’ 
willingness and ability to adjust to the victims’ preferred kinds of justice. In other words, it 
could be risky to move a case out of one domain of authority and into another. This could 
mean the accused not turning up and resorting to self-redress. It could also imply the victim 
not receiving the kind of justice that s/he desired or that the entire case between two parties 
was not fully resolved. In many cases splitting the case up meant that the categories of 
‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ shifted around and the original victim (e.g. of adultery) was the 
one who was punished (e.g. for criminal self-redress), while the original perpetrator went 
unpunished. In these situations, the success of the victim or perpetrator depended on the 
individual’s ability to convince the authority in question to adjust to their preferred notion 
of justice. For example, in Case 1, Fillippe was fortunate to receive any compensation at 
all, because the PRM officer was willing to hear his case outside the formal justice system. 
The original perpetrator (Antonio), on the other hand, went unpunished. Similar insights 
related to the frequent merger of uroi with criminal and social transgressions. However, as 
addressed next, this merger underpinned another significant aspect of the difficulty of 
boundary-marking: the links that people drew between the visible and invisible dimensions 
of transgressions and dispensations of justice.  
The merger of uroi, crime and social transgressions 
The merger of uroi with other categories of transgression was complex because, unlike 
adultery, it could not only lead to, but also result from a crime. In addition, uroi could also 
form an integrated part of resolving a crime and/or social conflict. These links could not be 
divorced from the fact that the sources of uroi were invisible, although its manifestations 
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were entirely visible (illness, death, madness, misfortune; see Chapter 7). More broadly, the 
links between uroi, criminal acts and transgressions of social norms have to be understood 
against the background of how people in Matica and Dombe conceptualised transgressions. 
They did not use separate words, as the PRM did for criminal acts and other sorts of 
transgressions, but the common word kushaisha. This word was used as an umbrella term 
for different types of acts of doing bad, inflicting harm, transgressing rules and initiating a 
conflict. It was translated into Portuguese as fazer mal and into English as ‘evil-doing’. The 
translation of kushaisha as evil-doing rather than, for example, ‘misconduct’ or 
‘wrongdoing’ is significant to take note of. It reflects how transgressions were explained 
not only as the commitments of visible acts by a given perpetrator, but also as caused by 
invisible, evil sources that lead the perpetrator to transgress a given rule.   
Like adultery, a number of uroi manifestations resulted in criminal self-redress 
committed by the victims of uroi against the accused person. For example, of 8 incidents of 
uroi, 3 led to homicides, 1 to destruction of housing and burglary, 1 to arson and 2 to 
stabbings. This happened because the person accused of inflicting harm or doing evil (death 
or illness) did not, as determined by a banja, undo the harm s/he had inflicted by removing 
the source of evil-doing or by compensating the victim. In other incidents, uroi resulted 
from a prior criminal act, for example 3 incidents of theft, 2 of homicide and 5 of beating 
“where blood was spilt”. This led the perpetrators to fall ill and accuse the original victims 
or the members of his or her family of having caused this by “sending uroi”. The same 
happened with other social conflicts: 6 incidents of adultery, 5 involving lobolo payments 
and 4 land disputes.  
The commonly held explanation for these types of cases was that the original victim 
resorted to uroi, consciously or unconsciously, because appropriate justice had not been 
dispensed. This could be the failure of the perpetrator to pay compensation to the victim of 
theft or to the victim’s family in cases of homicide. This form of uroi was referred to as 
mapipi, which was translated to me as “uroi with a reason”. It was seen as a justifiable form 
of self-redress when appropriate kinds of justice had not been dispensed. People contrasted 
mapipi with the kinds of uroi that were exclusively acts of evil-doing or “uroi without a 
reason” committed by an umroi (witch or sorcerer). Mapipi was also contrasted with those 
situations in which resorting to uroi or accusations of it became integrated into the 
perpetrators’ attempts to re-direct the resolution of a criminal or a social transgression to his 
or her advantage. For example, I encountered eight cases of victims falling ill during the 
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trial of three criminal offences and five social transgressions in which the original 
perpetrator was accused of resorting to uroi as a way of avoiding prosecution. Finally 
mapipi was contrasted with those situations in which the perpetrator of a crime or a social 
transgression falsely accused the victim of inflicting uroi in order to avoid being convicted. 
In short, manifestations of uroi in relation to crime or a social dispute could be 
explained both as a result of the lack of proper justice and as a way for the original 
perpetrator of a crime or of a social case to avoid a conviction by resorting to uroi or 
accusing the victim of doing so. The visible manifestations were the same (illness, 
misfortune, madness and death), and the invisible sources identical (medicine or vulí), but 
the ways in which they were explained and justified varied, depending on prior actions and 
social relationships. The crux of the matter is that visible manifestations of uroi could 
always be traced back to a particular person with whom the victim of uroi had a prior or 
ongoing case or conflict (ndava). In other words, visible transgressions, whether social or 
criminal in the sense defined by the PRM, could always potentially be linked to invisible 
acts of uroi.293 For the purpose of the discussion in this section, it is significant to note that 
this link challenged the ability of a given authority actually to end a case between two 
parties by treating it simply as a single or isolated category of transgression such as 
adultery or theft.       
Ideally, the banjas of chiefs could put an end to cases in which uroi emerged from a 
crime or social transgression by sending the parties to the wadzi-nyanga. The purpose was 
to verify whether the person suspected of uroi was guilty or whether he or she had been 
falsely accused. Either way, thereafter the conflict could be settled at the banja through 
compensation payments (in cases of death) or by ensuring that the source of uroi was 
annulled (in cases of illness). The original social or criminal transgression could be solved 
at the same time, thus ideally preventing a case from resulting in criminal self-redress and a 
future spiral of new uroi accusations. However, in the majority of such cases, this holistic 
form of resolution by a banja was the exception rather than the rule. Instead, cases were 
split into separate types of transgression, which were heard by different authorities. The 
case below exemplifies the possible implications of such a splitting up of cases.  
 
                                                 
293 As I shall show further in Section 3, this link between visible transgressions and invisible acts of making 
others suffer (whether as mapipi or justice, exclusive evil-doing and revenge) can only be understood as 
forming part of a wider world view in which the visible realm of mundane affairs is always linked to the 
invisible realm of productive, fantastic and destructive forces (for a similar observation with respect to 
northern Mozambique, see West 2005: 43).  
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Case 2.  From transgression of mutemo to uroi and crime  
In July 2004, two neighbouring families, the Magaro and the Chauque, bring an allegation of 
adultery to Queen Gudza’s banja. Two days prior to the banja proceedings, João Magaro accused 
his neighbour, Mateus Chauque, of having slept with his wife. João arrives at the banja with his 
wife, Luisa, and his uncle, Tomas, who is representing him as his baba. Mateus also brings an 
uncle, Lucas, as his baba. As is the usual practice at the banjas, the victim is asked to give his 
testimony first – that is, after each party has paid the banja for the resolution (today 20,000 per 
party). João sits on the ground facing the madodas and the Queen’s assistant, Mateus Gudza, who is 
to judge the hearing. The Queen, who has to approve the final verdict, is sitting on the ground a 
little apart from the others. After a small ritual of clapping, João begins to explain that he has for a 
long time suspected his wife of sleeping with other men while he was working in Zimbabwe over 
the past five years. On his return a week ago he started vomiting blood, which is the same as saying 
that his wife is sleeping with another man in the husband’s own house. This was referred to as 
priganiso in chi-Ndau, and regarded by the banjas as one of the possible transgressions of mutemo 
yo passe chigare. João points to Mateus as the offender, and to prove his point he explains that three 
days ago he saw his wife coming from the river together with Mateus, who was wearing no shirt. 
He believes they had sex at the riverside. When Luisa, João’s wife, is asked by the madodas to 
speak, she confirms that the act took place, but also excuses herself by adding that Mateus forced 
her to have sex with him by threatening her with a big knife. Although Mateus also confirms the act 
of sexual intercourse later, he rejects the accusation that he had threatened Luisa with a knife.  
After the three statements have been made, the madodas and the Queen’s assistant, Mateus 
Gudza, begin a long debate about how the case should be resolved. They agree that Mateus has to 
be punished for sleeping with a married woman. Two of the madodas furthermore insist that both 
Luisa and Mateus should pay a fine to the mambo because “having sex in the bush” is a 
transgression of the mutemo yo passe chigare – i.e. it “dirties the land and can make the spirits 
revolt”. At the end of the hearing it is agreed that each party should pay 50,000 as a fine. As regards 
the act of adultery the madodas, as it the practice in such cases, leaves it to Luisa to decide how the 
resolution should proceed. She is asked which of the men she wants to be married to. She replies 
that she wants her husband, and João agrees. As a result, Mateus has to pay a fine to João. The 
madodas arrive at a sum of 600,000, half of which they determine should be paid at the banja two 
weeks later.  
After this decision, the madodas discuss the knife threats. One of them suggests that this is 
a crime and that maybe the case should be sent to the police. When this is discussed, the male 
representatives of the two families begin a heated debate, the Chauque shouting that the story about 
the knife is all a lie and that there is no proof that it actually took place. The Mateus’s uncle shouts 
back that the Magaro family is “very bad” because they always “accuse other people”. In response 
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João’s uncle says that they should take care in saying such things because “one day something bad 
could happen to you”. After this threat Mateus Gudza intervenes, stating that it is very important 
that the payment is made at the banja, so that no further problems will arise, implicitly warning 
against self-redress. This is exactly what happens, first in the form of a suspicion of uroi.  
Although the Chauque turn up with 300,000 at the subsequent banja, the Magaros refuse to 
receive the money. The reason is that João feels very sick. He is convinced that the Chauque has 
caused this with uroi because they want to take revenge for the payment. It is out of fear of João 
becoming more sick or even that he might die that the Magaros refuse the money. Another heated 
debate between the parties takes place, the Magaros accusing Mateus’s uncle of being an umroi, 
which the Chauque reject. The madodas try to convince João to receive the money, but fail. Instead 
of sending them to a nyanga, as is the usual rule of the banjas, the madodas agree that the case has 
got out of hand and decide to send it to the community court in Dombe. The Magaros are given a 
notification to give to the community court. The community court reacts by calling Mateus Chauque 
before the court two weeks later, where he is accused of adultery, not uroi.   
We arrive in Dombe the day before the community court hearing, where by coincidence we 
meet the Chauque family outside Dombe police station. It turns out that all the huts in their 
homestead have been burnt down. When they are attended by the chief of the PIC, they accuse 
Tomas Magaro, João’s uncle, of the crime of arson due to his threats at the banja of Gudza. The 
PIC officer, however, decides that he needs to investigate the case further before he can arrest the 
suspect. To my surprise, the case of adultery is still heard the next day at the community court, 
where the same testimonies as in the banja are made. João Magaro, who is still sick, also accuses 
the Chauque of uroi. The judge, however, ignores this accusation, which, as he realises, he is not 
mandated to hear, and instead concentrates on the adultery case. He first tells the Magaros off for 
refusing to receive the payment at the banja, and then firmly tells Mateus that it is wrong to sleep 
with a lot of married women. Mateus in the end admits that he has done wrong and then places the 
amount of 600,000 on the ground before the judge. This time the Magaros agree to receive the 
payment.  
After this payment, which rounds off the case of adultery itself, the Magaros insist that 
João’s illness still needs to be resolved. They want the community court to decide that the parties 
should go to a nyanga to determine who has caused the illness in order for it to be removed. 
However, the judge rejects this and suggests that they should try the hospital first, adding that it 
could be “this thing of tradicão” (‘tradition’, here meaning uroi). But to assume this could be very 
dangerous, because then the talk will be about uroi and there will be further problems. At this point 
the judge briefly mentions the arson case, stating: “You, Magaro, you have to listen to the 
resolution…go to the hospital…and do not try to solve the case on your own. Because now a house 
has been burnt and people might think that it is you who did it…because you promised things there 
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in the banja…and then because of this suspicion of uroi”. The Magaros in the end agree to travel to 
the hospital, and the judge tells the parties that they should return to the community court with the 
results of the hospital’s examination. The judge ends by asserting that the arson case is now with the 
PIC and that his job is only to see to it that the parties agree on the case of adultery.  
Upon leaving the community court, we wonder why the Chauque did not bring up the arson 
case. When we ask them later, they reply that they wanted to make the payment for adultery to 
make peace with the other family in order to avoid future problems. Moreover, they had been told 
by the PIC that the case of arson should be dealt with by the police and not the community court. 
When we explore the issue with the people from the Gudza area, we are told that João is greatly 
disliked in the area because he has slept with a lot of married women. Although he has been accused 
before the banja four times before, he has never paid the fine to the victims. While some of the 
people we speak to reason that he has failed to do so because mambo Gudza is too weak to force 
him to do so, others think that it could be because João’s uncle, Lucas, is a person “who knows of 
the plants” (i.e. can bewitch people). Using this phrase, they are indicating that the victims might 
have been reluctant to push for payment because they feared to be the subject of uroi. Regarding the 
case of arson, our informants reply that it could be anyone who is fed up with João’s continuous 
“stealing of their women”, his failure to pay compensation and his family’s use of uroi – in other 
words, because justice had not been dispensed by the available authorities. Two weeks after the last 
community court hearing, the parties have still not returned to the community court with the 
hospital results and the arson case is formally closed. The PIC arrested João’s uncle and kept him in 
a cell for two days, but then released him due to “lack of evidence”. By the end of my fieldwork 
Mateus has recovered and the Chauque have moved to the neighbouring district, “due to problems 
with the neighbours”.  
 
This case further shows how uroi adds complexity and indeterminacy to the movement of a 
singular case between different transgressions and types of authority. A crucial point in 
common with Case 1 is that the splitting up of a case in accordance with the PRM’s rules 
could mean that only one of the transgressions was resolved or that none of them were. The 
case also adds two additional dimensions to the implication of adhering to the PRM’s rules: 
the limits of chiefs’s banja to enforce decisions, and the potential neglect of the importance 
people attributed to the longer-term history and moral reputation of contenders.  
 First, the case shows how the inability and reluctance of the chief to resolve a social 
transgression, which merged with uroi, is one reason why the case gets out of hand and 
leads to a criminal transgression. When the Gudza banja decides to send the parties to the 
community court, the uroi aspect is undermined and the perpetrator gets away with paying 
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compensation for the adultery alone. It is important here to take into account the fact that 
the prohibition placed on community courts not to hear criminal cases meant that the act of 
arson was resolved without taking into consideration the wider history of the transgressions 
in the case. Moreover, the existence of a plural institutional landscape, allowing chiefs to 
forward cases, undermined their ability to resolve the entire case in the sense of fully 
restoring the social relationship between the contenders.    
Secondly, the suspicion of uroi and the subsequent incidence of arson could not be 
divorced from the longer history of the Chauque family. In the Gudza area, they had a 
reputation for possessing knowledge of uroi and using it against their opponents in a case. 
This had made prior victims of adultery fear to push for a final resolution and rendered the 
Gudza banja incapable of enforcing its sanction. Ultimately the reputation of the Chauque 
was used to explain the incident of arson as an act of (criminal) self-redress, that is, as 
caused by the long-term failure of the Chauque family to engage in efforts to restore social 
relationships. The act of self-redress placed a family member of the victim of adultery and 
uroi at risk of being prosecuted for a criminal act. He was nonetheless fortunate because the 
PIC (the police’s criminal investigation unit) did not have evidence or witnesses. The act of 
self-redress, by contrast, led to the ultimate sanction of the Chauque, albeit indirectly, in 
their being banned from the regulado. As such, the Magaros implicitly ‘won’ the case.  
This fortunate result for the Magaros was not always the fate of the original victims. 
Because cases were split up into different transgressions that were treated separately by 
different authorities, the outcome could be that the original victims were punished more 
severely than the original perpetrators. This happened because the wider history of a case 
between two parties was not taken into consideration by the PRM when it resulted in a 
criminal offence. For example, in two cases from Dombe in 2004 the victims of uroi 
killings were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. This happened because, after many 
failed attempts to be compensated for the uroi killings, they had resorted to criminal self-
redress. In other cases the merger of uroi with a social or criminal case did not lead to 
(criminal) self-redress, but to no justice for the victims. For example, in 13 cases the victim 
of uroi (originally of 3 crimes and 10 social transgressions) refrained from having the case 
re-tried by an authority. The explanation given was that they feared future uroi against 
them, i.e. an escalation of evil-doing.  
The key point is that the always potential merger of uroi with other types of 
transgressions within the same case challenged the PRM’s neat separation of social, 
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traditional and criminal cases. An implication of this was that when people did abide by the 
PRM’s models for practice it could mean that a case was not fully settled or even that it 
escalated. Next I address the second pattern action, which in more depth brings to light how 
this potential escalation of cases was intimately related to conflicting forms of justice, and 
to the links that people drew between the invisible and visible dimensions of evil-doing 
(kushaisha).  
   
3. Pattern Two: Double-classifications, Conflicting Justice Forms  
 
This section explores the second pattern of action: situations in which, during the resolution 
process, the same transgression was re-classified as another type of case or where it 
simultaneously entered two of the PRM’s categories of cases. Double classifications, in 
other words, took two main forms. First, the section addressed cases such as lobolo 
payments, marriage disputes and uroi killings with medicine that, during the resolution 
process, were reclassified as crimes such as rape, domestic violence and homicide. 
Secondly, it explores crimes such as theft and homicide that were classified as criminal by 
the PRM and/or the involved parties, but were simultaneously explained as manifestations 
of vulí (evil spirit possession). What distinguishes this second form of double classification 
is that the same transgression was explained as both having a visible and an invisible 
dimension of evil-doing.  
Common to the two forms of double classification was that they resulted from 
situations where a case moved between the state police and the non-state authorities. As a 
result different forms of punishments, dispensed by different authorities, became possible. 
This could have different implications. The re-classification of a case (for example, from 
social to criminal) could be an asset for victims in achieving justice because it allowed them 
to manoeuvre strategically between the PRM, the chiefs and the community courts. But 
when the case reached the police or the official court, the dispensation of conflicting forms 
of justice could be made manifest, often with very unfortunate consequences for the 
victims.  
Re-classifications of a single case  
In this sub-section I address the first form that a double classification assumed. I begin by 
turning to the police station in Dombe in 2005, where a so-called social case was 
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reclassified as a crime when the victim chose to take it to the PRM. This happened after 
failed attempts to settle the case in a banja.  
 
Case 3. Rape or marriage payment?  
It is an early morning in September 2005 at the police station in Dombe sede. I am sitting together 
with my assistant, Noé, outside the station among a group of seventeen people. They have come to 
the police station with an ndava [problem] to present to the police or have been notified to come 
here. When the chief of police arrives, he greets the people sitting outside and asks if there are any 
urgent cases he should attend to. A middle-aged couple and a young woman, who turn out to be 
parents and daughter, approach the chief of police, and after exchanging a few words they enter his 
office. When they come out again the chief of police calls over two community police persons and 
hands them a set of handcuffs and two sjambokos. We overhear them being ordered to travel to 
Muoco to arrest a young criminoso with the name of Jojó. It turns out that the husband and wife, the 
Mutowas, are accusing Jojó of having “taken the virginity” of their fourteen-year-old daughter.  
The chief of police had immediately classified the case as “rape against minors” (under 
eighteen years of age) and therefore as a crime. Because of this classification, the accused needs to 
be arrested. Three hours later the arrest has become a reality. The community police arrive with Jojó 
and his parents, who are asked to wait outside the police station. Then a PRM officer orders  the 
young girl to proceed to the hospital for a medical examination, ‘in accordance with the Law’. An 
hour later, a letter from the hospital confirms that the girl has indeed been raped. Despite this, 
neither the victim nor the accused are sent to the PIC, as is the usual practice when a criminal case 
is dealt with. Instead the uniformed officer asks them to proceed to the sala de permanência, the 
room in the police station which is used when ‘social problems’ are heard.  
Once inside the room, the people involved in the case are asked to take a seat before the 
officer, who sits behind a big desk. As in the banjas, the offended party is asked to give its 
testimony first. Snr. Mutowa explains that two weeks ago Jojó “took the virginity of my daughter 
without my permission” and before asking to marry her. He took the case to a nearby sub-chief of 
Muoco, where the banja fined Jojó 4,000,000 Mtz for having taken the girl’s virginity without 
permission and also ordered him to pay 400,000 Mtz as lobolo to the Mutowas. Jojó and his parents 
had agreed to this resolution of the case, but when the payment fell due they refused to pay, arguing 
that the young girl was flirting with another man: “This is why we are now here with the case”, Snr. 
Mutowa explains to the officer. When Jojó is asked by the officer to speak, he confirms what Snr. 
Mutowa has said. After hearing the parties, the officer looks at Jojó and says: “What you have done 
is a crime…the hospital proves that you have raped this young girl…now you have to go to 
prison…we must open a criminal trial”. At this point in the process, Snr. Mutowa asks permission 
to talk. He tells the officer that he does not want Jojó to go to prison. The police officer reacts by 
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asking, “What is it you want, then?”, and before anyone can answer he looks at the two young 
people and asks “Do you want each other…do you want to marry?”  They reply ‘Yes’, and Snr. 
Mutowa adds that he wants Jojó to pay the fine and the lobolo. The officer repeats that Jojó could 
be sent to prison in Sussundenga for what he did, but then asks the accused party whether they can 
now agree to make the payments. They immediately state that they agree.  
 
The case illustrates how a single transgression could be classified both as a crime (rape) and 
a violation of a social norm (proper marriage arrangements). Reclassification happened 
because the case was taken to the PRM and moved out of the chiefly domain. The 
immediate consequence was that the accused was now treated as a criminal (i.e. arrested as 
a rapist) and that the potential form of penalty shifted from compensation to imprisonment. 
Intriguingly, the offended party did not take the case to the PRM because they wanted it to 
be treated as a ‘crime’, i.e. the perpetrator going to the official court and then possibly to 
prison. Instead they wanted the police to ensure that the sentence passed by the banja 
materialised. Turning to the police in this case was possible because the transgression could 
be reclassified as a crime.  
Reclassification was used as a tool to achieve justice when and if this had not 
materialised at a banja. The outcome, to the advantage of the offended (and for that matter 
of the perpetrator), nonetheless depended on the PRM officers’ willingness to return the 
case to its original classification and in so doing to adjust to the parties’ preferred form of 
justice. In short, reclassification could form part of the strategic manoeuvring or ‘situational 
adjustment’ of the rural population, but the success of such strategies depended on the 
PRM’s willingness to also engage in adjustments.294  
  In Case 3 the possibility for reclassification did not lead to any conflict between 
official state-legal sanctions and the victim’s notion of proper justice. Neither did it 
challenge the sentence that the chief had handed down to begin with. It only underscored 
the chief’s inability to enforce a sanction. This was not always the outcome. In numerous 
other cases double classifications had unfortunate results from the perspectives of both the 
victims and the perpetrators. This was due to conflicting forms of justice exemplified by a 
discrepancy between the state-legal sanctions and local ideas of how to properly restore 
social order.    
                                                 
294 The reasons why the PRM engaged in such adjustments are discussed in Chapter 9.  
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For example, in an identical case from the chieftaincy of Boupua in Matica, a case of lobolo 
payment ended up as a conviction of rape in the official district court because the banja and 
the community court had failed to enforce a fine: the victim achieved no compensation, and 
the accused was imprisoned. In yet other cases, double classifications and the involvement 
of the PRM not only made the victims lose the opportunity to achieve the kind of justice 
that they were striving for, it also challenged the de facto authority of chiefs to restore 
order. This was especially the outcome in cases of arson and the kinds of uroi that involved 
lethal poisoning, and thus material evidence for the PRM.  
One example was a case of arson in Dombe, where two boys mistakenly burnt down 
a neighbour’s maize field. The victim took the case to the chief, who, in accordance with 
the victim’s request, ordered the two boys to provide compensation. Because the arson was 
involuntary, the sub-chief did not regard it as a ‘crime’. However, when a local PRM 
officer heard of the outcome, he notified the boys and the chief, reclassifying the act as a 
crime. The chief was told off in public for solving a crime, the boys were sentenced to 
public work and the victim received no compensation. Another example was the death of a 
young teacher. He died after drinking locally brewed beer together with a number of male 
members of a chieftaincy. The teacher had at the time a case pending at the chiefly banja 
because he had been “sleeping with a married woman”. Due to this case and the fact that 
the teacher was the only person who had died from the beer, the chief and other nearby 
residents classified his death as an uroi infliction.295 They therefore held that this was a 
case to be settled in the banja with the assistance of the wadzi-nyanga. However, when the 
PRM learned that a “government employee” had been killed, they classified it as homicide 
caused by lethal poison, which provided concrete evidence for it to be reclassified as a 
criminal offence. The end result was that the case was never resolved: the PIC did 
determine that the teacher had been poisoned, but was not able to identify the poisoner. 
According to the statements of a number of rural residents, the intervention of the PRM had 
detrimental consequences. Not only did it mean that the perpetrator went free and the 
chief’s authority to enforce justice was questioned. Most seriously, it also meant that the 
umroi – the original source of the death – was not identified (i.e. by a nyanga), and as a 
                                                 
295 The reason why this was seen as uroi and not merely poisoning was that the beer had only caused the death 
of the teacher, not the other people consuming the same beer from the same calabash. This was a commonly 
held explanation for the death of people following joint consumption of beer in Dombe. To have caused the 
death only of the teacher meant that the poison had been accompanied by a specific spell to alone kill the 
teacher.   
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consequence that the spirit of the deceased had not been compensated (i.e. by paying the 
teacher’s family in money or kind).  
The failure to dispense these forms of justice could have severe consequences in the 
future. It could, I was told, make the spirit of the deceased rebel in the form of vulí (evil 
spirit) possessing a family member of either the victim or of the perpetrator. This would 
manifest itself in the form of illness, madness, or even death, as well as potential new acts 
of kushaisha (evil-doing). Such manifestations could only be annulled through exorcism 
performed by a nyanga and by identifying the original source of the vulí (i.e. the murderer). 
In short, it was widely held that failing to compensate the victim of uroi killings could set 
off a vicious circle of evil-doing, which, as noted above, could include acts of criminal self-
redress. Importantly, this perception also extended beyond uroi killings. Visible types of 
homicide (i.e. crimes), using force or weapons, were also coupled in many incidents with 
the manifestation of vulí when and if the spirit of the diseased was not compensated. This, 
for example, happened when the perpetrator was only imprisoned and not sentenced by a 
banja. One example was a case of homicide with the use of physical force in Dombe in 
2004. In accordance with the ‘law of the hurumende’, the case was forwarded by a chief to 
the PRM and then to the official provincial court. The perpetrator was sentenced to 
imprisonment. Two months later the deceased’s brother lost a child. A nyanga divined that 
the death was due to the angry spirit of the deceased, who wanted material compensation 
for the death. Since the perpetrator was in prison, this was not possible. Instead the brother 
had to convince the family of the perpetrator to pay the spirit so that no more deaths 
occurred. However, the lack of compensation also left the parties involved in fear of a 
future chain of evil-doing and misfortune.  
These cases illustrate how the reclassification of a transgression from uroi to a 
crime, thus moving the case from the domain of the banjas to the state police and courts, 
could contradict both the principle of material compensation, as well as the notion of a link 
between a visible and an invisible dimension of justice (or lack thereof). As addressed 
below, this link formed part of a wider understanding of the sources of evil-doing 
(including crime) and the particular ways in which they could be undone.  
Two classifications in one: visible and invisible dimensions 
This sub-section explores the second form of double classification to which crimes such as 
theft or homicide could be attributed, namely, an invisible, spiritual dimension, and a 
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visible, criminal dimension. I begin with a case from the Chibue chieftaincy in Dombe, 
where a minor dispute between two neighbours turned into a criminal act, which was 
equally understood as having been caused by vulí possession. The case illustrates the 
tensions between different forms of justice, here because the perpetrator of the crime ended 
up in prison.  
 
Case 4. The merger of vulí and criminal activity.  
At the banja at Chief Chibue’s homestead in August 2004, we encounter a minor dispute between 
two neighbours, Snr. Boca and Snr. Mafinquinje and his wife Maria. At the first hearing, Snr. Boca 
had accused his neighbours’ goats of having eaten his fields. At the same time the accused family 
counter-accused Snr. Boca of having stolen one of their goats. At the second hearing, the 
Mafinquinjes paid Snr. Boca 2 bags of sorghum, equivalent to what the goats had eaten. However, 
Snr. Boca refused to admit to the theft at this hearing and at two subsequent banjas where the case 
was discussed. This left the two neighbours in an uneasy relationship.   
When I return to the Chibue regulado in 2005, Snr. Boca’s son has just come out of prison 
in Sussundenga. Chief Chibue explains to me that the imprisonment had to do with the old case of 
the goats. Surprised to hear that the case had gone that far, I initially thought that the Mafinquinjes 
had given up at the banja and taken the theft of the goat to the police. But it is more complicated 
than that. It turns out that, at a fifth banja in 2004 (after my fieldwork), Snr. Boca was found guilty 
of theft, but refused to pay compensation. In the end the Mafinquinjes gave up on the case. 
However, a couple of months later the son of Snr. Boca, Lucas, went maluco (crazy). When this 
happened Snr. Boca informed Chief Chibue, who recommended that the son be consulted by a 
nyanga, because suddenly turning maluco could be a sign of vulí. A nyanga divined that Lucas was 
possessed by the ancestral spirit of the deceased father of Snr. Mafinquinje, who was the original 
owner of the disappeared goat. The spirit was angry because the case had not been solved properly 
(i.e. compensation paid). Without calling upon the Mafinquinjes, the nyanga treated Lucas with 
exorcism.  
Notwithstanding the treatment, Lucas again turned maluco a couple of weeks later. This 
time Snr. Boca decided to go to Mussone, a sub-chief of Chibue. He wanted to see if this would 
work better than with Chibue. Mussone, who knew about the goat case, called in the Mafinquinjes 
for a hearing. Both parties were sent to another nyanga, where they were told that the spirit had 
made Lucas crazy again because Snr. Boca had failed to pay compensation for the goat. Snr. Boca 
now agreed to pay compensation, but before he did so something else happened. The day after the 
nyanga consultation, Lucas went to the house of the Mafinquinjes, destroyed their stored food and 
stole money (100,000 Mtz) and a sack of fish. Furious at how the case had developed, Snr. 
Mafinquinje went straight to the PRM in Dombe, which notified Snr. Boca and Lucas to appear at 
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the station. The theft case was not sent to the PIC, but heard by an ordinary PRM officer. At the 
request of the Mafinquinjes, the officer agreed not to open a criminal process and simply ordered 
Lucas to return what he had stolen. The next day Lucas returned the sack of fish to the police 
station, but not the 100,000 Mtz. Without the money, the PRM officer decided to open a criminal 
process. Lucas ended up in Sussundenga prison for three months, but was released without a trial 
because the Mafinquinjes never took the case to the official court.   
When I ask if the case then ended (understanding the imprisonment to be punishment for 
the theft and for the goat case), the answer is no. Chief Chibue explains that the imprisonment did 
not solve the problem of the vulí. Quite the contrary: Lucas was still maluco, because vulí do not 
disappear when a person goes to prison. Sometimes it can even become worse. And so it did. A 
week after the imprisonment Snr. Boca’s wife went maluco too, and the two parties again went to a 
nyanga. They were told that, for things to go right with the son and wife of Snr. Boca, the spirit 
wanted two goats – one for the stolen one, and another for all the damage that Snr. Boca’s family 
had caused the Mafinquinjes. Snr. Boca delivered the goat at the subsequent banja of Chibue, and 
his wife got well again. There was just one problem: Lucas had not repaid the 100,000 Mtz because 
he was in prison. After his release the Mafinquinjes tried to convince him to pay, but Lucas refused, 
stating that he had now served his time with the hurumende and had a letter proving this. At the end 
of my fieldwork, Lucas had still not paid his debt. According to Maria they had given up on getting 
the money, stating that “We don’t want any more problems with the neighbour”. She also reminded 
me that the case had already cost them dear, in total amounting to two sacks of sorghum and 
630,000 Mtz (i.e. payments to 3 nyangas, 3 banjas and 3 traditional police who took them to the 
wadzi-nyanga). Conversely Snr. Boca told me that he regretted that his son did not want to pay the 
money, because this could mean that he remained maluco and that more bad things might happen.     
 
The material presented above brings us further into the role that the invisible, spiritual 
dimension played in the rural population’s explanations of transgressions and what their 
notions of appropriate justice were. Vulí not only became entangled with a criminal 
transgression as a second act, as was often the case with uroi (see Section 2). It completely 
merged with a criminal act: the theft and destructive acts were explained as a sign of vulí 
possessing the son of the original perpetrator of a theft who had failed to compensate the 
victims. Vulí was explained as an invisible dispensing of justice, and in that sense 
resembled the concept of mapipi (“uroi with a reason”, or a justifiable form of self-redress). 
But it also differed from mapipi by setting in motion another spiral of evil-doing, which had 
very visible dimensions. These explanations could not be divorced from wider, commonly 
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held local notions of justice, which clearly conflicted with imprisonment, as Case 4 also 
shows.  
When I discussed uroi, vulí and forms of justice with people in Dombe and Matica, 
justice was commonly conceptualised as the ability to restore the social relationship 
between two contending parties through compensation. This could be ensured by returning 
an equivalent for what had been taken (virginity, wife, material items, the eating of produce 
etc.) or by removing or annulling what had been given or sent (uroi or vulí). Whereas the 
former can be seen as a kind of reconciliation between the parties, the latter was also 
explained as a cure or restoration of the person inflicted by uroi or vulí. The latter was 
important, irrespective of whether the person inflicted was merely a victim or also a 
perpetrator of, for example, a criminal act understood to be caused by vulí (such as Lucas in 
Case 4). In contrast to these forms of justice, only in extremely few situations did people 
regard the removal of the perpetrator from the chieftaincy through, for instance, expulsion 
or prison as a desirable form of justice. This was only considered appropriate in situations 
of repeated insults or uroi inflictions of a chief, or repeated criminal transgressions and uroi 
killings (see also Chapter 7).   
Against this background, imprisonment of the perpetrator conflicted not only with 
the principles of compensatory justice and reconciliation: it also potentially reinforced a 
spiral of evil-doing. The source of evil-doing remained with the perpetrator, but worse still, 
it could also inflict a family member (such as the mother of the perpetrator in Case 4). 
Imprisonment did not mean that justice was achieved. It neither cured the perpetrator not 
reconciled the parties. As reiterated time and again by people in Matica and Dombe, 
imprisonment was not seen as a way to avoid future crimes: i.e. “prison is only payment to 
the hurumende” or “when people come out from there [prison] they just continue to do 
even more bad things.”296 Imprisonment both signalled the lack of compensatory justice 
and aggravated the state of the perpetrator and his kin. As shown in Case 4, to end the chain 
of evil-doing, the parties had to return to the non-state domain of justice enforcement, the 
wadzi-nyanga and the banja, because only here could both the visible and invisible 
dimensions of the particular transgression be dealt with. The problem remaining was that, 
                                                 
296 Geschiere (1996) mentions a similar perception of imprisonment in eastern Cameroon, but more precisely 
in regard to the imprisonment of witches and sorcerers, which followed the involvement of the official courts 
in prosecuting people accused of being witches. The point he draws is that, when these offenders return from 
prison, they are even more feared and suspected than they were before. This is due to the perception that the 
state can only punish witches, not cure them: the state cannot neutralize their powers, as the healers (known as 
nganga in Cameroon) can (ibid: 321ff.).  
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by serving time in prison, the perpetrator of the second act of theft could, entirely in 
accordance with state law, refrain from compensating the victims after he had been 
released. As made clear by Snr. Boca himself, this could potentially re-situate the 
perpetrator in a future chain of evil-doing. This underscores the point made earlier about the 
always potential link between the invisible sources of evil-doing, criminal activity and the 
lack of appropriate justice.  
In sum, this section has shown how the blurring of the PRM’s classificatory 
boundaries between different types of cases was related partly to the ability to (re)classify a 
single act as two or more types of transgressions and partly to deeply embedded local 
perceptions of transgressions as having both a visible (criminal) and invisible (non-
criminal) dimension. These forms of double classification became explicit when the 
resolution process moved from the banjas to the PRM either because the former failed to 
enforce a resolution and/or because it was prohibited from resolving it. The immediate 
implication was that different forms of sanctions and interpretations of a transgression were 
set in play, when and if the involved parties adhered to the PRM’s models for practice. 
Potentially this could conflict with the parties’ preferred forms of justice, but it could also 
be used strategically. Case 3, for example, showed that the very ability to classify a 
transgression as both ‘social’ and ‘criminal’ could be an asset in the victim’s strategic 
manoeuvring between different types of authority as a way of achieving justice. By 
contrast, Case 4 also showed that taking a case to the PRM could be risky business. A core 
point is that, from the perspective of the victims, a satisfactory resolution depended on the 
individual PRM officer’s adjustment to the victims’ own notions of justice. In the majority 
of cases this meant the police refraining from adhering to the principles of a ‘criminal 
process’ (i.e. with imprisonment as the result). This point is important to keep in mind, 
when I in the next chapter, address the third pattern of action, namely how and why the 
state police and the chiefs frequently settled the ‘wrong’ cases.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has taken a first step in exploring the everyday patterns of action and 
interaction within the field of policing and justice enforcement that emerged in the wake of 
the PRM’s attempt to organise this field. A key insight of the totality of cases I collected is 
that the classificatory boundaries of the PRM’s ‘models for practice’, discussed in Chapter 
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7, were more often than not blurred and challenged in practice. Overall, this points to the 
intricacy of boundary-marking, of the local tiers of the PRM’s attempts to regulate and fix 
distinct domains of authority and to compartmentalise social reality into distinct forms of 
transgressions of norms and rules. By implication, the local tiers of the PRM’s attempt to 
constitute a particular domain of sovereign state authority was not totalizing and 
straightforwardly achieved but matched by situational adjustment, by negotiations of the 
PRM’s rules and schemes of classification. Therefore, if the ‘models for practice’ were 
themselves the result of creative translations of official law by the local tiers of the PRM, 
then these also became subject to adjustments in everyday practices and interactions. In this 
chapter I have shown how this was reflected in the difficulty of enforcing the separate 
classifications of cases (‘social’, ‘traditional’, ‘criminal’), which provided the background 
against which the PRM drew up distinct domains of authority.  
Importantly, the intricacy of boundary-marking happened not because people in 
Matica and Dombe were unaware of the PRM’s models for practice: people were very well 
aware of where they should or could bring their cases. In fact, they frequently took their 
cases to the ‘right’ authorities, sometimes travelling between different ones as the case 
developed from one type of transgression to another or as an aspect of reclassifying a case. 
Rather, the impossibility of fixing separate categories of transgression arose because such 
rigid distinctions did not well match how disputes between parties often developed. Nor did 
they correspond to people’s perceptions of different forms of transgression as part of a 
common category of evil-doing (kushaisha). The key to understanding this was the always 
potential links that people in Matica and Dombe drew between the visible and invisible 
dimensions of evil-doing and the means to undo these (i.e. to achieve appropriate justice). 
Because this also included acts that the PRM classified as criminal transgressions, adhering 
to the ‘models for practice’ could be at odds with people’s notions of appropriate justice 
and of the restoration of order in general. Paradoxically, the wider implications of how the 
‘models for practice’ were adjusted to and appropriated in everyday practice was not 
increased regularity in the enforcement of justice, as intended by the PRM, but instead high 
levels of indeterminacy. This is the key point: despite efforts to fix a particular order, 
people were never sure whether they would achieve the kinds of justice they desired and the 
authorities who were implicated remained in a precarious position.   
It is clear from the cases presented that the plural landscape of institutions of justice 
enforcement, as well as the ability to reclassify cases, could be an asset for people in 
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achieving a desirable outcome. This nonetheless depended on the ability of individuals to 
manoeuvre strategically between the different authorities and to convince them to adjust to 
their preferred forms of justice. Taking a case to the police in particular could be a risky 
business. This risk reflected the tension between local notions of appropriate justice and the 
dominant form of punishment dispensed by the official justice system, namely 
imprisonment. Conversely, the ‘splitting up of cases’, which the PRM’s rules underpinned, 
also placed chiefs in a precarious position. It meant that they were not permitted to settle 
the different categories of transgressions that could be implicated in a single case. The 
police officers, on the other hand, were not able to satisfy people’s preferences for justice if 
they strictly adhered to the law. These different tensions are important to keep in mind 
when, in the next chapter, I turn to the many situations in which both chiefs and police 
officers flouted the rules of the PRM. Here we shall also address why many people in 
Matica and Dombe chose to bring uroi accusations and social cases to the PRM, despite the 
risks involved.  
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Chapter 9 
Beyond Mandates - Mergers and Distinctions 
 
 
This chapter explores the third pattern of action and interaction that was identified in 
Chapter 8, namely the pattern which indicated that the chiefs and the local tiers of the PRM 
in particular frequently received, heard and engaged in the settlement of the ‘wrong’ types 
of cases when compared with the ‘models for practice’. This means addressing how and 
why chiefs and police officers went beyond their ‘official mandates’, and also why people 
in Matica and Dombe at times took their wa-ndava (cases) to the ‘wrong’ authorities. It 
thus follows the same approach as Chapter 8, asking both how the pattern unfolded in 
practice by drawing on concrete cases, and why this was so, based on the different reasons 
that rural residents, chiefs and police officers gave me.  
The continued settlement of criminal cases by the chiefs, despite the risks 
involved, and the police officers’ increased engagement with settling uroi and social cases, 
despite the PRM’s own rules preserving these for non-state authorities, indicate that the 
PRM’s attempts to fix distinct domains of authority were precarious. To understand what 
this meant for the constitution of de facto authority implies asking a number of questions: 
What issues were at stake for chiefs, the state police officers and contenders in a case? 
What perceptions of chiefs and the state police informed the ways in which people chose to 
take their cases to the ‘wrong’ authority? What did the preferences of contenders mean for 
the practices of authority enforcement employed by chiefs and the state police? And 
overall, did the practices of going beyond official mandates mean that the state police and 
chiefs were de facto perceived as, and turned into, identical forms of authority in justice 
enforcement? In other words, did the apparently blurred boundaries between distinct 
domains of authority, communicated by the PRM, slip into complete practical fusions?    
 To address these questions, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first deals 
with the continued resolution of criminal cases by chiefs, but also how this continuity 
merged with new evolving practices in relation to the state police. Secondly, I address the 
developing action patterns of the local tiers of the PRM in settling uroi and social cases, as 
well as their conclusion of criminal cases outside the formal justice system. The latter is 
drawn in as another example of how and why police officers went beyond their official 
mandate.     
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1. The Chiefs: Reconfigured Continuity, Precarious Legitimacy  
 
As noted in Chapter 7, chiefs regularly continued the practice of settling criminal cases, 
despite being aware of the risk of punishment by the PRM for flouting the law of the 
hurumende. This could not be divorced from the fact that people continued to bring 
criminal cases to chiefs or sub-chiefs. In fact, in two thirds of the total number of cases that, 
according to the PRM, should be classified as criminal, the victims chose a banja of a chief 
as their first option for settling the case. Over half of these were resolved by chiefs. When 
some cases were transferred to the PRM, it was either because the banja failed to enforce a 
penalty (29%), because the chief feared punishment by the PRM (18%), or because the case 
was discovered by the PRM (6 %).  
Among both higher and lower ranking state officials, the continued solving of 
crimes by chiefs was seen as being due to “ignorance”, “lack of knowledge of the law” and 
“low education”, often followed by the argument that “the war has made it like that” and 
that “it is a matter of transition”. This explanation conflicted with the chiefs’ widespread 
knowledge of the ‘models for practice’. Similarly, interviews suggested that the vast 
majority of the population possessed the same knowledge. In the sixty interviews I 
conducted, 80% confirmed the ‘models for practice’ with regard to what types of cases 
chiefs were allowed or not allowed to solve, according to ma-lei we hurumende (the law of 
the state/government).  
However, when posing different scenarios of where people would actually prefer to 
take different types of criminal offence, there was a great discrepancy between what they 
considered were the official mandates of the chiefs and what their actual preferences were. 
Apart from homicide and stabbings, the vast majority preferred to have a criminal case 
heard either alone by a chief (30-50%) or by a chief as their first option. In the latter case 
people were only prepared to take a case to the PRM when a banja resolution had not 
materialized (17-50%).297 This indicated that the PRM was considered a last resort or an 
institution of appeal.  
                                                 
297 For example, in the case of robbery 32% of respondents preferred a chief alone to hear the case, and 50% 
that the PRM should only be involved if the chief gave up trying to solve the case on his own. Conversely 
only 15% said that they wanted the case to be taken directly to the PRM to be resolved, and only one 
respondent spoke of the official district court and one of the secretário. In cases of arson the figures were 
strikingly identical, though with slightly fewer people who preferred to take the case directly to the police 
(8%) and with two respondents who preferred to take the case to no authority at all due to fear of uroi. In 
cases of violent fights in which blood was spilled the figures were slightly different, with 24% wanting to take 
the case directly to the PRM, and 48% wanting the chiefs alone to solve the case. Only 11% preferred to use 
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The question is why chiefs and people in general supported the continued settlement of 
crimes by chiefs, despite knowledge of the PRM’s rules, and how this was actually done. 
As addressed next the answer lies not only in a desire for continuity, but also implied 
changes of chiefly practices in relation to the state police.    
Flouting and drawing on the Law of the Hurumende 
The settlement of criminal cases by chiefs (such as theft, domestic violence, beatings with 
the spilling of blood and arson), typically began with a victim (and his/her family members) 
informing the nearest saguta or, if they were closer, a sub-chief or chief about the case. 
This practice was confirmed in interviews. All but two people held that all kinds of cases 
should always be taken first to the mambo (higher or lower ranking), and then it was up to 
the mambo to decide the next step. This was also the case when the perpetrator was 
unknown to the victim or his/her nearby neighbours. In these situations people said they 
would rely on either the chief (26%) to help them find the perpetrator or on the wadzi-
nyanga to divine who it might be (18%). When the perpetrator was known or suspected the 
chief or sub-chief would send a police assistant to notify the accused of the subsequent 
banja hearing.298 In a fewer cases, such as more serious thefts and arson, a police assistant 
would be sent to arrest the accused and bring him or her straightaway to the home of the 
chief or sub-chief.299 It was at this moment that the PRM, according to its ‘rules’, expected 
chiefs to pass on the suspect to the police station. 
In the majority of the cases encountered, the chief or sub-chief did not, 
however, transfer a suspect directly to the police. This was in accordance with the dominant 
preferences of rural residents. Instead chiefs would delay giving a decision until they had 
consulted the offended party (including one or more family members) either during a banja 
or with the presence of at least one of the madodas. In the vast majority of cases I observed, 
this led to often heated debates over whether the matter was serious enough to be sent to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
the PRM as an institution of appeal when a banja resolution did not materialize. Conversely there were no 
less than 17% who preferred to solve cases outside any court. In cases of rape no respondent mentioned the 
PRM, whereas in cases of homicide all but two respondents preferred to go to the PRM as a first option.  
298 There were exceptions to this. For example, in cases of beatings with the spilling of blood, there were eight 
respondents (and four cases encountered) where the victims preferred to do nothing about the case. The 
reason given was that they feared future problems with the perpetrator – such as uroi - if the case was taken to 
court. The same applied to cases of arson.  
299 Only in four cases encountered did this involve the accused actually being tied up (i.e. with rope). As a 
general pattern this only happened when the accused had failed to come to the banja or had resisted being 
escorted to the banja of their own free will.   
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PRM, and with both the wronged and accused parties giving their opinion about how the 
case should be settled. These debates always revolved around preferred forms of sanction, 
sometimes coupled with the argument from the parties or the chief that “it is better to settle 
this right away”, adding “if we can agree on a resolution”. To have the case settled by the 
banja also depended on whether the parties could agree to pay the banja for the resolution. 
The key point is that the decision to settle a crime in the banja, as opposed to sending it to 
the police, was not a sovereign decision of the chief, but the result of relatively open 
negotiations between the members of the banja and the parties involved. That this was 
intimately related to the victims’ preferred forms of justice and their reluctance to go to the 
PRM is illustrated in the case below.  
 
Case 5: When a chief solves crime and uses force 
In 2004 two young married women, who were neighbours in the Pampanissa sub-chieftaincy of 
Dombe, were accused by their husbands of sleeping with two men who were seasonal workers in a 
timber business. The husbands took the case to the banja of Pampanissa as a case of prostitution, 
demanding that the young men pay compensation. However, on the day of the banja the accused 
men failed to turn up because they had left the area. During the hearing the two wives pleaded 
guilty to prostitution, after which the banja decided that they should be sent back to their parents for 
consultation. One of the couples returned at the next banja. The husband told Pampanissa that the 
parents-in-law wanted Pampanissa to deal with their daughter. Pampanissa asked the husband what 
he wanted him to do now that the perpetrators had disappeared. He told Pampanissa that he wanted 
him to “educate the woman so that she will not repeat what she has done”. Pampanissa first said, 
‘Ahh, but we [chiefs] are not really allowed to do that anymore…this is the law”. However, after 
thinking a moment, he agreed and then ordered one of his police officers to give the woman five 
strokes with a whip made of a tree branch. After the punishment the situation got out of hand. The 
husband got up, took the whip and, shouting that the woman needed more punishment, hit her very 
hard several times until she bled.  
In the end two of Pampanissa’s police officers managed to stop him and tied him up with 
two pieces of rope. The members of the banja then had a long discussion about what they should do 
with the husband. Two of the madodas argued that he should be sent to the PRM because he had 
committed a crime by making his wife bleed. However, in the end they agreed with Pampanissa that 
they should first ask the woman’s parents what they wanted to happen to the husband. One of the 
madodas added that “Maybe they don’t want him to go to prison…they want him to pay a fine to 
her parents…because he has violated their daughter”. At the next banja the husband paid 
compensation to the parents-in-law, as well as a fine to the banja for having violated the banja’s 
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order when he took hold of the whip and began beating his wife. After these payments were made 
the case was finally closed.  
At the same banja the second couple involved in the original case of prostitution was also 
present, together with the wife’s parents, who had actually brought the case to the banja. They did 
so because, four days earlier, the husband had beaten up their daughter severely. He had done this 
when he found out that she was pregnant, believing that the father was one of the workers. When 
this transgression was discussed Pampanissa very firmly concluded: “This is a crime that should be 
taken to the police…this is ma-lei we hurumende (the law of the state), because it is these things 
that can end with murder”. Upon hearing this, the accused begged Pampanissa not to send the case 
to the Dombe police. His excuse was that he was drunk when he beat his wife and that he had not 
done it on purpose. He also promised that he would never do it again. Pampanissa the turned to the 
woman and her parents, asking them what they wanted to happen. In a timid voice, the woman 
replied that she did not want her husband to go to the police because then he could end up in prison. 
She was afraid that if he went to prison, his family will blame everything on her, because she had 
been sleeping with another man. What she wanted was for her husband to promise not to beat her up 
again. Her father supported this view and added: “If he goes to prison he will not be able to support 
my daughter and her two children”. The father also asked the banja to make the husband pay 
compensation to him for physically injuring his daughter. After reiterating that “this case is a crime 
that should go to the police”, Pampanissa nonetheless agreed to the requests of the victim’s party. 
He closed the case after the perpetrator had promised never to beat his wife again and to pay 
compensation to his father-in-law: “If you do not do this”, Pampanissa promised him, “I will 
personally take you to Dombe [the police]”.   
 
This case from Dombe, because it led to corporal punishment, was rather exceptional. 
Besides this aspect, the case is illustrative of more general and increasingly evolving 
patterns of how chiefs continued to conclude criminal cases. Continuity in the sense of the 
types of cases solved, penalties imposed, and procedures for resolution, merged with novel 
practices related to state recognition and the PRM’s ‘models for practice’. Penalties were 
imposed even though the banja members explicitly defined the cases of physical aggression 
as ‘criminal offences’, which they were well aware should officially be passed to the PRM. 
The same applied to the administration of corporal punishment. Chiefs, in other words, 
continued to settle criminal cases, not because they were unaware of the fact that they in 
doing so were flouting ‘ma-lei we hurumende’. Rather it resulted from adjusting to victims’ 
explicit preferences, taking place through a negotiated settlement. But this was not all. As 
illustrated in the case above chiefs paradoxically made references to the law of the 
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hurumende as an integral part of flouting that law. In this sense chiefs exploited the 
classification of cases of physical aggression as ‘crimes to be sent to the police’ as an asset 
in enforcing sanctions. The use of threats of sending the parties to the police, i.e. by 
drawing on the ‘law of the hurumende’, was an increasingly emerging practice used by 
chiefs when they engaged in flouting the law. The possibility of ‘being sent to the police’ 
both explained why people preferred the banja to hear crimes and why it was used by the 
banja to convince the guilty party to accept the banja’s verdict. In other words, knowledge 
of the chiefs’ formal connection with the police became an asset when banjas settled 
criminal cases. It bolstered the authority of the chief to enforce decisions. Flouting ma-lei 
we hurumende merged with discursively drawing on references to this ‘law’ and the formal 
relationship of the chiefs to the state.  
These evolving patterns of chiefs bring to light a further dynamic aspect of the 
relational constitution of state police and chiefly authority. Whereas chiefs in settling 
crimes clearly challenged the police’s attempt to fix distinct domains of authority, as part of 
constituting the particular authority of the police, chiefs at the same time drew on these 
distinctions to constitute their own authority. Importantly, this relational constitution also 
gave way to significant transformations of the way that authority was enforced by chiefs. 
That the authority of the state police and the chiefs was indeed constituted relationally, was 
also reflected in the reasons that people gave for why the chiefs continued to solve crimes 
and why people often preferred the banjas.  
Why do chiefs still settle criminal cases? 
When posing this question to people in Matica and Dombe, only a very small minority (5% 
of respondents) gave a conservative answer. For example, arguing that they wanted all wa-
ndava to be solved by the mambo simply “because this is how it has always been and 
should be.”300 This corresponded to the view of higher ranking PRM officers that 
preferences for chiefs in settling crime could be dealt with through education and 
development.301 The vast majority did not share this view, however. Instead they provided 
answers that intimately related choosing a chief to hear criminal cases with their views of 
and experiences with the state police. In short, as in Case 5 presented above, preferring a 
chief was seen as a choice between alternatives, the state police or the chief, and as 
                                                 
300 Interview, male resident, approximately 70 years old, Gudza, August 2005.  
301 Interview, Chief Commander of police, Sussundenga, August 2004.  
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reflecting a reluctance by both the victims and the perpetrators to be sent to the police. This 
reluctance could be seen under two different perspectives.  
First, the victims’ reluctance to be sent to the police was directly linked to their 
preferred type of sanction and form justice enforcement. In line with the insights of Chapter 
8, choosing to go before the banja was related to both victims and perpetrators’ disregard of 
imprisonment, which they knew was a possible consequence of a case being sent to the 
police. This was contrasted with a general preference for monetary compensation, the 
dominant kind of justice dispensed by the banjas.302 For example, “I prefer the régulo with 
these kinds of thefts and fights because he will ask the accused to pay. With the police you 
cannot be sure that this happens and the thief can be beaten and then sent to prison…and 
then you will loose everything and just remain poor”.303 Added to the insights of Chapter 8, 
imprisonment was therefore also viewed as detrimental to the economic survival of the 
victims.  
The second perspective had more specifically to do with fearful ideas about entering 
the domain of the state police. Over half the people I interviewed, and 80% of those in 
Dombe, stressed the “fear of becoming known to the police” as a reason for having crimes 
resolved by a banja. Intriguingly, this applied not only to the guilty parties, but also the 
victims. This was captured in statements such as “When a person goes to the police and the 
case is a crime, he becomes someone who is involved in crime…someone who is seen as 
involved in ndava yakaxata maningi [very severe problems]…and then another day you can 
be accused…or even on that same day you can be punished.”304 In both Matica and Dombe, 
this was explained as the fear of victims being registered in the books of the hurumende.305 
In Dombe, it was also related to the history of the war and to ideas about the continued 
partisanship of the PRM. Whether in reality or just perceived, people with a history as 
Renamo supporters or worse, as soldiers (which included many a resident, particularly men, 
of Dombe) were widely held to be at a high risk of being punished especially severely by 
the police. This not only applied to the perpetrators: there was also a notion that victims 
                                                 
302 The preference for monetary compensation in criminal cases and the notion that this was the dominant 
form of justice dispensed by chiefs and the banjas was confirmed in the sixty interviews I conducted with 
rural residents: 80% of respondents preferred monetary compensation in criminal offences such as theft, arson 
and violent beatings, while 70% replied that monetary compensation was the dominant form of justice 
dispensed by the banjas.  
303 Interview, male resident, 25 years old, Boupua chieftaincy, Matica, June 2005.  
304 Interview, male resident, approximately 60 years old, Gudza Chieftaincy, Dombe, August 2005.  
305 This fear of the victims taking a case to the police – i.e. as someone known to be involved in ndava – 
cannot be divorced from the already mentioned notion of an always potential link between prior and present 
chains of evil-doing in which the categories of victims and perpetrators can be shifted around.  
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who were identified as Renamo supporters would not be treated fairly by the PRM, or 
worse still, would themselves be accused of crimes.306 The point is that the continued 
resolution of criminal offences by chiefs could neither be divorced from the forms of justice 
that were officially dispensed by the state institutions, nor from wider, historically 
embedded experiences with and ideas about state police practices. It was much less a 
question of sustaining continuity per se, that is, of maintaining ‘how it has always been’ 
versus the ‘new’ rules of the PRM.  
Having said this, people’s choice of the banjas was also weighed against the de 
facto authority of individual chiefs to enforce sanctions. For example, half of the 
interviewees thought that, if the chief failed to enforce sanctions, the police could be used 
as a last resort. It was always a matter of situationally weighing the different opportunities 
and potential consequences of being sent to the police. Complaining to a chief about a 
crime was no guarantee that compensation would be paid. Success depended on the chief’s 
de facto authority to enforce sanctions. Importantly, it also depended on individual chief’s 
willingness to respect victims’ preferences, and to take the risk of potentially being caught 
by the PRM and facing punishment himself. The question is why chiefs took this risk at all. 
When I discussed this question with chiefs, the answer was not a conservative desire for the 
continuity of ‘old’ practices either, nor was it cast as overt resistance to the state police’s 
rules. As noted earlier, chiefs did not reject, but in fact drew on these ‘rules’ when settling 
crimes. The main reason given was rather to ensure chiefs’ legitimacy among the subject 
population:  
 
Really we as régulos no longer punish criminals….this is prohibited by the police…it is only 
sometimes, yes, in some particular cases, if they are not so bad…that we do take care of crimes, 
because the people with problems want it…those who have been offended beg us to do so…and 
they don’t want to go to the police…the thing is that we do not want people to suffer with the 
police…because maybe the person who did wrong against another one is a family member or a 
neighbour…and then when he goes to prison or is chamboceado (beaten) by the police, then that 
family will suffer…and they will be cross with the régulo…or say that he is weak…not a real 
régulo.307
 
Hearing criminal cases was, as indicated by this comment, cast not as a challenge to the 
PRM per se, but as situationally adjusting to people’s specific requests in order to ensure 
that people were satisfied with their chief. This kind of assurance of legitimacy was 
                                                 
306 As I address in Chapter 10 the idea about the partisanship of the police was also based on concrete 
reference points, such as the random arrest of Renamo supporters. Here it suffices to note how it informed the 
preferences and practices of rural residents in their choice of a given type of authority.  
307 Interview, Chief Chibue, Dombe, 20 August, 2005.  
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precarious, because it depended on chiefs being able to demonstrate power, i.e. “show that 
the régulo is not weak”, in contradiction to the prohibitions that the PRM had laid down. 
The same could be said about the continued use of force by some chiefs. Although only 
three chiefs admitted still to administer corporal punishment, all the chiefs considered their 
potential to use force to be a significant back-up usually in the form of a threat. If as noted 
in Chapter 7, corporal punishment could be applied on those who threatened or insulted the 
authority of the chiefs and the madodas, then the PRM’s prohibition was the more 
precarious because, as shown above, it could also result from a specific request of the 
victims in a case. In short, the administration of corporal punishment could also underpin 
the popular legitimacy of a chief.   
By implication, the flouting of the law by chiefs needs to be seen in light of 
the precarious situation chiefs found themselves in, between the demands of rural residents 
and the PRM. Chiefs clearly risked punishment by the PRM when solving crimes or using 
force, but if they fully respected the prohibitions of the PRM they could undermine their 
own authority. They could face the wrath of their own ‘communities’ – the very source of 
their de facto as well as de jure legitimacy. The result was that chiefs had to balance 
different requirements according to the situation. In practice, this was done by, within the 
very same situation, breaching the boundaries of the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ and by 
redrawing these boundaries by referring to ma-lei we hurumende when enforcing a 
sanction. This underscores the point made earlier that the continued resolution of criminal 
cases by chiefs was not expressive of the simple continuity of past practices. Their practices 
were reshaped in relation to the law of the PRM, whether in the form of a threat or a 
promise for not transferring crimes to the police station. Importantly, such practices were 
also shaped and reshaped by the preferences and action patterns of rural residents, who 
oriented themselves in relation to the very distinctions between the chiefs and the police, 
even as they took part in manipulating the boundaries drawn between them. As addressed 
next, much the same could be said about the local police officer, that is, when they went 
beyond their ‘official mandate’ and situationally entered the domain of justice enforcement 
that the PRM had officially reserved for chiefs. 
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2. The State Police: Locally Adjusted, Uncertain Authority 
 
There were two main ways in which posto and locality level police officers went beyond 
the official mandate of the PRM: first, the increased hearings of cases categorised as uroi 
and social cases; and secondly, the resolution of criminal cases outside the official justice 
system, which also included the application of sanctions that the local police itself defined 
as confined to the banjas and community courts. In this Section, I begin with the first.  
The police hearings of uroi and social cases is remarkable, not only because it 
implied the very actors who communicated the ‘models for practice’ also transgressing the 
classificatory boundaries in everyday practice. It completely contradicted the shared view 
among chiefs, police officers and the population in general that the state police does not 
know of uroi nor has the mandate to deal with it, and that the police do not interfere in 
‘social’ problems. For example, 85% of my sixty interviewees confirmed that the police 
should only be summoned in cases of crimes (theft, homicide, knife-stabbings, arson 
etc.).308 The fact that the police did deal with uroi and social cases was not a matter of 
continuity with past practices. Rather it was an increasingly developed action pattern that 
paradoxically resulted from the local police’s increased collaboration with none-state 
authorities and its attempt to congeal separate jurisdictions. In 2004 the PRM in Dombe 
received and heard one or two such cases a day. In 2005 this had increased to between three 
and five cases a day. In Matica the number was slightly lower.  
Why was there this discrepancy between stating firmly that the police could not 
hear uroi and social cases, and the increased practices of turning to the PRM with such 
cases? And why did the PRM actually receive and hear such cases at all? In exploring these 
questions, I begin by illustrating how the police officers received and dealt with such cases.  
Localisation of the state police   
Spending days at the local police posts was remarkable. Over time, I observed an ever 
increasing crowd of people sitting outside, from early in the morning, waiting to be seen by 
an officer with any type of ndava. In Dombe from 2004 a special room was even reserved 
for people who came with non-criminal cases. Police officers did not just listen to the 
problems that people brought before them and then sent them on to the chief, the 
community court or a secretário nearby, as prescribed by its own rules. Rather they over 
                                                 
308 Only two women in Matica and three in Dombe asserted that the PRM had the mandate to solve uroi if the 
“case got out of hand” or ”the accused got nervous” at a banja.   
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time developed set routines for receiving accusations, notifying the accused and facilitating 
resolutions of non-criminal cases. In doing this they blurred the very boundaries between 
distinct domains of authority, produced by the PRM’s own rules. However, entering the 
domain of chiefly jurisdiction did not preclude that the officers acted as distinctive state 
authorities. The description below of a fairly ordinary day at the Dombe police post is 
illustrative of the routine practices developed.  
 
Case 6-9. A Day at the Police Post in Dombe  
In September 2005, at the police station in Dombe, four cases were heard by a subordinate officer 
inside the sala de permanencia, which is reserved for non-criminal cases.  
Case 6. The first case concerned an old divorce case, in which the families of the divorcees 
disagreed who should have the custody of the couple’s ten-month-old baby boy. Since the divorce 
the baby had been living with his father’s parents, because, according to them, the mother’s family 
had caused the child to fall ill due to vulí within that family. During the police hearing the mother’s 
parents rejected this accusation, and stated that they wanted the boy back. In support of their request 
they referred to a prior community court hearing at which they had won their case. However, the 
other party had not obeyed the resolution, so the mother’s parents had brought the case to the PRM. 
After the parties had each spoken, the officer stated that, “According to the Law a baby of this age 
has to be with the mother”, adding that the parties should have obeyed the resolution of the 
community court. When the father’s parents heard this they defended their position and claimed that 
the baby would fall sick if it were returned to its mother. The officer first responded by telling them 
off for handling the case in an uncivilised way, but then himself hinted that future uroi might 
emerge if they did not return the baby: “You have to give it back, because if something bad happens 
to the baby you [the parents of the baby’s father] could be accused of essa coisa de tradição [these 
things of tradition]”. In the end they agreed to hand over the baby.  
Case 7. In the second case, the PRM was also resorted to as a kind of institution of appeal. 
It concerned the failure of the accused party to pay “the price of life” (soro u mundo) of a child who 
had died due to uroi. The case had initially been resolved at the banja of Queen Gudza four months 
earlier, but the compensation decreed to the victims had still not materialised. They now wanted the 
PRM to enforce the compensation that had been agreed. After hearing the two parties, the officer 
convinced the accused family that they had to pay. Indicating that he was well aware that such cases 
can end in self-redress, he added: “It is very important that you pay…because these cases can 
become very dangerous and then one of you might end up in prison”. However, he refused to 
enforce payment at the police station, saying that “We the police cannot do this with pay”. Instead 
he sent a letter notifying Chief Dombe to oversee the payment.   
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Case 8. After this a father and his son, João and Elias, entered the room. They had travelled 
around fifty kilometres on foot from the area of Xixão in the regulado of Zomba each to bring a 
case before the PRM. Elias, the son, was the first to speak, interminably describing a case that had 
begun two months earlier, when his nephew (the son of his sister) fell sick. The parents of the sick 
child, Tobias and Maria, had been told by two wadzi-nyanga that it was Elias’ wife, Inês, who had 
bewitched the child. After this Elias agreed to take his wife with Tobias and Maria to a nyanga. Inês 
was accused, but the nyanga added that, without consciously knowing, she had been given a 
medicine by an old woman to kill the nephew. Tobias had then decided to take the case to the police 
post in Chimcono, a small village forty kilometres from Dombe sede. The police notified the parties 
and, after a hearing, the officer ordered Inês and the old woman to remove the medicine. The old 
woman denied the accusations and said she wanted to go to a nyanga. The officer decided to send 
the parties to the Sub-Chief Sanguene (of Chief Zomba), because only a chief can send people to a 
nyanga. At the nyanga the old woman was acquitted and Inês accused instead. Back at the banja, 
the sub-chief imposed a fine of MZM 900,000 on Elias for falsely accusing the old woman. Elias 
did not want to pay the fine, arguing that the nyanga had been ‘a liar’. Two weeks later the nephew 
died. Tobias informed the Sub-Chief Sanguene about this, who reacted by sending two of his chief’s 
police to arrest Elias (with rope). Elias was also charged the disproportionate amount of 300,000 as 
the price for bringing him to the sub-chief.309 The father of Inês also arrived at the banja of the sub-
chief. During the hearing, he insisted that they consult another nyanga before any compensation 
was paid. He wanted to make sure that Inês really was an umroi. But the sub-chief refused his 
request. Elias and his father-in-law left the banja angry and without paying anything. Subsequently 
Elias was threatened by Tobias and the old woman, who want the money.  
After this last information the PRM officer intervened, asking “What are you trying to bring 
forward here? Who are you accusing?” Elias responded: “We are accusing the mambo of solving 
the case badly…that he refuses to send us to the nyanga”. The officer responded by writing a 
notification to the Sub-chief Sanguene, stating aloud that “You have to appear here together with 
chefe de povoação Sanguene, Snr. Tomas and Senhora Maria this coming Friday the 26th of August 
and solve this case here at the police station. Is there anything else?” Elias’s father, João, stated that 
he also had a case.  
Case 9. João explained that his fifteen-year-old daughter was asked a year ago by a man to 
marry her. But he refused because his daughter was too young. However, one day she ran away to 
the man and got pregnant. Two weeks earlier, she had been expelled by her parents-in-law. After 
hearing this, the officer asked: “Why have you come here with this case?” João wanted the man to 
take responsibility for the pregnancy and pay lobolo. The officer asked for the man’s name, wrote 
                                                 
309 The usual price for bringing a person to the banja was in Dombe in 2004-5 usually between 10.000 to 
50.000.  
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another notification and ended by stating: “You can tell him [the accused] that if he does not appear 
here on the 26th of August, then he will have two cases. One for making a young woman pregnant, 
and another for abusing the police [failing to turn up at the police station]…if he does not come we 
will arrest him and educate him [moving his hands to show that he meant using the sjamboko or 
baton]. That's all. You can now go”. After the hearing we spoke with Elias and João at a local 
restaurant. We especially wanted to know why they decided to travel all the way to the police in 
Dombe with cases of uroi and marriage problems. Elias believed the police could put pressure on 
the sub-chief to allow the parties to visit another nyanga and that they could make Tobias stop 
threatening him. When we asked whether the PRM could end the case he responded: “No, the 
police cannot solve uroi…the police can help bring the case to an end by telling Sanguene to solve 
it well.” Knowing that the paramount Chief Zomba was the superior of chefe Sanguene, we asked 
why they did not complain to him. Elias replied: “This will be mean more money from my 
pocket…at the Police they don’t take money”. With regard to the marriage problems, João added 
that he was convinced that when the accused received the notification he would comply, because 
“He will see that it [the notification] comes from the hurumende…and then he will be too afraid not 
to turn up…you know, as he [the officer] said there the police will chambokear him [beat him with 
a baton] if he does not come”.  
 
The cases reflect the three main situations for taking uroi and social cases before the PRM. 
As Cases 6-7 show, the PRM was most commonly used as an appeal institution when a 
resolution issued by a banja or the community court had not materialised. On other 
occasions, as in Case 8, the accused in a case went to the PRM because she or he was 
dissatisfied with a verdict provided by a banja. Finally, as in Case 9, victims in fewer cases 
turned to the police as a first option because they did not believe that a banja could make 
the accused turn up for a hearing, but believed the PRM could. As the above description 
shows, the fact that people went to the PRM in these three types of situation could not be 
divorced from the ongoing, evolving action patterns of police officers. It made sense to take 
an accusation of uroi or a complaint about a failure to pay soro o mundo and lobolo to the 
PRM because the police officers de facto respected the requests of the complainants by 
facilitating the resolution process. Such facilitation can be divided into two steps: first, 
ensuring that the accused was brought to trial; and secondly, that a verdict materialised. A 
common characteristic of these two steps was that police officers combined resolution 
mechanisms that they officially identified with their non-state counterparts, with the use of 
state bureaucratic artefacts and references to the state police’s monopoly on force.  
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The first step in facilitating the process was to issue a notification after a party had 
presented a case to the PRM as a victim. These notifications obliged the accused to appear 
at the police station for a hearing. This practice also resembled a common practice of the 
non-state courts. It nonetheless differed in the sense that the notification came from the 
hurumende and was authorised with the official stamp of the Polícia de República de 
Moçambique. As noted by João in Case 9, this marked a clear difference from the chiefs. 
Even though social or uroi cases, as opposed to criminal ones, did not give way to the 
conventional policing practice of arrest, the notifications were presented as an order, an 
obligation, attached to the threat of state-police enforced sanctions. Notably this threat was 
attached to the use of force. This is exemplified in Case 9 above: failing to abide by police 
notifications was treated as “abusing the police authorities”, for which the abuser would be 
“educated”, that is, treated with force, as indicated by the gesture of the officer and 
understood as such by João, the accuser. That police notifications were effective was 
underscored by the fact that in only one of the incidents I came across did the accused 
completely fail to turn up. There were also concrete examples to draw on. For example, in 
2004 I encountered three incidents in which the accused (two of uroi, one of lobolo 
payment) were punished with the chamboko because they only turned up at the police 
station after a second notification. 
These developing action patterns of the police suggest that, while entering the 
chiefly domain of justice enforcement, the police’s capacity to facilitate resolutions of uroi 
and social cases was founded on simultaneously enacting the distinctive authority of the 
police as state representatives. This was also apparent in the actual hearing of cases: the 
second step in facilitating a resolution. The PRM did not explicitly hand down sentences, as 
judges in the official courts do, by reference to articles in the law, the obvious reason being 
that such sentences in respect to the non-criminal cases dealt with did not exist in the law. 
During the hearings the police rather played the role of mediators in affording resolutions, 
and in doing so drew both on references to the ‘state law’ and on local discourses of uroi. 
They listening to the parties to a case and concluded the hearing by supporting one of their 
proposals for a resolution. The police officers thus adjusted to the parties’ own notions of 
what was appropriate justice (such as compensation payments), while interchangeably 
referring to the state law and the potential risks of future uroi inflictions when trying to 
convince the parties to abide by a resolution (see, for example, Cases 7-9). These practices 
strikingly resembled the negotiated resolution procedures in the banjas, albeit the police 
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allowed the parties less time for vivid discussions. In actually helping ensure that a verdict 
materialised, the police officers nonetheless differed from the chiefs by drawing on the 
artefacts of the state bureaucracy and refusing actually to enforce their verdict. Police 
officers’ support ended with writing police notifications containing the names of the 
parties, the verdict and the official stamp. The notifications were nonetheless valuable 
because they gave the ‘winning’ party written proof and state-police authorisation of a 
verdict. As Cases 7 and 8 illustrate, notifications were issued as ‘tickets’ to be ‘cashed in’ at 
the banja of a chief or in other cases at the community and secretários’ courts. Even though 
the notifications provided no guarantee that money would be handed over, they did put 
extra pressure on a specific non-state authority and on the accused party to settle a case. 
Moreover, a notification could always be used by the victim to return to the police for 
assistance.  
The police’s new patterns of action simultaneously breached and adhered to the 
‘models for practice’: the police facilitated the resolution of non-criminal cases, but did not 
directly enforce verdicts that were defined as outside their mandate. They ‘returned’ uroi 
cases, which required (another) nyanga consultation, to chiefs, because, as was explained, 
“only a chief can send people to a nyanga” (see Case 8). Similarly, verdicts on monetary 
compensation were sent to either of the non-state authorities because “the police cannot do 
this with pay” (see case 7). By referring cases to the non-state authorities, the PRM redrew 
the boundaries between distinct domains of justice enforcement. In one sense this supported 
the particular authority of the chiefs, secretários or the community court. However, the 
practice of redirecting cases to non-state authorities for the enforcement of sanctions could 
also challenge the authority of individual chiefs. This was so because as a rule the police 
always sent the parties to a different individual authority than that which had resolved the 
case in the first instance (see Cases 6-7). Typically this also meant that it was a chief or the 
community court and secretários which was in the vicinity of the police post who were 
resorted to. The reasons given were either that this was easier or that it was because the 
PRM did not trust the same authority to be able to handle the parties. In this sense the PRM 
played a powerful intermediary role between the different non-state authorities, engaging in 
de facto authorising and not authorising the latter, irrespective of their de jure status. This 
role was also manifest when, as in Case 8, the police officers were directly addressed by 
rural residents to correct a badly-performing chief.  
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If this latter aspect, further accentuates the precarious position of chiefs in relation to the 
police, then I suggest that the evolving action patterns of the police outside its official 
mandate, also reflected the limits of the police to enforce its rules. It reflected the 
uncertainty of state-police authority in the rural hinterlands. Instead of straightforwardly 
consolidating a distinct and hierarchically defined domain of state-police authority vis-à-vis 
the chiefs in particular, the local tiers of the PRM became localised, and their practices of 
authority enforcement transformed. By localised, I mean processes through which state 
representatives are compelled to operate partly outside the law, exemplified here by their 
practices becoming embedded in local discourses of evil-doing, and fused with modes of 
order-making that are defined as distinct from the state – i.e. those of chiefs in particular. 
The intriguing part is that the extra-legal, localised practices of the police were at the same 
time made effective because of officers’ ability also to act as representatives of the state and 
to draw on state bureaucratic artefacts. In this sense, entering the domain of chiefly 
authority co-existed with articulations of the distinctive authority of the state police vis-à-
vis the chiefs. This accentuates how the very distinctions were constantly at stake in the 
relational constitution of authority, for police officers and chiefs alike. But the settlement of 
the ‘wrong’ cases it also brings attention to the transformative aspects of this constitution. 
These points were also reflected in the reasons given for why the police facilitated the 
settlement of non-criminal cases, and why people took these cases to the police station.  
Why did the police assist the settlement of uroi and social cases?   
When discussing this question with people in Matica and Dombe, it became clear that the 
choice of going to the PRM was weighed against the alternative: the chiefs. This line of 
reasoning resembled the explanation for preferring the chiefs in solving crime. In the case 
of the police, however, it was not a question of avoiding the chiefs per se. Rather it had to 
do with the relative authority of individual chiefs to actually enforce sanctions and make 
the accused appear for hearings vis-à-vis historically rooted ideas and experiences with the 
enforcing power of the state police. For example, when asked why people brought uroi and 
social cases to the police post, 85% of my sixty interviewees stated that “it is because the 
police are quicker than the chief”. Of these, 68% added that “it is because the police do not 
take money [for resolutions] as the chief does”.310   
                                                 
310 The remaining 15% claimed that it was because ‘people were ignorant’, i.e. they did not know that the 
PRM does not solve crimes. These respondents had never taken such cases to the PRM and were all residents 
of administrative capitals with higher levels of education.  
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The view that “the police are quicker” was given two explanations: the police’s 
habit of providing quick hearings without as much delay and discussion as in the banjas; 
and the police’s ability to make accused persons appear for hearings and pay compensation. 
Both explanations were tied to the state police’s instruments of force, and, it should be 
noted, with the widespread knowledge that these ‘instruments’ were frequently used by 
police officers. This was captured in statements such as: “People here believe that the 
police are very quick…because they can beat people and put them in the cells”311 or “When 
people get a notification from the police they are afraid…because the police will 
chambocear that person…and also if people don’t pay”.312 It is clear, as we saw above, that 
these historically rooted ideas about the police could not be divorced from the ongoing, 
evolving action patterns of police officers: i.e. that the police lived up to the expectations of 
rural residents, but also that its officers acted outside the law by applying force. The 
question is why the police officers flouted their own rules and the official law in general, as 
well as spend so many hours hearing cases, writing notifications, and then referring the 
enforcement of verdicts to chiefs. 
My material suggests that the answer lies not with economic concerns. Even though 
there were a few examples of police officers receiving gifts (chickens, goats and in one case 
money) for facilitating a resolution of non-criminal cases this was the exception, not the 
rule. Observing the practices of police officers and conversing with them suggested, rather, 
that the handling of non-criminal cases had to do with the precarious authority of the state 
police from the outset. When I discussed it with police officers they typically began by 
explaining that it was due to “a transitional phase”, because “the people here lack 
knowledge of the law…they do not know how to distinguish between what is crime and 
what is not…and where to go with their problems…this is due to the war and the lack of 
education.”313 This however followed by a particular justification for why the police 
actually heard such cases: “We cannot just send people away …we need to show that the 
police are there for the people…this is very important in these areas, you know…were 
some of the people have had this thing of not collaborating with the police because of the 
war.”314 This argument suggests that flouting the law was intended to address the 
precarious legitimacy of the PRM, that is, in light of a longer history of war and resistance 
                                                 
311 Interview, male resident of Gudza, approximately 60 years old, August 2005.  
312 Interview, female resident, 46 years old, Dombe sede, September 2005.  
313 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 25 July 2004.  
314 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 25 July 2004.  
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to the police, most notably in Dombe. As held by the Dombe police officers it was 
necessary to do what they did to “regain the trust of the people” (see Chapter 2).315
Settling non-criminal cases provided a concrete space for addressing the precarious 
authority of the police. When rural residents took an uroi or social case to the police, this in 
itself was an act recognising the particular authority and enforcing power of the state police. 
Similarly, in facilitating a resolution outside the law, the police used the same situation to 
demonstrate, usually in the form of threats, the sovereign power of the state police to apply 
force. Having said this, police officers’ justification for engaging in the settlement of uroi 
cases was also presented as a kind of crime-prevention strategy. Although always a bit 
reluctantly, police officers also acknowledged the locally embedded notations of the always 
potential mergers of uroi with criminal self-redress and social disputes. This was captured 
in statements like:  
 
It is true that today many cases come here as feitiçaria [Portuguese for uroi]…and then the police 
write [a notification]…but we do not solve them. But we assist, because if someone is inflicted 
[with uroi] and it is not solved it will create problems of crime…the victim [inflicted] will beat up 
the accused and there will be death…so that is why we assist these cases…we educate the people 
and tell them not to take the law into their own hands…because we know that it is from these 
social… traditional…cases that crime arises. This is the problem we face.”316  
 
This statement underscores the point made earlier about the ‘localisation’ of the police.317 It 
underlines clear resemblances with chiefs in terms of the ways that the police officers 
conceptualised transgressions. However, this did not erase the articulation of distinctions. 
By contrast police officers consistently articulated how distinct they were from chiefs when 
explaining why rural residents addressed the PRM and not the chiefs, and why the police 
had to respond. They did this by accentuating the ‘instruments’ and ‘force’ of the police:  
 
It is clear that people do this [take uroi and social cases to the PRM] because the police have 
instruments that can ensure obedience to law and order. When a person is notified by the police, 
they become very scared because he knows that if he does not obey he will end in prison…or be 
educated…and the chiefs do not have any instrument really to make the undisciplined fear 
them…we, the police, are the ones who have the power to deal with those [who are] 
undisciplined.318  
                                                 
315 The chief of police in Dombe during fieldwork was in fact one of the officers who were thrown out of 
Dombe in 1995. He still used this as a frequent reference point in relation to current police strategies.  
316 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 15 July 2004. 
317 Also the Chief Commander of Police, who firmly stated again and again to me that the police cannot deal 
with uroi but, while stressing this point, suggested that: “Really, if the practices of feitiçaria diminish, then I 
also think that crime will diminish. But this feitiçaria is for the chief to resolve, because it is outside the law” 
(Chief Commander of Police, Sussundenga, 31 August 2004). At the same time he took no measures to 
discipline officers who did settle uroi disputes. 
318 Interview, Chief of Police, Dombe, 26 September 2005.  
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 Hearing non-criminal cases, in this sense also provided police officers with the opportunity 
to demonstrate their superior authority vis-à-vis the chiefs. Despite clear practical fusions, 
the very blurring of the boundaries between state police and chiefs was accompanied by 
articulating the distinctive authority of the state police. That this indeed, emerged from a 
precarious process of order-making was reflected in how police officers always ended a 
conversation by stressing that their involvement in uroi and social cases were exceptional 
practices. They were applied in “a transitional phase until the people and the chiefs learn 
what is crime and not crime…until they realise what is law and what is not”. This, of 
course, did not explain away the fact that police officers indeed established new, routine 
and locally adjusted practices to settle non-criminal cases. This underlined not only how 
police officers were compelled into operating outside the law to constitute the law and the 
authority of the state police, but also how this at the same time transformed state police 
practices.  
Resolving crimes outside the Justice System 
Close to half the total number of criminal cases that led to the punishment of the perpetrator 
were concluded by the PRM without the parties ever ending up in the official courts. Eighty 
per cent of these penalties were inflicted in Dombe. These practices exemplify another 
aspect of the police going beyond their official mandate by operating outside official law. 
The way in which this was done has already been touched on in the cases presented in 
Chapter 8 (see Cases 1 and 3). Here it was shown how the local tiers of the police 
concluded crimes as another aspect of adjusting to the victims’ preferences for 
compensatory justice, rather than pursuing a state-legal process that could result in 
imprisonment. This reflected a common pattern. In fact, in half of the crimes resolved 
locally by the PRM, the sanction enforced within the confines of the police station was 
compensatory in nature. Hence when it came to crimes, the PRM broke its own rule of “the 
police does not do this with pay” as applied to social and uroi cases. This reflected another 
dimension of how the police drew on types of sanctions which officially belonged to the 
domains of the chiefs and the community courts. The difference lay in the fact that the 
issuing of compensatory forms of justice was always combined with types of punishments 
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that rural resident generally associated with the state police: corporal punishment during or 
after interrogation, public work for the police and/or detention in the cells.319  
These additional, extralegal punishments only conformed to the preferences of rural 
residents in some instances. While some held that one reason for bringing a crime before 
the PRM rather than a chief was that the police could help enforce sanctions through their 
potential use of force and short-term detentions in the cells, the majority resented the 
police’s application of public works for the police and the use of force during 
interrogations. This was because these could give the perpetrator a reason not to pay the 
victim, or worse, it could lead to self-redress following release from the PRM. In fact over 
half of the criminal cases settled locally by the PRM ended up leaving the victims empty 
handed (a point also noted in Chapter 8). The question is why, then, the PRM resolved 
crimes locally when, as was the case, there was not always an element of adjusting to the 
victims’ demands and thereby securing legitimacy?  
When officers were directly asked about this, a common answer was that “all crimes 
have to be sent to the PIC officer, and then he will forward them to the District”. However, 
when I discussed with local police officers the many cases that disconfirmed this official 
rule, the answers given again referred to “crime prevention” and the existence of “a 
transitional phase”. The main reference point and justification was the war: “In these 
areas…you know, where there was war and confusion…it is important that we show 
examples, that we show that the police reacts here and now…for people to see…it is to 
show that the police can control those undisciplined”.320 This comment accentuates the 
point made about the police’s involvement in social and uroi resolutions: the extra-legal 
practices of the police officers were an intrinsic aspect of demonstrating the sovereign 
authority of the local tiers of the PRM, that is, in a context where this was often challenged 
by chiefs. Conversely, had police officers always followed the official law and sent people 
to the district, they would have risked loosing face vis-à-vis chiefs and in other situations 
the legitimacy of the people who preferred to avoid imprisonment. Even if the extra-legal 
practices of the police were justified as necessary, but exceptional and transitional means of 
enforcing law and order in the former war zones, they also reflected the precarious 
authority of the police in this endeavour. This further underlines the point made in Chapter 
                                                 
319 When I asked the sixty rural residents in my sample directly what types of punishment the police enforced, 
all replied prison, but 75% also added chambokear (beatings), 50% public work for the police, and 55% that 
sometimes it could also involve a compensatory payment, but that this was outside the real law of the 
hurumende.  
320 Interview, Chief of Bunga police post, Bunga, September 2005.  
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7, namely that the ‘models for practice’ were themselves predicated upon a context where 
state-police monopoly on order-making was contested.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has dealt with the third pattern of action and interaction outlined in Chapter 8. 
It explored how and why chiefs and the local state police went beyond the official mandates 
prescribed in the models for practice. The chapter has taken a step further in understanding 
the dynamics underpinning the relational constitution of state (police) and chiefly authority. 
It has done so by illustrating how the relational constitution gave way not to a simple 
fixation of distinct domains of authority, as intended by the PRM, but to a mutual 
transformation of both chiefly and local state police practices of authority enforcement. 
These transformations by the same token redrew and redefined the boundaries between the 
distinct authority of chiefs and the local state police.  
Chiefly practices were indeed reshaped by interactions with and regulation by the 
police, but by the same token the police became localised. While the PRM attempted to 
regulate its non-state counterparts and, in the name of ‘law and order’, to fix distinctions, its 
officers situationally adjusted their operations to the local context. If not directly flouting 
the official law, localisation of the police gave way to new routine practices that lay outside 
the law and which drew partly on the procedures of resolution, sanctions and local 
discourses of evil-doing that the police officially confined to the chiefly domain of 
authority. Chiefs, on the other hand, began to refer to the state law and their formalised 
relationship with the PRM as an intrinsic and effective element in flouting the law (i.e. in 
continuing to settle crimes). 
These developing action patterns point to multiple practical fusions. They 
challenged the police’s attempt to fix clear boundaries, but also gave way to important 
transformations of authority enforcement. Most significantly, practical fusions did not 
extend to complete convergence: they were part and parcel of attempts to re-constitute the 
distinctive authority of the state police and chiefs, of re-defining the boundaries between 
them. The key to understanding these processes of mutual transformation in everyday 
practice and interactions was the precarious legitimacy and authority of both chiefs and the 
state police. This emerged in a context of competition over areas of jurisdiction, of unclear 
boundaries from the outset, and because of the rural population’s particular expectations of 
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chiefs and the state police and their preferences for particular forms of justice. As this and 
the last chapter have demonstrated, the action patterns of rural residents and the perceptions 
informing them considerably (re)shaped the action patterns of the different authorities and 
vice versa. Thus the relational constitution of chiefly and state authority was at least partly 
influenced by each authority’s attempt to ensure popular legitimacy, even if this involved 
taking risks and flouting the law.    
In conclusion, I suggest that the relational constitution of local state and chiefly 
authority be conceptualised as resulting from a productive tension between processes of 
regularization or boundary-marking and processes of situational adjustment or boundary-
crossing in which different actors, including the state police, were mutually engaged. This 
tension was productive because it gave way to new routine patterns of action and rule-
enforcement and, mostly importantly, to continuous redefinitions of and negotiations over 
the boundaries between distinct domains of authority. The wider repercussions and 
meanings of this tension for conceptualising de facto authority and citizenship are discussed 
in the next chapter. This also involves exploring the political script of the Frelimo party-
state that underpinned this tension in exceptional situations. 
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Above/below: settlement of cases within the banja (court) of Chief Chibue.   
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Above/below: State police hearings of non-criminal cases within the police station of Dombe.   
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Chapter 10 
Emerging Forms of Authority and Citizenship   
 
 
This chapter rounds off this third part of the dissertation by addressing the broader question 
of how to conceptualise the de facto forms of authority and citizenship that emerged from 
the evolving patterns of action and interactions of the local tiers of the state, the chiefs and 
ordinary people in Matica and Dombe. In line with my overall analytical framework, this 
means asking what the analyses in the foregoing chapters can tell us about emerging 
expressions of chiefly and local state authority as a set of practices and claims, that is, as 
more than just their de jure status. On the other hand, it also implies asking what kinds of 
citizenship were enacted, that is, as a set of ongoing practices in the form of modalities of 
inclusion in and exclusion from access to state services and recognition.   
In addressing these questions, the chapter takes as its point of departure the main 
insight gained from Chapters 7-9: the productive tension between boundary-marking and 
boundary-crossing that permeated the enforcement of chiefly and local state authority in 
policing and justice enforcement. This tension was reflected in the ongoing negotiations 
and situational adjustments of different actors that continually challenged the local state 
police’s attempt to fix distinct domains of authority, and to regulate the conduct of chiefs 
and rural residents. The productive result was that the boundaries between the state police 
and the chiefs were re-defined and re-drawn, and that new patterns of action emerged. The 
question is what we can make of this productive tension for conceptualising de facto 
authority and citizenship. In line with the insights of Chapters 8 and 9, this chapter suggests 
that, from the perspective of everyday interactions, what emerged were negotiable and 
hybrid forms of both state and chiefly authority. These also underscored de facto 
citizenship as relatively inclusive and as the result of the spaces left open for situation-
specific negotiations with the local authorities.  
Having established this it is necessary, I suggest, to take a step further and ask to 
what extent authority and citizenship were negotiable, and what were the wider 
implications of the scope of negotiability for citizens, chiefs and the local tiers of the state. 
The previous chapters have already shown that the immediate repercussions of everyday 
negotiations were high levels of indeterminacy in rural residents’ access to preferred forms 
of justice, and considerable uncertainty regarding the ability of either chiefs or local state 
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police officers’ to entrench authority. In this chapter, I explore these repercussions and the 
limits to negotiability in greater depth. In doing so, I attend on the one hand to the more 
subtle limitations on negotiations in everyday interactions, which produced internal 
distinctions between citizens and between individual chiefs. On the other hand I address the 
more pervasive limitations to negotiations that were underpinned by two historically 
embedded scripts, which have already been referred to earlier: first, the political script of 
the Frelimo party-state, distinguishing the included ‘friends’ and the excluded ‘enemies’ of 
a unitary order; and secondly, the local script of evil-doing, linking the visible and invisible 
dimensions of (dis)order.  
To address these issues, the chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 1 I begin 
by re-visiting the Africanist literature on state-chief relations as a background to discussing 
ways of conceptualising de facto authority and citizenship in everyday interactions. I also 
address how, in more subtle ways, the two underlying scripts created distinctions between 
people and framed the everyday negotiability of authority and citizenship. In Section 2 I 
move on to what I refer to as ‘exceptional situations’ enacted by local state officials, where 
the pervasive significance of the political script for de facto authority and citizenship 
becomes particularly apparent. These were situations in which limits to negotiability were 
explicitly performed and distinctions overtly articulated by local state officials. Concretely, 
they emerged from occurrences that were seen by local state officials as overtly contesting 
the sovereign authority of the local state and of the Frelimo-defined order more broadly. I 
have already addressed how this was expressed in the excessive punishment of chiefs. In 
this chapter, I draw on a case of the burning of state property in Dombe in 2004 as a way of 
discussing this more broadly. The section brings us a step further in understanding the flip-
sides for chiefs and rural citizens that partly resulted from the continued uncertainty of local 
state sovereignty in the everyday negotiations over authority and the politically exclusive 
and violent responses this gave way to in exceptional situations. More broadly, it also 
draws attention to the reproduction of historically embedded ways of constituting (Frelimo) 
state authority, its significant others, the political community and chiefs, and its constitutive 
outside, Renamo.    
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1. Negotiated, Hybrid Authority and Situational Citizenship 
 
The material from Matica and Dombe contests a conceptualisation of de facto chiefly and 
local state authority as either arising from (in the recent past) or as leading to (in the 
present) a co-existence of pure typologies of authority in the sense defined by Weber 
(1947): i.e. the state as representing a legal-rational type of authority, legitimated alone by a 
formalistic belief in the supremacy of the law, and the chief as equated with traditional 
authority, legitimated alone by the sanctity of past customs and cultural beliefs in the divine 
right of the ruler (Blau 1963: 308-313). Although these characteristics were present in 
certain claims and practices, the typologies fail to capture the practical and ideological 
fusions that permeated the everyday action patterns of chiefs and local state officials. 
Moreover, chiefs and state officials drew on different sources of legitimacy and practices of 
authority enforcement than those captured by the main characteristics of these typologies. 
As Chapters 7-9 illustrated, typologies, or distinct types of authority, did not form an 
inevitable background but were an ongoing issue continually subject to negotiations. They 
were part of contested processes of regularisation, manifest in representations, certain 
enactments and rules, in which the constitution of hierarchies of authority and order were at 
stake. As shown throughout the chapters, the key to understanding these processes was that 
the authority of chiefs and the local state were and have been for a long time constituted 
relationally, not in an of themselves.    
  This section addresses what we can make of these processes, first in conceptualising 
emerging de facto chiefly and state authority in everyday interactions, and secondly in 
conceptualising de facto forms of citizenship.  
Negotiated and hybrid authority  
As a point of departure in conceptualising de facto chiefly authority in Matica and Dombe, 
I find useful the concept of hybrid authority, which is used to describe present-day chiefs or 
‘neo-traditional authorities’ in some of the more recent literature on chieftaincy in Africa 
(see Chapter 1; Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996; von Trotha 1996; van Dijk and van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal 1999; Quinlan 1996; Sklar 1999). In this literature, chiefs are conceptualised 
as hybrid authorities because they draw on ‘the state’, even becoming state-like, while at 
the same time remaining distinct from the state. The concept therefore captures how chiefly 
authority is re-configured through interactions with state institutions by being partly drawn 
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into state-bureaucratic modes of governing and recognitions, while never becoming fully 
encapsulated by the state apparatus and its modes of representing traditional authority (van 
Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999: Spear 2003; Ranger 1993; Ray 1996; von Trotha 1996). In 
the literature, hybridity is concretely applied to describe the mixture of the sources of 
legitimacy that chiefs draw on (state law, ancestral spirits, kinship); the blending of tasks 
they perform (state-bureaucratic, ceremonial, religious, dispute resolution according to 
custom, engagement with witchcraft); and the different material resources they draw on to 
sustain a power base (taxes, state salaries, external donor funds, local tributes, 
personal/kinship networks of exchanges) (see Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996: 22).   
These mixtures denote that present-day chiefs do not represent a single typology of 
authority – such as ‘traditional’ or ‘legal-rational’ – but a hybrid mixture, which at the same 
time underpins transformations (van Nieuwaal 1999; Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996). The 
core argument of the literature is that the re-constitutions and endurance of chiefly authority 
are conditioned by chiefs’ ability to adapt to changes and to engage in ever-changing and 
dynamic forms of hybridization (van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999: 5). These modes of 
hybridization are continually changing the chieftaincy, but they are also what make it 
enduring (ibid.). In this sense, the concept of hybridity contests the existence of a fixed type 
of chiefly authority. Broadly speaking, the concept challenges “the belief in invariable and 
fixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity” (Fuss 1991: xi), by contrast 
highlighting the “interweaving of elements” which create “something familiar but new” 
(Meredith 1998: 2). Hybridity, in short, denotes “a wide register of multiple identities, 
cross-over, pick-‘n’-mix, boundary crossing and [as a result] erosion of boundaries” 
(Pieterse 2001: 221).321  
Defined in this way, I suggest, the concept of hybridity is useful in conceptualising 
the de facto forms of chiefly authority in Matica and Dombe that permeated everyday 
patterns of action. However, in using this concept, I depart in three important ways from the 
literature on chieftaincy presented above. These have to do with the way in which the 
concept of hybridity is employed when compared with my empirical findings. First, my 
material suggests it is useful to expand the concept of hybridity to conceptualise local state 
authority also, instead of confining it to chiefs. By implication, I depart from a tendency in 
the above literature to construe state authority as a relatively fixed entity, representing a 
                                                 
321 See Pieterse (2001) for a comprehensive discussion of the concept of hybridity and its various disciplinary 
uses, including its equivalents of bricolage in French academic literature (cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss) and 
syncretism in the earlier anthropology of religion.  
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particular typology of authority. As discussed in Chapter 1, this emerges from a 
conceptualisation of hybrid chiefly authority as conditioned by chiefs’ role as 
intermediaries and brokers between ‘the state’ and ‘the rural population’, which are seen as 
representing distinct ideological structures and radically different world views: “the 
traditional local order and the world of modern economy and politics” (van Dijk and van 
Nieuwaal 1999: 5; see also Chapter 1). By confining the concept of hybridity to chiefs, the 
literature ends up falling back on the fixed existence of pure and separate orders, which 
chiefs straddle. This fails to capture how, in Matica and Dombe, the very boundaries that 
were crossed were themselves the subject of active remaking and negotiations in the 
interactions between local state officials, chiefs and rural residents. Against this 
background, secondly, I propose to approach hybridity as a mode of boundary-crosses 
which co-exists with, and in fact is conditioned by, the ongoing processes of boundary-
marking that have been discussed throughout. Thirdly, by drawing out some differences 
between chiefs in Dombe and Matica, I suggest that the power dynamics involved in 
hybridization and the distinctions these produce be taken more seriously. This implies 
acknowledging that not all chiefs were equally able to engage in hybridization, and it means 
addressing the limitations to boundary-crossing and negotiations. Below I deal separately 
with each of these three additions.  
 
State authority as hybrid  
The literature on chieftaincy referred to above does not apply the concept of hybridity to the 
state authority or to the everyday operations of local state officials. Although examples are 
given of how, in public representations, higher ranking state officials borrow chiefly 
regalia, symbols and ritual forms as an aspect of bolstering state institutions, there is no 
mention of such ‘borrowing’ in the more mundane, everyday practices of state officials. 
Instead the tendency is to present the state as a pure domain of bureaucratic-legal authority 
or to speak of state operations in terms of deviances from this type of authority, for 
example, by using terms such as the privatisation of state authority, neo-patrimonialism, 
corruption, etc.322  
                                                 
322 Ray and van Nieuwaal (1996: 23) do emphasise how “the state in Africa has undergone in the last hundred 
years an enormous development”, emphasising the changes from feudal kingdoms to colonial states, political 
movements inspired by struggles for independence, one-party systems, military regimes and multi-party 
democracies. However, the emphasis here is on differently imposed ideological structures that are inherently 
different from the chieftaincy. While warning against too static and rigid an interpretation of the chieftaincy 
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My material from Matica and Dombe presented in Chapters 8 and 9, by contrast, suggests 
that the local state police officers also engaged in hybridisation in their everyday 
operations. Local state authority became hybrid when, for example, in the very same 
situation local state officials employed the local script of evil-doing and drew on state 
bureaucratic artefacts effectively to facilitate the resolution of uroi cases. Similarly, the 
cases presented illustrated how the police’s settlement of criminal cases outside the official 
justice system involved the issuing of sanctions that the police confined to non-state 
authorities, as well as how this was done by references to state law and the instruments of 
detention and force.  
To argue that the local tiers of the state were constituted as hybrid forms of 
authority resonates with another body of literature on the African state and politics (Bayart 
1993; Chabal and Deloz 1999; Schatzberg 1993). This can be distinguished from the 
literature on chieftaincy referred to above because it emphasises how state operations 
become deeply embedded in and shaped by social forces, rather than representing a distinct 
type of authority. For example, Bayart (1993) has emphasised the political hybridization of 
post-colonial African state institutions and operations. This, he argues, has given way to a 
state that reflects a mirror image of neither the Western, Weberian ideal-type of rational-
legal and bureaucratic authority, nor a pure continuity of ‘traditional’ governance. Instead it 
is a mixture resulting in a specific African state that operates according to the principles of 
patron–client relations, rather than simply according to an impersonal body of legal rules. 
Chabal and Deloz (1999) take this point a step further, arguing that formal state institutions 
in Africa in the sense defined by Weber have become little more than empty shells. The 
operations of state officials are dominated by a general disregard for formal rules and by 
private, personalised networks of vertical exchanges of favours between the rulers or 
patrons and the ruled or clients (ibid.: 42-3). This, they argue, underscores the 
informalisation of politics, i.e. the absorption of the state bureaucracy by social forces. The 
predominance of informalism, they argue, is conditioned by a particular ‘African political 
culture’ (ibid.: 40-1) where the dominant source of legitimate authority is based on the 
distribution of wealth, and where the main avenue to power is the accumulation and 
demonstration of riches (ibid.: 36; see Thomson 1999; van de Walle 2001; Schatzberg 
1993).   
                                                                                                                                                     
and the ‘traditional’, they do not deconstruct the state in the same way when it comes to discussing it within 
these different ‘ideological structures’.  
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These authors’ suggestion that the state’s actual operations are shaped by societal forces, in 
this sense becoming localised, captures well how the local police’s ‘models for practice’ – 
the secondary body of law – as well as the everyday action patterns of police officers lay 
partly outside the codified law as an element of adjustment to the local context. Also, the 
point that the local tiers of the state and its operations are not a mirror image of an ideal 
Weberian type of state-bureaucratic authority but also operate according to other scripts is 
well taken. However, my material suggests that it is too simplistic to understand the 
localisation of the state as resulting in a single predominant source of legitimate authority, 
vested in a particular Africa political culture: the redistribution and accumulation of wealth.  
Rural residents and chiefs in Matica and Dombe did to some extent engage with the 
local state officials in the hope of development inputs, and political campaigns did centre 
on such promises. However, the everyday action patterns of the state police officers and the 
negotiations between them and rural residents in settling cases did not convey forms of 
legitimacy based on a vertical network of material rewards. Rather, the legitimacy of the 
local state police was conveyed through local police officers’ ability to adjust to and 
facilitate the kinds of justice that people preferred. In doing this they adjusted their 
everyday operations, and to some extent their extra-legal rules, to the local script of evil-
doing, including how to deal with the evil sources of transgressions through compensation 
payments between rural residents. If these kinds of adjustments reflect the informalisation 
or localisation of the state police, then we have also seen how rural residents involved 
police officers in uroi and social cases because they expected them to act as distinctive state 
authorities. We have also noted how local police officers, even when they acted outside the 
law, consistently invoked the state law and state bureaucratic procedures in legitimising and 
effecting their enforcement of authority. This suggests that, in the case of Matica and 
Dombe, at least, the extent to which Chabal and Deloz (1999) speak of the informalisation 
of state operations seems overemphasised. This, I suggest, lies at the focus on a single 
predominant source of legitimate authority, vested in a distinct African political culture. In 
the last instance, this means that the concept of hybridity loses its original meaning.  
Rather, I suggest, the hybrid character of the local state in Matica and Dombe 
should be understood as reflecting the fact that local state officials draw on a mixture of 
sources of legitimacy and modes of operation, which are vested in different local as well as 
past and present extra-local scripts. Santos (2006) captures this point well when he speaks 
about the Mozambican state as hybrid and heterogeneous. This is exemplified, he argues, 
 321
by the intertwining of different historical layers of political cultures within the state 
apparatus as a whole (traditional/pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial socialist-
revolutionary, civil war-time governance and present-day democratic culture), but also by 
the prevalence of different micro-states within the same state. These micro-states are 
characterised by having their own combination of different local and extra-local, historical 
layers of operational logics and styles of behaviour because local state officials “exert their 
own personal differences on them [the operational logics]” (ibid.: 50). Microstates have 
developed, Santos argues, because of the inability of local state institutions to guarantee 
their own efficiency by relying alone on formal procedures and the codified law existing in 
the present (ibid.: 54). In Matica and Dombe, the most pervasive scripts (or ‘logics’ in 
Santos’ sense) that local state officials drew on were the local script of evil-doing, 
including the procedures of resolution exercised by chiefs, and the extra-local political 
script of the Frelimo party-state (on the latter, see Section 2). If these scripts shaped the 
operations and rules of the local state officials, they also lay outside the present law. They 
were nonetheless combined with consistent references to the law, the use of formal 
bureaucratic procedures and invocations of a larger national project of state-formation. 
These observations suggest that hybrid local state authority should also be understood as 
characterised by a continuous oscillation between the informal, acting outside the law, and 
the formal, acting with reference to the law, as well as between localised and wider national 
projects to constitute state authority.  
Das and Pool (2004) capture this point when discussing state operations in the 
‘margins of the state’. They highlight how the “legal and the extralegal runs right within the 
offices and institutions that embody the state” (ibid.: 14). The point is that the extra-legal 
practices of local state representatives in the margins are made effective by their ability 
simultaneously to “act as representatives of the state” and to refer to the “supposedly 
impersonal or neutral authority of the state” (ibid.). On the other hand, the application of 
extra-legal practices also reflects the precariousness of state authority in the margins, as 
noted earlier. They “represent at once the fading of the state’s jurisdiction and its continual 
refounding through its appropriation of private justice” (ibid.). The result is not that local 
state authority becomes completely indistinct from non-state forms of authority, such as 
chiefs. Alternatively, as Das and Poole argue, local state officials in the margins “do not so 
much embody ‘traditional’ authority as a mutation of traditional authority made possible by 
the intermittent power of the state” (ibid.: 14).  
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These perspectives of Santos (2006) and Das and Poole (2004) help us conceptualise the 
hybrid character of local state authority in Matica and Dombe, as conditioned by the 
precariousness of state authority and the negotiated character of authority in the margins in 
general. Authority is in a constant process of reconstitution, as local state officials adjust to 
the preferences of rural residents and interact with the chiefs. Much the same can be said of 
chiefs, who, like the state ‘in the margins’, where there is no de facto hegemonically 
established institution of authority, have to be actively engaged in re-constituting authority 
through “an active and contested process of assertion, legitimization and exercise” (Lund 
2006a: 679). This underscores emerging forms of state and chiefly authority as not only 
hybrid, but also as negotiable. Negotiability and hybridity do not mean indistinctiveness 
between chiefly and state forms of authority, nor as resulting in a single source of 
legitimate authority. Hybridity co-exists with and is conditioned by active processes of 
boundary-making. This brings me to the second point.     
 
The relationship between hybridity and boundary-marking  
The definition of present-day chiefs as hybrid authorities in the literature on chieftaincy 
discussed earlier relies on a notion of the empirical existence of pure, fixed domains of 
legitimacy, one traditional-rural and another modern-state, between which chiefs can 
convert, translate and be double gatekeepers. This is expressed in terms such as ‘radically 
different worlds’ (van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999), ‘antagonistic orders’ (von Trotha 
1996), ‘dual bases of power’ (Ray and van Nieuwaal 1996) and ‘distinct political systems’ 
(Hatt 1996). The implication is a notion of two types of distinct authorities: hybrid chiefs, 
situated between the state and rural society, and the modern state as separated from rural 
society.   
My material from Matica and Dombe alternatively suggest viewing distinct domains 
of authority as the result of ongoing interactions, representations and processes of 
regularization, rather than as fixed structures, as an inevitable background for hybridization. 
This also includes viewing both distinctions and hybridity as emerging from direct 
interactions between rural residents and the local tiers of the state, not simply through a 
mediated relationship between the state and rural society, with chiefs situated as 
gatekeepers in the ‘middle’.  
People in Matica and Dombe continually drew distinctions between the state and 
chiefly authority, but no fixed and pure empirical domains of authority were given at the 
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outset. One can take as an example the overlap of functions between the police and the 
chiefs in solving crimes that existed prior to de jure recognition of the latter. Another 
example is the discrepancy between the distinct categories of social, traditional and 
criminal cases produced by the local tiers of the PRM, and the multiple links between these 
in practice and in rural residents’ notions of evil-doing. Purity of domains and distinctions 
between them (i.e. the PRM’s ‘models for practice’) resulted from the active work of state 
police officers. These were then later taken up – confirmed, disconfirmed, redefined and 
negotiated – in concrete interactions and actions. My material therefore suggests that, 
instead of viewing hybridity as forms of conversion between already existing, historically 
fixed, distinct domains, it is more useful, as Pieterse also points out (2001: 220), to view 
hybridity as activities that co-exist with the active production of boundaries between 
essentially different entities. This means recognising that boundaries and forms of hybridity 
are relational and that they reshape each other. Hybridity is only noteworthy when fixed 
categories and boundaries are being produced, and boundaries are only produced and 
notable because there are always patterns of hybridity and border-crossing (ibid.: 234).  
Viewing hybridity in this way, I suggest, captures how the hybrid character of both 
the state and the chiefs, exemplified by various practical and ideological fusions, existed in 
a productive tension with articulations of distinctions. As shown in Chapter 9, the 
breaching of boundaries (such as going beyond official mandates) was part and parcel of 
constituting the distinct authority of chiefs and the local state police. The result was not a 
permanent fixation of distinct domains per se, but also mutual transformations of the 
practices of authority enforcement. Key to understanding this is that both chiefly and state 
authority (not only the authority of chiefs in relation to the state) were constituted 
relationally.    
In arguing this, it is important to recognise the historical specificity of both 
hybridity and boundary-marking, as Pieterse (2001) also points out. He stresses: “We can 
think of hybridity as layered in history, including pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial 
layers, each with distinct sets of hybridity, as a function of boundaries that were prominent, 
and accordingly different pathos of difference” (ibid.: 231). He further adds that boundaries 
themselves are often the product of hybridity, pieced together from different hybrid sources 
in time and space (ibid.: 238). This captures well the mixture of different elements in the 
PRM’s ‘models for practice’, as well as in chiefly claims to and practices of authority. But 
the historicity of hybridity and distinctions also draws attention to the limits to possible 
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modes of boundary-crossing and boundary-marking. This means that there are limits both 
to what is negotiable and to what can be distinguished. In addition, the use of hybridity 
should not lead us to side-step the significance of power differences (ibid.: 236). On the 
contrary, like boundary-marking, hybridity involves the mixing of elements, but some of 
these may be more dominant than others, and some actors have the capacity to engage more 
successfully than others. This brings me to the third point, namely how the hybrid and 
negotiated character of authority in Matica and Dombe also resulted in differentiations 
between more or less successful chiefs.    
 
The power dynamics of hybrid and negotiated authority: differentiations of chiefs 
The third of my revisions regarding the literature on chieftaincy referred to above has to do 
with the dynamics of power that underpin hybrid and negotiated authority. In view of my 
material, the literature grants too much equality of agency and creativity to chiefs, failing to 
capture the differences between individual chiefs’ abilities to engage in hybridization “to 
their own ends” (van Dijk and van Nieuwaal 1999: 7). It also overlooks the limitations to 
negotiability and hybridization that particular historically embedded scripts underpinned: 
the local script of evil-doing and the extra-local script of the Frelimo-party state. I return to 
the latter in Section 2. Here I address how, in more subtle ways, the negotiated and hybrid 
character of authority produced distinctions between individual chiefs and sub-chiefs in 
Matica and Dombe. In other words, not all chiefs and sub-chiefs were equally successful in 
re-constituting de facto authority. This became clear after the de jure recognition of chiefs.  
The negotiated character of authority underscored the requirement of much agency, 
skill and will on the part of chiefs and sub-chiefs. Sustaining de facto authority depended 
on the capacity actively to combine different sources of legitimacy and practices. It also 
required an ability to balance the demonstration of allegiance to the state police and the 
Frelimo party on the one hand, and a certain level of subversion of the rules of the 
hurumende on the other (see Chapter 9).323 Finally, the de facto authority of chiefs and sub-
                                                 
323 Notably, when compared to the points made by Chabal and Deloz (1999) and the general literature on neo-
patrimonialism referred to earlier, the de facto authority of the chiefs in fact depended very little on the direct 
accumulation and distribution of wealth. I do not have a ready-made answer for why this was the case, but 
one simple answer could be that chiefs and sub-chiefs had little to accumulate from and hardly any wealth to 
distribute. Due to a long history of war, official banning and their having few avenues of access to resources, 
chiefs were in fact among the poorest of the rural population. Although banja sessions were a source of 
income, relatively little went to the chiefs because it had to be redistributed amongst the madodas. Also no 
material benefits came from the state, as the promised subsidy from tax collection had still not materialized by 
2005. So far, as chiefs themselves argued, working for the state and serving the population was a route to 
poverty rather than wealth because it prevented chiefs from spending time on income generation. There was 
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chiefs also depended on their ability to manage the invisible domain of evil-doing, a 
domain of forces from which they were not themselves immune, but which set limits to 
their ability to re-constitute authority.    
In some areas, these requirements led, if not to direct forms of competition between 
and within chieftaincies, then to a differentiation between de facto authority and the de jure 
status of chiefs and sub-chiefs. This was reflected in policing and justice enforcement, as 
well as paralleled in other fields of action (such as taxation, development project inputs and 
land distribution). The de facto differentiations between chiefs and sub-chiefs took place 
alongside forms of competition that arose between some of them and the recognised 
secretários. Also, this happened in conjunction with state police officers privileging some 
chiefs over others when calling on their assistance or turning uroi cases over to them. 
The case of Chief Zixixe and his two sub-chiefs, Ganda and Boupua, in Matica is 
illustrative. While in 2004 Zixixe was still regarded as the superior chief in spiritual terms, 
corresponding to his de jure status, this did not match his de facto authority. He was very 
rarely addressed by members of the chieftaincy and relied on less and less by state officials. 
In practice his two sub-chiefs, Ganda and Boupua, had reversed the de jure hierarchy of 
authority. This was reflected in the spheres of justice enforcement and policing, but also in 
taxation and in attracting community-based development projects. Not only did the sub-
chiefs work with the state administration independently of Zixixe, they were also more 
successful in bolstering their de facto authority among the population. This was partly the 
result of Boupua’s and Ganda’s willingness to collaborate with the state officials and the 
Frelimo party, and partly due to individual leadership skills in attracting NGO projects, 
mobilizing the population for public meetings, enforcing sanctions and keeping track of 
bureaucratic artefacts such as population registers, tax receipts and notifications. Zixixe 
simply did not have the enforcing power and will to perform these tasks. His weekly court 
sessions had become a question of “solving cases when people come along”324  – which 
they often did not, because the majority chose to have their cases settled by sub-chief 
Boupua, who lived relatively close to Zixixe. Also, the PRM and the state administration 
had given up working with Zixixe. As a result, Boupua was the person on whom the state 
de facto relied to transfer criminal suspects and to mobilize the population for development 
projects.  
                                                                                                                                                     
nonetheless a hope that some day material benefits from the state would become a reality and not merely a 
promise.  
324 Interview with Chief Zixixe, 20 August 2004. 
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Another example was the Gudza chieftaincy in Dombe. By 2005 it was more or less non-
operational. This was partly due to continued leadership disputes and uroi afflictions within 
the chiefly family, and partly to the Queens’ fear of and lack of skills to engage with the 
state and conduct banjas.325 As with Zixixe, in public representations the Queen was 
recognized as the madzi-mambo, which corresponded to her de jure status. However, in 
practice a sub-chief of Gudza, Struba Mushambonha, had taken over the majority of 
‘clients’ in court sessions. In 2004, and to an ever greater degree in 2005, people in the 
Gudza chieftaincy simply by-passed the Queen and her banja and addressed Struba directly 
with their problems. Others went directly to the PRM in Dombe with uroi and minor 
disputes. Even at the annual rain-making ceremony, which is the high point of offerings to 
the ancestors to maintain the well-being of the chieftaincy, only fifteen people participated 
in 2005 (including a couple of near neighbours, the madodas and their wives, and myself 
and my assistant, Noé).326 Struba, by contrast, was able to bolster his de facto authority 
with both the state officials and the rural population. This was because he was able to 
balance the requirements of each. He regularly subverted the lei we hurumende by solving 
crime on the spot, and he also transferred ‘criminals’ and ‘suspects’ efficiently to the PRM 
when this was required of him.327 He was also the person on whom the PRM relied most 
when on the lookout for criminal suspects, and the person the administration trusted with 
taxation, the launching of development projects and land allocation to commercial farmers 
from 2004 onwards. Struba was in short de facto – not de jure, nor when presented at 
public meetings next to the Queen of Gudza – the individual the state officials trusted most 
with tasks in the Gudza chieftaincy. At the same time it was also he on whom rural 
residents relied when they did not want to ‘be known by the police’. Finally, Struba also 
pledged loyalty to Frelimo, at least in public, in 2004, when he became a member. He 
nonetheless kept in his house a much older membership card – that is, of Renamo.      
These cases illustrate how the inherently negotiated character of authority could 
increase the opportunities for some chiefs to bolster their de facto authority, while 
decreasing the scope for others. The point here is not that competition within chieftaincies 
                                                 
325 When Mumera, the Gudza queen, was called to meetings with the chefe do posto or to larger public state 
meetings, she always said that she or her son was sick. She feared the state officials, she told me, but also uroi 
from her rivals within the family if she attended.  
326 Even in 2002, when conflicts over leadership in the Gudza chieftaincy were very intense, at least eighty 
people participated in the ceremony.  
327 Struba indeed took his policing tasks very serious. By the end of fieldwork in 2005, he had just 
commenced the construction of a small prison, where suspects and trespassers could be kept overnight before 
being taken to the PRM.   
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is new. It is rather that, despite the de jure congealing of hierarchies, the interactions with 
the state officials and the delegation of state functions to chiefs and sub-chiefs have 
reconfigured the arenas for re-constituting de facto authority. In the cases cited above, the 
result was that chiefs with de jure and spiritually superior authority became merely 
symbolic figures to be displayed at public meetings, dressed in a uniform and covered with 
a set of national emblems. They were not necessarily leaders with de facto authority in the 
sense of being relied on in practical terms by rural residents and the state officials. To be a 
chief with de facto authority depended on the ability to go beyond de jure status, speak the 
languages of the state in public, perform state duties efficiently and at the same time have 
the courage to flout the law when rural residents required this. In short, it depended on the 
capacity to engage in the wider arena of the negotiated, hybrid constitution of authority.  
To these abilities should be added the wider significance of the invisible domain of 
uroi and vulí for the reconstitution of de facto chiefly authority – in short, what I have 
referred to as the local script of evil-doing. As already noted in Chapters 8 and 9, the de 
facto authority of the chiefs depended on their capacity to facilitate the resolution of uroi 
cases efficiently. This same capacity was also an aspect in how the state police recognised 
the de facto authority of some chiefs and sub-chiefs over others when they made a choice of 
where to ‘return’ an uroi case. Here I wish to add the limits that the fear of uroi afflictions, 
which chiefs were not at all immune from, placed on their room for manoeuvre and 
negotiations. In the case of the Gudza Queen, it constrained the extent to which she 
engaged with the state officials and conducted banjas. For others the fear of uroi hampered 
the extent to which they enforced sanctions on perpetrators and bolstered their positions 
vis-à-vis others. 
As Geschiere has noted (1996), witchcraft can be seen as a ‘levelling force’ in 
society because “it can serve to keep ambitious leaders … within bounds” (Geschiere 1996: 
314). This was acutely felt by Struba in early 2005 and Ganda in late 2004, when they fell 
severely sick and were out of action for three to four months: Struba allegedly due to uroi 
sent by his opponent Jossias, and Ganda supposedly because of vulí sent by someone who 
was furious about the settlement of his case.328 The local script of evil-doing was, as in the 
rural population’s understandings of transgressions, an ever-present, underlying grammar 
that influenced the scope of actions of chiefs. This was because, as Chief Chibue stated, 
                                                 
328 In 2004-5 there were also other examples of chiefs being inflicted by uroi, such as Chibue, Dombe and 
Kóa.  
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“uroi is the invisible that we [chiefs] can never fully control. We always have to be aware 
because people are jealous of chiefs…. The mambo is always in danger…the ancestral 
spirits cannot protect us fully…and the state can do nothing.”329  
The point is that chiefly authority was not above uroi, but intimately tied to it: their 
de facto authority depended on their capacity to ensure that perpetrators of uroi were 
judged, but also that they themselves did not become the victims of uroi.330 This aspect of 
chiefly authority adds another important limitation to the negotiability of authority: in 
reconstituting de facto authority, chiefs had to balance their relationship not only with the 
state officials, to avoid excessive punishments, and with the particular expectations of their 
populations, but also with the invisible domain of evil-doing, from which they were 
certainly not immune. If only implicitly, the constitution of local state authority in relation 
to the chiefs, and as partly dependable on adjusting to the expectations of rural residents, 
was also drawn into this local script of evil-doing. At least it both set limits to as well as 
shaped the local police’s attempt to constitute superior authority by establishing distinct 
domains of authority. This was exemplified by their involvement in settling uroi, but also in 
the ‘models for practice’ which recognised the local script of evil-doing, existing outside 
the law.331 As I address next, this script also set limits to and shaped the ways in which 
rural residents (dis)engaged with state institutions.  
Situational Citizenship  
What do the negotiated, hybrid forms of authority prevailing in everyday governance, 
discussed above, imply for how we should conceptualize emerging forms of de facto 
citizenship in Dombe and Matica? Based on the analysis of Chapters 8-9, I suggest that the 
everyday negotiability of authority underpinned de facto citizenship as relatively inclusive, 
but also as constituted through the situation-specific, negotiated ways in which rural 
residents gained access to state services and state officials adjusted to their preferences. The 
                                                 
329 Interview, Chief Chibue, August 2004.  
330 This also made a chief highly dependent on wadzi-nyanga in settling uroi cases brought to the banja, in 
protecting themselves from uroi and in removing its sources when afflicted.  
331 In Matica and Dombe, state officials were not perceived as falling victim so easily to uroi because they 
came from ‘the outside’ and were not tied to family or close personal relations. The question is whether this 
will change over time as a result of the state police’s active engagement in facilitating the resolution of uroi 
cases and in linking uroi with crime and thus, albeit not as directly as chiefs, entering the domain of the 
invisible. Other studies have pointed in this direction, as well as showing how the power of state institutions is 
popularly perceived as being intimately tied to the use of occult forces and/or the assistance of witches (see 
West 2005; Fisiy and Geschiere 1990).  
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implication was that modalities of inclusion co-existed with high levels of indeterminacy 
and did not preclude differentiations.  
 
Citizenship: situation-specific and negotiated inclusion 
The PRM’s ‘models for practice’ underlined the coexistence of a distinction between rural 
residents as ruled by community authorities in some matters (‘social’/‘traditional’) and 
rural residents as citizens of the state in other matters (‘criminal’/’legal process’). This 
roughly corresponds to recent distinctions in Mozambican legislation: on the one hand, 
Decree 15/2000, which recognises rural residents on the basis of their community 
membership, represented by a chief or other community authority; and on the other hand, 
the Constitution’s individually based model of citizenship, recognizing universal political, 
civil and social rights for all nationals. This means that rural residents have formal access to 
some rights as individual citizens (e.g. political rights in the form of voting for general 
elections, education, health and a legal process), but that they have to be members of a 
group or community to gain access to other sorts of benefits (e.g. political representation at 
the community level, access to development programmes, local conflict resolution, and 
land) (Kyed and Buur 2006).  
These different legal conceptualisation and their locally adjusted variants (i.e. the 
models for practice) suggest that the rural population did not fall into either of the 
categories of citizens or subjects in the sense defined by, for example, Mamdani (1996): 
‘subjects’ as those ruled by customary law under chiefs and treated as groups, who do not 
participate in the institutions of government; ‘citizens’ as those ruled according to modern 
law and a universal set of rights to individuals secured by the state, as well as being active 
participants in civil society. Rather than being either citizens or subjects, the people of 
Matica and Dombe were both to varying degrees.332 This came to light in the everyday 
practices of and interactions between the state, the chiefs and the rural population. Although 
here de facto forms of citizenship were not a mirror image of a strictly de jure conception 
of citizenship rights granted equally to all (such as inscribed in the Mozambican 
constitution and defined by scholars such as Mamdani), the rural population did actively 
influence the operations of local state officials and gain access to state services.  
Chapters 8 and 9 showed that, rather than restricting the rural populations to 
particular bounded domains of case settlement (i.e. as citizens of the state and subjects of 
                                                 
332 On a similar point for other areas of Africa, see Geschiere and Gugler (1998: 315). 
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the chiefs), the PRM’s ‘models for practice’ actually opened up a wide range of alternatives 
and strategies for going ‘forum shopping’ in order to access desirable outcomes (von 
Benda-Beckman 1981).333 Moving back and forth between the banjas, the community 
courts and the PRM could be an important asset in ensuring that a conflict was settled, 
compensation paid and punishments inflicted. The action patterns of rural residents 
challenged the boundaries produced by the state police. They also demonstrated that rural 
residents were capable of laying claims against the state directly and making its local 
officers adjust to their preferences. It is worth restating that it was to a large extent these 
preferences and expectations that laid the groundwork for the negotiated, hybrid forms of 
authority that emerged: for example, the police’s facilitation of the resolution of uroi cases 
and their willingness to re-classify criminal acts (such as rape) as social cases in response to 
the victims’ own preferences. The everyday interactions between the state police and the 
rural population created a relatively inclusive form of citizenship, but also one that was 
enacted situationally, highly localised and the result of negotiations surrounding concrete 
cases. De facto forms of citizenship did not result from state officials straightforwardly 
granting a set of formal rights to all rural residents, nor were they a consequence of rural 
residents claiming such rights (such as the civil right to a fair trial in the official courts). 
Rather, it was the result of the personal judgement and the willingness of police officers to 
accept the requests of the rural population, as well as the latter’s active engagement with 
the local tiers of the state. This had two implications.  
First, the preferences of the rural population and the state police’s adjustments to 
them tended towards a detachment from, rather than a process of inclusion in, the formal 
justice system. This was not because people did not have very real ideas about what a fair 
trial was. It was rather because they shared resentment over imprisonment, which they 
associated with the formal justice system. As noted earlier, imprisonment was seen as 
“payment to the hurumende and not to the people”: it could potentially worsen a chain of 
                                                 
333 Besides the action fields of policing and justice enforcement, there were also other modalities of 
citizenship at work in other fields of action, which either implied a direct link between the state and the rural 
population, or else involved chiefs and community authorities as intermediaries: for example, tax collection 
by chiefs and sub-chiefs, vaccination campaigns and population registers organized through chiefs by the 
state, community-based development projects launched by NGOs, and the micro-credit tobacco schemes of 
private businesses, all of which positioned chiefs and community authorities at the interface between external 
agencies and the rural population. Along with this, access to clinics and hospitals, schooling and market stalls 
was as a rule provided by the state directly to rural residents as individuals. In 2005 the framework for 
community participation in district planning introduced yet another modality of citizenship, one in which 
local councils and forums were to ensure that a broader representation of citizens participated in decision-
making.   
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evil-doing. In this sense the local script of evil-doing also had implications for rural 
residents’ (dis)engagement with (from) the state, in particular beyond the immediate local 
context. The notion of imprisonment as “a payment to the hurumende and not the people” 
also suggested that the reluctance to engage with extra-local state institutions was tied to 
the historically vested view of the state as not necessarily serving the ‘common good’, in 
particular the rural poor. The implication was that de facto forms of citizenship were not 
attached to a wider notion of the state as the neutral and impersonal guarantor of equal 
rights and obligations. Instead, access to state benefits and services was viewed as 
obtainable through localised and negotiated interactions with the local tiers of the state. In a 
sense the sub-district level state police reproduced this by communicating and enforcing 
their ‘own’ rules, which by and large left regulations, provisions and control of the rural 
population’s involvement with the state in the hands of local police officers (see Chapter 7).   
Secondly, the situation-specific and negotiated ways in which de facto citizenship 
was constituted at the sub-district level also entrenched indeterminacy and did not preclude 
differentiations. I elaborate on these aspects below. 
 
Indeterminacy and differentiation 
The negotiated character of authority also meant a high level of indeterminacy for the rural 
population. As noted in Chapters 8 and 9, taking a case to the police always involved the 
risk that compensational justice would not be dispensed and that imprisonment would be 
the result. In addition, fear of a future chain of evil-doing and uroi inflictions was always 
present in the choice of taking a case to the police, and there were potentially negative 
repercussions in “becoming known to the police”. The prevalence of self-redress and the 
continued settlement of criminal cases by chiefs reflected people’s views of the risks 
involved in bringing in the state police. Not all rural residents had the skill, will or courage 
to engage and negotiate with the police, and not all were treated the same way in every 
situation. The latter circumstance, for example, came to light in the resolution of criminal 
cases by the local tiers of the state, which often, but not always, implied the payment of 
compensation to the victims (see Chapter 9). This underpinned more subtle modes of 
differentiation, as well as more pervasive ones.   
If the plural institutional landscape left ample room for negotiating settlements, it 
was also the more affluent, the better connected and the more knowledgeable that had the 
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upper hand.334 There were limits to negotiability because it does not preclude 
differentiation. In Matica and Dombe, the content of what could be regarded as ‘affluent’, 
‘better connected’ and ‘more knowledgeable’ depended on the authority being addressed 
and were intertwined with different criteria of distinction: gender, age, marital status, kin 
relations, economy, residence and political affiliation. For example, we may recall from 
Chapters 8 and 9 how monetary issues both impeded the choice to seek appeal in banjas or 
community courts, and informed the choice whether to go to the PRM or not. Added to this 
was a tendency for women, in particular widows or unmarried women, to prefer the police 
to the chief because of inherent gender inequalities in the rules enforced in the banjas and 
the particular danger for these people in being accused of uroi. However, there were also 
exceptions to this, as when the female family members of a chief were involved, or if the 
case concerned a woman with a good reputation in the area. The rural population generally 
viewed the close kin of chiefs as being better situated at the banja than others, although this 
was denied by the chiefs themselves. The same applied to distinctions between people who 
had resided in the area before the war and those who were newcomers or just visitors. This 
was equally the case with the police, who tended to be biased towards local residents. 
Another form of differentiation shared by the banjas, the police and the community courts 
was age: young men were often treated with particular mistrust, easily lost a case and were 
punished more than others. But again there were exceptions, as when young male teachers 
and the sons of madodas were involved. Finally, personal connections with the authorities 
in the administrative capitals played a significant role regarding how cases were settled in 
the community courts and in negotiating settlements with the police (see, for example, Case 
1 in Chapter 8).  
Besides these significant but more subtle forms of differentiation that limited the 
degree of negotiability, but were not fully fixed, there were two more pervasive, underlying 
scripts that could underpin exclusions: the local script of evil-doing, which not only limited 
people’s scope of choices and actions, but could also be invoked to set some people apart 
from others and at times to exclude persons from the regulado (see Chapters 7-8); and the 
political script of the Frelimo party-state, which, as noted in Chapter 9, underpinned how 
party political affiliation or a history ‘on the Renamo side’ was important in the choices 
people made whether or not to take a case to the police. This was embedded in a wider 
history of the political partisanship of the police, but it was also confirmed by ongoing 
                                                 
334 On a similar point regarding Malawi, see Peters (2002).  
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practices and representations of distinctions by local state officials, as also noted in Chapter 
6. When seen from the perspective of de facto citizenship as a mode of producing 
membership of the political community, the political script was by far the most prevalent 
form of differentiation employed by the local tiers of the state. The limits that this script set 
to the inclusiveness of citizenship and also to the negotiability of chiefly authority will 
become explicit when I now address the responses of local state officials in ‘exceptional 
situations’.  
 
2. Exceptional Situations: Sovereignty and the Political Script  
 
So far this chapter has argued that the everyday patterns of action and interaction 
underpinned hybrid and negotiated forms of local state and chiefly authority. The point has 
also been made in this and the previous chapters that these everyday patterns challenged the 
state police’s attempt to fix distinct domains of authority as an element of consolidating the 
sovereign authority of the local state in the sense of a monopoly on the use of force and 
final decisions concerning ‘the land’, the ‘citizen body’ and ‘authority’. The immediate 
result of the everyday negotiability of authority was high levels of uncertainty in the 
constitution of authority. Authority remained precarious, but it did not erase attempts to 
draw distinctions and hierarchies. This section addresses the particular, but momentary 
responses of local state officials to the uncertainty of the sovereign authority of the local 
state, and the significance of the political script in these responses. It does so by drawing 
attention to situations in which local state officials overtly and in public ‘stepped’ out of 
everyday patterns of negotiations, re-marked hierarchies of authority and re-enacted a state-
defined order.   
I conceptualise these situations as ‘exceptional situations’. I do this because they 
emerged from particular occurrences that, as opposed to the more subtle challenges to local 
state authority in the everyday negotiations of the police’s rules, were defined by local state 
officials as overt resistance to state authority and, as it turned out, in particular to the 
Frelimo-state order: for example, when chiefs were caught using force or assisting the 
opposition party, when state officials met overt resistance from or were ‘brought to trial’ by 
rural residents, and in particular when activities were seen as overt political resistance to 
Frelimo. But the meaning of ‘exceptional’ also needs to be seen in light of the particular 
responses of local state officials that the occurrences gave way to. This included the 
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application of violence on the bodies of those seen as resisting the state and Frelimo, and 
above all of defining and enacting criteria of inclusion and exclusion from the unity of the 
political community, as defined by the local state officials.  
In this way, ‘exception’ denotes “an instance of leaving out or excluding” (for 
example, things, persons, and/or ideas), of drawing boundaries between the included and 
the excluded (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary 1989). Thus ‘exceptional situations’ 
are conceptualised not per se as deviance from the ‘normal situation’, but in particular as 
defining moments in which particular definitions of the ‘normal’ or the ‘rule’ are 
represented and enacted, and categories and practices of exclusion are overtly articulated. 
In this section, where the ‘exceptional situations’ are those in which the sovereign authority 
of the (Frelimo) state is at stake, such attempts to produce the ‘normal’ centred on 
definitions of the political community of righteous citizens and its constitutive outside or 
the excluded. This at the same time underpinned particular enactments and definitions of 
state sovereignty by local state officials. Characteristic of the practices of violence and 
exclusions invoked in these exceptional situations was the fact that they involved 
suspension of the official law in the very name of enforcing the law. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, sovereignty can be seen as originating in the exception, that is, in the capacity 
not only to define the ‘normal’ order and the law regulating it, but also to define the 
exception and suspend the law or the norm. The exception is characterised by the sovereign 
applying exceptional means on the bodies of those individuals who threaten the order or 
normal situation as defined by the sovereign (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Schmitt 1985). 
The substances of such exceptional means may vary from physical violence to exclusion, 
but they are characterised by excess. In Chapter 7, this was expressed in the PRM’s 
excessive punishments of chiefs. In this section, I begin by presenting a case from Bunga in 
Dombe that takes these insights further and shows how the enactment of sovereignty in 
exceptional situations was underpinned by the political script of the Frelimo party-state. 
This invested sovereignty, the law and citizenship with a particular political content, while 
casting Renamo as the ‘internal enemy’, ‘evil other’ and ‘constitutive outside’. The 
repercussions of this for de facto inclusive citizenship and chiefs’ room for manoeuvre and 
negotiation are discussed after presenting the case from Bunga.  
 335
The Bunga burning  
On 14 August 2004, we were in Chibue Chieftaincy and received the news that, during the 
night, the Bunga offices of the local state administrator (chefe da localidade) and the PRM 
officer, Raul and Mauritius, had been burnt to the ground. It was no accident. Somebody 
had set the offices on fire, we were told, but no one would say who it was. Fortunately no 
one was injured because Raul and Mauritius were in Sussundenga. Rumours immediately 
circulated in the Chibue area about the case. Some believed ‘it is ma-politica’, referring to 
how people in Bunga “do not want the police…and the hurumende’, because it is a “zona 
maningi de matsangaisa [a very strong Renamo zone]”. Others rejected this political 
interpretation, asserting that it must be someone who is “fed up with Raul eating the women 
[i.e. sleeping with married women]” or because “Raul and the police are beating the people 
and even the mambo” – practices that I was already familiar with after several stays in 
Bunga from 2002.  
Bunga is the administrative capital of the locality of Javela, which lies some forty 
kilometres from Dombe sede and a few kilometres from the former Renamo base at 
Sitatonga (see Chapter 2). State police and administrative presence was not re-established 
here until 2001 due to fear of resistance from the local people, who as a rule supported 
Renamo, including the chiefs. After the 1999 elections, when Renamo claimed nationally 
that Frelimo’s victory had been due to fraud, there were intense upheavals in Bunga, where 
rural residents in protest blocked the main road passing through Bunga and connecting 
Dombe with Zimbabwe. This was met with intensive police intervention and mass arrests. 
In 2001 Raul had been posted to Bunga as the first chefe da localidade of the area 
since colonial rule. He was a former First Frelimo Secretary in Dombe, who had actively 
played a role in re-establishing the presence of the party and the state administration in the 
sede in 1995-6. He was known to take his state administrative tasks very seriously. Indeed, 
Raul actively tried to turn Bungians into registered tax-payers, members of development 
associations and generally law-abiding citizens.335 But to him these transformations, which 
he referred to as ‘educar o povo’ (educating the people), were also intimately tied to turning 
Bungians, including chiefs, into Frelimo loyalists.336 In parallel with this wider national 
project, as Raul termed it, he had created his own ‘microstate’ for governing Bunga. With 
                                                 
335 In 2002, three people paid taxes in Bunga out of 3402 registered adults. Interestingly this was equivalent to 
the number of people who voted for Frelimo in 1999. Due to increased collaboration between the chiefs and 
Raul, taxes rose by approximately 20% in 2003-4. In the 2004 elections, votes for Frelimo increased to 16.  
336 Interview, Raul, Bunga, 2 October 2002.  
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the assistance of shifting PRM officers,337 he had established his own little ‘court’, 
receiving people who had ndava of diverse kinds, and regularly solving criminal cases by 
imposing penalties ranging from the payment of compensation to victims to corporal 
punishment and public work. On some occasions, he also put in their place chiefs who had 
been caught solving crimes or in other ways “boycotting the development goals of the 
governo” (such as not attending state-arranged meetings, not assisting with finding 
criminals or taking part in Renamo-arranged activities).338 Parallel to this, Raul had a 
longstanding controversy with the local Renamo delegate because, “according to the Law 
that prohibits political parties from displaying their flags next to an election venue”, he had 
ordered Renamo to remove their office and party flag from the main road next to the public 
school where elections are held.339  
Raul was viewed with ambivalence by Bungians. He indeed made things happen, 
assisting the people with ndava and cracking down on criminals, but they did not like the 
way he punished the mambo, and in particular the fact that he “stole the women of Bunga.” 
Raul indeed liked women, in particular married ones. In his ‘court’, he had developed a 
practice of ‘conquering’ women who were accused in a case by keeping them in his office 
for one or two days to serve their “sentence of public work” (cook food for him and give 
him pleasure). Rumours circulated that Raul had conquered nine married women since 
2001, made one of them pregnant, three severely sick (some believed of AIDS, others that 
it was vulí because their husbands had not been compensated), and one had died. In three of 
these cases the husbands had tried to get Raul sentenced according to the norms of 
compensatory justice that applied to adultery. On the first occasion, Raul agreed to go to 
the banja of Chief Kóa, but he refused to pay the fine that was imposed on him. After this 
the husband went maluco and killed his wife, probably because of vulí, people said, due to 
the lack of compensation. He served six months in prison and was released in early 2004. 
On the next two occasions, Raul went to the community court in Dombe, but here too 
refused to pay any fines. Both women fell severely sick thereafter, and Raul continued 
‘conquering’ other women. In 2004, prior to his office being burnt, the aggrieved husbands 
stated that they had given up trying to bring Raul to trial, but rumours circulated that some 
                                                 
337 Police officers posted in Bunga never remained there for very long. It was a very unpopular area to work 
in, not only because it was geographically remote from Sussundenga and Chimoio towns, where most 
officers’ families lived, but also because it was a Renamo area.   
338 Interview, Raul, 10 July 2004.  
339 Ibid. 
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of them had asserted that “One day, Raul will see”, indicating that somehow justice would 
be done.340   
Raul’s conquests of women were well-known by the PRM in Dombe, and also by 
the chefe do posto (the head of the administrative post of Dombe), who had warned Raul 
that it could harm the government. Nonetheless, when we reached the Dombe sede on 16 
August, the chief of police stated that the burning of state property in Bunga was most 
probably politically motivated. It had, he held, probably been engineered by Renamo as 
part of its “uncivilised campaign, organised against the law and order of the state”.341 He 
further linked the arson to an incident on 11 August in Cheringoma District, Sofala 
Province, which had just been transmitted over the radio: 25 armed Renamo supporters had 
stormed the police station to release five other Renamo supporters who had been 
imprisoned for beating up a Frelimo secretary. But he also linked the arson to Bunga being 
a zona da confusão (literally a ‘zone of confusion’). This label was commonly used by state 
officials to describe former war zones controlled by Renamo, where the people had become 
confused due to protracted exposure to such control. As the chefe do posto explained, it 
denoted areas where “people still take the law into their own hands…because they live in 
this war mentality…of the opposition…and they lack the education to know what is legal 
and what is not”.342 This interpretation reflected how the particular political script 
underpinned ways of conceptualising crime and transgressions. It also had concrete effects 
on how the case was handled by the police. However, this was widely contested by 
Bungians and Chief Kóa.  
 
Political sabotage against the state, or justice against the abuse of power? 
Two days after the fires, the secretary of the Renamo delegate was arrested by a PIC officer 
with Raul’s assistance. He was taken to Dombe, put in a cell, interrogated and beaten.343 He 
became a suspect because he had allegedly written a letter complaining about the removal 
of the Renamo office, in which he had also insulted the Frelimo presidential candidate, A. 
E. Guebueza, and claimed that Renamo would have Raul destroyed. He was released after 
four days due to lack of evidence (the letter was never found!), but he remained under 
                                                 
340 Interview with teacher, Bunga, 25 July 2004.  
341 The general and presidential elections were held four months after the fires at Bunga, in December 2004.  
342 See Kyed (2007a) on the production of Dombe as a zone of confusion, used to describe Renamo 
strongholds and to legitimise exceptional, war-like measures adopted in such cases by the state police.  
343 Interview with the arrestee, Bunga, 24 September 2005.  
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suspicion for ‘state sabotage’.344 Before his release, another man was detained, namely one 
of the aggrieved husbands who had allegedly promised Raul “that one day he will see”. He 
also happened to be the son of another prominent Renamo figure in Bunga.  
These arrests created a great deal of discontent among Bungians, who widely agreed 
that the fires had been a last resort to achieve justice by one of the wronged husbands 
because of the failure of the available courts to do so. To them it was not a political act in 
contempt of the state police and administration’s presence in the area. In their view the 
burning was not a good thing, but nor was it entirely unjust: Raul had done wrong in 
stealing other men’s women and in not paying the fines. He had set off a vicious circle of 
evil-doing: sickness, death, and now arson. But the Bungians were also furious that the 
police had detained two individuals without any public consultation with the people. If the 
people had been consulted, some held, Raul could not have turned the case into ma-politica 
(politics) in order to cover up his own illegitimate practices of “abuse of the power of the 
hurumende”. Chief Kóa was also very dissatisfied that the police had bypassed him in 
investigating a case involving residents in his area. In fact, he had tried to help the police 
find the perpetrator by arranging a large meeting between Bungians to discuss the case two 
days after the arson. Raul and Mauritius had also been asked to participate, but they never 
turned up: “They [Raul and Mauritius] were just doing their own secret business with the 
Dombe police [pursuing the arrests]”, Kóa told me. The discontent of the Bungians reached 
the Dombe administration through Chief Kóa, who informed the chefe do posto that the 
people wanted a meeting with the hurumende to discuss the case.   
On the 24th a public hearing was arranged. Modelled on other public meetings (see 
Chapter 6), Bunga received a visit from the trinity of power – the chefe do posto, two police 
officers and the First Frelimo secretary of Dombe. At the venue next to the burnt houses 
and the school, Chief Kóa was seated next to these men and to Raul. The meeting was 
indeed public, with around 150 people attending. The chefe do posto opened the meeting, 
and after a salute of “Viva Frelimo” and “Viva Bunga”, he said: “We have come here 
because state property has been burnt down. Maybe you, the people of Bunga, do not want 
the State and the Law here! This is a very serious crime. The perpetrator must be found and 
punished maningi [a lot].” He then asked the people to come forward and speak, adding: 
                                                 
344 This was not the first time that this Renamo figure had been detained in a cell. He had been there a year 
before, accused of holding secret political meetings at night. He was not taken to court, but according to 
himself the police had tried to enganar him (to win him over to Frelimo).  
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“We are now in a democracy where everyone has the right to speak freely and with any 
opinion. So tell me what you have to say. Tell me who did this bad crime”.  
 The first six (male) speakers who got up made it very clear that the arson had been 
caused by Raul abusing his power to steal married women, one also giving a detailed 
account of how he did this (he was a brother of one of the women). They also complained 
that the police had not consulted the people, but at the same time asserted very firmly that 
the arson was not because the people in Bunga were against the law and the state. The 
seventh speaker, one of the aggrieved husbands, added to this view:  
 
We thank you for bringing the police and a presidente [popularly used word for the chefe da 
localidade] here to Bunga. This is very good because it brings development and reduces crime. But 
there are two kinds of state representatives, one who works well with the people and another who 
does not. This one [pointing his finger at Raul] is going ways that has nothing to do with the 
job…he teaches us what is right and wrong, but then he is the one who breaks the law…the only 
real thief here in Bunga is him…and then he does not even get punished for that. Now you [the 
Dombe delegation] tell us if this is right or wrong! 
 
Following this statement, several people shouted out loud that the chefe should be removed 
from office, that he should be properly punished, and that the Dombe delegation should not 
protect him from prosecution just because he is part of the hurumende. The chefe do posto 
did not immediately accept these explanations from the Bungians. Rather, he responded by 
first explaining that people in Bunga should learn to respect the law. However, while 
referring to the law and democracy, he gradually merged the case, and criminal activity in 
general, with political opposition to the state and to law and order.  
 
Today, there are many people who end up in prison because they take the law into their own 
hands…and then the person who slept with the women go free…because adultery is not a crime, it 
is a bad thing, but not a crime…but arson is a crime and killing a person is…now you should learn 
that there are many authorities who can assist and counsel you with your problems. There is the 
régulo and the elders, there is the police and the Frelimo Secretary here…and if you don’t believe 
that the problem will be solved here in Bunga, you are free to go to the government in the sede 
[Dombe]…to the administration, the police, the Frelimo secretary and the community court. [And 
hinting that Renamo was to blame for the case:] I know that here in Bunga there are those people 
with oppositional ideas who advise you to do justice with your own hands…but this is a thing of the 
war. Today there is law and democracy.   
 
At this point an old man got up and, in response to the chefe do posto, replied that the 
people had indeed tried to take the cases to court and thus adhere to the law that the chefe 
was referring to. The problem, the old man said, was rather that Raul “is one of those 
persons who do not receive counselling…just does what is in his own mind because he is 
with the government.” The chefe do posto now agreed that “what he [Raul] has done is 
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wrong…he should not destroy the homes of people, but it is not the government that has 
done wrong”. However, immediately after this statement, he tried to divert attention away 
from Raul and instead blame the burning on the opposition. In doing so he turned to the 
past controversy over the removal of Renamo’s office. Again referring to law and legality, 
he stated:  
 
Today in Mozambique we have a multi-party system that permits a lot of parties. All of these 
parties have to follow the law like all Mozambicans. When the chefe da localidade told Renamo to 
move their office, it was not his own decision. It was the law that says that no party can be in front 
of the school. No politics can be where the children can hear. Everyone has to follow the law…and 
when someone is dissatisfied with a decision, he cannot take the law into his own hands.  
 
A ‘verbal tug-of-war’ over the domain of law and legality followed this comment. While 
the chefe do posto reiterated that political activities should not go against the law – i.e. be 
carried out in front of the school where children can hear –  the crowd responded by asking 
whether it was right for the police to beat up criminals where the children can hear and see. 
One also courageously asked why the Frelimo flag was still flying just opposite the school 
when the chefe himself had said that this was against the law. Two others asserted that the 
released member of Renamo should be materially compensated by Raul and the police 
because he was innocent and his name was now in the latter’s books. Finally some repeated 
that Raul should be replaced by another official, again repeating that Bunga indeed wanted 
the state and the law.   
The rather chaotic situation that emerged at this point came to an end when the 
chefe do posto informed the crowd that Raul would remain the chefe in Bunga until the DA 
had looked at the case and found a good solution for Bunga. He also promised that, when 
the real perpetrator was found, the people of Bunga would be informed. He would be 
presented to the people to explain why he had burnt state property and be made to rebuild 
the offices. The latter stimulated loud applause from the crowd. However, after this promise 
the party politicization of the case reached its peak. The meeting was turned into a political 
campaign that equated Renamo with the evil ‘Other’ of the law, the state and the people.   
    
Renamo as the criminal and evil ‘Other’  
After making his promises to the Bungians, the chefe said that he had one more issue to talk 
about: “the secret meetings that are held at night here in Bunga”. He continued: “These are 
very illegal and against the law…because all meetings are supposed to be public and 
granted the permission of the Government…people can go to prison for that”. Although the 
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chefe did not use the word ‘Renamo’, anyone who has lived in Bunga for any length of time 
knows that the phrase ‘secret night meetings’ has been used by local state officials to 
criminalise Renamo’s political activities and in some instances to legitimise arrests of 
Renamo supporters.   
At this point in the meeting, however, the messages of the chefe of post that denoted 
the criminalisation of the opposition’s activities was not confined to invoking the law and 
thus of positioning Renamo as representing the opposite of the law. He merged emphasis 
on legality with the local script of evil-doing, and in particular the locally embedded notion 
of the secret activities of witches performed at night. As discussed in Chapter 8, uroi could 
be used by anyone for diverse purposes, including legitimate ones (e.g. mapipi). The umroi 
(witches), the sources of evil, by contrast were held to have the capacity to make 
themselves invisible and turn themselves into animals so they cannot be identified. They 
were held to do so particularly at night when the umroi would also meet secretly and 
devour close kin to gain strength.  
 At the meeting, the chefe tapped into this script by drawing an analogy between the 
illegal night meetings of Renamo and the evil forces that eat people at night: “Meetings at 
night can destroy the development of Bunga…it can destroy Mozambique….because it 
works to cheat you into false promises of the good….as our forefathers said, you should not 
wake up the leopard that sleeps in the mato [bush] because in the end it will eat all your 
relatives.” After this the chefe turned to the theme of the upcoming elections, asking people 
to abide by the law and vote peaceably. He then reminded them of the war and the suffering 
before he returned to the well-known story about the “leopard that sleeps in the mato”:  
 
A woman was walking along the road at night with meat and her three children when she met a 
leopard sleeping by the side of the road. She could not stop herself from waking it up. The leopard 
began to dance and then told the woman, ‘When I dance you will get a fortune, but what are you 
going to give me?’ She answered, ‘I will give you some meat’. The leopard began to dance, but kept 
on asking for more meat until there was no more left. It then asked for more. Having nothing more 
to give, the woman gave the leopard first one, then two children, and then the last child. Then she 
was left with nothing.   
 
Judging from the comments that my assistant, Nóe, overheard among the people sitting at 
the back, no one doubted that the leopard, which eats the relatives of those who feed it, was 
intended as a reference to Renamo. As if triggered by the underlying political messages of 
the story, one man at the back got up at this point. He was the person who had just been 
released from the cell in Dombe. He asked the chefe: “So was I arrested because of politics, 
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or was it really because the police thought that I burnt down the houses?” The chefe did not 
directly answer, but replied: “Had we found the letter [of Renamo] to be in your 
handwriting, then you would still be in prison.” Hence, from drawing an analogy between 
Renamo and the evil forces that work at night, the chefe again returned to equating Renamo 
activities with crime and illegality, irrespective of whether this had anything to do with the 
arson or not. The chefe rounded off these messages by repeating once again that “people 
cannot interpret the law on their own”, followed by shouts of “Viva Frelimo”, “Viva 
polícia”, the “law” and “the people of Bunga”. He then gave the stage to the First Frelimo 
Secretary of Dombe, who used the occasion to speak about the up-coming elections – 
including encouraging people to vote for the Frelimo presidential candidate, E.A. 
Guebueza.  
The end result of the case was that no one was charged with the arson attack. The 
Bungians nonetheless got rid of Raul, who in September was transferred to the 
neighbouring locality of Matarara. Meanwhile the Dombe police and administration 
withheld the conclusion that the chefe do posto gave to me after the August meeting: “Ah, 
in the end it was all politics. Why else did they not tell us who the real offender is? They 
just talk about the women to hide the political issues.” Three months later, Renamo again 
won a convincing electoral victory in Bunga, suggesting that the chefe do posto’s main 
messages had not been entirely convincing to the people of Bunga.  
Irrespective of the unsuccessful voter outcome for Frelimo, this case of the 
destruction of state property in Bunga brings to the fore the particular underlying politics of 
representing and enacting local state authority and the law, which surfaced explicitly in 
exceptional situations. Burning state property was unusual in post-war Dombe, once the 
state administration and police post had been set up and the chiefs recognised. However, 
the case exemplified an exceptional situation, not so much by being an exception to the 
rule, but due to the responses of state officials that it led to. First, it reflected how local state 
officials merged illegality with politics: the burning was presented and acted on as an act of 
political sabotage against the state and the law, not merely as a criminal act of self-redress, 
which, as noted in Chapter 8, was not that unusual in Dombe. Secondly, the burning was 
appropriated by state officials as a moment of exclusion, of outlining in acts and 
representations the opposition Renamo as the ‘constitutive outside’ of law and order, not 
simply as a political party competing for votes with Frelimo. This was exemplified by the 
arrest of (legally speaking) innocent Renamo members and conjured up in the different 
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analogies drawn in the speeches at the public meeting between Renamo, evil forces, 
illegality/self-redress and animals that consume human beings. These analogies played into 
the overall message of conveying Renamo as the constitutive outside of not only the state, 
Frelimo and the law, but also of the good forces and the well-being of local society. By 
drawing on the local script of evil doing, the chefe do posto tried to appeal to local ideas 
about the uncontrollable and destructive forces of society.345 But by merging this local 
script with the political script of the Frelimo party-state, the analogies also represented 
Renamo as symbolizing the forces that are uncontrollable for the Frelimo state: i.e. those 
forces which cannot fit into its unitary order and hence must be excluded. If, then, these 
actions and representations of local state officials can be interpreted as momentary 
responses to deal with the continued uncertainty of local (Frelimo) state authority in 
Dombe, I suggest that they also reflected deeper, historically embedded ways of 
(re)constituting state authority and the political community, that is, of representing and 
enacting a particular (Frelimo) state-defined order. Below I first address the repercussions 
of this for the limits to inclusive citizenship and spaces for negotiation. Secondly, I discuss 
what it meant for chiefs.  
Party politicised citizenship: ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’  
In discussing the repercussions of the political script for de facto citizenship, I wish to 
begin with the core tension that surfaced between the state officials’ and Bungians’ 
interpretations respectively of the case of burning state property. As already shown, the 
people in Bunga saw the arson as a last resort to obtain justice against an individual state 
official’s illegitimate abuse of power and transgression of a local norm (i.e. sleeping with 
married women) without paying due compensation. It was not seen as an act of resistance 
to the state and the law. This interpretation reflected people’s views of what should be the 
morally appropriate behaviour of state officials, and of how the local justice system ought 
to function and authority be exercised. This included the view that the chiefs and the 
population should be consulted by the police in matters of crime and conflict in their area, 
just as the police officers themselves encouraged them to do at the public police meetings 
(Kyed 2007a). It also included the view that local state officials should be prosecuted for 
                                                 
345 At other public meetings, similar analogies were drawn by local state officials between Renamo and 
crocodiles. For the rural population, the crocodile is the symbol of malice and evil, as well as a significant 
source of lethal poison in the work of umroi. The hint that Renamo was like crocodiles reinforces the 
denotation of its evil meaning.     
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transgressing local norms, and of potentially setting in motion a chain of evil-doing. In 
short, it reflected the view that local state officials were not (or ought not to be) detached 
from the local social order of transgressions and dispensations of justice, including the links 
between the visible and invisible dimensions that underpinned these. As addressed earlier 
this was in fact, if only situationally and outside the law, supported by local police officers 
in their everyday settlements of uroi and social cases (including, as noted, by Raul himself). 
Against this background, the burning of state property was seen as a response to a state 
official who was acting with impunity, as if he was above the ‘law’ and local norms, and 
worse still, whose actions led to a chain of evil-doing.  
This way of viewing the case stressed a tension between official law on the one 
hand and the enforcement of the models for practice and local notions of legitimate 
enforcement of authority on the other. For example, according to the official law sleeping 
with married women is not a criminal offence, but arson is, and according to the law the 
police do not have to involve chiefs or ordinary people in investigating crimes. However, as 
addressed earlier, the locally adjusted rules and practices of local police officers themselves 
expanded beyond these aspects of official law, confirming both the legitimacy of 
prosecuting perpetrators of adultery and of involving by obligation chiefs in criminal 
investigations.     
The most striking tension that arose was by implication not a tension between 
official law and local norms and notions of evil-doing, but rather the fact that state officials 
presented the arson in Bunga as a political act of resistance to the state, the law and the 
wider order per se. The point is that, irrespective of whether state officials actually believed 
that the arson was an organised act of state sabotage engineered by Renamo or simply an 
act of self-redress by an individual, it was drawn into particular political script that merged 
legal and political categories, and ultimately also the local script of evil-doing: criminal 
self-redress was presented, if not as overt political opposition to the state and the law, then 
at least as having been caused Renamo’s morally corrupted, confused and evil ideas. This 
underpinned how the political script not only politicised criminal acts, but also criminalised 
the political activities of the opposition. It also went beyond this. One radical consequence 
of equating Renamo with crime, confusion, immorality and the ‘evil forces that operate at 
night’ was that it conveyed a (party) politicisation of citizenship as a mode of belonging to 
a ‘political community’. Criteria of membership, of inclusion and exclusion, were defined 
not on the basis of legal status or criteria of national or community belonging, but in 
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accordance with (party) political affiliation and thus the categories ‘us’/Frelimo and 
‘they’/Renamo. Put differently, the de facto definition of citizenship was not confined to a 
distinction between “Mozambicans” and “foreigners”, but also relied on an internal 
‘outsider’. This emphasised the de facto internal differentiation between de jure citizens.   
The way in which the political script underpinned criteria of citizenship was 
particularly problematic, I suggest, because of the moral-political content that the 
“us”/“they” relation was invested with. It was conveyed as a distinction between enemies 
and friends, between evil and good, which ‘allowed’ for particular responses: the 
application of physical and symbolic violence, outside the law.  
It is clear that ‘us’/ ‘they’ relations are an intrinsic element of the production of 
citizenship as a kind of collective identity: the creation of a “we” can only exist by 
demarcation from a “they”. However, as Mouffe (2006) also shows, different types of 
we/they relations can be constituted, depending on the way the ‘they’ is constructed as the 
constitutive other of the ‘we’ (ibid.: 18-19). Thus, she distinguishes between us/they 
relations that permit the acceptance of the difference of the ‘other’, and therefore allow 
dialogue and pluralism, and us/they relations that turn into a friend/enemy relation. Because 
the latter is based on moral categories of good and evil, it follows an antagonistic logic that 
does not accept differences (ibid.: 19). “This happens when the ‘they’ is perceived as 
putting into question the identity of the ‘we’, and as threatening its existence” (ibid.: 15-
16).346 The consequence of such a we/they relation is, as Mouffe argues, “when the we/they 
confrontation is visualized as a moral one between good and evil, the opponent can be 
perceived only as an enemy to be destroyed” (ibid.: 15). Similarly, the political script 
articulated by local state officials underpinned an antagonistic we/they relation: i.e. 
‘friends’/‘good’/Frelimo and ‘enemies’/‘evil’/Renamo. As reflected in the speech of the 
chefe do posto at the Bunga meetings, in representations this was conveyed through a lucid 
mixture of languages belonging to different domains and historical epochs: the Frelimo war 
                                                 
346 Mouffe (2006) here draws on Carl Schmitt’s (1985) concept of ‘the political’ to describe those political 
confrontations that rely on enemy/friend distinctions rather than on categories of ‘us’ and ‘they’ that accept 
differences. It should be noted that Mouffe’s (2006) warning about the dominance of enemy/friend relations is 
not made with regard to African power and politics, but about current trends in Western democratic politics, 
referring, for example, to President Bush’s war on terror. But she is also referring more broadly to European 
politics, in which, she argues, the ‘Third Way’, consensus politics of the previous prime minister of the UK, 
Tony Blair, and its elimination of left and right oppositions has been accompanied by a moralization of 
politics, where political differences are no longer about right and left, but about right and wrong. This, she 
argues, has given way to antagonism rather than constructive agonisms that allow for ideological differences 
and political plurality. Her point is not that we/they distinctions can be removed, as in the Habermassian 
notion of ‘consensus’, but rather that they must be transformed from an enemy/friend distinction to a we/they 
distinction that sees political pluralism as being constitutive of democracy (ibid.: 14).   
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rhetoric of the civilised (Frelimo) versus the uncivilised (Renamo), mixed with the socialist 
era’s emphasis on destroying or re-educating “the internal enemy” of the unitary order of 
Frelimo and the use of the local script of evil forces that work to destroy the well-being and 
existence of the people. All these made up the political script that produced an analogy 
between Renamo and the uncontrollable, untamed forces that must be kept at bay and 
watched out for – in short, be excluded and destroyed. This also underpinned particular 
practices.  
In Matica and Dombe, ‘destruction’ was enacted around concrete instances of the 
physical removal of the Renamo office in Bunga and the simultaneous detaining of Renamo 
supporters for political reasons. More broadly, ‘destruction’ related to attempts to destroy 
the spaces and possibilities to act (party) politically and to identify with Renamo when 
benefiting from the state’s services. The point is that the political script was not confined to 
verbal representations by state officials at public meetings. It also permeated, and in the 
view of Frelimo and state officials legitimised particular practices. The political script set 
limits to who could negotiate with the state police, for example, when settling a case. It 
meant that not only criminal activity, but also people’s particular grievances or complaints 
about state officials or simply their disengagement from the state were interpreted and 
reacted to from the perspective of a (party) political lens. It was also exemplified by the 
particularly violent punishments and arbitrary arrests of Renamo supporters. The political 
script granted certain “rights to illegality” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 12) to local state 
officials when they were dealing with Renamo supporters and with what they labelled 
(Renamo) “zones of confusion” such as Bunga. The conceptualisation of these zones as 
territories previously controlled by the ‘enemy’ ‘allowed’ state officials to apply violence 
on the bodies of those who trespassed against the law.  
These repercussions in one sense underscore how the political script invested the 
state’s activities with a larger “national project”, as Raul himself termed it, of creating 
allegiance to the Frelimo party.347 However, the point is that such allegiance went beyond 
pure party political competition for votes and power within a democratic polity: it also 
permeated how sovereign authority was enacted and marked out sovereign authority as 
vested not merely in the law and the state apparatus, but in particular in the Frelimo party. 
                                                 
347 In another publication (Kyed 2007a) on the work of the PRM and community policing, I have referred to 
this as the ‘politics of policing’. I use the concept to capture how, besides combating crime, the PRM engages 
from a legal perspective both discursively and practically in producing the “political community” of people 
with affiliation to the Frelimo state and their constitutive outsiders, namely Renamo supporters (ibid.: 134).  
 347
Even if the everyday operations of ‘micro-states’ contest the existence of a homogeneous 
and unitary state (Santos 2006), then this did not preclude situation-specific attempts to 
establish ‘unity’ and ‘homogeneity’. Perhaps the uncertainty of local Frelimo-state 
authority even laid the grounds for these enactments, reflecting the constant attempts to 
overcome the precariousness of a unitary order. What can be said with certainty is that one 
consequence of the political script was a denial of political pluralism and heterogeneity, 
which limited negotiations in everyday interactions. Another consequence of the political 
script was that it also limited chiefs’ room for manoeuvre.  
Party politicisation of chiefs: Frelimo as the final authority  
The foregoing chapters have shown how local state officials approached the recognition of 
chiefs as an intrinsic part of reconstituting local state sovereignty. This took the form of 
both the chiefs’ incorporation in and separation from the state. Most directly, the sovereign 
authority of the local state was demonstrated through the excessive punishment of 
disobedient chiefs outside the legal system. These exemplified another instance of 
exception by marking out the hierarchical boundary between local state and chiefly 
authority. However, as the chefe do posto of Dombe reminded me, these activities of the 
state could not be divorced from entrenching Frelimo politics:    
 
Today the tasks of dynamising groups have been replaced by community and traditional leaders. 
They too dynamise the politics of the government at the local level and infiltrate the politics of 
Frelimo. The functions are practically the same, only the names and titles have changed because it 
is seen as more reflective of the current strategy of political, historical, economic and socio-cultural 
development. (chefe do posto, Dombe, August 2004)  
 
The party political instrumentalisation of chiefs in the sense of facilitating allegiance to 
Frelimo, suggested in this statement, was overtly realised during the election campaign of 
2004. Frelimo secretaries called chiefs to closed meetings in the administrative capitals and 
strongly encouraged them to persuade their populations to vote for Frelimo and to mobilise 
them for campaign meetings. Renamo did the same, but outside the purview of the local 
state administration and the police. The most intricate form of political instrumentalisation 
of the chiefs, however, was that pursued by state officials, including the heads of sub-
district level administrations, the DA and chiefs of police. It was intricate not only because 
the local state apparatus was used for political campaigning, but also because the failure of 
chiefs to (publicly) obey was backed by the threat of force, as if they were flouting the law, 
and even worse threats of the removal of their de jure authority.     
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Despite state officials’ emphasis on chiefs being apolitical actors, they actively used chiefs 
to mobilise the population for public meetings for “government matters” and “crime 
prevention” that were infused with party political campaigning. At these meetings 
administrative personnel and police officers injected the message that rural residents should 
vote for “the government in power” into speeches that ostensibly addressed the combating 
of crime, service provision and development projects.348 In 2004, chiefs were also obliged 
to have a picture of the Frelimo presidential candidate, A.E. Guebueza, displayed 
prominently at their homesteads.  
According to the chiefs themselves, they had no choice but to play along in public 
because of the fear of punishment that they had been promised by the local police. For 
example, after one such government meeting, one chief in Dombe explained: “These 
meetings are to make the chiefs tell the people to change to Frelimo…just like they tell us 
to change and get membership cards…. This is not right because it is not the task of the 
traditional leaders to mobilize the electorate to vote for this or that party. But if we don’t, 
then one day we will find ourselves in prison or even dead…or at least they [state officials] 
will tell us that we are no longer régulos.”  
The political instrumentalisation of chiefs by state officials, however, extended 
beyond electoral campaigning. The political script also underpinned a deeper enactment of 
state–chief relations in which again the legal and the political intersected, if not merged 
entirely. State officials explained the illegal acts of disobedient chiefs (such as solving 
crimes or hiding criminals) as a matter of the latter still being corrupted by Renamo and its 
ideas. They also used the equation between disobedient chiefs and Renamo to justify the 
excessive punishments meted out to them. Thus attempts to position chiefs as an authority 
structure under the sovereign authority of the state merged with the state’s other aim of 
turning chiefs into Frelimo loyalists. The same could be said of other forms of community 
authority, such as the secretários and the community court personnel, but this was less 
visible because as a rule they were already loyal members of Frelimo (see Chapter 7).  
At a deeper level of analysis, the political script emphasised Frelimo’s monopoly on 
defining public authority. This also became clear when state officials were directly 
confronted with questions such as: “Who has the authority to dismiss a bad-performing 
chief? and “What happens if a chief does not agree to carry out the state’s tasks?” Although 
                                                 
348 That at least the district administrator was aware that such political campaigning by state officials was not 
allowed in the era of the separation of powers became clear when I was politely asked to leave two such 
meetings in 2004.  
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state officials would begin by answering that it was the community who had to decide 
whether a chief should be replaced, there were limits to this power to decide, as also noted 
in Chapter 5. For example, in 2004 a chefe do posto answered these two questions as 
follows:   
 
If a chief is not performing well and the people complain, we [the state] will have to facilitate the 
process to see if he should be replaced…. But if the chief is going against the ideas of the 
government, then this is very serious…because he [the chief] is the arm of the government and he 
has functions in relation to it. The activities of the government cannot be prevented because of the 
oppositional ideas of the chief. The opposition [referring to Renamo] is not allowed to create 
impediments to development. Now, if he [the chief] is working to create barriers, then he is not a 
régulo. He is not a community authority. Then we will have first to try and change his mind…to 
consult him…but if this fails we will have to remove him.  
 
This statement supports the underlying perception that the final authority to decide who is 
or should remain a ‘community authority’ is Frelimo – i.e. the decision is made on the basis 
of whether a chief is pro-Frelimo or pro-Renamo, that is, whether he is a friend or a 
traitor/enemy. When a chief collaborates with the opposition, he is no longer a ‘community 
authority’. When he does not collaborate with the state, he is automatically considered a 
member of the opposition and thus a threat to and enemy of the Frelimo state. Hence the 
limits to the negotiability of authority lay not in the domain of legality or illegality alone, 
but in the domain of the political – of the enemy/evil and friend/good relationship. One 
implication of this is that the chiefs’ relationship to the state ultimately becomes based on 
the state’s threat of force and politically defined exclusion. Another implication is that the 
sovereign authority of the state is itself constituted in (party) political terms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has engaged with the broader question of how to conceptualise de facto 
authority and citizenship in Dombe and Matica, following the recognition of community 
authorities. It has also brought us a step further into understanding the kind of local state 
that was constituted through the precarious attempts of local state officials to regulate chiefs 
and constitute a particular order.  
A main argument of the chapter is that the negotiated and hybrid forms of both 
chiefly and local state authority that permeated everyday patterns of case settlement did not 
preclude, but underpinned both subtle and more pervasive forms of distinctions and 
 350
differentiations. Hybridity co-existed with and was conditioned by ongoing modes of 
boundary-making. The productive tension between boundary-marking and boundary-
crossing reshaped the practices of authority enforcement by both chiefs and the local police, 
but it also created a context in which authority remained precarious. The result of the 
interaction between state officials and chiefs were high levels of uncertainty in the exercise 
of authority. In more subtle ways, this underscored indeterminacy and the requirement of 
much agency, skill and will on behalf of chiefs to sustain de facto authority and rural 
residents to access the preferred benefits of local state institutions. De facto citizenship did 
not result from state officials straightforwardly granting a set of formal rights to the whole 
of the rural population, but on situation-specific negotiated settlements between rural 
residents and local state officials. Not all were equally successful. The result was a de facto 
differentiation between chiefs, in some areas challenging the authority of those with 
superior de jure and spiritual status, as well as to more subtle differentiations between 
citizens. The key to understanding these differentiations were the limits to negotiability 
provided by two historically embedded scripts of order and disorder: the political script of 
the Frelimo party-state distinguishing the included ‘friends’ and the excluded ‘enemies’ of 
a unitary order; and the local script of evil-doing linking the visible and invisible 
dimensions of (dis)order.  
The local script of evil-doing shaped the choices and scope of action of chiefs and 
rural residents, as well as, more implicitly, the local adjustments of police officers. The 
political script, on the other hand, was by far the most pervasive, divisive and violent mode 
of differentiation imposed by local state officials. This became explicitly apparent through 
what I referred to as ‘exceptional situations’, such as the Bunga Burning, acts interpreted as 
political resistance to the Frelimo state and the excessive punishment of chiefs. These 
situations became exceptions because of the responses of state officials that they led to. 
Here subtle differentiations of citizens turned into fixed categories of inclusion and 
exclusion, negotiability of authority into indivisible decision.   
Ultimately the outcome is a local state that momentarily relies on political exclusion 
and violence for dealing with the uncertainty of Frelimo-state authority. Chiefs get the short 
end of the stick. They are faced with a dilemma between sustaining their own authority and 
risking being subjected to state violence if they do not pledge allegiance to Frelimo. For 
people in Dombe and Matica, the result is conditional citizenship (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2004: 191). Access to services, recognition and influence not only depend on the ability to 
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engage in negotiating settlements with local state officials, they are ultimately conditional 
on allegiance to the Frelimo party – not on their formal rights as citizens or as members of 
the local ‘community’. Rather than a reproduction of what Mamdani (1996) has called a 
bifurcated state with rural residents as either subjects-of-custom/chiefs or citizens-of-
law/state, the political script emphasises the de facto differentiation between “us”/“citizens” 
and “they”/“non-citizens” on the basis political affiliation amid the sum of equally de jure 
citizens. Citizenship becomes not a question of legality/illegality or nationals/foreigners, 
but of (party) political identification. Similarly, the political script underpins a definition of 
a “real” community authority as a Frelimo loyalist, as well as setting the terms for the state 
officials' right to exclude/punish or include/reward non-state authorities.  
The real danger of the political script is that it establishes us/them categories as an 
enemy/friend opposition. This follows an antagonistic logic that does not accept the 
differences of the other, but seeks to eliminate its possibilities for existence. This underpins 
the limits to political pluralism, negotiation and discussion, but it also grants a certain “right 
to illegality” to local state officials. Because disobedience, complaints about the state and 
severe criminal activity could always be interpreted as the actions of the nation state’s 
principal enemy (i.e. Renamo), violent and exceptional means were justified from the 
perspective of sustaining what was indeed precarious Frelimo-state authority.  
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Above: the burnt down office huts of the chefe of locality and the PRM  
he arson case. Below: public meeting between the Bunga population and the state about t
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Above: the official visitors and the local chiefs. From left: First Frelimo Secretary of Dombe, 
substitute Chefe of Dombe Posto, Chefe of Bunga Locality, Chief Kóa and Sub-chief Bunga  
Below: Bunga Resident giving his version of the arson case 
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Above: Bunga resident furious at the chefe of locality for conquering married women.   
Below: First Frelimo Secretary showing the picture of the Frelimo Presidential Candidate during 
his speech at the Bunga Meeting.  
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have explored how state recognition of traditional authority in 
Mozambique was carried out at the beginning of the 21st century, and tried to understand 
what this implied locally for practices and claims to authority and citizenship. In studying 
these processes, I have attempted to fill empirical gaps in our understanding of the 
apparently surprised return of de jure authority to traditional leaders during the liberal 
democratic transition in Mozambique, which has also been paralleled in many other Sub-
Saharan African countries since the 1990s. Moreover, in applying a process-oriented 
analytical approach that looks at the linkages between history, national law/policy-making 
and local practices and representations, I have sought to contribute to our theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics of state formation processes in the ‘margins of the state’ in 
general, and the constitution of de facto local authority and citizenship within such 
contested arenas in particular.   
 At centre stage of this study has been not only the question of what state recognition 
meant for the de facto authority of chiefs and the spaces of influence for citizen-subjects in 
the rural former war zones of Dombe and Matica, but also what kind of local state authority 
it gave way to. The latter is a much neglected theme in most of the literature on chieftaincy 
in Africa. There has been a tendency to focus predominantly on reconfigurations of local 
chieftaincies in the context of colonial and post-colonial legislation on traditional authority 
and customary law, while omitting what such legislation means empirically for the 
practices and claims of local state authorities. This has either led to the conclusion that 
chieftaincy has become completely encapsulated over time by the state apparatus, or that it 
has remained partly distinct from the state by also representing and drawing legitimacy 
from a traditional, rural culture that follows an entirely different logic from that of the 
modern state. In the Mozambican case there were processes that pointed in both these 
directions, but they do not capture the whole picture.  
 State recognition of traditional authority was certainly appropriated by local state 
officials to regulate and use chiefs to consolidate Frelimo-state authority and re-expand the 
state administration to the rural hinterlands, but this was a precarious process that also 
reshaped the practices and claims of the local state authorities. Moreover, there were indeed 
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articulations of chiefs as distinct from the state, as representing a separate domain of 
‘traditional authority’, but such distinctions were part of past and present processes of 
redefinition and regularisation, as well as being matched by multiple practical and 
ideological fusions. They were not an inevitable background, reflecting a pure and fixed 
domain of ‘the traditional’ in the present and the recorded past. This became clear once I 
went beyond legal categories and ideal representations to explore also the everyday 
practices and claims of local state officials, chiefs and ordinary people, as well as the 
interactions between them. I did this by first exploring how chiefs were identified, 
legitimised and recognised in practice by local state representatives, and secondly by 
investigating how the relationship between state officials and chiefs was organised and 
practised within the fields of policing and justice enforcement.    
 As shown throughout this dissertation, the official claims to a benign recognition of 
‘traditional authority’, of ‘what already exists’, were intimately tied to bolstering the power 
interests and authority of other actors, beyond chiefs themselves. The authority of local 
chiefs was, and had been for very long time, constituted in relation to the constitution of 
state authority and the consolidation of expansionary polities more generally. This 
relational constitution reshaped and reconfigured not only the chieftaincy, but also the local 
tiers of the state apparatus. It gave way to mutual transformations. The key to 
understanding these transformations was a productive tension between boundary-marking 
and boundary-crossing, or between what I, paraphrasing Moore (1978), defined as 
processes of regularisation and situational adjustment. As shown in this dissertation, these 
processes were partly permeated by local and extra-local historically embedded scripts, and 
partly shaped by present state-legal categories of ‘traditional authority’, ‘rural community’ 
and ‘the state’, which in their turn were informed by wider conditions and actor interests 
beyond the local context.  
 In studying these processes, the main focus of study was the ethnographic present, 
that is, the ongoing practices and representations of different actors in two particular local 
arenas. But the purpose was never to explore these local arenas in isolation. Instead, a 
central concern throughout the dissertation has been to investigate the linkages between the 
local and the national, as well as between the past and the present. This reflected my 
interest in understanding how, after being officially banned for 25 years, ‘traditional 
authority’ was able to become a subject of national policy-making at the very moment of 
the liberal democratic transition. It also reflected my concern with understanding to what 
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extent the policy-making process and its final outcome, Decree 15/2000, reflected locally 
lived realities and what impacts they had for de facto authority and citizenship locally. But 
exploring the linkages also had a deeper analytical value.  
 Keeping an eye on the relationships between present state law/legal categories, 
larger national political agendas and historically embedded extra-local scripts on the one 
hand and local conditions, practices and historically embedded local scripts on the other 
provided the analysis with a deeper understanding of the processes of change and 
continuity that were going on in and around the implementation of Decree 15/2000. It 
helped me understand why people did what they did, as well as the different scripts that 
chiefs and local state officials drew on in making claims to authority and exercising it. 
Moreover, it also helped me capture the mutually constitutive relations between state-legal 
categories and local realities. As shown in the dissertation, although Decree 15/2000 was 
not a mirror reflection of actually existing forms of chieftaincy and community in Matica 
and Dombe, it did set in motion a number of activities, as well as providing a vocabulary 
that reconfigured local practices and representations. The ways in which this happened and 
its repercussions could only be understood by exploring how the Decree was appropriated, 
reinterpreted and transformed by state and non-state actors in Matica and Dombe. This 
underpinned the importance of analysing local state and chiefly authority as well as 
citizenship beyond de jure status or legal categories, and also as sets of practices and claims 
that were constituted in everyday interactions and vindicated in public representations.       
 In conceptualising these processes of implementing Decree 15/2000, I drew 
inspiration from Moore’s (1978) analytical framework, which is based on a process-
oriented theory of social life. This theory understands social order as never fully fixed and 
total, but as continuously being made and remade through active processes of regularisation 
(e.g. the implementation of state law and other activities of fixing rules and categories 
aimed at creating durable social orders), and as matched and shaped by various modalities 
of situational adjustment (e.g. adjustments, reinterpretations and negotiations of categories 
and rules in particular situations). Moore’s framework was useful in capturing how the 
official law failed to be straightforwardly implemented, producing predictable results, and 
how it was adjusted to the local context, reshaped by local state officials’ own ideas about 
traditional authority and state formation, as well as appropriated for political purposes that 
went beyond State recognition of chiefs. In fact, as we have seen, many of the activities 
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going on unfolded outside the official law. But the analytical framework was also useful 
beyond this point.  
 Moore’s conceptualisation of processes of regularisation and situational adjustment 
as two forms of behaviour that co-exist and shape each other in social situations also helped 
capture how the local adjustments of Decree 15/2000 gave way to new layers of 
regularisation and situational adjustment in the local contexts, as well as underpinning 
important continuities. This was exemplified by the secondary body of law (i.e. the ‘models 
for practice’) of the local tiers of the state police, which centred on fixing hierarchical 
boundaries between distinct domains of authority, but was also challenged and reshaped by 
different layers of boundary-crossing in everyday practice. The latter gave way to new rules 
and routines of exercising authority (i.e. the police officers’ new action patterns for dealing 
with witchcraft or uroi cases, and chiefs increased references to state law and de jure status 
in settling cases in the banjas), while in other instances reflecting elements of continuity 
(i.e. when people failed to adhere to the rule that delinquency, being defined legally as 
crime, should be taken to the state police, due to prevailing patterns of action and notions of 
justice and evil-doing). The point is that the lack of a perfect fit between the enactments and 
representations of bounded orders and the negotiated aspects of many everyday practices 
did not simply reflect a discrepancy between fixed, invariant structures on the one hand, 
and deviant, individual change-oriented behaviour on the other. Instead, as I have shown 
throughout this dissertation, it was the very boundaries between the chieftaincy and the 
state as distinct domains and orders that were at stake. They were the subject of ongoing 
negotiations and modes of re-ordering, which at the same time reshaped the ways in which 
authority was exercised. Central to understanding these processes and their immediate 
outcomes was the centrality of issues of power and the interrelationship between 
representations and practices. In these respects I departed somewhat from the analytical 
framework laid down by Moore (1978).    
 In this dissertation I have shown how power understood in the broader sense of 
historically embedded scripts that were both productive of modes of ordering and set limits 
to negotiability permeated the possible ways in which authority was constituted and 
community and citizenship were enacted and represented. In the case of Matica and 
Dombe, this included in particular the extra-local political script of the Frelimo party-state, 
the local script of evil-doing and a relatively shared culture of power that informed and 
legitimised who could make decisions and decide questions of leadership. But I have also 
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shown how issues of power, in the sense of the capacity of some actors to enforce their will 
upon others’ behaviour, and in particular to enforce final or sovereign decisions on central 
areas of social life, was a key issue at stake in the precarious constitution of local state and 
chiefly authority. These stakes were also significant for understanding the immediate 
outcomes. Not all people were equally positioned to engage in negotiations and ordering, 
and some were more influential than others in setting the terms. Negotiability did not 
preclude hierarchies, differentiations and modes of exclusion. In this dissertation, I have on 
the one hand shown how this was reflected in more subtle ways in the distinctions that 
emerged between the de facto authority of individual chiefs and between the capacities of 
different rural citizens to gain access to influence and services. On the other hand I have 
pointed to the more pervasive and inherently politicised distinctions that local state officials 
invoked in exceptional situations by drawing on the state’s instruments of force, authority 
to define the law, and capacity to include and exclude chiefs and citizens. This ultimately 
underpinned a hierarchy between chiefs and state officials. It also reflected the emergence 
of a local state that was not only politically partisan, but also relied on symbolic and 
physical violence to deal, at least momentarily, with the negotiability and uncertainty of 
authority in everyday interactions.     
Having just briefly summarised the approach and main insights of this study, 
in the remainder of this concluding chapter I would like to first recapitulate what this study 
has taught us about the seemingly paradoxical but timely convergence between formal 
resurgence of traditional authority and democratic transitions. Secondly, I provide some 
more detailed reflections on what this study can tell us about the forms of authority, 
citizenship and local state that are developing in the former war zones and opposition 
strongholds of Mozambique.  
 
1. The Democratic Transition and Traditional Authority 
 
The link between the liberal democratic transitions and the formal resurgence of traditional 
authority in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s may at first sight seem surprising, if not 
downright contradictory, as Mamdani suggests (1996). In this study of the Mozambican 
case, it nonetheless became apparent that the democratic transition, with its various 
ingredients of multiparty-ism, pluralism, decentralisation and a strong civil society, 
provided both an important context and a significant vocabulary for revised definitions and 
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imaginations of traditional authority as a force to be reckoned with. This was manifested by 
the sheer fact that traditional authority, having been officially banned for 25 years, emerged 
as a policy field at the very moment when Mozambique embarked on a democratic 
transition. It was also reflected in the new label ‘community authority’ and in the MAE 
research’s definitions of traditional leaders as representing an inherently African form of 
local, decentralised democracy, which could ensure increased local community 
participation in rural development and governance.  
Having said this, the dissertation has also shown that the link between 
democratisation and state recognition of traditional authority was neither a simple one nor 
to be confused with the achievement of democracy per se. As shown in Part I of this 
dissertation, the representations of traditional authority as a democratic force to be reckoned 
with co-existed with other partly contradictory agendas and actor interests, which all played 
a role in laying the ground for Decree 15/2000. The crux of the matter was, as shown in 
Chapter 3, that the formal resurgence of ‘traditional authority’ did not emerge exclusively 
from any one single factor determined by a single group of actors. Nor was it confined to 
local and national issues alone, but also informed by wider global discourses such as the 
increased celebration of cultural diversity, the local, tradition and community. To 
understand how Decree 15/2000 came about, it was therefore necessary both to look 
outside Mozambique’s borders and to look back on the longer and more recent history of 
chief-state relations and political dynamics in Mozambique. Importantly, as had been the 
case in the past, the vexed question of ‘traditional authority’ as a subject of policy-making 
also reflected interests beyond traditional authority itself. It was intimately related to 
(re)constituting the power positions of other actors and/or their particular models of post-
war democratic society: for example, academics’ celebrations of pre-colonial culture as a 
way of reasserting a common Mozambican national identity; international donor’s calls for 
decentralisation and the localisation of development; the pre-occupation of local state 
officials with re-establishing rural state administration and recoering lost legitimacy; and 
not least Frelimo and Renamo’s competition over power and rural votes within the new 
multi-party democracy. Each of these actor positions envisioned different roles for 
traditional leaders, i.e. as colonial-style counterparts of the state administration, as 
development agents securing community participation and as cultural-symbolic figures in 
nation-building that should be preserved as a separate domain from the modern state and 
politics. The point is that the complex question of ‘traditional authority’ as a policy field 
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within the democratic transition could be made to fit very different agendas. This was also 
reflected in the final outcome of the protracted policy-making process of the 1990s, Decree 
15/2000, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, included a potpourri of tasks and aims that 
virtually satisfied all the different agendas. This compromise was not without its 
contradictions, however.   
Decree 15/2000 reproduced definitions of ‘traditional authority’ as conducive to 
rural democratisation, but it was also used to justify the Frelimo governments’ decision not 
to extend democratically elected governments to the rural areas. If this decision implicitly 
reflected Frelimo’s fear of losing power to Renamo in the latter’s rural strongholds, then it 
explicitly underpinned a definition of the rural areas as separate spheres to be governed 
according to a different model of democracy than the urban, not to say modern, areas. This 
clearly shows, as Englund (2004: 3) has pointed out, that democratisation is not “a unilinear 
process, a technical procedure with predetermined means and goals”. Rather it can be seen 
as a vocabulary that may be infused with different contents and appropriated for numerous 
agendas, including inherently undemocratic ones. In the Decree itself this underpinned a 
paradox, because in order to make ‘traditional authority’ fit in with the democratic 
transition, legislation relied on de-historicised, de-politicised and inherently reified 
definitions of ‘traditional authority’. Legislation depended on disembedding ‘traditional 
authority’ from its historical and political contexts and elevating ‘it’ to a static, indisputable 
domain of Mozambican ‘tradition’, in order to make ‘it’ fit with the ‘modern’ agendas of 
community-based development, national unity, democratisation and a decentralised state 
administration. The same could be said of the rural population, relabelled ‘traditional 
society’ and then ‘community’, which was presented as existing in a pure, almost 
undisturbed form of existence, characterised by an intimate correspondence between a 
specific territorial space, people, leadership, rules, values and interests. 
These definitions gave the impression that all the state needed to do in order to 
ensure the Decree’s official aim of improved community participation was to go out and 
identify the community in order to legitimise the ‘real’ traditional or other community 
leader. It also conveyed the idea that the rural communities were best left to legitimise their 
own representatives from among the ‘traditional’ and other local leaders and that they were 
truly capable of doing so in a democratic manner that would ensure broad-based 
community participation and representation in the future. These assumptions justified 
Decree 15/2000 as catering for a kind of rural democratisation that respected, if not 
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preserved, rural needs, values and “the traditional rules of the respective community”. 
While this justification cast ‘traditional authority’ in a democratic vocabulary, at the same 
time Decree 15/2000 covered elements that merged colonial-style indirect rule with the 
maintenance of figures who had played a role in the Frelimo socialist period. This was 
exemplified by the last-minute inclusion of the secretários of suburbs and villages as one 
category of community authority, and by the long list of state administrative duties to 
‘community authorities’ that strikingly resembled colonial legislation on autoridades 
gentilicas (i.e. the three-tiered system of régulos and sub-chiefs, discussed in Chapter 2). 
These duties indicated that community authorities were envisaged not only as the local 
representatives of community interest and values, but also as the assistants of the local state 
institutions in various matters defined by the state. The inclusion of the Frelimo loyal 
secretários, on the other hand, underpinned, if only implicitly, the party-political interest 
behind the recognition of community authorities. Regardless of these elements, Decree 
15/2000 and official government discourse more generally promised that the state would 
simply recognise “what already exists” and ensure that community and local state 
authorities would mutually benefit from joint collaborations and peaceful co-existence 
without ‘disturbing’ either of the two authorities. This could be seen as a way to distance 
the decree from colonial manipulations of the chieftaincy and from party politics, instead 
casting it as ensuring an autonomous domain of community leadership much in line with 
the international donors’ call for an independent civil society within a liberal democratic 
polity.  
Now one question was how and according to which justifications and definitions 
state recognition of traditional authority was linked in complex, partly contradictory ways 
with the democratic transition in national level debates and finally in Decree 15/2000. 
Another significant question that I addressed was the local level appropriations and 
repercussions of legislation in areas like Matica and Dombe. By exploring in ethnographic 
depth how Decree 15/2000 was put into practice, this study has shown that the official 
promises to democratize rural society was mitigated by other interests, practices and ideas 
deriving from the colonial, socialist and wartime pasts, as well as being shaped by the 
reality of the ‘state’, ‘community’ and ‘traditional authority’ in the rural former war zones.  
As shown in Part II of this dissertation, the sacrifice of the potential democratic 
credentials of the Decree in the sense of ensuring broad-based community participation in 
the legitimisation of leadership and in rural governance more generally did not result from a 
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de facto recognition of “what already exists”. Instead, it resulted from local appropriations 
of the Decree that led to a pervasive process of mutually re-constituting the state 
administration in the rural hinterlands and what local state officials understood as the ‘real’ 
traditional leaders. This mutual re-constitution underpinned both the resurrection of 
particular power relations within chieftaincies, i.e. the ‘family’ or organising unit of the 
chieftaincy, and attempts to incorporate chiefs under the command hierarchy of the local 
state and, as it turned out, of the Frelimo party in particular.  
As shown in Chapter 5, the very activities of identifying and legitimising the 
community authorities were fused with the expansion of the territorial-institutional 
presence of the state administration, with practices of statecraft to fix and order population 
units and leadership, and with the creation of alliances to bolster state authority in areas 
where this had hitherto been highly contested. If this appropriation of the Decree for state 
formation purposes reflected what, paraphrasing Hansen and Stepputat (2001), I referred to 
as transnational languages of stateness, then the activities of local state officials also drew 
on particular colonial and post-colonial scripts, which fused with a relatively shared culture 
of power and state officials’ own ideas about the nature of ‘real’ traditional authority. The 
first implication was that, in implementing the Decree, the local state officials did not begin 
with the ‘communities’, asking ‘them’ to identify what whatever leader their members 
found legitimate and worthy of state recognition and community representation. Rather, 
they began with the leaders, and more precisely with a list of lineage and area names 
catalogued in the old colonial register of régulos and sub-chiefs. This register, or o Livro as 
it was referred to, was used as a pragmatic tool to deal with the disputed leadership 
positions and unclear population units that existed in many areas. At the same time it was 
held out as containing the ‘truth’ of the ‘real’ traditional leaders as a revivable, pure and 
indisputable domain of tradition, kinship and spiritual power. This reliance on o Livro gave 
way to a de facto re-constitution and re-fixation of the colonial three-tiered hierarchy of 
régulos and sub-chiefs, as well as set limits to who could claim legitimate community 
authority and against what sources of legitimacy. O livro conferred authority on the state as 
holding the ‘truth’ of the real lineages, and it also authorised particular lineage members 
and their assistants to decide questions of community authority. The flipside of this two-
way conferring of authority was scale-differentiated communities and the exclusion of the 
majority from legitimising leadership.  
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The new label ‘community’ spilled into a distinction between the community as “the 
population” of passive subjects of chiefs and state intervention, and the community as the 
“genuine family” of active members of the chieftaincies imbued with decision-making 
power and knowledge of the tradition. If this distinction was partly the result of the use of o 
Livro, it also reproduced, and was widely accepted due to, a relatively shared culture of 
power related to “the family” and secrecy. This culture of power had two dimensions that 
had become merged over time. It allowed for no space outside “the family” of the chiefs 
and hurumende (the government/state/Frelimo) for participation in appointing leaders and 
in decision-making more broadly. One of its dimensions related to the colonial and post-
colonial socialist history of the top-down conferring of authority on to chiefs and other 
intermediate leaders and the lack of broad-based consultation in matters of leadership. The 
other dimension related to the risks and dangers associated with interfering in the internal 
family matters of the chiefs in particular and the hurumende, which best were kept secret to 
prevent misfortune and conflicts. Like o Livro, this culture of power underpinned the 
mutual constitution of state and chiefly authority through the merger of different 
historically embedded scripts that both state officials and chiefs drew on. The most concrete 
example of this was the merger of a state bureaucratic artefact, o Livro, with the claim to 
spiritual power of the ‘real’ lineage chiefs, and the notion amongst local state officials that 
this power could also bolster the state administration’s ability to govern.    
 These mergers suggested that local state and traditional authority were neither 
understood nor pre-existed the Decree as strictly isolated domains or ideal types of 
authority. The complementarity and mutual constitution of local state and traditional 
authority did not, however, preclude attempts to create hierarchies and distinctions between 
state officials and chiefs. State recognition of traditional authority was accompanied by the 
incorporation, disciplining and inscription of chiefs within a state-defined order. The 
incorporation of chiefs was followed by the production of a distinct domain of traditional 
authority that criminalised important self-proclaimed mandates of chiefs, redefined the 
‘tradition’ (mutemo) and separated chiefs from state sovereignty within a local, state-
defined order. This was an order belonging to the domain of official power, to the 
hurumende, that chiefs and the rural population in general associated with top-down orders, 
obedience and coercive sanctions, reminiscent not only of colonial rule, but also the kind of 
post-colonial state they were familiar with. It was also underpinned by a particular form of 
politics.  
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As shown in the analysis of the recognition ceremonies in Chapter 6, local state officials 
implicitly and explicitly tapped into and reproduced these historically embedded 
perceptions of official power and added to them the particular political script of the 
Frelimo-party state. In a ceremonially staged form, the recognition of traditional authority 
was appropriated to celebrate not only state authority, but in particular the Frelimo party as 
embodying the state, the law, the nation and now also the tradition. Frelimo was conveyed 
as the superior family. In light of the official promises of democratisation, the flipside of 
these public representations was not only a clear reproduction of the merger of Frelimo and 
state. The representations also underpinned modalities of political exclusion, which 
extended beyond the apparent sacrifice of broad-based community participation in the 
legitimisation of leadership. The ideal representation of the new unity between state, 
community and community authority conveyed a notion of the opposition party Renamo as 
the ‘constitutive outside’ of this unity, as the entirely excluded. Recognition and inclusion 
as a result came at a price. Not only did chiefs have to “obey the orders of the hurumende”, 
as was commonly held. Citizenship and community authority were also made conditional 
on pledging loyalty to the Frelimo party and of not doing so to Renamo. Under the pretext 
of rural democratisation, the recognition of traditional authority and the inclusion of ‘their’ 
communities were appropriated to boost the power of the ruling party.   
 These party-political underpinnings of state-chief-citizen relations were also present 
outside the public space of the recognition ceremonies, as discussed in Chapter 10. But 
their wider exclusionary, extra-legal and violent repercussions could not be understood 
independently of the precariousness of the larger project of party-state consolidation and 
the uncertainty of local state authority in everyday practice. Outside the public spaces of the 
recognition ceremonies other processes were going, as discussed in Chapters 7-9. This 
brings me to a recapitulation of what this study has taught us about the forms of authority, 
citizenship and local state that have emerged from state recognition of traditional authority.   
 
2. Mutual Transformations, Pervasive Continuities  
 
In Matica and Dombe, the larger project of re-constituting (Frelimo) state authority through 
state recognition of chiefs turned into inherently localised, extra-legal processes of 
consolidating local sovereignty that both transformed the practices of chiefs and local state 
officials and left the authority of each essentially precarious. This became clear when 
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exploring how the relationship between chiefs and the local state was organised and 
practised within the fields of policing and justice enforcement.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, the authority to organise these fields was 
appropriated by the sub-district level tiers of the police. This resulted in a set of extra-legal, 
uncodified rules that congealed and sought to place under local police regulation a system 
of distinct domains of authority and legal orders (criminal/state police, traditional/chiefs 
and social/non-state authorities). These rules or ‘models for practice’ marked out 
hierarchical boundaries between chiefs and the state institutions. They also constituted the 
local tiers of the state police as a kind of local sovereign power. While drawing on their 
official status as state representatives and law-enforcers, local chiefs of police appropriated 
the authority to make, re-make and suspend the law. This included not only local state 
recognition of resolution mechanisms that were outside the law (for example, uroi, the 
banjas, the wadzi-nyanga), but also extra-legal rules and practices to protect the authority 
of the chiefs, criminalise some of their functions, and punish them with excessive force and 
public humiliation outside the official justice system. 
The key to understanding this localised constitution of state sovereignty was 
that neatly bounded, distinct domains of authority did not exist in the first place. The state 
police operated in contexts in which the use of force and the claim to make final decisions 
on ‘the land’, the ‘citizen body’ and ‘authority’ were not de facto a monopoly of the state. 
This was equally claimed by chiefs and underscored a particular tension: the police 
depended on the authority of the chiefs to reconstitute their own authority, but doing this 
required the congealing of distinct domains of authority. The immediate result was a 
precarious positioning of chiefs as domesticated sovereigns. Chiefs were relied on to 
exercise functions that could bolster the sovereign authority of the police, yet through these 
very functions they were always potentially at risk of being subjected to the performance of 
sovereign authority.  
In everyday patterns of action and interaction the domestication of chiefly authority 
was precarious, as too were the boundaries marking the sovereign authority of the local 
state. The result was not neatly separate domains of authority, peacefully co-existing and 
mutually benefiting from joint collaboration, but the emergence of hybrid and negotiated 
forms of local state and chiefly authority. All actors, included the police officers 
themselves, engaged in blurring the classificatory boundaries of the ‘models for practice’. 
Chiefs continued to settle criminal cases while also beginning to refer explicitly to the law 
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of the hurumende. The police increasingly began to hear and facilitate the settlement of uroi 
and social cases, while drawing on the law, state bureaucratic artefacts, threats of state-
enforced sanctions and chiefly procedures of resolution. Boundary-marking was averted by 
multiple practical and ideological fusions. This was partly because the police’s own 
classificatory boundaries did not match people’s perceptions of transgressions as part of a 
common category of evil-doing (kushaisha) and the always potential links between the 
visible and invisible dimension of order/disorder. This local script of evil-doing was very 
significant because it conveyed authority on to chiefs, shaped the choices of rural residents 
and set limits to the local state’s capacity to constitute authority alone on the basis of 
adhering to its own version of order. The constitution of the de facto authority of the state 
police in the rural hinterlands depended on police officers’ ability not only to flout the 
codified law (i.e. refrain from following official procedures of criminal processes), but also 
to adjust to and draw on the domain of authority that the police had reserved for chiefs. 
Much the same could be said of the chiefs.       
These everyday patterns of action underpinned a productive tension because the 
chiefs and the local state police had to draw on each others’ domains of authority in order to 
constitute their own distinctive forms of authority. By implication, the relational 
constitution of state and chiefly authority gave way to mutual transformations of the 
practices of authority enforcement. But practical fusions did not extend to complete 
convergence: they were part and parcel of attempts to re-constitute the distinctive authority 
of the state police and chiefs, of continuously re-defining the boundaries between them. The 
result was high levels of uncertainty in the exercise of authority. Authority remained 
negotiated and essentially precarious. As I showed in Chapter 10, this precariousness had 
repercussions for the de facto authority of individual chiefs and for citizenship as an 
inclusionary category.  
Chiefs were left in a precarious position between maintaining de facto authority in 
their own areas by partly flouting and drawing on the law, and the risk of state-police 
imposed violence. The negotiated and hybrid character of de facto authority also produced 
more subtle differentiations between individual chiefs in some areas, resulting in the 
bolstering of inferior chiefs to the detriment of those with de jure and spiritually higher 
status. From the perspective of the people of Matica and Dombe, the negotiability of 
authority within a plural institutional landscape did indeed open up spaces of influence and 
negotiations, and therefore of inclusion. However, it also underpinned high levels of 
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indeterminacy and the requirement of much skill and capacity to achieve the desired 
services of the local authorities (i.e. justice). This also underpinned more subtle 
differentiations between de jure citizens.   
 The most pervasive and critical repercussion of the precariousness of 
authority was the responses that it gave way to on the part of local state officials in 
exceptional situations. These were the situations that local state officials defined as overt 
resistance to state authority and in particular to the Frelimo-state order: for example, when 
chiefs were caught using force or assisting the opposition party, when state officials met 
overt resistance from or were ‘brought to trial’ by rural residents, and in particular when 
activities were seen as overt political opposition to Frelimo. In these situations, the 
negotiability of authority and inclusion of citizens’ demands were replaced by excessive 
violence and political exclusions. The political script of the Frelimo party-state underpinned 
but also legitimised these responses. It invested state sovereignty, the law, community 
authority and citizenship with a particular political content. The legal and the political 
merged. Political opposition to the Frelimo party was criminalised, and criminal activity 
was always potentially associated with the political opposition, Renamo. More broadly, it 
cast Renamo not simply as a political party competing for votes, but as the ‘internal 
enemy’, the ‘evil other’, the ‘constitutive outside’ of the unitary Frelimo-state order and the 
well-being and good forces of local society more generally.   
The real danger of this political script was that it produced the categories of we/they 
as a friend/enemy relation. Because the latter is based on moral categories of good and evil, 
it follows an antagonistic logic that does not accept differences. The ‘Other’ is represented 
as threatening the existence of the ‘We’ and therefore can only be perceived as an enemy to 
be destroyed. This allows for the use of violence and exceptional means, for a suspension 
of the norm and the rule. In Matica and Dombe, the repercussion is “conditional 
citizenship” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004: 191), privileging those who pledge allegiance 
to Frelimo and allowing for extra-severe punishments of those who do not. For chiefs the 
political script underpinned the definition of a “real” community authority as a Frelimo 
loyalist, as well as setting the terms for the state officials’ right to exclude/punish or 
include/reward non-state authorities on the basis of political affiliation. The result was a 
sacrifice not only of the democratic credentials of the Decree, but also more broadly of the 
official constitutional commitments to political pluralism, freedom of expression and equal 
citizenship rights for all nationals. Intriguingly, the production of Renamo as the evil, 
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criminal Other was cast precisely in the language of the law, democracy and development. 
The looming danger then seems not so much to be a reproduction of what Mamdani (1996) 
defined as a bifurcated state with rural residents as either subjects-of-chiefs and custom or 
citizens-of-state and rights, but the reproduction of local state despotism in the guise of 
discourses on law, democracy, development and community participation.  
The question is to what extent the state officials and Frelimo are being successful in 
this endeavour in the long run. Already the everyday practices of chiefs in flouting the law, 
the reactions of rural residents in the Bunga burning case and the voting patterns in Dombe 
seem to indicate that state (and thus Frelimo) authority will remain precarious. In an area 
like Dombe, where close to ninety percent of the population voted for Renamo in the last 
elections in 2004, the partisanship of the state police and administration could prove full of 
risks. If not actually creating the grounds for counter-violence in the future, as the Bunga 
case suggests, it is risky in the sense that it sustains the reappearance of self-redress and the 
persistent lack of trust in the formal judicial system, the state administration and the police. 
The real danger, however, is the prospect for the continued infliction of state-imposed 
violence on those who insist on enjoying their political rights. For the people of Dombe, by 
2005 the pressing concern was the group of young community police recruits that the local 
police increasingly employed to patrol, randomly arrest and inflict state-sanctioned violence 
on those people who walked around these areas at night.  
For chiefs in both Matica and Dombe, discontent was also rising by 2005. They 
were beginning to become impatient and disenchanted because they were still not being 
materially rewarded for the work they were doing for the state, despite the promises they 
had repeatedly been given. Also, the Dombe chiefs in particular were furious at the attempt 
by the state to use them in propagandismo politico, because, as one chief asserted, this “is 
degrading our authority with the people.” As many chiefs stated, though, they nonetheless 
continued to work for the hurumende because of their inherent fear of state-imposed 
violence.  
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Tradicionais”. 
 
Domingo, weekly newspaper, 26/12/99: “Régulos exigem regalias e formalização do seu 
papel”.  
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 16/05/95: “Canana solicita intervenção da autoridade 
tradicional”.  
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper,18/05/95: “Autoridades tradicionais cooperarão com o 
Governo”. 
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Notícias, Daily newspaper, 27/04/95: Régulos e curandeiros aplicam pena de morte. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 18/02/95: “Régulos e ‘”Madjibas” da Renamo exigem 
vencimento em Dombe” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 27/06/95: “Régulos da Renamo poderão ser julgados” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 17/07/95: “Atitude irreversível dos régulos deriva do tribalismo 
e posse de armas.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 18/07/95: “RENAMO defende reintegração imediata dos chefes 
tradicionais”. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 08/08/95: “Administrador procura substituir régulo de Ribáuè.” 
  
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 19/08/95: “Governo vai reinstalar Posto Policial em Dombe”. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 10/08/95: “Dualidade Administractiva inquieta populares em 
Nampula.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 13/10/95: “Chefe do Posto afasta Régulo”. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 16/09/95: “Falsos Régulos disputam regedorias em Manica.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 09/10/95: “Régulos substituídos por secretários dos GD’s.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 28/08/95: “Régulos e Grupos Dinamizadores disputam poder  
em Manica.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 03/11/95: “Chefes Tradicionais querem suas insígnias.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 18/11/95: “Poder Tradicional constituí matéria bastante 
delicada.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 04/01/96: “Reimplantação do poder nas ex-zonas da 
RENAMO.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 18/01/96: “Dupla Administração deixou de constituir um 
problema.” 
  
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 08/02/96: “Malema vai actualizar ficheiro de figuras 
tradicionais.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 17/02/96: “Autoridades Tradicionais dificultam actividades 
partidárias no litoral.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 24/04/96: Governo deve repor a Autoridade Tradicional.” 
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Notícias, Daily newspaper, 30/04/96: “Régulos e Curandeiros firmes no apoio ao 
Governo”. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 05/06/96: “Regulamento vai ser aprovado brevemente.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 13/06/96: “Régulos de Cheringoma reclamam incentivos do 
Governo.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 13/06/96: “Em Nacala-a-Velha há exigências de Gratificações.” 
   
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 27/06/96: “Régulos de Gorongosa manifestam desejo de 
cooperar com Governo.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 08/07/96: “Legislação sobre interacção entre Estado e 
Autoridade Tradicional quase pronta.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 23/07/96: “Régulos colaboram com autoridades de Manica.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 27/07/96: “Chefes Tradicionais constituem o melhor 
interlocutor das comunidades.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 24/08/96: “Régulos de Mossuril procuram inviabilizar acções 
do Governo.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 05/09/96: “RENAMO não tem competência de conferir poder 
aos Régulos.” 
  
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 14/09/96: “RENAMO acusada de inviabilizar execução do 
programa do Governo e Régulos desinformam as populações sobre o resultado das 
eleições.” 
  
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 30/09/96: “Pai de Dlhakama dispõe-se a colaborar com o 
Governo.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 02/10/96: “Combinação pode conduzir a uma boa 
administração.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 23/10/96: “Alguns cidadãos contestam métodos do Régulo 
local.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 04/11/96: “Autoridade Tradicional, Democracia e Segurança: 
que papel para as Chefias Locais? (Conclusão)” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 02/11/96: “Autoridade Tradicional, Democracia e Segurança: 
que papel para as Chefias Locais?” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 11/11/96: “Governo lança debate sobre o papel da Autoridade 
Tradicional”.  
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Notícias, Daily newspaper, 31/01/97: “Régulos estão de mãos dadas com o Governo.”  
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 21/02/97: “Governo acusa RENAMO de promover 
desobediência.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 22/02/97: “RENAMO cobra dinheiro para comprar uniforme de 
Régulos.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 01/05/97: “Poder Tradicional é importante na administração do 
nosso país.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 10/05/97: “FRELIMO denuncia desmandos de Régulos.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 19/06/97: “Poder Tradicional reclama inserção na governação 
do país”. 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 05/07/97: “Régulos de Marromeu exortados a colaborarem com  
o Executivo.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 18/07/97: “Régulos em Homoíne acusados de desobedecerem 
autoridades.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 22/08/97: “Governo satisfeito com Autoridades Tradicionais.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 31/12/97: “Régulos incitam população à desobediência em 
Inhambane.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 13/11/97: “O papel da Autoridade Tradicional.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 22/12/97: “Régulos de Mabalane querem programa de 
trabalho.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 16/09/97: “Desconcentração de competências e Autoridade 
Tradicional-uma reflexão.”    
   
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 08/02/99: “Régulos não fazem parte da Autoridade Tradicional: 
esclarece Felício Zacarias Governador de Manica.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 07/03/99: “Poder tradicional: sim ou não.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 11/08/99: “Há concenso na questão da Autoridade Tradicional.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 02/09/99: “Régulos deixam RENAMO e filiam-se ao Partido 
FRELIMO.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 29/10/99: “Régulos aderem à FRELIMO em Homoíne.” 
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Notícias, Daily newspaper, 02/11/99: “Régulo Digodiua assegura apoios ao Partido no 
poder.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 06/11/99: “Régulos ao lado da FRELIMO em Muanza.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 09/02/00: “Régulos prometem colaborar.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 28/02/00: “Urge definir papel da Autoridade Tradicional.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 25/04/00: “Autoridade Tradicional colabora com o Governo; 
Segundo Ministro da Administração Estatal.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 11/08/00: “Autoridade Comunitária não é Autoridede 
Tradicional.” 
 
Notícias, Daily newspaper, 10/06/00: “Governo aprova legislação sobre Autoridade 
Tradicional.” 
 
Savana, weekly newspaper, 28/06/96: “ Poder Tradicional certidão de óbito não mata”. 
 
Savana, weekly newspaper, 28/07/95: “Os Régulos: estão de volta ao poder”. 
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Appendix I: Data-collection 
 
Data-Collection techniques 
The analytical framework of this study calls for a combination of a range of different data-
collection techniques. My approach to data collection follows the imperative of 
triangulation between different forms of data produced in the field: textual and public 
discourse analysis, participant observation, interviews/conversations, situational analysis 
and case studies. These correspond to the interplay that I have highlighted between 
representations and practice.  
Textual and public discourse analysis covered secondary historical writings, 
newspaper articles, academic articles, donor reports, ministerial documents and laws 
(Decree 15/2000 and other legislation pertaining to decentralisation of governance, policing 
and justice sector reforms). The analysis of these texts form the main basis of exploring the 
historical reconfigurations of chieftaincy  and the policy-making process of the 1990s 
leading to Decree 15/2000. The texts were not only treated as informative and as a 
preparation for interview and research questions. The underlying grammar of the different 
concepts, including their historical and ideological connotations, was also analysed. This 
included how the concepts of community and traditional authority applied in the Decree are 
related to current development discourse by donor agencies and to post-war changes in the 
government’s policies and laws. A newspaper article database was made with the help of 
Carlota Mondlane, from the Department of History, Eduardo Mondlane University. It 
covers ten years of public debates over the theme of traditional leaders in the five leading 
newspapers in Mozambique. The database was intended to provide a basis for exploring the 
national discourse and the debates on the formal recognition of traditional leaders since the 
1992 peace agreement – including the periods of the debates (e.g. when people began to 
speak about the new law etc.), changing political-party and academic ideas, and reactions 
by traditional leaders and other local authorities towards the promises of the future role of 
traditional leaders.  
Participant observation was a significant data-collection technique used in Matica 
and Dombe. It was concentrated in different fields of action, ranging from participation in 
public events, meetings and court sessions, to ‘hanging around’ state administrations, police 
stations and the homesteads of traditional leaders and rural residents. It has, in other words, 
been applied to explore both the public arenas in which the acts of implementing the Decree 
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have taken place, and the more everyday practices of and encounters between different 
categories of local authority (state officials, traditional leaders, party politicians, secretaries, 
NGOs etc.) and the rural population.  
In order to explore encounters and practices in public arenas, I have made use of 
situational analyses (Gluckman 1955, 1965; Turner 1996; see also van Velsen 1967; 
Alverson 1996) of public meetings or events that involve the participation of state and non-
state authorities and/or locality residents. Events covered initially the ‘recognition 
ceremonies’ of traditional leaders. Later it also covered traditional/community/formal court 
sessions, police hearings of social cases, national celebration days, official visits by high-
ranking state personnel, monthly meetings between community authorities and the chefes of 
administrative posts, meetings between community authorities and NGOs or private 
businesses, and public meetings held by state officials and the police on crime, law, 
taxation and development projects. These events are temporarily staged and spatially 
bounded, and therefore cannot be analysed in isolation from what people do outside of 
them in the course of everyday practice. Nonetheless they have provided me with 
illuminating data on what issues are at stake in the public arena and how they are 
formalised and discussed, how positions of authority are represented, and what official 
discourses are at work (Alvesson 1996: 34-60). These insights emerge from paying 
attention to a variety of aspects: spatial location of the participants conveying relations of 
power and authority, organization of the meeting site, timing of the events (including who 
controls them), displays of material symbols (flag, monuments, books, dress, furniture, 
witchcraft paraphernalia etc.), concrete actions, gestures and postures, and finally spoken 
words (including both the official speeches and the small-talk and gossip amongst the 
participants). The different forms of meetings have also been related to questions of 
community and citizenship. This has implied paying attention to how community and 
citizenship are delineated in speeches, what constituencies (gender, age, new-comers, 
occupation and so forth) participate in public events and in what ways they participate (i.e. 
passive/active). In addition, state-sponsored meetings, such as national celebration days and 
those related to crime and the communication of law by the police, gave key insights into 
the symbolic-representational dimension of state formation and the nurturing of state 
authority (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Geertz 1993; Bell 1992). For state officials, public 
events provided very significant, and in the most outlying areas the only spaces in which 
the goals, ideals and state lines of authority could be delineated for the rural population.  
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Meetings held exclusively between community authorities and state officials provided a 
different kind of data, which, although also providing insights into manifestations of 
authority, relate to more concrete elements of discussion, decision-making, lines of 
command and differences in the perceptions and expectations of the actors with regard to 
concrete problems, such as how to resolve cases of conflict or deal with criminals. These 
direct interactions were particularly valuable sites for exploring how orders are given, and 
also how policies and directives are transformed through minor negotiations in which the 
contents of directives are given new meanings. In my fieldwork in 2004 and 2005, 
situational analysis also included traditional and community court sessions, as well as 
police hearings of social cases. I used these to collect concrete cases (see below) and to 
study the practices of problem-solving, issuing of punishments, and discussions of rules and 
norms. Finally, one aim was to explore the differences between how problem-solving and 
different forms of justice enforcement were carried out and rationalised from court to court 
and between courts and police hearings, as well as how cases were passed on between these 
institutions, and for what reasons.   
Situational analysis of the different arenas described above was combined with 
qualitative, in-depth, interviews, along with informal conversations with a variety of 
selected actors.349  The purpose was not only to gather ‘factual’ information, but also to 
study reflective talk and the use of certain discourses in order to access people’s 
representational and operational models and their definitions of key concepts such as 
‘community’, ‘authority’, ‘state’ and ‘chieftaincy’. In addition, I set out to explore the 
relationship between the concrete cases I had followed and seen solved with people’s 
different strategies related to cases and their opinions about these. One of the peculiar 
aspects of interviews is that, especially as first-time encounters, they tend to be confined to 
the level of ideal models for action, which, as I discussed above, is of course useful 
information, but does not always tell us much about actual practice and why people act as 
they do. At the beginning of my research in 2002, and with new encounters in 2004, there 
was always the sense that people were telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, which 
                                                 
349 In the selection of informants, I covered both the official categories (chiefs, assistants of chiefs, state 
officials, police officers, court judges, NGO workers, teachers, traditional healers etc.) and representatives of 
the rural population, taking into account gender, age, level of education, socio-economic position and relative 
distance of residency from chiefs and administrative posts. I conducted a total of 60 interviews with rural 
residents and 107 semi-structured interviews (not including informal conversations) with the official 
categories of actors (Police: 7; community or chiefs’ police: 11; chiefs/sub-chiefs: 31; Renamo: 8; Frelimo: 3; 
Court judges: 5; Secretários: 5; Traditional healers: 3; local state officials: 15; provincial/national state 
officials: 6; NGOs: 3; teachers: 3).   
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at times did not fit well with the different practices and course of events that I followed. For 
example, while people would say that Chief X had a lot of power, he was not able to 
enforce any decisions or was not addressed with equal respect in public. Another example 
that puzzled me was the large measure of agreement that the state police could and did not 
attend to witchcraft cases, but in practice a lot of people would bring such cases to the 
police station. The same discrepancy regarded chiefs and the solving of criminal cases. In 
attempting to go more deeply into the meanings of these discrepancies, what people made 
of them and what it meant at a deeper level in terms of the dynamics of the relationships 
between the different forms of authority, it was a clear advantage to combine interviews 
with participant observation and, of course, to return to the fieldwork sites. Having 
followed the same events and cases of conflict as some of my interviewees opened up a 
space for discussing with informants the relationship between practices and “how things 
ought to be”. During fieldwork it proved easy to speak with chiefs, their assistants, police 
officers, state officials, NGO workers, representatives of political party and other important 
public figures in the local political landscape. In fact, these men (there were few women in 
this category) were often more than eager to engage in long conversations about the themes 
of the research.  
Going beyond these categories of actors proved to be difficult. In fact, one of the 
most difficult aspects of the field research was to obtain access to the voices of the 
‘ordinary’ people, particularly those who lived outside the heads of administration or who 
were not the close neighbours of chiefs. The majority of residents in the Dombe and Matica 
areas do not live in clearly demarcated villages, but are dispersed over large tracts of land in 
smaller family clusters. These are often not accessible by car and in some cases require 
several hours of walking. This meant that I could not go from house to house or draw a 
residential landscape of different families, securing a valid representational sample of 
‘ordinary’ people. To solve this problem, a major part of the 2004 fieldwork was to use 
public events and court sessions to make initial contacts and plan visits to conduct 
interviews. The majority of the people I talked to at the beginning were thus those who had 
at some point been involved in social or criminal cases. Later, during 2005, I continued 
these contacts, which also led me to new ones, including people who had not been involved 
in any cases. Thus in 2005 I made a systematic sample of 60 interviewees, some of whom I 
knew well and others not. These interviews centred on descriptions of concrete cases, 
opinions about state and non-state authorities, and rankings of them, and finally the posing 
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of different scenarios related to what actions people would take in relation to a range of 
different cases: e.g. what they would do first if they were robbed, bewitched, beaten etc., 
where they would take the case (if they would take it anywhere), and what forms of justice 
that they would see as favourable. These systematic questions, asked of sixty rural 
residents, were open-ended and therefore also led at times to reflexive dialogue about 
authority, the state, punishments, witchcraft and so forth. A key constraint during 
interviews and informal conversations has been my inability to engage fully in 
conversations when the Chi-Ndau and Chi-Teve , and not Portuguese, were being spoken. 
During my periods of fieldwork I acquired a relatively good understanding of these local 
languages, but not to the extent that I could engage in more complex conversations. I have 
therefore had to rely on my research assistants for in-depth understanding, which on the 
other hand has had the advantage of my having valuable companions with whom to discuss 
issues along the way.350  
A third method I used is that of case studies (Mitchell 1983; Walton 1992). Detailed 
case studies were made first of six major leadership conflicts between and within 
chieftaincies, which took place in the context of state recognition. These are the object of 
analysis in Chapter 4, and they convey important insights about how state recognition 
triggered the quest for stabilization and gave way to intense struggles over sources of 
legitimate authority, community boundaries, the organization of leadership and so forth. 
Secondly, a number of detailed social as well as criminal cases were collected during my 
2004 and 2005 periods of fieldwork. These are based on a combination of different forms 
of data: interviews and informal conversations with implicated parties, the authorities 
receiving the cases and different people who had observed or heard rumours about the 
cases; and participant observation of the resolutions of the cases and analysis of the wider 
context within which they were played out. Taking into account the clear particularity of 
each case, the purpose of incorporating these cases in the analysis was first and foremost to 
trace both certain patterns in the way that the different forms of authority solved cases, 
passed on cases between them (i.e. collaborated) and the strategies people used to achieve 
                                                 
350 The subject of translation is important to discuss for how information is obtained and interpreted. This is 
particularly the case because it is not always possible to translate local words directly, as they belong to 
particular semantic universes and have specific emotional connotations and historical backgrounds. Although 
the problem can never be fully resolved, I have tried to deal with it positively by discussing language 
differences with my assistant and by elaborating on local words through informants’ descriptions of concrete 
phenomena, practices and events. In the thesis I repeatedly use local terms when these are not easily translated 
to English, or would lose their meaning if translated.  
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what they regarded as just resolutions. There is, of course, a certain danger in selecting a 
specified number of detailed studies. As Walton argues (1992), a duality underlines the use 
of the term ‘case’. On the one hand cases imply particularity, as they are situationally 
grounded and provide specific, limited views of social life. On the other hand cases pretend 
to do something more: when we use cases we want to claim some level of generality (ibid.: 
121). This claim to generalisability, Monique Nuijten suggests, makes it all the more 
important to present an elaborate study of the context from which the cases have been taken 
and to make conscious theoretical reflections on the way we present the cases. For example, 
is the choice of a case intended to convey how conflicts are normally settled, or do we 
choose different cases to trace how different, even diverging elements may decisive in the 
resolution of a conflict (Nuijten 1998: 26-7). In this research, I use cases in both senses and 
triangulate them with other sorts of data. In addition, the smaller number of detailed social 
and criminal cases is analysed in relation to the greater number of less detailed cases (243 
in total) that I collected through conversations as well as participant observation. The sum 
of cases have an element of quantification and comparison of: a) types of cases (theft, 
witchcraft, murder, adultery and so forth) occurring during certain periods of time in 
particular areas; b) types of authorities (traditional authorities, state police, community 
courts, formal courts); c) ways in which cases are transferred between different authorities; 
d) how and with what types of punishments cases are solved in the end and by whom; and 
e) how rural residents make use of the different authorities and why. By placing the totality 
of cases in a large schema following data collection, I have been able to trace different 
patterns of action and interaction. These insights were triangulated with interviews with the 
sixty rural residents about the meanings they attached to these patterns. In the final analysis, 
these insights, emerging from verbal representations and practice, are brought to bear on the 
wider questions of the constitution of different forms of authority and citizenship.   
It should be acknowledged here that fieldwork in Dombe and Matica, greatly 
benefited from the help of  two assistants, first Antonio Makumbe and later Dambinho Nóe, 
who were familiar with the areas and the local languages. They were extremely valuable 
partners in discussing the observations we made together and the conversations we had 
with different people.    
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Ethical considerations and positioning in the field 
Female resident of Dombe, September 2002: “This recognition of chiefs…well it means that the 
state has come here. It means that the chief has a flag. That has never happened before…and then 
you, mushungu [foreigners/whites] have come here to sleep at the homestead of the chief. No 
mushungu has ever done that before.” 
 
For ethnographers, positioning in the field is naturally an unavoidable aspect of doing 
fieldwork and one that must be taken consciously into consideration when analysing the 
information that one is given (Hammersley and Atkinson 1992: 80-1). Constant reflections 
on the roles that one is given and the strategies some informants use to fit one within their 
personal projects were necessary for grasping the information I was given and the way 
people acted around me. In my case, positioning in the field was shaped by my being a 
foreigner and to a lesser extent a female, as well as by the fact that few researchers had set 
foot in the chieftaincies, at least after the war, and never for long periods of time. To begin 
with, in 2002, this meant that state officials viewed me as representing an avenue to donor 
aid, and rural residents as either this or some representative of the government. The latter is 
not surprising, given that, during the first encounters in 2002, my colleague Lars Buur and I 
had to rely on local government officials to provide us with formal access to these areas and 
thus we would often arrive the first time together with government people. In party-political 
terms this was quite significant, as state officials are to a large extent perceived by rural 
residents and chiefs (most of whom were Renamo supporters) as synonymous with the 
Frelimo party. Over the course of time my association with the state, donors and Frelimo 
lessened, as I was seen and talking with Renamo delegates and time and time again 
explained that I was on neither side of the political divide and discussed the research I was 
carrying out.  
However, dilemmas associated with positioning never ceased to be an issue and had 
to be constantly balanced between being in the field, relying on people’s hospitality and 
state officials’ permissions, and the different projects that some of these individuals tried to 
draw me into. For example, I was drawn into and asked to help solve an internal leadership 
dispute between two sub-chiefs, chiefs asked me if I could get the government to pay them 
salaries, and I was asked on several occasions by police chiefs to provide information on 
criminal cases or by Frelimo to provide information about the activities of certain chiefs in 
campaigning for Renamo. Instead of providing this kind of information or promises to 
solve issues for the chiefs, which would necessarily compromise my other informants, I 
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tried to reciprocate as well as I could by entering discussions on common issues without 
compromising my other informants. I never paid any informants for interviews or 
hospitality, but always brought plenty of food and smaller contributions of clothing to the 
people with whom I stayed, as well as providing them with transportation when needed. 
This, of course, left me with the ever-present concern of unbalanced relationships, which I 
have found few ways to solve.  
Added to this, at times my fieldwork placed me in personally ethical dilemmas, 
which I had to keep to myself in order not to compromise my findings. This particularly 
related to the various moments when I observed and heard acts of physical and symbolic 
violence performed by state officials, in particular police officers, for example, public 
beatings of suspects, and random arrests and public humiliations of members of the 
Renamo party. The way in which I have dealt with these aspects of violence has been to 
include them in disseminating my research, though without pretending that this ipso facto 
will give way to changes.   
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